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Lev Bezymensky

HUMAN. BEHIND HITLER

MARTIN BORMANN JEGO'S DIARY

"VECHE" MOSCOW 2000

Bezymensky L.A. B 40 People behind Hitler's back. Martin Bormann and his diary. — M.: Veche, 1999. — 432 p., illustration. (16 p.)

(Military secrets of the twentieth century)

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The book, which opens a fascinating new series on the most intriguing mysteries of the military history of the 20th century, recreates the portrait of Martin Bormann, the man who always hid behind Hitler's back. Using many previously inaccessible archival materials, including Bormann's diary, the author of the book, well-known journalist and historian Lev Bezymensky, tells about the agony of the Third Reich, the secrets of the life and death of Nazi

leaders.

FROM THE AUTHOR

Chance wanted the author to be one of the first Soviet officers who happened to see the handwritten signature of a man surrounded during the war (and especially after it) with a veil of secrets and mysteries. His name is Martin Bormann, Reichsleiter of the National Socialist Party of Germany, head of the party office and personal secretary of Adolf Hitler.

But it happened under circumstances I remember—on the night of | May 1945, in the suburbs of Berlin, Strausberg. Here, in the last days of the Great Patriotic War, the command post and headquarters of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, were located. The headquarters, where the author was assistant to the head of the information department of the intelligence department, occupied several houses. A pancake was opened nearby, even for a communications center and for the command post itself. Although no one expected German air raids, dugouts were dug out in accordance with all the rules of military engineering. All the threads of command and control of the troops that fought fierce battles for the capture of Berlin converged here. The day of April 30 was coming to an end, which brought our troops to the city center and to the Reichstag, which was considered the main goal of the offensive. If the telegraph lines to Strausberg could be heated, they would certainly melt: so

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On the eve of May Day, they were waiting not only at the headquarters of the front, but throughout the country, and especially in the Kremlin, for reports about the fall of Berlin. From the Strausberg dugout, a direct line of the HF telephone led to the Kremlin, through which the Supreme Commander-in-Chief could safely be overheard talking to the commanders of the fronts. But, perhaps, that night there could not have been a more important conversation than the one that Stalin was looking forward to - a conversation with his deputy - Marshal Zhukov.

That night, our headquarters did not sleep, and the officers, without undressing, could only afford to take a short nap. I was raised by the cry of the attendant:

- Captain Bezymensky, quickly to the command post to the commander!

There was no need to hurry, I ran out of the house like an arrow to the headquarters dugout and went down the wooden steps. When I entered, I saw the entire Military Council of the front, headed by Marshal Zhukov, plus the heads of departments of the headquarters, including my chief, General Trusov. Having reported on my arrival, I did not remain without work for long: the marshal, holding out several thick sheets of paper, ordered me to translate.

Now these leaves are a document of the history of the twentieth century. They informed the "leader of the Soviet peoples" that Adolf Hitler had committed suicide. I will talk in detail about the content of this historical document a little later. There were two signatures on the last page: the first was by Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the second was strange and hard to read. But it was clear from the text that it was Martin Bormann's signature.

Then - at dawn on May 1, 1945 - I already knew (this was part of my official duties) that this man meant a lot in the Nazi hierarchy. After the war, when I had to change my profession as a military intelligence officer to a more relaxed occupation of journalism and military history, I had to seriously

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her to do "Bormann studies". It was a kind of science, because no other high-ranking Nazi was known so little as about Bormann. But, perhaps, so much was not written about anyone else in the post-war press!

How could I not be delighted when, somewhere in 1965, I found in my hands a small notebook in a black leather binding, on the first page of which there were lines written by its owner.

Name and address: M. Borman

Obersalzberg

Phone: Berchtesgaden 2443 or Berlin 117411

In case of accident, notify: Munich 7026 or Blankensee / Mecklenburg 66.

So, Martin Bormann's diary? A manual for unraveling the riddles that this man asked the world - one of the most influential in the "Third Reich", but less known to the outside world than other "leaders"? A man about whom, after his disappearance, the world press wrote from year to year as the head of the neo-Nazi worldwide underground...

But Bormann would not have been Bormann if he had so easily entrusted his secrets to paper. First, a diary is usually a personal document. That notebook, which was opened by the above entry, is least of all connected with the personality. This is a document of a person who lived not as a private person, but as a link in the executive mechanism of the whole regime. Pedants may object: a notebook with dates and designations of meetings and visits cannot yet claim the rank of a diary. But I don't want to argue about terms. One way or another, every day the owner of the notebook took it out of his pocket, made notes and kept it like the apple of his eye. And the fact that a significant number of entries are purely calendar in nature only emphasizes the specific character of both the diary and its owner.

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Secondly, revelations are expected from the diaries. From the very beginning I want to warn the reader: do not expect revelations from Bormann. Even if he were capable of them (which is doubtful), I don't think he would put them on paper. There are not so many diary entries left from the leaders of the Third Reich (except for the nightly rantings of Joseph Goebbels before then

still imperfect recording mechanisms). The famous diary of Hans Funk is a purely office chronicle. Diary of General Halder - his official records as chief of the main staff of the ground forces. So Bormann's notebook is an "official chronicle" of that period in the existence of the leaders of the Nazi empire, the onset of which they feared more than anything else: the period of collapse.

My book is not a detailed biography of Martin Bormann. Such biographies have already been written, and they contain a lot of information about the Nazi leader - reliable and unreliable. But in this case I am in a more favorable position than a number of my colleagues. In my possession was a document that really belongs to the hand of Bormann. Its authenticity is not subject to any doubt, and the reader will soon be able to verify this.

Is the reader fed up with documents? However, this question does not have the right to be put before a person who is serious about the historical period he is studying. It was once said that war is such a serious matter that it cannot be trusted to generals. The Nazi era - to paraphrase a famous saying - is such a serious period in the history of Europe that it cannot be trusted only by the dry analysis of archival specialists. Moreover, it is impossible to stop the painstaking work of studying Nazism and the war provoked by it. When another authentic document of this era appears before us, we must include it in that grandiose "Cher

book", which is being compiled day by day for the edification of posterity - in order to avoid a repetition of the terrible events of 1933-1945. Who wants the opposite? Is it just suicidal? But documents, even those belonging to suicides, are not published to instruct suicides. People who are alive and want to live on should and can draw lessons from the document for the present and the future.

Moreover, we must take advantage of the rare opportunity to trace the events of the collapse of the Nazi Reich on the basis of authentic records that Adolf Hitler's personal secretary, head of the party chancellery, Reichsleiter, one of the main war criminals Martin Bormann kept from January 1 to May 1 1945. Therefore, I built the book on an exact reproduction of the text of the diary, to which I attach a number of separate essays-research - they will help to understand the key moments of the period covered in Bormann's notes. In order not to overload the reader with biographical details about those persons who are mentioned in the diary, the data about them are placed in a special ("reference") apparatus in

the end of the book.

This is not the first time I have addressed this topic. In 1964 my book "In the Footsteps of Martin Bormann" was published. Since then, so much water has flowed under the bridge that many authors' positions have to be revised. Not because it has become fashionable. Huge new material has appeared from German - and, finally, Soviet! - archives. I tried to master it.

## INTRODUCTION

How Bormann's notes ended up on STALIN's desk

Before moving on to the document, it is necessary to deal with one more circumstance characterizing its birth, or rather, its "second life". The fact that Bormann kept any records was little known in wartime, since even his surviving colleagues did not rightly classify him among the adherents of this genre. But literally as soon as the war ended, they started talking about Bormann's diary.

I remember well that in the very headquarters of the 1st Belo

Russian front, in which I had the honor to serve, in the first post-war days of May 1945, they said that such a document not only exists, but fell into our hands. But then he was immediately sent to Moscow, and no one really saw him.

It is not easy to search for documents "at the scene of the crime." But it is even more difficult to find them after many years. And even my colleagues at the front headquarters could not immediately help me. One of them was my then boss, the late Colonel A.M. Smyslov recommended me to "rummage around" in all directions – namely, to interview people from the three Soviet armies who were then operating in the center of Berlin. In other words, it was necessary to undertake a historical reconstruction of those days in order to trace the possible route of Bormann on the night of May 2, 1945

of the year.

..By the moment when the last "remnants of the empire" remained in the Reich chancellery, the Soviet troops occupied the following lines: from the south to the imperial chancellery, where – and not at all in the Reichstag, for which so many lives were laid, Hitler was – the troops of the 8th Guards Army, Colonel General Chuikov, were moving. At dawn | May they reached the line Leipzigerstrasse - the southern outskirts of the Tiergarten. This meant that it was separated from the imperial office by several hundred meters. From the east came the 5th shock army of General Berzarin; she fought on Unter den Linden (in its eastern part). Its parts moved from the north, reaching the Spree River, northeast of the Weidendammerbrücke bridge. The 3rd shock army of Colonel-General Kuznetsov had already taken the Reichstag, which was located a kilometer northeast of the imperial chancellery.

On the night of May 2, units of the 8th Guards Army reported that large enemy groups - up to 200 people, up to 8 tanks - began to break through to the northwest, trying to reach Unter den Linden and further to the Spree. In turn, units of the 5th shock army,

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standing behind the Spree, discovered a large concentration of enemy troops at the Weidendammerbrücke bridge, where a stubborn battle ensued. Significant German groups broke through the front of the army (which was not continuous here) and began to move out in a northwestern direction. They actually moved along the rear of our troops and even penetrated the location of the headquarters of the 47th Army, which operated in the northwestern part of Berlin.

I tried to find the participants in this battle in order to clarify the circumstances of the breakthrough of the German group on the night of May 1-2. One of the officers of the headquarters of the 5th shock army, Colonel Anatoly Dmitrievich Sinyayev, immediately remembered this:

— Yes, it was practically the last battle at the army sector. Of course, the Germans used their knowledge of the terrain, all sorts of courtyards to break through the battle formations of our troops. The group of Germans was quite significant, they had tanks and

self-propelled guns...

Member of the Military Council of the front, Lieutenant General Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin told to me:

— On the night of May 2, we were informed that on the front of the 5th Shock Army a large enemy group, with about 12 tanks and self-propelled guns, attempted to break through; it consisted mainly of SS men. A significant part of it was scattered by the fire of our troops,

many were taken prisoner.

— Did it become known then that Martin Bormann was in the group?

Yes, it has become famous. This was shown during interrogation by many prisoners. In particular, I remember the testimony of the cook who followed the tank along with Bormann. The tank, he pointed out, had come under fire from our heavy batteries. The group was literally blown to pieces. The cook was badly injured. He never saw Bormann again.

- What was done?

"12

- Immediately sent scouts, carefully examined the battlefield. There were only a few corpses in civilian clothes. Bormann was not found. But soon they brought me his notebook.

— Have you seen her?

"Of course," said K.F. Telegin, - I saw Bormann's notebook. She was brought immediately after the end of the fighting by scouts. As far as I remember, she was found on the street while clearing the battle area...

But who found this book? Intelligence of the 3rd shock, 5th shock or 8th guards armies? Former member of the Military Council 3rd shock general A.I. Litvinov replied that no such document had been found at the sector of his army. Veterans of the 8th Guards also did not know anything about Bormann's diary, although under certain circumstances they could have been the ones into whose hands the document fell. After all, the army was fighting in the area of the imperial chancellery, and the battle formations of the teats were mixed up.

The 5th shock remained. HELL. Sinyaev immediately replied:

- Yes, it was the intelligence of the 5th shock army that found Bormann's diary. Apparently, it was at the breakout site of the German group on the night of May 2 ...

But then I heard from A.M. Smyslov:

- Why on the street? As far as I know, this notebook was found in the bunker of the Imperial Chancellery. Kind of notebook was absolutely normal, intact. And the last entry read: "Attempt to break through" ...

In a bunker? More accurate information was given to me by Lieutenant General Fyodor Efimovich Bokov, who during the battles for Berlin was a member of the Military Council of the 5th Shock Army. After the end of the fighting, the army commander, General Berzarin, led the Berlin garrison. On the recommendation of K.F. Telegin, I found the address of F.E. Bokov, wrote him a letter and received the following reply:

"In the first half of May 1945, the Military Council

"13/7

army (Berlin garrison) an officer from the headquarters of one of our divisions, which was fighting on the right wing of the army, came to Karlshorst and handed me a pocket diary notebook. The officer who handed over the diary reported that on May 2, after the battle, a wrecked German tank was found on the site of one of the regiments. Near the tank lay a dead man in a leather coat. When examining the corpse, no documents were found, and a notebook was found in the coat pocket. On the title page of the book were written the name, address and phone numbers of the owner of the book - Martin Bormann. Diary entries were made daily and covered the period from January 1 to May 1, 1945. At the end of the diary, blank sheets were filled with phone numbers, some addresses, and other notes. The nature of the entries in the diary made it possible to conclude that the found notebook belonged to Bormann. After reviewing and translating, I sent the diary and a quickly made translation with a brief report to the Military Council of the front. Under what circumstances a German tank was hit and who accompanied it, who was killed, from whom the book was confiscated, the representative of the division did not know and could not tell me.

Thus, the fact of finding the diary could be considered established. But it could not yet be considered as established where, with whom it was found. I shared the results of my search with a well-known Soviet specialist in unraveling the mysteries of the Second World War, the now deceased writer Sergei Sergeevich Smirnov. S.S. Smirnov listened to me and said:

- All this is very interesting! But do you know the story about Bormann's notebook found in the tank?

— In a tank?

- It's in the tank. Fedor Nikolaevich Shemyakin can tell you about this ...

Of course, I knew Shemyakin, a former instructor in the political department of the 1st Belorussian Front.  
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immediately sought him out, and he told me the following:

"On one of the first days after the end of hostilities in Berlin, an officer of one of the divisions arrived at the front's political department — its headquarters was in Spandau, on the western outskirts of the city. He brought us a trophy - a small notebook. The circumstances of her discovery, as far as I remember, were as follows. A group of German tanks made their way out of the city to the west. After the battle, a notebook was found. I read it myself. It was Martin Bormann's notebook, which I quickly became convinced of...

A completely new option! But was Bormann himself a participant in the battle on the western outskirts of Berlin? This, according to Shemyakin, could not be established then.

"However," Shemyakin remarked at parting, "I myself heard from the lips of one of the veterans a story about Bormann's notebook found in the imperial office. It is likely that there were several books... Perhaps my then boss, Colonel Melnikov, could tell you in more detail.

Colonel Melnikov? I knew him too, and after some time I found him—he was then living in Kyiv. I.P. Melnikov wrote to me:

"I saw Bormann's diary. As I recall, it was found in the building of the Imperial Chancellery. This happened shortly after Victory Day, somewhere in the first half of May 1945. After the translation, we sent Bormann's diary to Moscow."

Back in the Imperial Chancellery? But there is nothing more dangerous than eyewitness accounts. Only one piece of evidence has become quite reliable for me. Unexpectedly for me, it was delivered by my good friend, the well-known Russian translator Vladimir Ivanovich Stezhensky. He spent the war as a military translator and in April 1945 was assistant chief of staff of the 383rd rifle division (her place

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formations were called "miners", and at the end of the war the division was given the honorary name "Brandenburg"). Stezhensky said:

- In early May, I was sent to the commandant's office of Berlin, which was then being formed. The head was General Berzarin, who had a group of translators at his personal disposal. One of our tasks was to dismantle and identify the captured German documents. Carrying out this task, in a pile of documents brought to the commandant's office, I found a small notebook, on the first page of which was: "Martin Bormann."

- When. It was?

— I started work at Berzarin on May 16th. I found the book somewhere on the 18th or 19th. Of course, I immediately reported to Berzarin. He ordered that a translation\* be made and the document sent "upstairs," that is, to the headquarters of the front, which had already become the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet military administration. The headquarters was located in the suburbs of Berlin - Karlshorst.

- How did the book get into your commandant's office?

I didn't see the person who brought her. I only heard that some German brought the book, who found it in the pocket of the murdered man ...

This story was confirmed... by the German side. Journalists from the Stern magazine in 1965 tracked down the traces of the man who found the book. His name is Ernst Ott. A mechanic by profession, at the end of the war he lived in Berlin and in the May days of 1945 worked near the place where two corpses were found on May 8, which, unlike the others, did not have any wounds or damage. Judging by the then Berlin customs, someone was not averse to profiting from the good. A leather coat was removed from one of the corpses, and a leather notebook was taken out of his pocket. Ernst Ott decided to take it to the Soviet

\* This short translation also survives.

mendatur, hoping to get a Soviet "food package" for the "trophy". The calculation was correct: the package was given, but the little book ended up in the commandant's office. This option is quite plausible (more plausible than the one I heard from Telegin).

So, the notebook came from the Berlin commandant's office to the headquarters in Karlshorst (to Bokov). I drew attention to one of the signatures under the translation made by Bokov. She said Weinert. Colonel A. Sinyayev explained to me with pleasure that the daughter of the eminent German anti-fascist poet Erich Weinert, Marianna, worked as an interpreter at his headquarters. Where is she now? Probably in Berlin. A call to Berlin - and I had the following conversation with Marianne Weinert:

Did you have a diary in your hands?

- Certainly. It was a small book.

Was his affiliation clear?

- At one time, I remember, not everyone was sure that the diary belonged to Bormann. Lieutenant-General Bokov also doubted this. But still, the general opinion tended to be that Bormann himself made the notes.

- By the way, how to interpret the fact that in the records all the time Bormann is referred to in the third person and he is designated "MB"? In particular, in your translation, following the letters M.B. it says "Martin Bormann" in brackets. Is this your addition?

- The words in brackets, of course, belonged to me as a translator. Everywhere there were only the letters M.B. However, at that time it was quite common to write about oneself in the third person. I do not think this is an argument in favor of belonging to the diary to someone else.

— Did you do the translation alone?

Yes, I did it alone. Perhaps the translation was checked after me, but in any case, I had to do the main work myself. And as far as I remember, then it cost me a lot of effort ...

“17/7

After some time, Marianne Weinert confirmed her memories in a letter:

“It is absolutely true that a few days before the end of the war I was translating Bormann's diary from German into Russian. Then I worked at the headquarters of the 5th shock army, engaged in propaganda among the German troops and, first of all, acted as an interpreter. Advancing from the Küstrin region, our army advanced rapidly and was the first to reach the eastern outskirts of the then imperial capital in the Mahlsdorf-Friedrichsfelde region. Our unit was located in Friedrichsfeld. Further, Soviet troops advanced along the Frankfurter Allee and

in the center of Berlin, they ran into fierce resistance from the Nazi troops. The fighting required the application of all the forces of our army.

Early in the morning of one of these battle days, I was called to headquarters in Karlshorst. Lieutenant General Bokov received me personally. He declared that he was giving me an exceptionally important political assignment. At night, during the fighting, Soviet troops seized a significant number of fascist documents. He believes that among these documents is the diary of Reichsleiter Bormann, one of Hitler's closest associates. It is necessary to translate this diary immediately, because it may contain important data about the fate of Hitler and other important information. Stalin had already been informed about the discovery of the diary, and he ordered that an accurate translation be made immediately. Some army staff officers who spoke German had already begun to do this, but they could not do it, as the text was very difficult to read. The diary is written by hand, in some places it is difficult to make out, there are some strange signs that no one can understand.

Now it is very difficult for me to remember exactly when I translated this document. Immediately after finishing work on Bormann's diary, I was instructed to

translate from Russian into German the first orders of the Soviet military administration addressed to the population of Berlin.

M. Weinert.

The identity of the diary is undeniable. A graphological comparison, which I undertook with the help of documents obtained from the Frankfurt prosecutor's office, confirmed that the text was written by Bormann's hand. By the way, even before receiving the original, I conducted such a study. In the diary, under the number "April 14" is: "Our Krenzi was born." What kind of name is Christian, Credenz? Bormann did not have such children (among 10!) The riddle was helped by none other than one of Bormann's sons. To my question about who was called "Krönci" in the family, he wrote in writing that this was the nickname of the youngest son, who was considered the "crown prince" in the family. I looked in the directory: indeed he was born on April 14, 1930.

But the detective story of Bormann's book did not end there either. From the headquarters of Berzarin and Bokov, it ended up in Moscow (Bokov immediately reported the book to Stalin by telephone). Where? Judging by the military archives, it ended up in the affairs of the Main Political Directorate (this is how it formally had to be done, because Bokov was a member of the Military Council of the GSOV in Germany. If the text got to Telegin, a member of the Military Council of the group of Soviet troops in Germany, then he sent his documents along the political line). But here we have such a document from the archive of I.V. Stalin.

"Special folder TOP SECRET June 22, 45

No. 735/6 GOKO - to Comrade Stalin of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - Comrade Molotov of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks  
- Comrade Malenkov.

At the same time, I am sending you a copy of the diary of Martin BORMANN, head of Hitler's office and Hitler's assistant in the leadership of the National Socialist Party.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR (L. Beria)

Where did Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria come from here? The answer to this question can be given, knowing the originality of the then relations between the military and state security agencies. This competitive struggle (and especially the struggle for the right to report to Stalin) especially flared up at the moment the Soviet Army entered Germany. The subordinates of Lavrentiy Beria and his representative under Zhukov, General Ivan Serov, with passion ensured that everything related to the fate of the leaders of Nazism went only through them, through the organs of the NKVD. No wonder the investigation into the fate of Adolf Hitler was immediately withdrawn from the military — and



so decisively that even Zhukov himself was not informed about this issue. Even Zhukov himself!

So it happened with Bormann's diary. The ranks of the NKVD "intercepted" the diary from the military political workers, slightly corrected the translation, retyped it on their typewriter, and on June 22, 1945, reported to Stalin, Molotov and Malenkov. Of course, the addressees did not go into details and did not know that the NKVD had nothing to do with the find. But there was a new stamp from the Politburo archive: "Special folder, file 394, pages 32-48."

So the diary ended up on Stalin's desk.

#### OUTLINE FIRST:

Owner — Martin BORMAN

There is a document logic. Since there is a name on its first page, therefore, it is necessary to tell about the person who bore (or still bears) this name. In addition, we must take into account the following circumstance: probably among the readers will be many people who do not know anything about Bormann. Proceeding from this, I proceed to the presentation, which I would like to call so: "How do war criminals become?". The answer to such a question is important, because - in fact - who were those people about whom we have now become

"21

forget, but which twelve years determined the fate of Germany?

Once Bormann (this was in 1937) filled out a short questionnaire.

Surname, name Bormann Martin Part number 60508 Joining date February 1927 Rank, number in the SS Reichsleiter, Gruppenführer Current occupation Reichsleiter NSDAP Protestant, Catholic, believing believer

You can immediately think: Bormann, this is the embodiment of the Nazi spirit, and joined the Nazi party only in 1927! And where is the number in the SS? \* There are many questions - the more interesting it will be for us to find out some of the circumstances of his life. To do this, let's fast forward to the 1920s.

..Many historians of fascism are trying to find the geographical "birthplace" of the National Socialist movement. At the same time, most often their eyes are directed to Bavaria, to Munich, where the NSDAP was created. However, the "Bavarian theory" of the origin of German fascism far from covers both the geographical and social roots of Nazism. It would be a mistake not to look into other corners of Germany at that time, where in the most varied and sometimes ugly forms the sprouts of future domination were ripening.

\* The answer to this question can be found in another document - the so-called "SS rank list", where all SS numbers are given. It was customary for the leaders of the Nazi clique to brag about the "small" numbers - both party and SS, since these numbers corresponded to the date of entry. Bormann's SS number was 278267. For a Nazi boss, such a number was "indecent", so Himmler, by special order in December 1938, assigned Bormann the number 555.

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running mode. There are many reasons to go not only to Bavaria, but, say, to the Ruhr - to Düsseldorf, Essen, to the bureau of Messrs. Kirdorf and Thyssen. We will do this later. And now we would like to draw the reader's attention to one corner of Germany, which has always been considered the most abandoned and deaf.

There is hardly a historian who would talk about the decisive influence of the province of Mecklenburg on the fate of Germany in the 20s and 30s of our century. Mecklenburg was always written about last. This is explained not only by the poverty of the Mecklenburg landscape and the poverty of the Mecklenburg peasants, but also by the fact that the true owners of Mecklenburg always tried to remain in the shadows. Mecklenburg was one of the classic areas of Junker landownership. If anywhere in Germany there were still remnants of the military feudal regime, then in Mecklenburg they manifested themselves most vividly. The Junker rule in Mecklenburg got along perfectly with the bourgeois one. The replacement of the Kaiser by a republican government was perceived by the Mecklenburg landowners as a matter of course. However, they took all measures to ensure that the process that had begun did not overflow the given limits. Here they received enormous, truly invaluable help from the Kaiser's army.

Kaiser's army? After all, it ceased to exist together with the empire of Wilhelm II?

No, everything was more difficult.

Generals Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Groener and Seeckt ensured that the cadres of the Kaiser's army were retained, and this coincided with the wishes of the Mecklenburg big landowners. The notorious "volunteer corps" began to emerge — armed detachments created from officers and non-commissioned officers of the former Kaiser's army.

The names of those Landsknechts of German reaction who were behind the scenes

"23/4

masters of many regions of Germany in the 20s. Let's say that Erhardt and his brigade were no less famous in those days than Hitler was in the 30s. Gerhard Rossbach also enjoyed ominous fame, who created a "volunteer corps", which acted first in the suppression of Soviet power in Latvia, and then in the suppression of an uprising of Polish patriots in Silesia. Then this "corps" ceased its legal existence and went underground. In 1920 it became the armed "Rossbach organization".

Why did Rossbach go to Mecklenburg? Because the wealthy landowners needed watchdogs to maintain their dominance in the turbulent and turbulent days of the post-revolutionary period. The aged Otto Strasser (in the early stages of Nazism he was one of the leaders of the NSDAP, but broke with it) told me in Munich about the trip of a prominent figure in the NSDAP, who recruited supporters of the party among the Ruhr industrialists. He was received by a major Ruhr businessman and, after long ramblings, his interlocutor said directly:

— Tell me, will your SA protect me from the crowd of strikers?

And, having received an affirmative answer, he wrote out a large check. But we are not yet in the Ruhr, but in Mecklenburg, where the von Treyenfels landowner family, one of many in Mecklenburg, needed "protection".

We are not going to present the history of this family and describe its genealogical tree up to Henry the Bold or Charles the Bald. It is important for us to state that in those years in the life of the Treyenfels, as in a drop of water, many features of the bourgeois-landlord regime that dominated Germany were reflected. The Treyenfels were bosses in the Parchim area and owned many estates:

Wilhelm von Treyenfels - Lenshof - 510 hectares;

Hermann von Treyenfels – Herzberg – 810 hectares,

He is Muschwitz - 370 hectares;

Oskar von Treyenfels - Möllenbeck - 910 hectares;

He is Karlshof - 500 hectares;

He is Horst - 520 hectares.

So, in total, the von Treyenfels family owned 3,620 hectares in the Parchim area. In addition, they had possessions in the Wismar area. One can understand why the Treyenfels needed a mercenary guard. They had to keep their more than three thousand hectares in the midst of the waves of social revolution that threatened to overwhelm the then Germany. What if the unrequited and timid Mecklenburg peasants stop obeying them? What if the soldiers who were on the Eastern Front become infected with the Bolshevik infection? It is not surprising that when Rossbach appeared in Parchim with his bandits, Herr Hermann von Treyenfels cordially opened his arms to him.

Until recent years, one could see a long barn in Herzberg, where a place was set aside for the Rossbachers. The main group lived here. The commanders of two detachments, Georg Pfeifer and Rudolf Hess, also lived here. Only one member of the Rossbach group lived separately. It was the manager of the estate, Martin Bormann.

According to the rules of camouflage, the "Rossbach organization" in Mecklenburg adopted the intricate name of the "Union for Agricultural Vocational Training", and then became the "German People's Freedom Party" (oh, the unfortunate word "freedom!"). In essence, it was a branch of the Nazi party, for Rossbach himself had become a member of the National Socialist Party by that time.

"25/7

And in the summer of 1923 Parchim became the scene of a bloody crime. A group of Rossbachers killed the former teacher Walter Kadov. The murder was cruel, sadistic. At night, Kadov was taken out of Parchim. He was beaten to death with rubber clubs and sticks. Regarding Bormann and other organizers of the murder, the court decided: "In view of the gravity of the crime, all defendants accused of assistance should be severely punished."

True, the judges turned out to be merciful: the murderers from Parchim got off with short prison terms. Höss received ten years, but only served three years. Subsequently, Rudolf Hess (not to be confused with Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy) became one of the most terrible SS executioners. In 1943-1944 he commanded Auschwitz. Martin Bormann was sentenced to a year in prison, most of which was credited to him on remand. But on the other hand, in the eyes of his colleagues, Bormann became a patented killer and, therefore, an extremely useful.

The murder of Kadov was an important step in the future career of Martin Bormann. No wonder it was for this "feat" that he was subsequently awarded the so-called "Order of Blood" of the Nazi Party. Many years later, on December 31, 1938, Bormann sent a letter to the personnel department of the Reichsfuehrer SS, in which he reported: "Based on new instructions, the Fuhrer awarded me the Order of Blood on September 5, 1938, because I spent more than 12 months in prison."

How did Bormann find himself in the ranks of the killers?

The youthful years of Martin Bormann were not rich in events. His family had long lived in the province of Brandenburg, his father was a military musician, and then a postal official in Halberstadt. He died when Martin Bormann was still a child; after a while, the mother made a more profitable game: she married the director of the bank. Education stepson director,

born | June 1900, received a very meager one: three classes of a private school, several classes of a real gymnasium. In any case, he did not finish school. He served in the army from June 1918 to February 1919. Unlike corporal Hitler and sergeant-major Himmler, Bormann remained an ordinary gunner. From the army, he went to Parchim - into the arms of Treyenfels and Rossbach. Borman received the post of accountant, and then the manager. Here he spent almost six years. For the future secretary of Hitler, Herzberg turned out to be a good school. Cruelty towards subordinates and unbridled flattery before superiors - such were the classic mores of the landowner Mecklenburg, assimilated by Bormann.

The beginning of Bormann's political activity also belongs to the Mecklenburg period. In his questionnaires, he indicated that in 1920 he joined the ranks of the so-called "Union against the rise of Jewry." It was one of the many nationalist and chauvinist organizations that existed in those years in Germany. At the same time, Bormann contacted the "Rossbach organization", which brought him to the dock. Thus ended the initial stage of Bormann's career — the career of an ordinary killer, who, at best, could, like Höss, get the post of commandant of one of the "death camps". But Martin Bormann managed to go further; after his release from prison, he tied his fate with the NSDAP.

Why did the Nazi Party hold on to the German political arena in the early 1920s? It could share the sad fate of dozens of such small parties and groups that abounded in every German land, not to mention Munich, where in those years any party could be founded in any beer hall. It would, of course, be vulgar sociology to believe that Gustav Krupp or Hugo Stinnes Sr. personally visited any of the taverns in order to order themselves along with another mug of beer

ÿ372

new, moreover, a massive and influential party. All this was not so easy. But not so much difficult.

Let us continue the geographical search for the origins of Nazism. To do this, it is necessary to move from the fields of Mecklenburg to the sooty and smoky Ruhr region, not to the factories, but to the directorates of the Ruhr concerns. Until now, in the center of Düsseldorf there is a gloomy and solemn "Park Hotel". In its hall, Adolf Hitler gave a speech to the Ruhr industrialists. It was there that a pact was concluded between Ruhr firms and Nazi mercenaries, which determined the further development of political events in Germany. Hitler met with German industrialists before. Back in the 1920s, Stinnes, Thyssen and others came to him. He did not shun handouts from small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. But the further development went, the more aces of the German industrial and financial world turned out to be in the Nazi deck.

Speaking theoretically, the German industrialists could have opted not for Hitler. Not without reason there was a fierce squabble within the Nazi Party itself, and one leader shoved aside the other. But everything was decided not by internal squabbles between the Nazi leaders, but by calculation. Skilled in the affairs of true government, the bigwigs of industry could best determine which of the politicians of the time could be the most convenient tool in their hands.

Nazi politicians attracted attention in the "gentlemen's clubs" for their specific qualities. The fact that the Nazis openly and shamelessly engaged in an outrage against common sense seemed to them a lucky find. After all, firstly, from the very beginning of their activities, the leaders of the party made it clear to their "sponsors" that they would be ready to fulfill their will. More than once Hitler personally assured Stinnes, Borsig, Krupp and all the "captains" of the German bourgeoisie of this.

Secondly, unlike a number of other parties, the Nazi Party knew how to influence the masses. The Nazis addressed their propaganda not only to a narrow circle of their

adherents, but also to the many millions of petty bourgeois, who were then in cramped circumstances. Through the layman they also went to the worker, who lived even worse than the petty bourgeois.

...Martin Bormann served a year in prison without much incident. As soon as Bormann was released, he tied his fate with Hitler. Although Bormann's membership book lists the date of joining the Nazi Party as May 2, 1927, Bormann actually became a Nazi as early as 1925. It is known that on July 4, 1926, he took part in the work of the Weimar Congress of the NSDAP.

The little-known Martin Bormann began his ascent through the Nazi hierarchy. First, he became the head of the press department of the NSDAP leadership in Thuringia (1927-1928), and then moved to the main headquarters of the assault squads - in Munich. This happened at the end of 1928.

Bormann moved quickly. He became intimately acquainted with a young admirer of Nazi ideals named Gerda Buch. Bormann knew who Gerda was. Her father, retired Kaiser army major Walter Buch, was a close friend of Hitler. Subsequently, he became chairman of the Supreme Party Court of the NSDAP. Bormann's calculation was accurate: Hitler appeared at the wedding as Gerda's imprisoned father. Since then, Bormann has not parted with Hitler - until April 30, 1945.

When Hitler began to create his central headquarters in Munich - the Brown House - Bormann took his place in it. At first he served in the main headquarters of the assault detachments, and on August 25, 1930 he became the head of the so-called "NSDAP aid fund."

The official purpose of the "help fund" was to help the families of those stormtroopers and the Nazis,

who died or were injured during the political battles. Quantitatively, this was not much: for example, from 1928 to 1932, 303 deaths were registered, in total, the benefits fund issued 20,234 cases. However, the value of the box office went beyond "charity". The cash desk had much more opportunities, since collections to it were a very convenient way of "donations" for some firms that needed to mask their financial participation in the affairs of the NSDAP. As some sources testify, Bormann's cash desk became the "reserve bank" of the NSDAP for some difficult times for the party. And there were such times! For example, the so-called "Abegg notes" kept at the Institute of Modern History in Munich contain the following statement by Gregor Strasser, an associate of Hitler at an early stage in the development of Nazism, made in July 1933: Hitler would have achieved his goal long ago, "if the German steel industry had not cut its subsidies from time to time."

However, in Nuremberg - not the "city of party tags", but the city of the International Military Tribunal, Walter Funk, the Reich Minister of Economics, was asked such questions and received answers:

Question: What was your profession before 1938?

Answer: From the middle of 1931 I supervised the publication of the Bulletin on Questions of Economic Policy. It was intended mainly for leaders. There were many industrialists among the subscribers.

Question: How much?

Answer: I believe about 60. They paid very well.

Question: Did you receive contributions from industrialists to the Nazi Party?

Answer: I did not, but whenever Hitler communicated with them through me, a conference was arranged with the participation of Hess or someone else ...

Question: Have the industrialists donated any other funds and gifts to the Party?

Answer: They were always meant for Hitler and passed on through Hess.

Indeed, all the threads that went from industrial firms to Hitler and his party passed through the so-called headquarters of the Deputy Führer (Hess). Officially, the functions of the Hess headquarters included: leadership of the Nazi party, development of all-imperial and local legislation, preparation of Führer decrees, control over the appointment of senior officials. It was an important instance of the party, but it was also the instance of its financing. The chief of this staff was Martin Bormann. It was precisely this function of the Hessian headquarters that Funk had in mind when he said in Nuremberg that the Ruhr industrialists collected funds for Hitler personally and transmitted them through Rudolf Hess. More precisely - through Martin Bormann!

Not only this. On May 29, 1933, Gustav Krupp, President of the Reich Association of German Industry, sent a letter to Finance Minister Schacht informing him that representatives of all branches of industry were creating a special donation fund so that the transfer of money for the NSDAP was carried out "centrally". "In order to replace the various individual collections of individual organizations and departments of the NSDAP, a centralized collection is established from all sectors of the economy," read the founding document. This is how the Adolf Hitler Foundation for German Industry was born, and Martin Bormann was appointed its manager. Attached to this eloquent document was a personal message from Krupp to Schacht in which the uncrowned King of the Ruhr urged the uncrowned King of German finance to personally participate in this fund, which "should represent gratitude to the Führer of the nation." Some time later, on June 14, 1933, this agreement was formalized in accordance with all the rules. Krupp on behalf of

"317

Neither the German Association of German Industry and Karl Kettgen, on behalf of the Association of German Employers, drew up a circular on the establishment of the "Adolf Hitler Foundation for German Economics" (FAG). The funds collected by the FAG were initially used to finance the SA (attack aircraft). However, an agreement was soon concluded between the curator of the FAG and the economic headquarters under the Führer that the money would go to the imperial leadership of the party to "finance" party work. The lion's share went straight into the hands of the top leadership - nominally Hess, in fact - Bormann.

It can be assumed that Bormann was the unrestricted master of these funds. His immediate boss, Rudolf Hess, was busy with completely different problems. There was a certain division of labor in the brown top. Goebbels made speeches, Goering dealt with the SA and behind-the-scenes diplomacy, Hess supervised the party apparatus, and Bormann at first fell out with accounting and finance. In other words, during his tenure as chief of staff of Hess, Martin Bormann joined the real apparatus of control of Nazi Germany, which was hidden behind the magnificent facade of the Third Reich. "Public" figures acted in the foreground: dressed in magnificent uniforms of various ministries and departments, they held parades, receptions, made speeches and statements. And behind the scenes, the fate of Germany was decided.

The position of the Adolf Hitler Foundation (FAG) was exceptional in its way. The fact is that various Nazi authorities were not averse to collecting funds at their own discretion, turning this procedure into a kind of "fief requisitions". Martin Bormann brought order here by issuing the following directive on behalf of Hess:

"I hereby categorically forbid all members

"32/7

and authorities of the party, all its organizations to collect donations from those enterprises that can document their participation in the FAG. I gave

ordering all affected firms to report to me about those organizations that, despite the ban on collecting money from FAG members, continue to collect such funds."

Instructions for the practical application of this directive will be issued by my Chief of Staff.

Rudolf Hess. Munich 1 June 1936.

"My chief of staff" - that is, M. Bormann - issued the corresponding instruction on the same day, which made an exception only for the so-called "Winter Assistance Fund" (collection of warm clothes). Still, the rest of the collections had to give way to the FAG. The company that contributed money to the FAG received a special certificate and the so-called "red stamp" (in other years, the stamp was of a different color). Bormann made the basis for his activities in the FAG from the "aid fund", and on the basis of the FAG he carried out many financial transactions (for example, the deduction in favor of the FAG of fees from all postage stamps on which the Fuhrer was depicted).

From the FAG money went straight into the pockets - for example, the most influential secretary of state Lammers (600,000), the ministers Funk (about 550,000), Ribbentrop (500,000), Field Marshal Milch (500,000), Hitler's personal doctor Morell (250,000). From these funds, the houses in Braunau and Leonding were "outbidden" by Hitler himself, a fund was created for the future Fuhrer's "personal art gallery" in Linz.

Another operation, no less important in Hitler's eyes, was the construction of a complex of structures on the Obersalzberg - the Berghof house, a tea house on the Kehlstein (only the road to it cost up to 40 million marks), barracks for guards and houses for "brown"

2 Zach, No. 665 Bezymensky "33/7

bonz. The meaning of his visits to Obersalzberg was formulated by the Reichsleiter himself | July 1937: "Visit the construction site every day. Customize, customized"

I happened to stumble across traces of a large financial operation carried out by Martin Bormann during the war. Leafing through Bormann's notebook, I found several telephones there: his number in Berlin (11-74-11) and his number in Berchtesgaden (24-43) were listed. This was understandable, since Bormann was alternately in one of these two places. But it was not clear why the Berchtesgaden telephone was followed by a telephone in the town of Blankensee in Mecklenburg (number 66). Why Blankensee? After all, there was no Hitler's headquarters?

I had to start searching. The telephone number mentioned was not in Blankensee itself, a railway station near the town of Neu-Strelitz. This telephone belonged to the neighboring estate of Stolpe. What was in Stolpe? It turned out to be very simple. Arriving in Stolpe, I found the old-timers of this town, who willingly told me: it turns out that Martin Bormann often visited here. Adolf Hitler came here with Eva Braun. Lush festivities were held in the landowner's house, and an SS camp was built in the forest next to Stolpe, where furniture from the imperial office and dozens of sealed boxes were brought from Berlin at the end of the war.

Did Stolpe belong to Bormann himself? I found documentation concerning Stolpe in the local archive. It turns out that Bormann bought estates in the very years when he called on the German people to fight for the "ideals of Nazism." He bought several estates near Neu-Strelitz, including Stolpe and neighboring Mellenbeck. So, Mellenbeck Bormann bought on July 4, 1943 for 1.8 million marks. Gradually, all the estates in the area passed into the possession of Bormann: Rolenhagen, Flatow, Watzkendorf, Kantnitz.

Bormann's choice fell on Mecklenburg not by chance. They say that he decided to buy estates here, because Hitler liked these places and after the war he wanted to settle down here - of course, Bormann expected to have the Fuhrer as his guest. Bormann's house in Stolpe has not been preserved, and the SS forest camp, from where everything was removed in April, has not been preserved either.

1945 in Bavaria, in Berchtesgaden. By the way, the Reichsleiter was not alone in his choice. Here, on the Mecklenburg lakes, the possessions of many bosses of the Third Reich were located. About twenty kilometers from here was the personal sanatorium of Heinrich Himmler; Not far away was the estate of Obergruppenführer Oswald Pohl, the head of the economic department of the SS, who was in charge of the concentration camps. And ten kilometers away were the "objects" of Oswald Pohl: two "death camps" - Ravensbrück and Sachsenhausen.

Research into the activities of large German firms, including their role in Hitler's rise to power, does not mean that we should dutifully follow in the wake of the "monopolistic theory" of the origin of Nazism, created in the era of the Comintern. At that time it was customary to reduce everything to the initiative and plans of the largest German monopolies, and to declare fascism itself the unlimited "dictatorship" of these monopolies. Nobody discounts the industrialists, but they were not the only ones who determined the fantastic success of Adolf Hitler's party. This success was born in the specific conditions of the country, which suffered defeat and found itself in the most difficult economic conditions. This determined the mood of the masses, for it - and not just Krupp's money - brought success to the National Socialist Party and determined Hitler's support not only in the offices of the Ruhr monopolies, but also among those same factory workers who were considered protected by the orthodox communists. from Hitler with his "class instinct". And the post-war experience has shown that National Socialism, extremism and racism

2\* "35/7

can appear where there is no smell of Ruhr monopolies ...

But in the biography of Martin Bormann, the years spent in financial funds and "mutual aid funds" became years of acquiring valuable experience and knowledge. These years became the springboard for an incredible career - from a run-down manager of the Mecklenburg estate to the position of almost "second man" in the brown Reich.

Now, after getting acquainted with the "economic basis", we can move on to Bormann's personal characterization, in which almost all authors quite unanimously agree. Thus, most historians believe that the most important thing in Bormann's career was the ability to intrigue. This coincides with the opinion of the former owners of the Third Reich. In the summer of 1945 I had to find myself in Bad Mondorf (Luxembourg), where the main German war criminals were held before the court. They were to be interrogated by Soviet officers from Zhukov's headquarters. I was in this group. I remember how Reichsmarschall Goering, who had grown considerably thinner, sitting in front of the Soviet officers interrogating him, spewed blasphemy against his colleague and like-minded Martin Bormann. It was worth mentioning this name, as he literally boiled with indignation. In the protocol of his interrogation, I wrote down the following words:

"Never, even in the most influential years of my life, did I have such weight with Hitler as Bormann did in recent years. We called Bormann "a little secretary, a big schemer and a dirty pig".

Goering later said:

"Bormann was called the Fuhrer's Mephistopheles. As soon as Bormann, when discussing the military situation, put a note on the table discrediting this or that general, the general fell into disgrace"...

Approximately in the same spirit spoke about Bormann and others. In his memoirs, Hitler's chauffeur Kemp

ka on many pages describes the large and small intrigues of Bormann. Here are some examples:

"The most hated and dictatorial person in Adolf Hitler's inner circle was Reichspeter Martin Bormann. Outwardly, and when he needed it, he, with his feline mannerisms, seemed the epitome of excessive friendliness. However, in reality he



was extremely cruel. His ruthlessness was boundless... With the expansion of his power, Bormann became less and less shy in his relations with his subordinates. He began to feel more confident. For his subordinates, he became a boss from whom one could expect anything. He could treat a person very friendly and considerate and even give gifts, and a minute later ruthlessly humiliate this person, insult him and offend him. Often he diverged so much that one involuntarily created the impression that you were in front of a madman.

When the entire staff came under his control, he got the right to hire and fire whoever he wanted. Woe to the subordinate who fell out of favor with Martin Bormann! He pursued him with all his hatred, and this continued as long as he was within his power. In a completely different way, he treated people about whom he knew that the boss sympathized with them, and who did not stand in his, Martin Bormann's, way. His friendliness towards such people knew no bounds, and he was immensely kind, trying to win over the boss.

... In an effort to achieve influence over Hitler at all costs, Bormann stopped at nothing to remove people who did not obey him blindly. If he could not convict these people of any misdeeds, and they themselves voluntarily did not leave the place, despite his threats, then he staged a "case", in which his "friend" Heinrich Himmler willingly helped him. Between these two people there were

"37/7

very strange relationship. Outwardly, they seemed to be best friends. When they met, they showered each other with pleasantries. So, for example, when greeting, they did not confine themselves to a simple handshake, but defiantly shook both hands to each other. In fact, they hated each other and there was a constant struggle between them. Each envied the other because of his influence on Hitler, each tried to expand his own power ... "

In other words, Bormann internalized all the "categorical imperatives" of Nazi policy. His position became almost a monopoly. Almost all documents went to Hitler through Bormann. No one could get to report to Hitler without Bormann's permission. Bormann gradually accustomed Hitler to the fact that he was in his office during any reception and any conversation. Even if he was not called, he found a convenient excuse to appear in the office, and then not leave it. Practically Bormann was in charge of everything: from the guard of the Fuhrer to the preparation of the menu. Gradually he pushed aside Goering, then Goebbels and Rosenberg. In the future, Bormann managed to undermine even Himmler's position. Stubbornly and meticulously, Bormann pushed everyone away. It is no coincidence that in a few of his photographs, Bormann most often stands behind Hitler.

There were several stages in Bormann's "ascension" inside the "Brown House". The first was the famous flight of his direct superior Rudolf Hess to England on May 10, 1941. The disappearance of the "deputy Fuhrer" had no effect on the career of his chief of staff. Bormann remained at his post: more precisely, the headquarters of the "Deputy Fuhrer" was transformed into the "Party Chancellery".

Bormann went a long way in his desire to win the nearest place next to the dictator, thus providing us with interesting material for the analysis of the structural features of the Nazi regime. The totalitarian regime as such, being the

based on the decision to abandon parliamentary democracy in the name of overcoming the internal crisis and concentrating all forces for external aggression, was not "given" in a definite form from the very beginning. Even the most arch-conservative politicians understood that it was impossible to restore the order of the Wilhelmian monarchy in Germany in the 30s (although this idea wandered in some minds, especially among the military). The Nazi dictatorship itself went through a number of stages in its development, in each of which it was looking for both optimal forms and optimal camouflage.

Having dealt with parliamentarism, directing a blow against the Communist Party as its main enemy, and after it against the Social Democracy, Nazism first needed some kind of "mass character", which was what the assault squads did for it. When did they make their

case, they were expelled from the arena. Almost since 1934, the Nazi dictatorship began to create its own "pure forms" of state bodies of the "estate type". Therefore, it would be one-dimensional to consider the Third Reich as the "personal state" of Adolf Hitler. With all the personalization of the Reich, there were certain centers of power in it, and with them - independent types of activity - say, the SS, the Wehrmacht, the party, economic systems. Moreover, these centers of power waged a continuous and cunning struggle among themselves for influence, weight and their interests.

Studying the archives of the Reich, sometimes one wonders whether it was a total dictatorship or a "state of total intrigues". If you look at the history of relations in the brown top, then here you observe an unprecedented in its sharpness struggle for power and positions, for influence and access to the Fuhrer. This struggle gradually threw one or the other overboard, and those who destroyed one became the victim of the other.

In this "state of total intrigue", Bormann chose his own path: a path that was supposed to lead him to the maximum possible power under the conditions of a dictatorship, but without conflict with the dictator. For this, one did not have to be a person, one had to be an executive mechanism. All eyewitnesses unanimously testify that here Bormann succeeded a lot.

Dr. Werner Koeppen, after the war an insurance official in Munich, and once an assistant to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Territories of the East and his representative at headquarters, told me about it in the following terms:

"Bormann never looked for footlights, never wanted to be mentioned. But he was always there. He was not talkative, he did not look for connections, devoting all his time only to working for the Fuhrer. As soon as Hitler mentioned something at the beginning of dinner or asked about something that no one knew, Bormann already had an answer by the end of the dinner (he quickly wrote a note on a paper napkin and sent an adjutant for help). He developed a special skill in picking up the thoughts expressed by the Führer, who used the famous "dinner conversations" for a kind of "word defecation". As soon as Hitler gave up some idea, and in a few hours Bormann formalized it in the form of a directive or order. Of course, the choice of what exactly to issue in such a form belonged to Bormann himself. He knew everything that was going on in the Imperial Chancellery, and maneuvered between everyone...

A man of a completely different kind, one of the founders of the NSDAP and the head of its opposition wing, the Black Front, Otto Strasser, who knew Bormann at the beginning of his career, told me about the same thing:

- Bormann's strength was in his love for washing "dirty linen". If someone was guilty of something, then it gave Bormann sincere joy. "Now I have it in my hands!" he said. At

he had no ambition, he tried not to participate in public disputes and clashes, and in some ways was similar to Hitler, including the ability to lie.

"Once," Strasser recalled, "I was talking to Hitler about who was the greatest man in history. I named Richelieu, Hitler named Caesar Borgia.

Why did you choose him? I asked. "Because of his absolute ability to lie." Bormann was far from Borgia, but in terms of his intrigue, he clearly reached Borgia degrees...

Unlike Göring or Himmler, who had such powerful organizations as the SA and SS at their disposal, Bormann had a relatively small mechanism of power. At first it was the party office. Then - in 1943 - Bormann received another TITLE - "Personal Secretary", because, as the head of the Imperial Chancellery Lammers wrote in a directive dated May 8, 1943, Bormann "receives various tasks from the Fuhrer over a number of years, outside the circle

his duties as the head of the party office", and most importantly, "transmits the instructions and thoughts of the Fuhrer" to various authorities". In the annex to this directive, another one was sent out:

Fuhrer 12.1U.43

Reichsleiter M. Bormann, as my personal assistant, receives the designation "Secretary of the Fuhrer."

Subsequently, Bormann himself defined the range of tasks of the "secretary" as follows:

- 1) Execution of numerous personal affairs of the Fuhrer; 2) Participation in meetings held by the Fuhrer;
- 3) Report to the Führer of incoming papers falling under the competence of the Führer Secretary;
- 4) Transfer of decisions and statements of the Fuhrer to ministers, other higher institutions or authorities of the Reich;
- 5) Settlement of differences and the question of competence between ministers;
- 6) Handling questions related to assignments concerning the city of Linz;
- 7) Supervision of the Fuhrer's household;
- 8) Supervision of a group of stenographers of the rate.

Handing over this list to Kaltenbrunner, Bormann's personal assistant remarked that this was an incomplete list of the functions of the Fuhrer's secretary; in particular, the security of the Fuhrer and his retinue also belongs to them. The well-known function of Bormann was not mentioned - to decide who and when gets to report to Hitler. Even the ministers could not bypass this control authority (an exception was made for Himmler and Goering). This is how Bormann's personal practice was codified, not as a second dictator, but as an "a-keg evo" dictator, a man "behind his back."

We can now move on to Martin Bormann's 1945 diary itself.

FIRST SIX DAYS: January 1 - 6

Monday, January 1

Headquarters of the Fuhrer "Adlerhorst".

Fuhrer's dinner with Goering, Keitel, MB, Rundstedt, Scherf, Doenitz, Jodl, Ribbentrop, Burgdorf, Guderian, Speer.

Rudel receives diamonds for a gold knight's cross.

Tuesday, January 2

Ribbentrop at the Fuhrer, then at M.B.

Wednesday, January 3

13:00 meeting with M.B. with the participation of Goebbels, Naumann, Speer, Saur and Gantzenmüller on the issue of conscription in favor of the Wehrmacht from the military industry and railways, after lunch a meeting with

Fuhrer. Thursday, January 4

Speer and Saur with the Fuhrer, then Gantzen-Müller.

Friday, January 5

The Fuhrer summons the Reichsmarschall with a report on the situation in the air war. M.B. reports to the Fuhrer.

Saturday, January 6"

\* There are no entries.

## ESSAY TWO:

Beginning of the year 45th

Reading these notes, made by Bormann at the very beginning of 1945, one can get an idea of how familiar everything was then for the leading figures of the German state. The Fuhrer is functioning: he is acting as the supreme commander in chief and is in one of the field headquarters. Moreover, at the headquarters located near the western borders of Germany, where since the end of December 1944 the Wehrmacht was actively attacking, led by Field Marshal Rundstedt.

Even considering that this was the last major offensive of the Wehrmacht, it caused considerable trouble for Eisenhower and Montgomery. The defensive lines of the American Army Group Bradley and Field Marshal Montgomery's front had been breached, and Rundstedt was about to threaten to reach the coast. That was the subject of conversation at Hitler's New Year's dinner, which brought together all the highest ranks of the Reich: the Reichsmarschall - Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and the formal successor of the Fuhrer Hermann Goering, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command (OKW) Wilhelm Keitel, Bormann himself, the commander of the - sing armies "West" Gerd von Rundstedt, head of the historical department of the OKW, General Scherf, commander-in-chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, head of the operational headquarters of the OKW, General Jodl, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, head of the Fuhrer's military adjutant office and head of the cadre department - ditch OKW General Wilhelm Burgdorf, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Colonel General Heinz Guderian, Minister of Armaments Albert Speer. Traditionally, the presentation of awards - this time to the pilot Rudel. The topics of the meetings are also traditional: the strengthening of the Wehrmacht, the problems of transport, the air war.

What did they talk about at the festive table at Adlerhorst? Of course, about the military operation that at the end of 1944, on the idea of Hitler himself, was carried out by the German ground and air forces in the area of the Ardennes hills against the Anglo-American troops. Hitler pinned great hopes on it, as on the only offensive operation at that time, in which the Wehrmacht seemed to take the initiative into its own hands — not on all fronts, but only on the Western one. It was here that Hitler saw the weak link in the enemy coalition: at the junction of the American army group of General Omar Bradley and the British group of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, he decided to strike in order not only to disrupt their advance in Ger

mania, but also to go across the river Meuse to Antwerp, that is, to the sea, and then surround and destroy the enemy. On December 16, a carefully prepared and secret operation began with a powerful blow that took the Americans by surprise. In addition, it was snowing, allied aviation was inactive, and saboteurs specially dressed in American uniforms under the command of the famous Otto Skorzeny caused panic in the actions of Bradley's troops.

But Field Marshal Rundstedt, Generals Sepp Dietrich and Manteuffel had nothing to bring to Hitler's New Year's table. Already by December 25, their tank armies were stuck. The weather has improved. Hitler himself, coming out of his bunker, could watch two thousand American bombers go on combat missions. The Americans launched a counteroffensive, the German advance practically ceased far from reaching the Meuse. I had to be satisfied with small successes in the southern sector of the allied grouping (in Alsace), and they soon ran out.

But this did not prevent Hitler from pronouncing major toasts. He himself told about their background to Joseph Goebbels, who a couple of days later arrived from Berlin to Adlerhorst. Here Goebbels met with all the highest officials of the Reich, including Martin Bormann (Goebbels was able to reach full agreement with Bormann). In a private conversation on January 4, Hitler said (entry in Goebbels' diary):

"As for the military-political situation, it is, of course, so encouraging that there is nothing to say about it. The Führer believes that the crisis in the enemy camp will very soon reach a new climax. He believes that 1945 will be decisive and will certainly lead to the collapse of the hostile coalition. In what way and for what reason - it is still impossible to say.

And about the same:

"The Fuehrer expresses his conviction that the summer of 1945 will bring a great solution to this war."

About Roosevelt:

"Roosevelt, in the opinion of the Fuhrer, is striving to get out of the European war in good health."

About Churchill:

"In principle, he is against the Bolsheviks. If he gets an opportunity to get out of the game and put the British world empire back on its feet, then he will use this opportunity. We will not miss the opportunity to create it. This can be achieved both by military and political means."

About Stalin:

"In this bundle, Stalin is the "laughing third". He conducts a very cunning and skillful policy. But, according to the Fuhrer, Stalin will ever want too much and then our hour will strike.

Hitler's mood was definite: to wait until the Allies quarreled, and to hold on with all his might until that desired moment - say, until the summer of 1945.

It was the sixth year of the war in Europe, the fourth year of the war between Germany and the USSR. In fact, it should have ended long ago. After all, he wrote in his diary - not Bormann, but Goebbels on July 9, 1941:

"Early in the morning I fly to headquarters. After the military meeting, the Fuhrer comes. It looks better than one might expect and makes an impression that inspires a sense of optimism and confidence. He briefly describes to me the military situation, which he looks at very positively. According to his irrefutable and confirmed facts, two-thirds of the Bolshevik forces were destroyed or badly battered. Five-sixths of the Bolshevik air and tank forces can be considered destroyed...

Our losses are moderate. In tank units, they even reach 10%, including damaged tanks. For the advancing army, this is not particularly much, because the damaged part can be fixed. A huge rear system takes care of

that repairs be carried out on the largest possible scale. In addition, in the rear we have collected so many reserves that it is very easy for us to quickly replenish the loss. Human losses are also, fortunately, very small, being comparatively higher only among the officers ...

If Bolshevism is liquidated, it will suffice to leave 50 divisions in the East. With these forces, the country, insofar as it becomes occupied by us, will be completely pacified.

... True, the sudden action against the Soviet Union, not prepared propagandistically and psychologically, caused a certain shock in the German people for several hours and, perhaps, for a couple of days. But this should be attributed to the fact that we, as already emphasized, could not

prepare the people for this action. This was absolutely impossible to do if we wanted our offensive to take the Bolsheviks by surprise. During the following days we had to try to make up for all that we could not prepare. Now the German people in their broad strata see that a clash with Bolshevism was necessary, and the Fuehrer made the right decision at the right moment. The war in the East can be ended with a victory, and only then will we be able to throw the entire force of the German attack on the West or against England.

The Führer emphasizes once again that military experience shows how timely the offensive in the East was. This is what distinguishes the present conduct of the war by Germany now from the conduct of the last war. Until August 1, 1914, we sat and quietly waited until the enemy coalition gathered - and only then did we march. Now our military command sets itself the goal of fighting the enemy one by one and smashing the enemy piece by piece...

..We have enough reserves to withstand this gigantic struggle. from Bolshevism  
dol

nothing to stay. The Fuhrer intends to wipe out such cities as Moscow and Petersburg from the face of the earth. Yes, this is necessary! For if we want to divide Russia into separate component parts, then this huge state should not have a spiritual, political, or economic center.

... We do not attach any importance to the fact that the Bolsheviks will destroy the harvest. We do not need to harvest this crop and it is not taken into account in our calculations. If they really destroy the harvest on a large scale, then next winter in Russia there will break out such a famine that history has never known before. But this is not our concern. Everyone creates for himself such a paradise, which he desires. In the event of a favorable development of operations in the course of the next few days, we will advance as far as the Volga, and, in case of military necessity, as far as the Urals. The pacification of other Russian regions in the event of military resistance will be carried out by special expeditions. Of course, we will not tolerate any military or military-industrial center being formed anywhere in the part of Russia not occupied by us.

The Führer is extremely pleased that the disguise of the preparations for the Eastern Campaign was completely successful. He is of the opinion that in this way we will save from 200,000 to 250,000 people. The whole maneuver was carried out with incredible cunning...

Whether the Japanese will take part in hostilities in the further development of the conflict is not yet entirely clear. However, the Führer considers this to be absolutely certain. If at the present moment the Japanese are still a little slow, this must be attributed to the fact that they must first prepare their people for this clash.

What England will do in the event of a victorious end to the Eastern Campaign is still completely unclear. Churchill will try first of all to draw the United States into the war. Whether he succeeds is unknown. It's in

to a large extent depends on how and in what way we defeat the Soviet Union and how long it will take. The Führer is at the moment absolutely firm in his attitude towards England. It is not known whether he would now accept the general peace proposal coming from London. He foresees the downfall of England with the certainty of a somnambulist. England has no sound foundation. This world power is a pyramid standing on its top. Such a small metropolis cannot lead such a gigantic empire forever. If it is objected to us that we can never get colonies in the way we wage war, it does not matter. If we have at our disposal the vast expanses of the East, then we do not need any colonies for the time being. Europe, as an economic whole, will be dismembered and reorganized by us. In this way Europe can feed itself by forming

a single whole.

... The Führer, together with the relevant authorities of our armed forces, once again reviewed all our military forecasts. Regarding this, he holds an extremely sober and realistic opinion. The results show that the war in the East has basically been won by us. A whole series of battles will still have to be waged, but the Bolshevik armed forces will no longer recover from the blows received. It goes without saying that we will have to occupy vast areas, as already predicted, and therefore the campaign in the East cannot be compared with last year's campaign in the West.

..The good qualities of the German soldier and the quality factor of military equipment showed once again that they are on top. We are vastly superior to the enemy. The difficulty for us is only space. However, the repetition of the Napoleonic case is impossible, although - the irony of fate! - we came out against Bolshevism on the same night, in

which Napoleon crossed the Russian border, i.e. on the night of June 21-22. But we acted not only as marching infantry, but as motorized tanks. It will be incomparably easier for us to overcome the vast expanse of the East."

And even two years later, after the defeats at Moscow and Stalingrad (May 8, 1943), the same Dr. Goebbels wrote in the same diary and in that "Napoleonic spirit":

"The Führer expressed his unshakable confidence that the Reich would take over all of Europe. There are still many battles ahead of us, but they will certainly lead to magnificent successes. Then the path to world domination will be predetermined. Who owns Europe, he will seize the leadership of the world.

If everything went according to Hitler's blueprints, then | January 1945, Europe should have looked like this (if you move along the geographical map from East to West):

The Soviet Union - there is no such state. There are four imperial commissariats; the largest of them is "Moskva" or "Muscovy", headed by the Reichskommissar Siegfried Kasche. But Kashe himself is not in Moscow: the city of Moscow, as well as Leningrad, has been turned into a deserted stone sea of ruins. Kashe manages "Muscovy" from the Arkhangelskoye Palace, which once belonged to the most ancient Russian Yusupov family. The colossal possessions of Kashe stretch from Western Siberia to Smolensk, from Arkhangelsk to Mozdok; in the south they border on the Caucasian possessions of the Reich Commissar Arno Shikédants, who is much more comfortable in sunny Tbilisi. It is no less convenient for the Reichskommissar of Ukraine, Koch: he is in ancient Kyiv, and the whole of Ukraine is at his disposal.

Poland — this word is forgotten, as the "governor general" is already celebrating the sixth year of its existence.

formation.

Czechoslovakia - who remembers about it? Perhaps only Slovakia, by association with its name, being a member of the "pocket" "Balkan Federation".

Hungary, Romania - included in the "Great Europe" as members of the "Balkan Federation".

Yugoslavia - divided into separate regions, which are included in the "Federation".

Greece - as a state does not exist, is included in the "Southern Federation" under the protectorate of Italy.

Switzerland - occupied by the Wehrmacht and turned into "Gau Schweiz".

Francia - as such is no longer marked on the map. The SS model state of Burgundy included the northeastern French lands, the former Belgium and

Holland. The remnants of France are occupied territories administered from Vichy.

Spain and Portugal exist, but without Franco and Salazar. The first was replaced long ago by the pro-German general Muñoz Grandes, who facilitated the Isabella-Felix-Ilona operation, during which the Wehrmacht captured Gibraltar and advanced to Biscay.

England - long occupied; it is ruled by the king and at the same time the imperial governor Edward II; Sir Samuel Hoare became Prime Minister, a longtime supporter of the idea of collusion with Germany.

Norway, Denmark, Sweden - united in the "Northern Federation" under the imperial protectorate; Vidkun Quisling became head of the united Scandinavian Nazi Party.

11 million Jews have already been exterminated in Europe. The Great Millennium German Empire was created, the capital of which was renamed from Berlin to "Germany". Here the construction of a new imperial office and other grandiose buildings according to the plans of Albert Speer is underway. Supreme High Command

"52/7

the macht is occupied by plans for landings in the western hemisphere, since Asia and Africa are already divided between Germany, Italy and Japan ...

I do not insist on the accuracy of all the details, however, if we follow the German documents, this is what Europe might have looked like in 1945 if Operation Barbarossa had succeeded in 1941, followed by the operations already developed by the Wehrmacht General Staff: Tannenbaum "(capture of Switzerland), "Silberfuks" (Sweden), "Felix - Isabella - Ilona" (Gibraltar - Spain - Portugal), "Zeeleve" (England), "Directive 32" (Iran - Iraq - India) and many other. But the reality of January 1945 looked very different.

No, the front line no longer ran along the Stalingrad, Kursk and Ukrainian lands. In the autumn of 1944, Finland withdrew from the war. Already the Wehrmacht was forced to leave Belarus and Ukraine, retreat from the Baltic republics, leaving part of its troops blocked, pressed to the Baltic Sea. In the possession of the Germans, only East Prussia remained, turned into an eastern bastion of defense. And even then it was in anticipation of a new Soviet offensive. From East Prussia stretched a narrow strip still under German control—Northern Poland and Pomerania. Soviet troops were already standing in front of Warsaw itself and industrial Silesia. In the south, things were even worse for the Wehrmacht: Romania was lost as an ally, and Hitler made desperate efforts to save Hungary, which had to be occupied. Bulgaria dropped out as a potential ally. There was no question of any active offensive operations on the Eastern Front. They were limited only to a local operation against the Western allies in the Ardennes.

.. Minister of Arms Albert Speer, having received an invitation to a New Year's dinner at the Fuhrer's Adlerhorst field headquarters near Nauheim, hardly added

"53/7

rallied to the goal: every now and then he had to get out of the car to take cover from the Anglo-American bombing. As a result, he spent 22 hours to cover 300 kilometers. The New Year was celebrated with champagne, and the Fuhrer made optimistic toasts. But in a narrow circle, he allowed himself to be more frank. It was in the first days of 1945 that he confessed to his adjutant von Belov that he was ready to commit suicide.

"I know the war is lost," Hitler said. But he immediately added: "We will never capitulate. If we die, we will die, but we will take the whole world with us ...



Someone who, but Hitler knew what this war cost. In a special memorandum prepared for him by the OKW, the following data on losses were given, starting from September 1939 to January 1945:

Killed: ground forces - 1,662,561 (of which 1.1 million on the Eastern Front)

Total casualties (Army, Navy, Air Force) - 2 001 399

Wounded (all types of troops) - 4 429 875

Missing - 1 902 504

General losses of the armed forces - 8 333 978

The number of destroyed buildings in Germany from the bombings is 595,514.

But the war was not over yet! One can understand what Hitler's words meant that he wanted to take the whole world with him. With you - into oblivion. This intention was also clear to Martin Bormann, who on January 3, 1945, at a meeting (its participants are also listed in the notebook) actively supported the proposal to conscript all men who could still hold weapons in their hands into the army.

Joseph Goebbels was not at Hitler's New Year's dinner. But the lines from his diary for | | January 1945

characterize well the moods that prevailed in the "higher spheres" of the Reich:

"I think that the year 1945 will be very turbulent for us. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that we will succeed and we must manage to cope with its difficulties. Anyway, we got good training for this in 1944. After all, it is not for nothing that they say: what does not overturn you will only benefit you.

In 1944, the Reich, indeed, had not yet capsized. But it did not benefit either Hitler, or Goebbels, or Bormann in 1945. On the contrary, they only brought grief, death and destruction to the world (and to their people).

DAYS: January 7 - January 19

Sunday, January 7

In the evening, 22:00 - departure of M.B. by car to Munich.

Strong repeated raids on Munich.

Monday, January 8

\$ hours - arrival in Munich. Until lunchtime at the Fegeleins, then a trip by M.B. on mountain".

Tuesday, January 9

M.B. with mother and children on the Obersalz

berge. "55

Wednesday, January 10

Afternoon meeting with Klopfer, Friedrichs, Hummel.

Then with the imperial leader of the youth Axman.

Thursday, January 11

Inspection of all galleries. M.B. (conversation) with G. Shenk.

Friday, January 12

M.B. with Weingart, with Preuss, with Dr. von Hummel.

Dinner with the Weingarts, Josef, Freil. Silberhorn, Funk, fr. Lazecki, Mrs. Tresemer, fr. Bauridl, Dr. Stoll, Dr. von Hummel, Müllerbuch, Post, Schreck, Greider, Bredow, Buhler, Wolff, Schenk, Preuss, Meyer, Dr. Frank.

Saturday, January 13

- "Adlerhorst"

Afternoon M.B. with mother and children in the cellars of the Fischerbräu in Bad Reichenhall to see the champignon plantations of the gardener Vollmer.

In the evening M.B. with Party Genosse Treish. In the morning the Bolsheviks go over to a major offensive!

Sunday, January 14

Afternoon visit to Aunt Hyoshen.

Potthast - Gutshof - Theater Hall - Reindeer Feeding - Dürrek.

Monday, January 15

Due to a major offensive in the East, the Fuhrer's train leaves for Berlin at 16.30, arriving in Berlin at 16.1. at 8:00.

M.B. must wait on the Obersalzberg.

Tuesday, January 16 Wednesday, January 17

Thursday, January 18

(18.10) 19.10 departure by special car to Berlin,

daddy with mommy, E.B., Frau Fegelein and Bredov.

Friday, January 19

Arrival in Berlin 14.55. after dinner, mommy goes to Stolpe.

These days can be idyllic: daddy and mommy, the whole family visits a restaurant and mushroom plantations; January 12 M.B. gathers for dinner all his employees and retinues living on the Berghof. About the seriousness of the situation

"577

some records indirectly signal, for example, "visiting the mines" (apparently, they examined places for the faithful storage of documents and valuables). And suddenly: the Bolsheviks go on the offensive!

Thus, by the hand of Bormann himself, the word fatal and hated for him and for the Third Reich was inscribed: "Bolsheviks". This will be the subject of our next essay, in which we explore

Bormann's role in the most significant military operation of the Reich - in Operation Barbarossa, which was supposed to lead to the defeat of Soviet Russia.

### ESSAY THIRD:

Martin BORMANN and the Russian people

It is no coincidence that in 1939 Hitler said in a confidential conversation:

Everything I do is directed against Russia.

It really was. World historical science is unanimous in recognizing the defining position of the Barbarossa plan - a campaign against the Soviet Union - throughout the course of the Second World War. This code name - "Barbarossa" - was invented by Hitler himself. At first it was top secret. Now a lot is known about him.

What did Martin Bormann have to do with the Barbarossa plan? The most direct, and it is enshrined in the document that he drew up on July 16, 1941.

The document refers to a meeting where Hitler, Goering, Rosenberg, Keitel and others established the main features of the regime that was to emerge from the ruins of Moscow and Leningrad and ensure the victorious conclusion of the war. For "Barbarossa" was not only a military operation, but a political, economic and ideological operation. Here is the text of the document:

Bormann's secret memorandum

"The Fuhrer's Headquarters 16.7.1941. A secret document of national importance. Archive entry.

On the instructions of the Führer today at 15 o'clock he held a meeting with the participation of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reichs Minister Lammers, Field Marshal Keitel, Reichsmarschall (Göring. - Ed.) and myself. The meeting began at 3 pm and, including coffee breaks, lasted until 8 pm.

Opening the meeting, the Fuhrer announced that he wanted to make several fundamentally important statements. Now we need to take a number of actions. This is proved, among other things, by the shameless attack of one Vichy newspaper, which declared that the war against the Soviet Union is a war for all of Europe and, they say, must be waged for the benefit of all of Europe. Evidently, the Vichy newspaper wants to use such hints to ensure that not only the Germans, but all European states benefit from this war.

The most important thing is that we do not give out our goals to the whole world. This is not necessary at all. The main thing is that we ourselves know what we want. We are not

should obstruct their way with excessive chatter. Chatter is not needed. If we have enough strength, we can achieve everything; but what lies beyond our strength, we still cannot achieve we can.

In the face of the world community, we must motivate our steps, guided by tactical considerations. We must now act exactly as in Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium. At that time we did not say anything about our intentions, and we will act wisely if we continue to do so in the future.

So, we will again emphasize that we are forced to occupy territories, restore order and ensure security; in the interests of the local population, we are supposed to take care of peace, supplies, transport, etc. and so on. For this, our orders are introduced. No one should guess that these orders are final. All necessary measures - executions, evictions, etc. - We'll get through it no matter what.

We must not make enemies prematurely and unnecessarily. We must act as if we are carrying out a mandate. However, it should be clear to ourselves that we will never leave these areas.

It is about the following:

1. Do not interfere with the final settlement, gradually prepare it.
2. Emphasize that we bring freedom.

In particular:

Crimea should be cleared of all foreigners and populated by Germans. The former Austro-Hungarian Galicia is to be incorporated into the Reich. Our relations with Romania are good now, but who knows how they will develop in the future! Therefore, we must be ready for everything, including being ready for everything and on the issue of borders. Do not rely on the benevolence of others - this is the basis for our relations with Romania.

Basically, it's about sharing a huge pie conveniently so that we can:

First, master it

secondly, to manage it,

thirdly, to exploit it.

The Russians have now given the order to conduct a guerrilla war behind our front line. This guerrilla warfare has its advantages: it gives us the opportunity to exterminate all who come against us.

Basic principles:

We cannot allow the existence of any armed forces west of the Urals - even if to achieve this goal we would have to wage war for a hundred years. All successors of the Fuhrer must know that the safety of the Reich is ensured only when there is no foreign military force west of the Urals. The protection of this region against all possible threats is undertaken by Germany. An iron principle for all eternity: no one but a German should be allowed to bear arms!

This is especially important. At first glance, it seems easier to enlist any other peoples subject to us for military assistance. But this is a mistake! This will sooner or later turn against us! Only a German can bear arms - not a Slav, not a Czech, not a Cossack, not a Ukrainian!

We must not pursue a "swing policy" as in Alsace before 1918. It is typical for the British that they always uniformly pursue one goal and draw one line. In this respect we must definitely learn from the English. Therefore, we must not make our politics dependent on individuals. And in this sense, the behavior of the British in relation to the Indian princes gives us an example. Only soldiers can ensure the stability of the regime!

We must turn the conquered eastern regions into a Garden of Eden for ourselves. They are vital to us. The colonies play completely secondary

new role.

If we start separating some regions already now, then we must act as defenders of the rights and interests of the population. Accordingly, it is necessary to find formulations for this. We are now talking not about the new imperial territory, but about the tasks put forward by the war.

In particular:

In the Baltic States, the territory up to the Dvina should be taken under control (in agreement with Keitel).

Reichsleiter Rosenberg emphasizes that, in his opinion, different treatment of the population is necessary in each commissariat. In Ukraine, we should have made promises in the field of culture. We should have awakened the historical self-awareness of Ukrainians, we should have opened a university in Kyiv and the like.

The Reichsmarschall disagrees. He, on the contrary, considers it necessary first of all to take care of ensuring our food supply, everything else will have to be thought of much later. A side question: is there a cultural layer among Ukrainians at all, or is it only among emigrants who are outside the borders of present-day Russia?

Rosenberg continues: he proposes to support in Ukraine the well-known aspirations for independence.

The Reichsmarschall asks the Führer to tell him what territorial promises he has made to other states.

The Führer replies that Antonescu wants Odessa and Bessarabia, as well as the strip running from Odessa to the west and northwest.

To the reproaches of the Reichsmarschall and Rosenberg, the Führer objects that the new frontier that Antonescu is asking for is not much different from the old one. The Fuehrer then emphasizes that the Hungarians, Turks and Slovaks are not promised anything definite.

Then the Fuhrer raises the question of whether the former Austro-Hungarian part of Galicia is worth including

to go to the general government. In response to objections, the Fuhrer decides that this region (Lemberg) \* will not be included in the General Government, but will only be subordinated concurrently to Reich Minister Frank.

The Reichsmarshal declares that he considers it necessary to include in East Prussia some areas of the Baltic (for example, the Bialystok forests).

The Fuhrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic should become part of the empire.

In the same way, Crimea should become part of the empire with adjacent regions (the region north of Crimea). These surrounding areas should be as large as possible.

Rosenberg expresses his doubts about the Ukrainians living there.

(In passing: it has been repeatedly noted that Rosenberg pays too much attention to the Ukrainians. He also wants to significantly enlarge the old Ukraine.)

The Führer further emphasizes that the Volga colony\*\* should also become part of the empire, just like the Baku region. It should become a German concession (military colony).

The Finns want to get East Karelia. However, due to the large production of nickel, the Kola Peninsula should go to Germany.

The accession of Finland as a union state must be prepared with all caution. The Finns lay claim to the Leningrad region. The Fuhrer wants to raze Leningrad to the ground in order to then give it to the Finns.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then raised the question of ensuring the security of administration.

The Führer addresses the Reichsmarschall and the Field Marshal, saying that he always insisted that the police regiments receive tanks. For application

\* Lviv. \*\* Republic of Volga Germans.

the police in the new eastern regions need this extremely, because with an appropriate number of tanks, the police could do a lot. However, stresses the Führer, ensuring security is, of course, very insufficient. However, the Reichsmarschall would build his training airfields in new areas, and if needed in the event of an uprising, Ju-52s would be able to drop bombs. The gigantic space, of course, should be pacified as soon as possible. This can best be achieved by shooting anyone who even casts a sidelong glance.

Field Marshal Keitel emphasizes that the local population must be made responsible for their own affairs, since, naturally, it is impossible to put guards at every post, at every station. Local residents must know that anyone who shows inaction will be shot and that they will be held accountable for any misconduct.

In response to a question from Reichsleiter Rosenberg, the Führer replied that it was necessary to revive newspapers, for example, for Ukraine, in order to be able to influence the local population.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg asks for an appropriate service building. He asks that the building of the Soviet trade mission on Lützenburger Strasse be handed over to him. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, is of the opinion that this building is extraterritorial. The Führer replies that this is nonsense. Reichsminister Dr. Lammers is instructed to inform the Foreign Office that the house is to be handed over immediately to Rosenberg without further negotiations.

These are the most important fragments of the recording of the meeting at Hitler's headquarters on July 16, 1941. Bormann took notes not for history, but for himself and his office. He cared very little about style. Bormann cared even less about bringing

3 Dec. No. 665 Bezymensky 465,

nice make-up for the participants of the meeting. The rulers of the Third Reich appear before us in all their disgusting plausibility. They do not lie ("we must know what we want"), they do not pretend to be peacekeepers, they do not lisp with their satellites ("who knows what relations will become in the future"). All sentiment is discarded! That is why we can consider Martin Bormann's entry as a kind of manual for studying a historical phenomenon called: plans directed against the Soviet Union.

As is well known, plans for the seizure of the Soviet Union were developed by the Nazi elite for a long time and many-sidedly. The General Staff was occupied mainly by the military side, Hermann Goering was entrusted with the preparation of the economic exploitation of the eastern territories, Alfred Rosenberg dealt with the problems of the future occupation administration, Heinrich Himmler prepared the extermination apparatus. What did Bormann do? His function was no less important. He oversaw that the general concept of the enslavement of the Soviet peoples and their subsequent extermination was put into practice.

Rosenberg's former adjutant, Dr. Werner Koeppen, who lived after the war in Munich; he recalled once in a conversation with me that Hitler very often returned to the problems of "Ostpolitik" during his remarks at the dinner table, which served as the basis for Bormann's corresponding directives. Koeppen, in turn, reported them to Rosenberg. For example:

10.9. 1941

"Regarding the capture of Shlisselburg, the Führer spoke about the fate of St. Petersburg. An example must be set here, and the city will completely disappear from the face of the earth.

19.9.41

"The Slavs are like a family of rabbits that will never cross family boundaries unless forced to do so by the ruling class. Universal de

organization for them is a natural and desirable state. All the knowledge given to them remains at best half-knowledge, which makes them dissatisfied and anarchic. Therefore, the foundation of a university in Kyiv should not be allowed. In addition, there is hardly anything left of Kyiv. The Fuhrer's tendency to destroy large Russian cities as a precondition for the stability of our rule in Russia finds support from the Reichskommissar (Koch. - LB). He wants to destroy Ukrainian industry as much as possible in order to return the proletariat to the countryside. Saxon industry will receive extraordinary opportunities for the sale of finished goods and consumer goods on the Russian market. If, in addition, a state monopoly is introduced on such essential goods as alcohol and tobacco, then the population in the occupied territories will be entirely in our hands. Koch emphasized that we must be tough and cruel from the very beginning and not repeat the mistake of 1917/18, when we were either pliable or strict. By the way, General Eichhorn was killed not by the Bolsheviks, but by Ukrainian nationalists. The Führer called the model for our administration in the East the British rule in India. For the German nation, the closest popular community and education must be ensured; in relation to others, absolute domination must be exercised.

24.9.41

"The Fuhrer spoke of the Russian national character and remarked that the Ukrainians are just as lazy, disorganized and nihilistic-Asiatic, like the Great Russians... The border between Europe and Asia does not pass in the Urals, but where the settlements end tribes of the Germanic persuasion and Slavdom begins. Our task is to move this border as far as possible to the east, and if necessary, beyond the Urals. Such is the age-old law of power, according to which history itself has granted Germany the right to subjugate low-value nationalities,

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to rule over them and by force to induce them to useful labor.

9.10:41

"The city (Moscow) will be surrounded and wiped off the face of the earth."

...And so on. How did Bormann act in this context? This can be seen in one example: on July 22, 1942, a year after the start of the war in the East, Bormann, being at the Fuhrer's field headquarters in Vinnitsa, decided to drive through the Ukrainian villages. Accompanied by Hitler's personal physician, Professor Brandt, Bormann made this journey and in the evening outlined to Hitler some of the thoughts that he had. The first thing that struck the Reichsleiter was the children (which, however, was quite natural). But everything natural took on an unnatural character in Bormann's eyes. Bormann noticed that there were very few men and very many children in the villages. Second, he saw few children with glasses, and they all had good teeth. Hitler listened very carefully and made a few remarks.

A transcript of this conversation has been preserved. Bormann talked for a long time about the need to prevent the growth of the Slavic population. He exclaimed:

"We are only interested in the fact that these Russians, or, as they are called, Ukrainians, do not multiply so quickly. After all, one fine day we will populate with Germans all the lands that belonged to the Russians ...

Hitler agreed with the reasoning of his closest assistant. He stated that the population of the occupied territories must remain both without health care and without education. Here is an excerpt from the transcript:

"The non-German population should not receive education. If we make this mistake, we ourselves will sow the seeds of future resistance to our domination. Of course, it is necessary to leave the schools for which they will have to pay. But you have to learn

no more than understanding traffic signs. By geography, let them roughly know that the capital of the empire is called Berlin, and everyone should visit it once in a lifetime..."

Then everything happened according to Bormann's favorite method, turning death into paragraphs and paragraphs into death. He sat down at the desk. Soon a directive was prepared for Rosenberg. It contained the following principles for the treatment of the population of the Soviet Union:

"1. If women and girls in the occupied eastern territories are having abortions, we should only welcome this. German lawyers should not object to this. According to the Führer, an intensive trade in contraceptives should be allowed in the occupied eastern regions, since we are not interested in the growth of non-German

population...

Under no circumstances should the German health authorities operate in the occupied eastern territories. There can be no question of vaccinating the non-German population and other preventive medical measures.

The non-German population should not receive any education other than the lowest. If we make this mistake, we ourselves will give birth to future resistance. In the opinion of the Fuehrer, it is quite enough if persons of non-German nationality, including the so-called Ukrainians, learn to read and write.

In the non-German population, we must in no case and by no means educate the "feeling of masters." The opposite is required.

Instead of the current alphabet, henceforth, the normal alphabet must be introduced in schools"\*.

In addition to these six points, Bormann informed Rosenberg: Germans should not live in Ukrainian cities,

\* I.e. Latin.

they should build special settlements. Ukrainian and Russian cities are not subject to improvement. German settlements must be different from Russian ones in every way — right down to the outward appearance. kind...

One might wonder: if only one Bormann trip had such consequences, then how many plans were discussed between Hitler and Bormann during their hours of numerous face-to-face conversations!

Bormann's list of occupation policy documents is very long and "diverse" in its own way. For example, among them: a letter to Rosenberg dated April 19, 1941 on the confiscation of art objects in Russia; a letter dated 28 November 1941 about the insufficiently harsh treatment of Soviet prisoners of war; Protocol of November 17, 1942 on the regime in the occupied territories; a circular of 29 November 1943 on the necessity of ill-treatment of prisoners of war; letter dated January 11, 1944 on the export of goods from the occupied territories; Decree of 13 September 1944 on the use of prisoners of war for forced labor.

Like a man possessed, Bormann repeated Hitler's barbaric ideas and, like a man possessed, demanded their implementation. On August 19, 1942, Bormann wrote in one of his memorandums:

"Slavs should work for us. When we don't need them, let them die. Vaccinations and non-German health care are a luxury for them. Slavic fertility is highly undesirable. Education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count to 100.



allow only such a scale of education that will make decent assistants out of them. We will leave religion as a distraction. We will give food so that they do not die. We are gentlemen, we are in the first place!

Bormann was true to himself: he strove to foresee everything down to the smallest detail. It was he who developed in 1942 a plan for the removal of 400 from Ukraine to Germany -

500 thousand women within three months. But the pedantic Reichsleiter wanted them to be humiliated even after death. Here are the lines from his directive of November 5, 1941, regarding the burial of Russians:

"Coffins should not be provided for the transportation and burial of corpses. The corpses should be completely covered with strong paper (oiled, tarred or, if possible, asphalt paper) or some other suitable material. Transportation and burial should be carried out discreetly. If several corpses are to be buried, they should be buried side by side and not on top of each other in accordance with local customs regarding the depth of the graves. In cases where burial takes place in cemeteries, a remote location should be chosen. Ceremonies or decoration of graves should not be allowed."

Bormann was far from alone; in his hands were not only paragraphs and directives. To implement the ideas of the memorandum of July 16, he found suitable people. One of them was named Erich Koch. They were linked by a long-standing friendship over the territorial acts of the 1920s. When Koch was appointed Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, Bormann ensured that Koch was subordinate not only to Rosenberg, but also to him.

Bormann's role in the creation and implementation of colonial plans in the East is undeniable, and my interlocutor, Dr. Koeppen, even allowed himself (by his own admission, exaggerated) formulation: none other than Bormann is guilty of that Germany had lost the war in the East. With his exaggeration, my interlocutor wanted to emphasize one thought that I repeatedly heard from the lips of a number of leaders of the Reich (especially former employees of the Rosenberg ministry): everything would have gone differently if Hitler had listened not to Bormann and Koch, but to Rosenberg.

But were there really two antagonists?

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nistic concepts of politics in the eastern territories? How far apart were Rosenberg and Bohr. man?

There is no doubt that there was a continuous, exhausting internecine and interdepartmental struggle going on in the top of the Reich. The archives testify to it, and sometimes one has to be amazed at how much energy the same Bormann or the same Rosenberg invested in defending their departmental and personal positions. But this is, so to speak, the form of existence of the Reich. What about the content?

The most important difference that they want to see between the concepts of Rosenberg and Hitler (Bormann) boils down to the fact that the former allegedly wanted to create separate state entities on the territory of the USSR, while Hitler refused this; Further, Rosenberg wanted to involve the population in this process, while Hitler and Bormann categorically opposed him. Once they even reminded Rosenberg of his concept. (That was in 1943.) To these reminders and reproaches, Rosenberg replied:

— The peoples of the East have lost the right to their own political formation, because since the beginning of the war they have not met us halfway with their revolutionary actions...

Here he is, a supporter of "statehood" Rosenberg! For him, "the right to form one's own political formation" was not a goal, but a method, and when the method proved unsuitable, he was without

regrets discarded.

Indeed, in his first sketches of the occupation policy, Rosenberg spoke about the possibility of creating some kind of state formations on the territory of the USSR. But what? Thus, on April 20, 1941, he directly spoke of Russia as "an object of German world politics." He considered his goal "the weakening of Russia" through the "complete elimination of the state apparatus." "The remnants of the Russian state" were to be "pushed far from the German borders." Here

his

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words: "It is not our duty to feed the Russian people. This is a cruel necessity that is beyond the limits of the senses.

How are these formulas inferior to Bormann's formulas? Nothing. Yes, in fact, Hitler himself spoke of the creation of "republics without the Stalinist spirit." The same "states" that Rosenberg talked about at the beginning of the war were more likely administrative complexes (Great Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Crimea, the Baltic states, the Caucasus, Turkestan). When the war began, it was clear even to the most blind of the occupying generals that there could be no question of any involvement of the Soviet population in the implementation of Hitler's goals. Let us recall Bormann's minutes of the meeting of July 16, 1941, which formed the basis of the official policy of the Rosenberg Ministry (after all, it was founded the day after the meeting): it deals with the Reichskommissariats and nothing else...

Of course, there could be discrepancies in the "subtleties". If we take Ukraine, for example, then Rosenberg, based on his old connections with the Ukrainian nationalist emigration (and on its illusions), believed that he would be able to create a more significant layer of collaborators in Ukraine. He was echoed by the leaders of the Abwehr, who had their own "Ukrainian hetmans" in reserve. As is known, the latter even tried to establish the power of a certain "Ukrainian government" during the capture of Lvov by the Germans in 1941, but this experiment was immediately canceled - by the way, not without the participation of the bodies of the Rosenberg ministry.

Such a touch is curious: in 1944, when the invaders had already been expelled from Ukraine, the "unemployed" ministry of Rosenberg began to draw up plans in case the Wehrmacht returned to Kiev and Donbass again. For example, the former General Commissar of Kyiv, Magunia, recommended the "policy of an iron fist in a velvet glove." And the manager

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Labs, a department of the Imperial Commissariat of Ukraine, came out with a broadcast program of the "Europeanization of Ukraine" (!). In his opinion, Germany "on the basis of its superior demographic, military and economic strength represents the only leading force in Europe", and every nation should receive in this new Europe a position corresponding to its "maturity, good will and guiding". However, the author immediately limited this generous proposal: "There are peoples who are incapable of being under a certain leadership. It is necessary to rule over them"... He assigned a similar place to Ukraine, which was supposed to be "so heavily occupied by the police and troops in order to put an end to the partisan movement forever." Ukraine itself should become "a single political and economic region, i.e. not be divided into rear areas of individual army groups or into different Reichskommissariats. According to Labs, some self-government bodies should be created with "some independence". As you can see, the officials of the "Eastern Ministry" have learned little!

All constructions aimed at constructing an imaginary "pro-Ukrainian policy" of Rosenberg should be regarded in the light of a number of facts that relate to the final goals of the German occupation authorities in the East. After all, what matters in the end is not the means (an iron fist, a velvet glove, a university in Kyiv, the gallows in Uman), but the end. The aim was

the destruction of the Slavs as such and the settlement of the liberated living space. What was the attitude of the Rosenberg Ministry towards this plan?

These questions were in charge of Dr. Erhard Wetzel, a man brought up by no means Bormann. One of the leaders of the "Eastern Ministry" in a conversation with me called Wetzel "fantasy". It seemed to me that

magnification, and when I got acquainted with some of the documents, I saw that Mr. Wetzel was a man of very real deeds.

Back in November 1939, as the head of the main consulting department of the Racial Political Department of the NSDAP, together with Dr. G. Hecht, he drew up a memorandum under the heading: points of view". There is a section on the settlement of these lands, in which we read the following: the German population should receive a "natural and dominant position" - especially in the cities, while in the countryside zones of military settlements should be created. "The courtyards of these zones must ... give their owners a political and economic feeling of German domination." The land should not belong to the Poles, even to the assimilated ones, but in principle the Polish population should be "taken out". Wetzel and Hecht estimated that about 150,000 people were to be resettled.

Dr. Wetzel then expressed his views on the policy of settlements theoretically - Poland had just been captured. But later he had the opportunity to practice. Thus, he took part in meetings with the executioner of the Jews, Eichmann. On October 25, 1941, he wrote to the Reichskommissar "Ostland" Heinrich Lohse about the proposal to create a gas chamber with the help of exhaust gases (the idea of an employee of the office of Bormann Brak). As is clear from a document signed by Rosenberg himself, Wetzel worked closely with both Braque and Eichmann. Therefore, it is not surprising that he had to participate in a number of meetings on the problem of the resettlement of Germans in the "liberated" eastern territories, which later became the object of the ominously famous "General Plan Ost", the development of which was concentrated in the hands of the SS, in particular, the General Directorate of Reich Security and the Office for the Preservation of the German Race. One of these meetings

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took place on February 4, 1942 and dealt with a particular issue — the problems of settlement and Germanization in the Baltic states.

This document is interesting for a number of reasons. First, we meet some of our acquaintances in it. For example, the same Labs or Dr. Peter Kleist, who after the war posed as a "friend of the Soviet peoples", and on February 4, 1942, quite calmly discussed plans in which the Soviet people were to play a role - in the best! - guinea pigs. Further, the protocol gives us a direct comparison of points of view: the representative of the SS Schubert frankly stated that "all racially undesirable people should be evacuated to the East" Rosenberg's ministries (Kleist, Wetzel, and others) believed that it was necessary to exile, but "voluntarily." (So it is written: "undesirable elements should be sent to the Russian regions, if possible, voluntarily.")

This is what the practice looked like, and for all the difference in method, it was aimed at one goal: the enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union and their mass extermination. Such was the purpose of the "general plan" Ost ", briefly mentioned in Wetzel's note of February 4, 1942. By the way, it was from this note that the German scientist Dr. Heiber managed to find a trace of this most important element of Nazi planning. As he told me, while cataloging the documents of the Nuremberg trials, which at one time had not been studied deeply enough, he came across document MO-2585 with a mention of the "master plan", and then others.

This plan was discussed during one of the Nuremberg trials (the Greifelt case). As Greifelt's deputy Rudolf Krantz said, "The purpose of this plan was to settle the Germans

large areas in the East. The prerequisite for this was the redeployment

migration of the local population to other areas" (MO-4718). In general, about what Wetzel wrote about in 1939! The basis was the ideas of Hitler and Himmler about the complete colonization of the East (by the way, Himmler even wanted to settle here all the Germans from the USA, Latin America and Africa, which he spoke about on April 23, 1942). Professor SS Oberführer Konrad Meyer-Hetling was given the task, as he himself testified on June 28, 1947, to make a calculation - how many Germans could be settled here in 25 years? He added that it was at the same time a calculation of how many Slavs would have to be destroyed in the same 25 years. The document was sent to various departments, including the department of Rosenberg, from where the conclusion followed - again by the same Dr. Wetzel.

The calculations of the "General Plan" were made quite concretely. 4,555,000 German settlers had to be resettled in the "Eastern Territories", which would have cost the Reich 66.6 billion Reichsmarks (over about 30 years). In turn, only 14 million "foreigners" were to remain in the respective territories. This would mean—given that the respective territories were understood to mean the entire European territory of the Soviet Union up to the line of Lake Ladoga—Valdai—Bryansk and further south to Crimea—the destruction (or "relocation" to Western Siberia) of about 50 mil. - Lyons man. Further, another 16-20 million people would have to be "evicted" from Poland.

I cannot deny myself — I am quoting Dr. Wetzel's document in full, which is quite eloquent evidence of the final goals of the German occupation in the East.

"1/214, of national importance TOP SECRET Berlin, 27.4.1942.

#### COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ON THE GENERAL PLAN "OST" OF THE REICHSFUHRER SS

Back in November 1941, I became aware that the Imperial Security Main Directorate was working on the General Plan "Ost". Standartenführer Elih, a responsible officer of the Imperial Security Main Office, told me already at that time the figure of 31 million people of non-German origin to be resettled, envisaged in the plan. This matter is in charge of the Reich Security Main Office, which now occupies a leading position among the bodies subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS. At the same time, the Main Directorate of Reich Security, in the opinion of all departments subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS, will also perform the functions of the Reich Commissariat for the strengthening of the German race.

#### GENERAL REMARKS ON THE OST MASTER PLAN

According to its ultimate goal, namely the planned Germanization of the territories in question in the East, the plan should be approved. However, the enormous difficulties that will undoubtedly arise in the implementation of this plan and may even cast doubt on its feasibility appear relatively small in the plan. First of all, it is striking that Ingermanland \*, Pridnestro-

\* Under Ingria, the Nazis meant the territory of the Novgorod, Pskov and Leningrad regions.

ne, Tavria and Crimea as territories for colonization. This is obviously due to the fact that in the future the plan will additionally include new colonization projects, which will be discussed at the end.

At present, it is already possible to establish more or less definitely as the eastern boundary of colonization (in its northern and middle parts) a line running from Lake Ladoga to the Valdai Upland and further to Bryansk. Whether these changes will be made to the plan by the SS command, I do not presume to judge. In any case, it must be foreseen that the number of people subject to resettlement according to the plan should be even more increased. It can be understood from the plan that this is not a program to be implemented immediately, but that, on the contrary, the settlement of this area by Germans should take place within about 30

years after the end of the war. According to the plan, 14 million local residents should remain in this territory. However, whether they will lose their national traits and whether they will undergo Germanization within the envisaged 30 years is more than doubtful, since again, according to the plan under consideration, the number of German settlers is very small. Obviously, the plan does not take into account the desire of the Commissar for the Strengthening of the German Race (Department of Greifelt) to settle persons suitable for Germanization within the German Empire proper...

The fundamental question of the whole plan for the colonization of the East is the question - will we succeed in awakening again in the German people the desire for resettlement in the East? As far as I can judge from my experience, there is undoubtedly such a desire in most cases. However, one must also not lose sight of the fact that, on the other hand, a significant part of the population, especially from the western part of the empire, sharply rejects resettlement to the East, even to Wartheland, in the region

Danzig and West Prussia ... It is necessary, in my opinion, that the relevant authorities, especially the Eastern Ministry, constantly monitor the trends that are expressed in unwillingness to move to the East, and fight them with the help of propaganda .

Along with the encouragement of aspirations for resettlement to the East, the decisive moment is also the need to awaken in the German people, especially among the German colonists in the eastern territories, the desire to increase childbearing. We must not deceive ourselves: the increase in the birth rate observed since 1933 is a welcome development in itself, but it cannot by any means be considered sufficient for the existence of the German people, especially considering their enormous task of colonizing the eastern territories. and the incredible biological reproductive capacity of our neighboring Eastern peoples.

The master plan "Ost" provides that after the end of the war, the number of settlers for the immediate colonization of the eastern territories should be 4,550 thousand people. This number does not seem too high to me, given the colonization period of 30 years. It is possible that it could be more. After all, it must be borne in mind that these 4,550,000 Germans should be distributed in such territories as the region of Danzig-West Prussia, Wartheland, Upper Silesia, the general government, South-East Prussia, the Bialystok region, The Baltic States, Ingermanlandia, Belarus, and partly also regions of Ukraine. If we take into account the favorable increase in the population due to the increase in the birth rate, and also, to a certain extent, the influx of immigrants from other countries inhabited by Germanic peoples, then we can count on 8 million Germans to colonize these territories over a period of about 30 years. . However, this is not

the planned figure of 10 million Germans is reached.

According to the plan, these 8 million Germans account for 45 million local residents of non-German origin, of which 31 million are to be evicted from these territories.

If we analyze the preliminarily planned figure of 45 million inhabitants of non-German origin, it turns out that the local population of the territories under consideration in itself will exceed the number of immigrants. There are supposedly about 36 million people on the territory of the former Poland. Of these, it is necessary to exclude approximately 1 million ethnic Germans. Then 35 million people will remain. The Baltic countries number 5.5 million people. Obviously, the Master Plan "Ost" also takes into account the former Soviet Zhytomyr, Kamenetz-Podolsk and partially Vinnitsa regions as territories for colonization. The population of Zhytomyr and Kamenetz-Podolsk regions is approximately 3.6 million people, and Vinnitsa region is about 2 million people, since a significant part of it is in the sphere of interests of Romania. Consequently, the total number of the population living here is approximately 5.5-5.6 million people. Thus, the total population of the regions under consideration is 51 million. The number of people to be evicted according to the plan should actually be much higher than envisaged. If only

Considering that approximately 5-6 million Jews living in this territory will be liquidated even before the eviction is carried out, one can agree with the figure mentioned in the plan of 45 million local residents of non-German origin. However, it can be seen from the plan that Jews are also included in the mentioned 45 million people. From this, therefore, it follows that the plan obviously proceeds from an incorrect calculation of the number of

villages.

In addition, it seems to me that the plan does not take into account that the local population of non-German origin will multiply very rapidly over a period of 30 years ... Considering all this, one must proceed from the fact that the number of inhabitants of non-German origin in these territories will significantly exceed 51 million people. It will amount to 60-65 million people.

This leads to the conclusion that the number of people who must either remain in these territories or be evicted is much higher than envisaged in the plan. Accordingly, the implementation of the plan becomes even more difficult. If we take into account that 14 million local residents will remain in the territories under consideration, as envisaged by the plan, then 46-51 million people need to be evicted. The number of residents to be resettled, set by the plan at 31 million people, cannot be considered correct.

Further notes on the plan:

The plan provides for the resettlement of racially undesirable local residents in Western Siberia. At the same time, percentage figures are given for individual peoples, and in this way the fate of these peoples is decided, although there are still no exact data on their racial composition. Further, the same approach is established to all peoples, regardless of whether the Germanization of the respective peoples is envisaged at all and to what extent, whether this concerns peoples who are friendly or hostile to the Germans.

#### GENERAL REMARKS ON THE QUESTION OF GERMANIZATION, PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE FUTURE ATTITUDE TO THE RESIDENTS OF THE FORMER BALTIC STATES

In principle, the following should be noted here first of all. It goes without saying that  
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This Germanization applies only to those peoples whom we consider to be racially complete. Racially complete for our people are basically only those local residents of non-German origin who themselves, like their offspring, have pronounced signs of the Nordic race, manifested in appearance, behavior and abilities ...

In my opinion, it is possible to win over suitable local residents in the Baltic countries for Germanization if the forced expulsion of the undesirable population is carried out under the guise of a more or less voluntary resettlement. In practice, this could easily be done. In the vast expanses of the East not envisaged for colonization by the Germans, we will need a large number of people who have been brought up to some extent in the European spirit and have mastered at least the basic concepts of European culture. Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians have this data to a large extent...

We should constantly proceed from the fact that, managing all the vast territories that are part of the sphere of interests of the German Empire, we should save the forces of the German people as much as possible ... Then, events unpleasant for the Russian population will be carried out, for example, not by a German, but by a Latvian or Lithuanian used for this by the German administration, which, if this principle is skillfully implemented, will undoubtedly have positive consequences for us. At the same time, one should hardly be afraid of the Russification of the Latvians or Lithuanians, especially since their number is not so small and they will occupy positions that put them above the Russians. Representatives of this stratum of the population should also be instilled with a sense and

the consciousness that they are something special compared to the Russians. Perhaps later the danger from a hundred

The crown of this stratum of the population, connected with its desire to become German, will be greater than the danger of its Russification. Regardless of the more or less voluntary resettlement of racially undesirable inhabitants from the former Baltic states to the East proposed here, the possibility of their resettlement in other countries should also be allowed. As regards the Lithuanians, whose general racial data is considerably worse than that of the Estonians and Letts, and among whom there is therefore a very considerable number of racially undesirable people, it would be worthwhile to consider providing them with a territory suitable for colonization. - torii in the East...

#### TO THE SOLUTION OF THE POLISH QUESTION

##### a) Poles.

Their number is presumably 20-24 million people. Of all the peoples subject to the resettlement plan, the Poles are the most hostile to the Germans, the largest and therefore the most dangerous people.

The plan provides for the eviction of 80-85 percent of the Poles, i.e. out of 20 or 24 million Poles, 16-20.4 million are subject to eviction, while 3-4.8 million will have to remain in the territory inhabited by German colonists. These figures proposed by the Main Directorate of Reich Security diverge from the data of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of the German Race on the number of racially full-fledged Poles suitable for Germanization. The Imperial Commissioner for the Strengthening of the German Race, on the basis of a survey of the rural population of the regions of Danzig-West Prussia and Wartheland, estimates the proportion of inhabitants suitable for Germanization at 3 per cent. If we take this percentage as a basis,

then the number of Poles to be deported must be even more than 19-23 million...

The Eastern Ministry is now showing a particular interest in the question of housing the racially undesirable Poles. The forced resettlement of about 20 million Poles in a certain region of Western Siberia will undoubtedly cause constant danger to the entire territory of Siberia, creating a hotbed of continuous rebellions against the order established by the German authorities. Such a settlement of the Poles might perhaps make sense as a counterbalance to the Russians, if the latter regained their state independence and the German administration of this territory would therefore become illusory. To this it must be added that we must also strive in every possible way to strengthen the Siberian peoples in order to prevent the strengthening of the Russians. Siberians should feel like a people with their own culture. A compact settlement of a few million Poles could probably have the following consequences: either in the course of time the smaller Siberians will become Polish and a "Greater Poland" will arise, or we will make the Siberians our worst enemies, push them into the arms of the Russians and prevent thereby the formation of the Siberian people ...

It is quite clear that the Polish question cannot be solved by liquidating the Poles, just as it is done with the Jews. Such a solution of the Polish question would burden the conscience of the German people for eternity and would deprive us of the sympathy of all, all the more so as other peoples neighboring us would begin to fear that one fine day they would suffer the same fate. In my opinion, the Polish question must be resolved in such a way as to minimize the political doubts I mentioned above.

It is quite possible to resettle millions of the most dangerous Poles for us by emigration to South America, especially Brazil. At the same time, it was possible

try to return the South American Germans, especially from South Brazil, by means of an exchange, and settle them in new colonies, for example, in Tavria, the Crimea, and also in Transnistria, since now we are not talking about settling the African colonies of the empire ...

The vast majority of racially undesirable Poles must be resettled in the East. This applies mainly to peasants, agricultural workers, artisans, etc. They can easily be resettled on the territory of Siberia...

When the Kuznetsk, Novosibirsk and Karaganda industrial regions begin to operate at full capacity, a huge amount of labor will be required, especially technical workers. Why shouldn't Walloon engineers, Czech technicians, Hungarian merchants and the like work in Siberia? In this case, one could rightfully speak of a reserve European territory for colonization and extraction of raw materials. Here the European idea would make sense in every respect, while in the territory destined for German colonization it would be dangerous for us. In this case, this would mean that we, by virtue of the logic of things, accept the idea of racial mixing of the peoples of Europe... It should always be borne in mind that Siberia before Lake Baikal has always been a Territory for European colonization. The Mongols inhabiting these areas, as well as the Turkic peoples, appeared here in the recent historical period. It must be emphasized once again that Siberia is one of the factors that, if properly used, could play a decisive role in depriving the Russian people of the opportunity to restore their power.

#### 6) TO THE QUESTION ABOUT UKRAINIANS

According to the plan of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security, Western Ukrainians should also be resettled to the territory of Siberia. This provides for the resettlement of 65 percent of the population. This figure is significantly lower than the percentage of the Polish population lying down  
eviction...

#### c) ON THE QUESTION OF BELARUSIANS

The plan provides for the eviction of 75 percent of the Belarusian population from the territory they occupy. This means that 25 percent of Belarusians, according to the plan of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security, are subject to Germanization...

The racially undesirable Belarusian population will remain on the territory of Belarus for many years to come. In this regard, it seems extremely necessary to carefully select Belarusians of the Nordic type, who are racially and politically suitable for Germanization, and send them to the empire in order to use them as labor force... They can be it would be used in agriculture as agricultural laborers, as well as in industry or as artisans. Since they would be treated like Germans and because of their lack of national feeling, they could soon, at least in the next generation, be completely Germanized ...

Even those Belarusians whom we cannot leave for racial reasons in the territory intended for colonization by our people, we can use to our advantage to a greater extent than representatives of other peoples of the eastern regions. The land of Belarus is scarce. Offer them

the best lands means to reconcile them with some things that could turn them against us. To this, by the way, it should be added that the Russian population itself, and especially the Belarusian population, is inclined to change their homes, so that the resettlement in these areas would not be perceived by the inhabitants as tragically as, for example, in the Baltic countries. We should also think about resettling the Belarusians in the Urals or in the regions of the North Caucasus, which in part could also be reserve territories for European colonization...

#### TO THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE TREATMENT OF THE RUSSIAN POPULATION

It is necessary to touch upon one more question, which is not mentioned at all in the Ost General Plan, but is of great importance for the solution of the entire Eastern problem in general, namely, how can the German



dominance in the face of the enormous biological power of the Russian people. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly consider the question of the attitude towards the Russians, about which almost nothing is said in the General Plan. Now we can say with confidence that our previous anthropological information about the Russians, not to mention the fact that they were very incomplete and outdated, is largely incorrect. This was already noted in the autumn of 1941 by representatives of the Race Policy Office and well-known German scientists. This point of view was once again confirmed by Professor Dr. Abel, former 1st assistant to Professor E. Fischer, who in the winter of this year, on behalf of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, carried out detailed anthropological studies of Russians ...

Abel saw only the following possibilities for solving the problem: either the complete annihilation of the Russian people, or the Germanization of that part of it that has clear signs of the Nordic race. These very serious provisions of Abel deserve great attention. It is not only about the destruction of the state with its center in Moscow. Achieving this historic goal would never mean a complete solution to the problem. The point is most likely to crush the Russians as a people, to divide them. Only if this problem is considered from a biological, especially from a racial-biological point of view, and if the German policy in the eastern regions is carried out in accordance with this, will it be possible to eliminate the danger posed to us by the Russian people.

The way proposed by Abel to eliminate the Russians as a people, not to mention the fact that its implementation would hardly be possible, is also not suitable for us for political and economic reasons. In such a case, one must take different paths in order to solve the Russian problem. These paths, in brief, are as follows:

a) First of all, it is necessary to provide for the division of the territory inhabited by Russians into various political regions with their own governing bodies in order to ensure in each of them a separate national development ...

For now, one can leave open the question of whether an imperial commissariat should be established in the Urals, or is it necessary to create separate district administrations for the non-Russian population living in this territory without a special local central governing body? It is of decisive importance here that these regions should not be administratively subordinate to the German supreme authorities, which will be created in the Russian central regions. The people who inhabit these areas must be indoctrinated in order to

under no circumstances did they orient themselves towards Moscow, even if a German imperial commissar was in Moscow...

Both in the Urals and in the Caucasus there are many different nationalities and languages. It will be impossible, and politically, perhaps, wrong to make Tatar or Mordovian the main language in the Urals, and, say, Georgian in the Caucasus. This could irritate other peoples in these areas. Therefore, it is worth thinking about the introduction of the German language as a language that connects all these peoples... In this way, German influence in the East would increase significantly. Consideration should also be given to the administrative separation of Northern Russia from the territories under the control of the Imperial Commissariat for Russian Affairs... The idea of transforming this area in the future into a Great German colonial region should not be rejected, since its population is still to a large extent it has signs of the Nordic race. In general, in the rest of the central regions of Russia, the policy of individual general commissariats should be directed, as far as possible, to the separation and separate development of these regions.

A Russian from the Gorky General Commissariat should be instilled with the feeling that he is somehow different from a Russian from the Tula General Commissariat. There is no doubt that such an administrative fragmentation of Russian territory and the systematic separation of individual regions is one of the means of combating the strengthening of the Russian people.

c) The second means, even more effective than the measures indicated in paragraph "a", is the weakening of the Russian people in racial terms. The Germanization of all Russians is impossible for us and undesirable from a racial point of view. What, however, can and should be done is to separate the existing

the Nordic population groups and to carry out their gradual Germanization ...

It is important that the majority of the population on Russian territory consists of people of a primitive semi-European type. It will not cause many worries for the German leadership. This mass of racially inferior, stupid people needs, as the centuries of history of these areas testify, leadership. If the German leadership manages to prevent rapprochement with the Russian population and prevent the influence of German blood on the Russian people through extramarital affairs, then it is quite possible to maintain German dominance in the area, provided that we can overcome such a biological danger as the monstrous ability of these primitive people to reproduce.

c) There are many ways to undermine the biological strength of a people...

The goal of German policy towards the population on Russian territory will be to bring the birth rate of Russians to a lower level than that of the Germans. The same applies, by the way, to the extremely prolific peoples of the Caucasus, and in the future, partly to Ukraine. For the time being, we are interested in increasing the Ukrainian population as opposed to the Russians. But this should not lead to the fact that Ukrainians will eventually take the place of Russians. In order to avoid an increase in population in the Eastern regions, which is undesirable for us, it is urgently necessary to avoid in the East all the measures that we used to increase the birth rate in the empire. In these areas, we must consciously pursue a policy of population reduction. By means of propaganda, especially through the press, radio, movies, leaflets, short brochures, reports, etc., we must constantly instill in the population the idea that it is harmful to have many children. It is necessary to show how much money

worth res

food for children and what could be purchased with these funds. It is necessary to talk about the great danger to the health of a woman, which she is exposed to when giving birth to children, etc. Along with this, the broadest propaganda of contraceptives should be launched. It is necessary to establish a wide production of these funds. The distribution of these drugs and abortion should not be restricted in any way. Every effort should be made to expand the network of abortion clinics. It is possible, for example, to organize special retraining of midwives and paramedics and teach them how to perform abortions. The better the quality of abortions, the more confidence the population will have in them. Understandably, doctors also need to have permission to perform abortions. This should not be considered a violation of medical ethics. Voluntary sterilization should also be promoted, the struggle to reduce infant mortality should not be allowed, and the education of mothers in the care of infants and preventive measures against childhood diseases should not be allowed. The training of Russian doctors in these specialties should be reduced to a minimum, and no support should be given to kindergartens and other similar institutions. Apart from these health measures, there should be no bar to divorce. Assistance should not be given to illegitimate children. No tax privileges should be allowed for large families, no financial assistance should be provided to them in the form of wage supplements ...

It is important for us Germans to weaken the Russian people to such an extent that they will no longer be able to prevent us from establishing German domination in Europe. We can achieve this goal in the above ways.

Signed: Dr. Wetzel.

I do not want to comment on this document, from reading which goosebumps run. I will only draw the reader's attention to the almost verbatim coincidences between Wetzel's document,

Bormann's reasoning in Vinnitsa and Hitler's statements in the "table talks" published after the war. So the logic of the documents themselves brings us back to the role of Martin Bormann. His eye watched closely how the general plan of the occupation policy was carried out. It can be understood that the "practitioner" Koch was closer to him than the drafter of plans and memorandums, Rosenberg. Even a person as close to Rosenberg as Köppen testifies that "Rosenberg had enough ideas, but he could not put them into practice." How could such a minister arouse Bormann's sympathy? For Bormann, there was only one imperative: the Soviet Union must be crushed, the Slavs must be reduced to the status of slaves.

But it was those who were destined for such a fate, on January 13, 1945, they went on the offensive.

DAYS: January 20 - February 7 Saturday, January 20

Noon: the situation in the East becomes more and more menacing: withdrawal from the Warthegau, advanced armored units at Katowice, etc.

In the evening, mother returns from Stollie.

Sunday, January 21

Berlin. 13 hours M.B. with Terboven at the report

f(yurer) followed by a conversation with Lammers.

15:00 Quisling's reception at f. with the participation of Lammers, M.B., Terboven.

And in the evening with my mother at the Fegeleins.

Monday, January 22

15:00 Fuhrer's meeting with Terboven, Quisling, Lammers, M.B.

Tuesday, January 23

After lunch, after a briefing with the Fuhrer about the situation in Norway (sabotage) and about Quisling's wishes with

Rosenberg - M.B. - Lammers - Keitel - Jodl - Doenitz - Reich Marshal.

Wednesday, January 24 Thursday, January 25

Friday, January 26

The situation in the East is getting more and more aggravated!

Saturday, January 27

In the morning at 4 o'clock, mother leaves Berlin with the driver Kinkl. At 15 o'clock

in Munich, at 16 o'clock - departure from Munich, 20 o'clock - in Oberasalzberg. In the morning M.B. talking to Grazer.

Sunday, January 28

After dinner conversation f. with Quisling - M.B. - Terboven - Lammers - Ribbentrop.

Monday, January 29

After lunch 15.15 - 16.20 Zeiss-I.\* with M.B. at the Fuhrer.

Before lunch, M.B. with Dr. von Hummel.

Tuesday, January 30

Happy M.B. — as every day — at a brief report to the Fuhrer.

After dinner conversation with Dr. Nauman. Evening with Dr. Lay.

19.15. The Fuhrer addresses the German people with a speech.

Wednesday, January 31

In the morning, Russian tanks are in front of Crossen and cross the Oder between Kustrin and Vritsen.

\* Seyss-Inquart, viceroy in Holland.

Thursday, February 1

Before lunch, M.B. with Stöhr Evening: the Fuhrer receives Stöhr and appoints him Gauleiter.

Friday, February 2

Happy M.B. talks with General Reinecke, and at 18 o'clock with Axman, then with Dr. von Hummel.

Saturday, February 3

In the morning, a heavy raid on Berlin (new Reich Chancellery). The Fuhrer's apartment - a reception hall, a dining room, a winter garden, a party office.

Battles for crossings on the Oder. (The party office becomes the front line!)

Sunday, February 4

Monday, February 5

M.B. talks with Tirak about Freisler's successor.

In the morning - in the afternoon 14.45. - 500 four-mot.

- 200 two-motor.

Villach (4 times), Saliburg (5 times), Regensburg, Straubing, Traunstein, Rosenheim, etc.

In the evening after the operational meeting, M.B. with Lammers + Seyss at the Fuhrer.

After that, Dr. Goebbels. Conversation M.B. with (Goebbels).

Tuesday, February 6

Birthday of E.B. In the afternoon 13.15. meeting of Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Lammers + M.B.

Wednesday, February 7

Conversation f. with Gauleiter Koch - Guderian - General Wenck.

Then with Obergruppenf. Wolf. In the evening M.B. together with the Reichsführer SS at the Fegeleins.

This was followed by a party with E.B. + Fegelines.

4 Zak, No. 665 Bezymensky

#### ESSAY FOUR:

Karl WOLFF and Rudolf HESS

Have you ever talked to an SS Obergruppenführer? Moreover: with an SS Oberstgruppenführer, that is, with the holder of the highest rank in the SS hierarchy, which in all the years of the existence of the SS was awarded only once, and to my interlocutor? True, the Oberstgruppenführer was sitting in front of me out of uniform (it turns out that he did not wear it, because according to the bureaucratic bagpipes, Himmler did not manage to approve his last rank, and the Reich collapsed). Slender and vigorous for his 82 years, he went through the folders of his se

the main archive and very willingly recalled the years when he had to be the chief of the personal staff of the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler - that is, a kind of "Bormann" who stood behind the back of the powerful head of the SS organization.

Karl Wolf was a living refutation of the typical idea of the SS man as a crude and uncouth professional killer, a bestial executor of criminal orders. It turns out that there were others: highly educated, highly cultured people who spoke many languages, connoisseurs of German and international law, who knew how to deal with crowned persons and the highest aristocracy. Such would be Karl Wolf, who unexpectedly chose the path in the ranks of Heinrich Himmler's "security detachments" in the 1920s. The calculation turned out to be accurate: Himmler also needed such "atypical" SS men who could perform the most difficult tasks, which differed in complexity from the work of the execution "Einsatz teams" in Babi Yar. That is why it fell to Wolf to carry out the cunning political plan, which at the end of the war was born in the narrowest circle of the top of the SS and seemed to this top a means to win by political methods what could not be achieved by military methods. However, not only at the end of the war. The chronicle of the Third Reich captured an event that was not completely clear (until now!) that happened at the end of May 10, 1941 - and not in Germany, but on the Scottish coast of England, where none other than Adolf's deputy jumped with a parachute Hitler, Reichsleiter Rudolf Hess.

The political meaning of Hess's flight - although it is the object of endless disputes among historians - is quite definite. In Hitler's "multipolar" policy and his struggle for world domination of Germany, there were many options, many alternatives. One of them was that Germany must and can wage this "world-historical struggle" not in the same

4

overnight, but with the support of Western "democratic" states. The same possibility was considered by political strategists not only in Germany, but beyond its borders - in England, France and the USA. Another thing is that this alternative had powerful opponents, among whom for a long time was Adolf Hitler himself and the most prominent figures of the NSDAP, SA and SS. But there's a lot to think about here too...

The historical literature devoted to the flight of Hess is very large. Nevertheless, there are still many controversial issues that need to be resolved in order to understand the political place that this episode occupies in the history of the Second World War, and in our study, in Bormann's career. The most frequently expressed view in the literature is to explain this unprecedented flight as the personal initiative of Rudolf Hess and deny the participation in this risky undertaking of Hitler and other leaders of the Third Reich. In essence, this version belongs to none other than Martin Bormann, who once recommended to Hitler that Hess be declared insane. This version was published as early as May 1941 and since then, in various versions, has been circulating through the pages of historical studies and popular pamphlets. But that doesn't make it particularly convincing. Just the opposite! The fact that it belongs to Martin Bormann makes us treat it with extreme caution.

By the way, in Bormann's diaries for 1941, this event looks like this (several versions of the old diary have been preserved, which, at Bormann's instructions, was retyped on a typewriter and placed in his personal archive.):

May 11th. Adjutant Pinch delivers a letter to Rudolf Hess in the afternoon: the latter flew to England on 10.5 in the evening.

12 May. Meetings of the Führer with MB, Goering, Ribbentrop and Horst. The first message about Hesse.

may 13. Second message about Hess; all Reichsleiters and Gauleiters are with the Führer."

In another, more detailed post, it looks like this:

May 11th. At noon Adjutant Pinch delivers the Führer's letters to the Führer; the latter at 17.40 on May 10 flew to England. The Führer's meeting with MB, Goering, Ribbentrop and Udet were summoned to the Obersalzberg.

12 May. Führer's meeting with MB, Ribbentrop, Udet; the first report on the flight of Hess is published.

may 13. The second message about the flight of Hess. 16.00 - 18.30 - meeting of the Führer with all Reichsleiters and Gauleiters.

In these two "messages" the version of the "abnormal" Hess was formulated.

Another, but no less controversial, interpretation of Hess's flight to the West is that it is viewed as a kind of "extravagance" that has no connection with the general context of the Nazi policy of that time. All this makes us dwell on this episode in detail, focusing on two main issues.

Question one: Was the flight a personal affair of Hess?

Question two: What were the political goals of this enterprise?

So, let's start in order. There are many descriptions of how the events of May 11, 1941 played out, when the Fuehrer learned about the flight of his favorite colleague and deputy to England. These descriptions belong to various persons, for example, the head of the SS intelligence Schellenberg, Hitler's personal translator Schmidt, the head of the OKW Keitel and many others. All of these testimonies are similar. They report that, upon learning of what had happened, Hitler went into an indescribable rage. Immediately follows a description of how he ordered to report on the madness of Hess.

We have the opportunity to use the evidence that describes the true course of events on May 10th. One of them is the living testimony of Hitler's personal adjutant, SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Günsche\*.

... "On May 11, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, Führer's adjutant Albert Bormann, brother of Martin Bormann, appeared in the waiting room in front of Hitler's office, with Hess's adjutant Oberführer SA Pinch. Pynch held a white sealed package in his hands. Albert Bormann asked the valet Linge to wake Hitler and report to him that Pinch had come with an urgent letter from Hess. Linge knocked on the bedroom door. Hitler asked in a sleepy voice:

- Hello, what happened?

Linge reported. The answer followed:

- I am coming now.

A few minutes later, Hitler, unshaven, came out of his office, adjacent to the bedroom. He approached Pinch, greeted him and asked for a letter from Hess. With the letter in hand, Hitler hurried down the stairs to the living room. Linge, Pinch and Bormann had not yet come down the stairs when Hitler had already rung the bell. When Linge entered the living room, Hitler was standing at the very door, holding an open letter in his hands. He asked Linge sharply:

- Where is this person?

Linge went out and led Pinch into the living room. Hitler turned to Pinch:

Do you know the contents of the letter?

Pinch answered in the affirmative. Leaving the living room, Linge saw Pynch and Hitler approach the large marble table. A few minutes later the bell rang again. Linge again entered the living room. Hitler was still standing at the table. Next to him was Pinch. Hitler told Linge:

Let Hegel come.

\* For the origin of this testimony, see below.

Hegl, head of the police team at Hitler's headquarters, quickly appeared. Hitler ordered him to arrest Pinch. Then he ordered that Martin Bormann, who was then Rudolf Hess's chief of staff, be called immediately. After a conversation with Bormann, Hitler summoned Goering and Ribbentrop to the Berghof. In the meantime, Dietrich, the imperial press manager, who was at the Berghof at that time, was summoned to the Führer. Hitler ordered Dietrich to report to him all reports from England about Hess's flight and forbade him to report anything about Hess in

print.

On the evening of May 11, Hitler met with Göring, Ribbentrop and Bormann, who had arrived at the Berghof. The meeting went on for a very long time. Dietrich was summoned several times and asked if there were any messages from England.

There was no news of Hesse.

Late in the evening, Dietrich reported to Hitler that, according to English radio, Hess had landed by parachute in a remote area in the north of England and was detained by a policeman, to whom he told that he had flown to England to meet with his friend the Duke of Hamilton.

Hitler quickly asked if the British had informed Hess of his intentions. Dietrich replied that the British were silent about this. Then Hitler ordered Dietrich to present the flight of Hess in the German press as an act of "insane". It became known in Hitler's entourage that the decision to declare Hess mentally unbalanced was taken at a meeting between Hitler and Goering, Ribbentrop and Bormann.

When a message arrived from London that Duke Hamilton refused to acknowledge his acquaintance with Hess, Hitler burst out with an exclamation:

— What hypocrisy! Now he doesn't want to know him!"

Hess found himself in England on the evening of May 10, albeit in circumstances that were not very favorable for him. Hess was unable to land on the plane, jumped out of steam

chute, injured his leg. On the morning of May 11, the Duke of Hamilton was brought to him, to whom Hess outlined the meaning of his mission in the most general terms and asked him to send a telegram to Zurich at a conditional address. Following this, Hess was visited by Sir Ivon Kirkpatrick, a former adviser at the British Embassy in Berlin, who identified Hess and heard from him more detailed comments on the flight, including a proposal for an Anglo-German agreement based on the division of world spheres of influence. Kirkpatrick had three conversations with Hess on 13, 14 and 15 May. It seemed

would, the situation for the British cleared up; besides, there was Hess' statement that "Germany intends to present certain demands to Russia, which must be satisfied either through negotiations or as a result of war." That is exactly what Kirkpatrick reported to his government after his conversation with Hess.

What happened? If we proceed from the logic of the situation when England and Germany were at war (moreover, England in those days already knew that the war would soon be expanded by Germany's attack on the USSR), then, of course, Hess's claims should have been immediately rejected, and he was subject to imprisonment in a prisoner of war camp. What, indeed, could be a conversation with him!

However, the British government practically entered into negotiations with Hess, entrusting this to the Lord Chancellor John Simon, who, accompanied by the same Kirkpatrick, on June 9 held a detailed three-hour conversation with Hess.

The English protocol of this conversation was presented in Nuremberg (paradoxically, not by the British, but by the German defense). In it, Simon is named Dr. Guthrie, Kirkpatrick is named Dr. McKenzie, and Hess is identified by the letter "J". The protocol starts like this:

"TOP SECRET 9 / \ 1-1941 from 14.30 to 17.30

"Dr. Guthrie. I think our plan is very good. We are here and with us the stenographer, and also Mr. Maas - a witness, further, as an interpreter, Dr. Mackenzie and Captain Barnes.

Mr. Reich Minister, I have been informed that you have come here feeling that you are on a mission and that you wanted to speak on this matter with someone who could pass this on to the government. As you know, my name is Dr. Guthrie, and I am authorized by the government and fully intend to listen to you and talk to you, as far as possible, on any matters that you want to put to me for the information of the government.

J.\* I am very glad that Mr. Guthrie has arrived.

J. I know that my arrival is very difficult to understand.

J. In view of the fact that this was an extraordinary step, I cannot expect otherwise.

J: That's why I'd like to start by explaining how I got here.

J. This idea came to me when I was with the Führer during the French campaign last June.

Dr Guthrie. I would like to know: maybe you would prefer to use the expression "I have come to this decision" and repeat these words. It is better that there would be no misunderstanding.

Translator. Fine.

Dr Guthrie. So, be kind enough to repeat the last sentence: I didn't quite understand it.

Mr. stenographer, kindly repeat.

\* In the original, almost every phrase of Hess is for some reason given from a new line, apparently due to the sequence of translation.

Secretary. I came to this decision to come here after I saw the Fuehrer during the French campaign in June.



J. I must say that I came to the Führer, being, like all of us, sure that we will defeat England sooner or later, in any case we will win. And I expressed the opinion to the Führer that we should, of course, demand compensation from England in various values, for example, the merchant fleet. In addition, we lost a lot as a result of the Treaty of Versailles.

J. Fuhrer immediately objected to me. He was of the opinion that in the long run the war might lead to an agreement with England, which we have been seeking since the beginning of our political activity. I must assure you that from the moment I became acquainted with the Führer, namely from 1921, the Führer talked about this all the time, namely about the agreement between Germany and England, which should be reached. From the moment he came to power, he pursued this goal. When we were in France, at that time he told me that, even as a winner, one should not impose too difficult conditions on the country with which an agreement must be reached. At this time I thought that if this fact were ever known in England, it would in turn be possible for England, for her part, to be ready for it.

agreement.

J. This was followed by the Fuehrer's proposal to England at the end of the French campaign. As you know, this offer was rejected. This circumstance more than confirmed my determination that under these conditions I must carry out my plan (long pause). This was followed by an air war between Germany and England, which, of course, brought more destruction to England than to Germany. I got the impression that England could not get out of her way without a significant

loss of prestige.

J. That's why I said to myself that I, more than ever, must carry out my plan, for if I come to England, she will be able to negotiate without loss of prestige.

But all of these were, so to speak, "refrains", although they lasted indefinitely. Even the phlegmatic Simon ran out of patience, and he forced Hess to read out the document that he had brought with him.

The document was called "Basis for an Agreement".

Kirkpatrick read point one:

"1. Spheres of influence will be defined to prevent future wars between England and Germany. Germany's sphere of interest is Europe; England's sphere of interest is her empire.

Simon: "Europe here certainly means continental Europe?"

Hess: "Yes, continental Europe."

Simon: "Does it include any part of Russia?"

Kirkpatrick translated Hess's reply thus: "He said that it is self-evident that European Russia interests us: if, for example, we conclude an agreement with Russia, England can in no way intervene."

Simon said: "I want to know what is meant by "European area of interest?" If the German sphere of interest is Europe, then, naturally, one would like to know whether Russia is included in it. Hess replied: "We are not interested in the Asian part of Russia." A few days later, in a conversation with Lord Beaverbrook, he told him bluntly that his goal was to induce England to make peace with Germany in order then to act jointly against the USSR.

Sometimes one can come across statements that Hess did not know at all about the plan of attack on the USSR. On this occasion, I heard curious details from Dr. Werner Koeppen. He accompanied Rosenberg (who

not only knew about the plan, but from April 1941 he took part in the development of the future occupation policy) on the morning of May 10, 1941 on a trip to Hess. Rosenberg, who was summoned to the Führer on May 10 at the Berghof, received a phone call from the same Pinch on the evening of May 9 and asked him to visit Hess as far as the Berghof. The two Reichsleiters met at Hess's apartment in Harlaching and had a long private conversation. Apparently, the conversation was rather frank, for Rosenberg subsequently said:

— I'm afraid that Hess will be drugged with something and he will tell everything...

In reality, Hess was not drugged. Even without "doping" he was quite talkative.

We have the opportunity to get acquainted with another, absolutely authentic document, little known to the general public. Its author is Hess's personal adjutant, Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Pinch, who for a long time was Hess' confidant. It was he who was instructed by Hess to take the letter to Hitler on May 11, 1941, in which Hess informed about his flight under the strictest secrecy. But, as is often the case, secrets don't stay secret for long. Sent after the flight of his boss to England on the eastern front, Pinch ended up in Soviet captivity. In the same place - having fallen into the hands of experienced investigators - he set out in detail everything that he knew about the flight. On February 27, 1948, this document was reported - like Bormann's diary - to I.V. Stalin, as well as V.M. Molotov, L.P. Beria, A.A. Zhdanov and M.A. Suslov. But what is even more important: having returned home from the Soviet captivity, Pinch confirmed the correctness of the stated facts. In particular, he did this in conversations with the famous English researcher John Lizer. Thus, if we make allowances for the typical investigative phraseology of the NKVD officials who recounted Pinch's story, this document can be trusted, especially since it is largely confirmed by other sources. So,

"In December 1940, I accompanied Hess on his trip to the front to inspect field airfields near Paris. We spent Christmas Eve at the Ritz Hotel in Paris. After Hess addressed the German people on the radio, in which he declared that peace could be expected in 1941, he told me in a conversation that in August 1940, on the initiative of the Duke of Bedford and other influential British politicians, a meeting of the British commissioners with the German commissioners Professor Albrecht Haushofer (son of General Karl Haushofer). At this meeting, the British expressed their readiness to start peace negotiations with Germany and clarified the German conditions. The British, for their part, set as a precondition for peace negotiations the termination of the non-aggression pact concluded in 1939 between Germany and the USSR. Hess said at the same time that Hitler and he himself were ready, of course, to fulfill this condition of the British, but Hitler wanted to start negotiations with England only after the German army had occupied the Balkans.

At the end of January 1941, Hess informed me, having previously taken the word of confidentiality, that he, by Hitler's decision, intended to fly to England in the near future in order to complete the negotiations begun in August 1940. Hess at the same time expressed confidence that his appearance in England would strengthen the position of those British politicians who seek an immediate conclusion of peace with Germany, and that his task would be crowned with success.

Already at the beginning of 1941, Hess began preparations for his flight to England. In February and March 1941, Hess was very intensively engaged in the development of political and economic proposals, which were to form the basis of negotiations with the British. Gauleiter Bohle (head of the foreign organization of the NSDAP), ministerial director from the imperial ministry, took part in the development of these proposals.

Ministry of Economy Jakwitz, Professor Karl Haushofer and Hess's brother Alfred Hess, who was the deputy head of the foreign organization of the NSDAP.

At the beginning of March 1941, Hess dictated to me on a typewriter the proposals he had worked out.

The content of these proposals, which I personally typed and therefore remember well, boiled down to the following in general terms:

- a) Germany renounces claims to her former colonies in Africa;
- b) Germany is ready to voluntarily limit her navy, recognizing the dominance of England at sea;
- c) Germany is not interested in the defeat of the British world empire;
- d) Germany is ready to give full support to England in maintaining her position as a world power;
- e) Germany is ready to render full support to England in preventing the world economic crisis expected after the war;
- f) Germany demands from England the return of private German assets abroad, frozen since 1918, not included in reparations;
- g) on account of these assets, England undertakes, after the conclusion of peace, to supply Germany with raw materials;

3) Germany assumes the obligation to avert the danger of the Bolshevization of Europe threatening from Russia and receives freedom of action in the East, which corresponds to the conditions of the British put forward already at the talks in August 1940 in Geneva.

In the course of this preparatory work, Hess, in conversations with me, expressed a number of interesting considerations about the planned negotiations with the British and about the motives that forced Germany to seek peace with England at this very moment.

The meaning of Hess's statements boiled down to the fact that

the entire policy of the German government is now directed chiefly towards preparing for war against Russia. I remember exactly what Hess said in this connection: "The forces employed in the West will be freed up and can be used against Russia."

At the same time, Hess's statements contained several references to Hitler. Thus, I remember Hess's statement that after the victory over France, Hitler firmly hopes that it will be easy to come to an agreement with England if Germany opposes Russia.

Hess carefully studied the information received from official and secret sources, which reported political symptoms favorable for Germany in England.

I remember, for example, that at that time inspired defeatist articles appeared in the English press by well-known publicists on military matters, General Fuller and Captain Liddle Hart, who sought to prove the hopelessness of continuing the war against Germany.

Hess attached particular importance to the report of the German ambassador in Madrid, von Storer, according to which the English ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, had recently become exceptionally kind to him. Storer wrote that relations between him and Sir Samuel Hoare had improved, that it was impossible to imagine that their countries were at war.

A message was received through General Haushofer from Lady Robertson of Lisbon, the widow of the British General Robertson, that pro-German circles in England felt that the time had come to start peace negotiations with Germany.

After Hitler approved the peace proposals worked out by Hess, Hess instructed Professor Albrecht Haushofer in early April 1941 to go to Geneva to Professor Burkgardt in order to

him to inform the English of the content of these proposals. Before leaving, Haushofer received in Berlin personally from Hess at the NSDAP liaison headquarters (Wilhelmsstraße) detailed instructions regarding the negotiations in Switzerland.

In the first days of April, Haushofer returned from Switzerland and telephoned Hess in Berlin from the nearest German city (Constance on Lake Constance). After this telephone conversation, Hess ordered me to make all the necessary preparations, and that same night he went with me to Augsburg, where he summoned Haushofer to report.

In Augsburg, at the Three Moors Hotel, Haushofer reported privately to Hess about his negotiations in Switzerland.

After a conversation with Haushofer, Hess told me that the time had come for him to fly to England to negotiate.

By that time, the technical preparations for the flight, which began back in January, were completely completed. These preparations were attended by Grand Admiral Raeder, the Imperial Postal Minister Ohnesorge, Colonel-General of Aviation Udet, and Professor Messerschmitt.

Grand Admiral Raeder provided Hess with a special map of the coordinates of the North Sea, Minister Ohnesorge, who is an inventor in the field of radar, taught Hess how to use a beam antenna; Colonel-General Udet instructed Colonel-Engineer Beckmann at the Ministry of Aviation that, at my telephone request, the Elektra beam antenna used by our bombers during raids on England should be turned on.

Professor Messerschmitt provided Hess with the Me-110 fighter. By order of the chief engineer of the test shop of the Messerschmitt plant in Augsburg, Mr. Piel, this fighter was specially equipped for long-range flight.

"12

To lighten the machine, weapons, seats, etc. were removed from it; spare fuel tanks were installed, which could be dumped if necessary. The aircraft was also equipped with a special radio station. Since January 1941, he stood at the airfield of the Messerschmitt plant in Augsburg, remaining exclusively at the personal disposal of Hess.

The famous German pilot Stöhr taught Hess how to skydive from the Messerschmitt-110. From the beginning of March 1941 the head of the meteorological station of the Air Ministry was instructed to transmit to me daily by telephone for Hess weather reports from the Atlantic Meteorological Service, which reported the weather over Scotland. These weather reports were necessary for Hess, since he was going to fly over Scotland only in heavy cloud cover and a cloud height of about 200 meters in order to protect himself from anti-aircraft artillery and fighters.

On May 9, 1941, on the eve of my flight to England, Hess ordered me to summon Reichsleiter Rosenberg from Berlin and Gauleiter of North Westphalia, Dr. Alfred Meyer from Münster, at about 8 o'clock in the evening, to a meeting by 11 o'clock in the morning on May 10, 1941 to his private apartment.

Gauleiter Dr. Meyer could arrive in Munich on time with the night express, and Reichsleiter Rosenberg, on Hess's order, was to fly to Munich from the Tempelhof airfield in Berlin on Hess's plane. On Saturday, May 10, 1941, at 10.30 am, Reichsleiter Rosenberg arrived in Munich with his adjutant Dr. Koeppen. Gauleiter Dr. Meyer also arrived there. I reported to Hess of their arrival. At about 11 o'clock in the morning at Hess's apartment (Munich-Harlaching, Harthausenstrasse 48) a meeting began between Hess and Rosenberg. Gauleiter Dr. Meyer first waited in the waiting room, and then Hess invited him to the meeting. At about 2:30 p.m. I received from Hess on the telephone

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well, instructions to prepare everything for the trip to the airfield in Augsburg and make sure that his Messerschmitt-110 was ready for flight. At 3 pm Rosenberg and Gauleiter Dr. Meyer said goodbye to Hess. Rosenberg, in the car of the imperial leadership of the NSDAP, left the Munich hotel "Seasons" with his adjutant Koeppen went to Obersalzberg to Hitler. At 4 p.m., Hess, accompanied by the head of his bodyguards, SS-Hauptsturmführer Lutz, his valet Platzer, and myself, drove out in a car driven by SS-Untersturmführer Lippert from Munich to the airfield of the Messerschmitt factory in Augsburg. There, in the room that was always at his disposal, Hess put on the uniform of an air captain, and over it a flight suit, meaning, in case of a forced landing, to impersonate an air captain named Horn.

To this end, back in April 1941, Hess ordered me to mail two letters addressed to Captain Horn to my address: Munich-Harlaching, Harthausenstrasse 38a. Hess put these two envelopes with the Munich postmark in the pocket of his uniform jacket in order to disguise his identity.

The chief engineer of the experimental workshop of the Messerschmitt plant, Piel, reported to Hess at about 18:00 that the aircraft was ready for launch. Hess ordered me and all the persons accompanying him to wait at the airfield for 4 hours after his departure. If he does not return within this time, it will mean that he has reached his goal - Dungavel Castle - the seat of the first Peer of Scotland. Then I had to go to Obersalzberg to Hitler and personally report to him about the departure of Hess.

At 18.20 Hess' plane took off. After that, as ordered by Hess, I immediately contacted the Reich Air Ministry with the Beckmann department with a request to instruct them to turn on the Elektra beam antenna. At the start at the airfield in Augsburg, the chief engineer Piel was present, the assault

SS Hauptfuehrer Lutz, valet Platzer, chauffeur Lippert and myself. In addition to us, there were several people from the service personnel of the Messersch-MITT plant.

At 10.30 pm, accompanied by the indicated persons, I left the Augsburg airfield for Munich, and from there that same night I left for Obersalzberg in order to personally report to Hitler about Hess' departure. On May 11, 1941, at about 12 noon, I was received by Hitler. Hitler listened to my message calmly and let me go without making any remark. At 12.30 Hitler's adjutant Gruppenführer Albert Bormann invited me to Hitler's table. Present at the dinner were: Hitler, Eva Braun, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, Field Marshal Keitel, Imperial Press Chief Dr. Dietrich, General Bodenschatz, Hitler's doctor Dr. von Hasselbach with his wife, Hitler's adjutant Albert Bormann and myself. During lunch, the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop arrived. After dinner, Hitler retired with von Ribbentrop.

About half an hour after dinner, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann called me and went with me to his apartment, also located in the Obersalzberg. There he demanded that I name all the persons present at the departure of Hess. After I named these persons, Bormann again went to Hitler, leaving me to wait in the waiting room. At 4 p.m., Reichsleiter Martin Bormann returned, announced that I was under arrest, and handed me over to the head of Hitler's bodyguard, SS Standartenfuehrer Rattenhuber. In the evening, having already been arrested, I was again brought to Martin Bormann, who asked me where Hess' briefcase was, and again made me list who knew about Hess's flight. I told him where the portfolio of Hess was. When I pointed out that he, Bormann, was especially well aware of the preparation of Hess for the flight to England, he shouted and ordered the SS men to immediately take me away.

"15

On the night of May 12-13, 1941, I was handed over to the Munich Gestapo.

On May 18, 1941, I was taken from the Munich Gestapo to Berlin, to the Reich Security Headquarters, where SS Gruppenfuehrer Müller informed me that my case would be entrusted to the Director of the Criminal Police, SS Oberfuehrer Headquarters and Criminal Adviser.

Police to SS Standartenführer Sanders. During the interrogations, which lasted from May 19 to June 15, 1941, the Gestapo wanted to get me to state that in the days preceding the flight of Hess, I noticed signs of a mental disorder in him. I could not and did not want to make such a false statement. Then I was shown a horoscope found in Hess's briefcase. It was supposed to serve as proof that the mental state of Hess cannot be considered normal. This evidence of the Gestapo seemed ridiculous to me, since I witnessed how Hess jokingly asked to make this horoscope. My verbal statements that Hitler and Bormann knew about Hess's flight were not recorded in the minutes. As proof, I cited the fact that a few days before the flight, after a long meeting with Bormann in Munich, Hess went with me to the studio of the Munich radio station, where his speech prepared for "Mother's Day" was recorded on tape 18 May 1941. This was the first time that Hess's speech had been pre-recorded on tape. On the way back from the radio studio, Hess told me that if negotiations with the British dragged on, Bormann would be able to prove his presence to the public by broadcasting Hess' speech recorded on tape under the guise of a personal speech by the latter. I demanded that, as proof of the veracity of my testimony, this film be seized and delivered to the Gestapo. However, the Gestapo did not pay any attention to my arguments.

Until February 1942, I was in strict isolation

tion in the prison of the Berlin Gestapo on Prinz Albrecht Street. Then I was transferred to the Oranienburg concentration camp, where I also sat in solitary confinement. My correspondence with my family was sent by the Gestapo to Martin Bormann for review. On March 2, 1943, I was again transferred from the Oranienburg concentration camp to the prison of the Berlin Gestapo.

After I gave SS Gruppenführer Müller an undertaking that I would maintain the strictest silence about all facts connected with Hess's flight to England, I was released, as Müller told me, on Hitler's orders. In addition, I had to commit myself to go as a soldier to the front. After a short stay with my family, who had been exiled from Munich to Moravian Ostrava, I was drafted into the army. Despite my officer rank, I was sent as a private to the 540th penal battalion. In December 1943, I was summoned to the commander of the 23rd Infantry Division, General Gurran, who announced to me that Hitler had ordered me to be transferred from the penal battalion and given the rank of lieutenant.

In conclusion, I would like to inform you that during my short stay in March 1943 in Munich, I was invited by Mrs. Hess to dinner. Mrs. Hess said that she often received news from her husband and that the letters were passed on to her by Martin Bormann. At the same time, she gave me to read several letters received from Hess in England. Hess wrote that he was living very well in England, that he was under the protection of his English friends, and that the future would show that he had not taken this step in vain. In one of the letters Hess said hello to me too.

Karl Heinz Pinch, prisoner of war, Oberleutnant of the former German army.

February 23, 1948".

"17

Approximately the same version of Hess's flight - thorough preparation, Hitler's awareness of it, the strange indulgence of the authorities towards the "accomplice" Pinch - was presented to me by Karl Wolf. And add- VIL:

"Hitler told me that he was very worried about the fate of his deputy. "But I couldn't protect him! In the interests of Germany, I had to betray him!"

Immediately, Hitler compared the actions of Hess in 1941 with what Wolf himself was doing in 1945:

"If you fail, I will give up on you just as I gave up on Hess!"

But on the night of February 6-7, 1945, Wolf offered the Fuhrer something that Rudolf Hess wanted to achieve! A brief record of the Obergruppenführer's proposals has been preserved: "On February 6, I informed Hitler about the military situation in my area and about the peaceful soundings of the Allies from Switzerland, which became more specific during this time, as well as about the mediation proposals of the Catholic Czech Church". In practice, it was about the fact that Wolf established strong channels of communication with the Bern residency of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its head, Allen Dulles (Wolf traveled to Switzerland four times). On the same night of February 6, Martin Bormann recorded the following Hitler's reasoning:

"It struck five minutes to twelve. The situation is serious. It is very serious. It seems almost hopeless... But the situation cannot be hopeless. How often in the history of the German people there have been unforeseen turns! Old Fritz\* was always on the brink of disaster during the Seven Years' War. In the winter of 1762, he decided to poison himself and even fixed a day when he would do this, if military happiness came to him. And three days before the appointment

\* Prussian King Friedrich P.

The tsarina dies at a certain time!\* Miraculously, everything turns in his favor. Like Frederick the Great, we face a coalition of powerful enemies. But even coalitions are the work of human hands, resting on the will of individuals. Let's say Churchill disappears and everything will change. If he is gone, the English elite will see the abyss that opens up before them as a result of the fact that Europe has been given over to Bolshevism. Awakening may come... We can still win with the last effort. If only we had enough time for the last fight!"

Could Karl Wolf in the spring of 1945, with his Swiss operation, turn the tide — and change the outcome — of World War II? The same question could have been raised at the beginning of the war, when Rudolf Hess flew to England. Today, anyone who is more or less familiar with the history of the greatest battle between the world's major powers in the middle of the 20th century can give an answer to it. Not Hess started, not Wolf completed it. Not even Himmler. And not Hitler, who started it. Nevertheless, history knows exactly how many times and how actively attempts were made to such a "turn all of a sudden". So great was the temptation!

Of course, the temptation was especially great for the losers. Germany, although shedding blood, but in the future was a significant force in Europe - especially in the future Europe, in which the confrontation between the two worlds, which began back in 1917, was certainly to continue. Even earlier, in the 1930s, Hitler actively and skillfully used this confrontation to his advantage, portraying himself as a strike force against the "Bolshevik East". Why not repeat it in 1945?

But the world was already different. Those political forces and groups that, like the Duke of Hamilton, went on

\* Russian Queen Elizabeth.

about the "German lure", after the terrible lesson of 1939-1945, they no longer decided the fate of Europe and America. There is a most curious document dated the summer of 1943 and drawn up for the leaders of the United States and Britain before their meeting in Quebec. It was compiled by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), ie. at the top intelligence agency in the United States. In this document, concerning the prospects for a world war, three options for the behavior of Western countries were considered, namely:

- focus on common interests with the USSR and immediately resolve all differences;

— to conduct a policy independent of the USSR, but aimed at the defeat of Germany.

And finally the third (I quote):

- "to try to turn against Russia all the power of undefeated Germany, still ruled by the Nazis and generals."

This was written in August 1943, i.e. already after Stalingrad, Kursk, El Alamein. Churchill and Roosevelt - and Roosevelt in the first place - did not go for the third option, leaning towards some symbiosis of the first and second. But it is important to state that, alas, there was real ground for Wolffian-type soundings in the West, and Hitler instinctively wanted to use it - if only there was "enough time for the last fight."

But time was running out. As we already know, on the night of Sat, February 7, Wolf had an audience with Hitler. Here is how he himself, in a conversation with me that took place in Darmstadt in 1982, described this conversation:

— The Fuhrer received me in his big office in the Imperial Chancellery. Since I requested admission as Higher SS and Police Commander in Italy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs also had to be present. It didn't matter to me, but I couldn't object. There was also Hevel - the representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Fuhrer, and Fegelein - a personal representative

Himmler's body. We sat all together on sofas near a low table. I mostly spoke, Ribbentrop was silent - as if he had taken water in his mouth. Hevel occasionally inserted remarks.

— What were you talking about?

— I was ready to tell the Führer about the need to enter into political negotiations. Himmler, to whom I had told my plan the day before, did not give a definite answer. When I asked him if we could count on the rapid appearance of a new "miracle weapon", he replied that only the Fuhrer knew this. Consequently, there was nothing left for me but to ask Hitler...

- Did you get an answer?

- No. That is why I began to detail my plan. I said that lately tentacles have been reaching out to me from three directions - from the Vatican, the Americans and the British. With the Vatican, everything was clear to me: in the face of the entire Catholic world, the pope wants to appear as the savior of mankind. The British, in turn, believe that they should govern post-war Europe. According to the Americans, England has outlived its time and now the leading role should be played by America. All together they do not want communism to win this massacre. "I ask you, my Fuhrer, to instruct you to take these threads into your own hands. Himmler is incapable of giving me such instructions, only you can do it," with these words I ended my information.

"Knowing Hitler," Wolf continued, "I felt that he liked my ideas. But I knew that in the past such proposals caused an immediate rejection and even an outburst of his rage. This time the Fuhrer was silent, pacing around the office and snapping his fingers. Of course, we were also silent ...

This scene ended, according to the same Wolf, as follows: Hitler said goodbye to him, saying: "Thank you for the report with which you arrived. It is very interesting.

"121

Take action and try to get the most favorable offers." Wolf saluted and left the office with the others.

Two months later, Wolf was back with Hitler. The conversation on the night of 17/18 April began with Hitler asking Wolf a question about his meeting with Dulles, which he had already had in the past few days. Then the Obergruppenfuhrer uttered the following tirade:



- My Fuehrer! Let me remind you that when I visited you on February 6 and the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs was present, I asked you: when will the new secret weapons and jet fighters finally appear? I then reported that envoys from the Vatican, the British and the Americans were being sent to me. I reported this and asked for guidance. The fact that you did not ban contacts, I interpreted as their active legitimization. Equally, you did not forbid them to the Imperial Minister, and he interpreted your reaction in the same way. It was clear to me that if I failed, then in the interests of the Reich you would have to give me up. I decided to take action. Now I have come to you, although you did not call me. However, I have come to you as the highest authority, the arbiter of the fate of Germany!

This tirade, as Wolf recalled, made the right impression. Hitler said:

"You, Wolf, of course, know only your southern sector of the front. He is important in his own way. However, the Eastern and Western fronts are even more important. I have no time to devote you and other commanders in all the details. Yes, it doesn't matter to you. I expect one thing from you: you must control the situation in the Italian theater of operations with all the intrigues and betrayal there. You did it flawlessly. I'm glad you were successful!

Immediately after this, Hitler postponed the continuation of the conversation for the afternoon. The meeting continued in the garden of the Imperial Chancellery between

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bombings. Although Hitler promised Wolff that he would give him instructions on how to contact Dulles, he started from something quite different—by describing the battles for Berlin. This is understandable: on April 18, the Red Army was already on the outskirts of the city, and the roar of guns was heard very clearly. At first, Hitler began to explain to Wolf that now, instead of Guderian, he had a new and very capable Chief of the General Staff, Krebs, who "understands what I want." With some surprise, Wolf heard such an assessment of the battles:

- There were major battles on the Oder. We knocked out 150, 200, even 250 Russian tanks a day. Even Russia cannot stand such bloodletting. After all, it depends to a large extent on American and British supplies arriving by sea ...

I asked Wolf:

Did Hitler really think so?

"I don't know if Hitler believed in his words," my interlocutor replied. But that's exactly what they were told. "Russia cannot bear such losses," he repeated.

Dalish was followed by the concept of the final stage of the war. Here she is:

"I deliberately created three main zones of resistance," said Hitler. - The first is the imperial capital of Berlin. I will stay here and defend her. The second is in the Alps, under the command of Kesselring. The third is in Denmark and Norway, under the command of Bush. The German troops will withdraw concentrically into three zones. At the same time, I deliberately leave free spaces between the zones - from Hamburg to Berlin, from Berlin to the Alps. There the unnatural allies clash—the Communist Soviets and the super-capitalist Americans. Of course, Stalin will not be satisfied with what was agreed at Yalta. He will want to rush forward and cross the agreed demarcation line with all his troops. That's when the Anglo-Americans will fight back. The Americans have already launched the Russian too far

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skies to Europe. They will be forced to throw them back. And then the moment will come when I will receive the highest payment for my participation in the war!

Describing his last meeting with Hitler, Wolf clearly regretted that the Fuhrer's cunning plan had not been realized. Indeed, Hitler did not receive either the highest or even the smallest pay.

DAYS: February 8 - February 15

Thursday, February 8

Afternoon M.B. talking with prof. Giesler and Standartenführer Becher, then with Burgdorf about the SD.

At night for tea with Giesler, the Fegeleins and

Fuhrer at E.B. Friday, February 9

Afternoon raid on Weimar

In the evening departure of E.B. and Frau Fegelein. Saturday, February 10

Lunch at the Fegeleins with Reichsführer SS Himmler and Gen. Burgdorf. After dinner, a conversation with Himmler, then with Lammers. Dinner with G. Himmler, Sepp Dietrich, Berger, Fegelein.

Then a meeting.

Sunday, February 11

Afternoon - M.B. conversation with Kaltenbrunner.

Monday, February 12

Afternoon M.B. conversation with Dr. Kaltenbrunner.

Tuesday, February 13

Before noon M.B. with Fegelein in the Maybach-Possen camp \* with Colonel Stroeve!!

Late in the evening and at night - major raids on the center of Dresden.

In the afternoon, the conversation of M.B. with Lammers.

Wednesday, February 14

Happy M.B. as always at the report of the Fuhrer.

In the afternoon, the third major raid on Dresden.

Thursday, February 15

In the afternoon another raid on Dresden. Afternoon M.B. with Hummel, Lammers, then with Kaltenbrunner.

What will keep our eyes on these days? Much has been written about the bombing of Dresden. Perhaps the historians of the Norwegian Resistance will be interested in the records of the intensified negotiations in Berlin between Terboven and Quisling, the ground under whose feet had been burning for a long time. Eva Braun's birthday is an event that hardly deserves comment.

+ Headquarters of the High Command of the Ground Forces near Berlin.

“1257

However, something draws attention: Bormann's intensive contacts with the leadership of the SS. Indeed, at the beginning of February there is a whole series of them:

6.2 - SS-Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner.

7.2 - Kaltenbrunner, Gruppenführer Fegelein, Himmler, Wolf.

8.2 - Fegelein, Standartenführer Becher.

9.2 - Fegelein.

10.2 - Himmler, Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich, Berger, Fegelein.

11.2 - Kaltenbrunner.

12.2 - Kaltenbrunner.

13.2 - Fegelein.

15.2 - Kaltenbrunner.

What did it mean? Thus we come to the need to turn to two letters in the German political jargon of those years and their special role. It's about the SS.

#### ESSAY FIVE:

##### Martin Bormann and the "Final Solution"

Two letters “SS” are inscribed in blood in the history of Germany and Europe in the 20th century. For Germany, they were so special that during the years of Nazism, a special key was introduced on typewriters: the designation “SS” should have been denoted not by two “s”, but by special “Gothic” runes: “44”.

The history of this designation began back in 1919, when Hitler's National Socialist Workers' Party (NSDAP) created its own armed groups (assault units - SA) and at the same time

“17

took care of the protection of party events and the protection of the Fuhrer himself. Then a black uniform appeared, and then the name “Adolf Hitler's shock detachment”. He received his baptism of fire during the November Putsch of 1923 in Munich. The group was banned. But in September 1925, a “revival” took place: detachments were recreated to “guard the assembly areas”, collect advertising for the newspaper “Völkischer Beobachter”, and recruit new members of the NSDAP. By the end of the year, the guard units were already up to | thousands of people.

But everything changed when, on January 6, 1929, a little-known and inconspicuous person, Heinrich Himmler, became the head of the detachments. He wore number 168 in the SS. A failed soldier (he was not at the front), a failed agronomist, a participant in nationalist meetings, a participant in the unsuccessful "November putsch" of 1923, unemployed Heinrich Himmler joined Hitler's party in 1925 and became a party functionary. Here he came to the attention of Hitler, who instructed him to transform the SS from personal guard units into an elite group within the party. This is exactly what Himmler did. By the way, regarding Himmler, the same Martin Bormann, who in the early 1930s worked at the headquarters of Hess, wrote in October 1932 to Hess, who at that time enjoyed unlimited confidence in Hitler:

"Look at the SS. You know Himmler and you know his abilities..."

Himmler's abilities were especially useful when Hitler decided to crack down on his rivals in the party, who chose as their base the structure of the SA - the most massive "assault squads". On Bormann's recommendation, members of the SS and Himmler himself were made Hitler's mainstay. It was with their help that the "Night of the Long Knives" was held on June 30, 1934. Gradually, Himmler's influence grew and his SS became a "state within a state." Nevertheless, Himmler needed Bormann. When he needed

to buy a house for his mistress Hedwig Potthast, none other than Martin Bormann "lent" Himmler 80 thousand Reichsmarks from the party fund, and Potthast became the beloved friend of Bormann's wife Gerla ...

Numbering 52,000 by the time Nazism came to power, the SS detachments turned from a party structure into a state structure. From now on, the SS leadership was in charge of the entire police and forensic apparatus (Himmler became the head of the German police in 1936.) It was in charge of the state security agencies. The Main Directorate of Imperial Security of the SS (RSHA) supervised internal political and foreign intelligence, concentration camps, and punitive measures. Elite SS troops were also created (38 divisions by the end of 1944) as selected, best-equipped formations. People in black uniforms with the sign "Death's Head" on their caps were everywhere.

But among the tasks that were carried out by the SS, there was one that stood apart. It was the extermination of the Jewish population of Germany and all of Europe. At that time, the term "Holocaust" was not used yet. In Nazi vernacular, they spoke of the "final solution of the Jewish question." The SS prepared for it little by little, preparing until 1933, carrying out anti-Semitic measures inside Germany. When the Wehrmacht began its campaign for world domination, the slogans of racism and genocide became a program for the occupation regimes, first in Poland, then in other conquered areas of Europe. On November 11, 1941, Himmler's personal physician Kersten wrote in his diary that his illustrious patient shared with him the Führer's last revelation: the Jews in Europe must be liquidated...

The SS were ready for this task. Their fighting cadres were brought up in the spirit of biological anti-Semitism, they grew up and "tempered" in anti-Semitic practice. Already by the beginning of the war, the first results were achieved.

5 Law. No. 665 Bezymensky

Tats: out of 503,000 Jews living in Germany, 270,000 were forced to emigrate, 170,000 ended up in concentration camps. But how could the terrible machine of misanthropy stop there?

On January 20, 1942, in the picturesque Berlin suburb of Wannsee, on the shores of the lake of the same name, a select audience gathered. The lake house has long become something of a "guest house" of the SS leadership, more precisely, the head of the SS Imperial Security Main Office (German abbreviation – RSHA), SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich. He was also the leader of the meeting of 15 senior officials of the Nazi state, invited to the "conference on the final solution of the Jewish question, followed by breakfast" at 12.00 on January 20 at 56-58 on Am Grossen Wannsee. The minutes of this meeting have been preserved:

"Secret matter of national importance MINUTES OF THE MEETING

At the conference held on January 20, 1942 in Berlin, on the Gross-Wannsee, no.

The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service, SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich, first informed that the Reichsmarschall had appointed him Commissioner for the preparation of the final solution of the Jewish question in Europe, and indicated that he had convened this meeting in order to clarify to fundamental questions. The desire of the Reichsmarschall to be sent a draft of the organizational measures concerning the final decision of the Jewish

which issue in Europe, and the material support for their implementation, requires a preliminary joint discussion by all central authorities, not

directly involved in the solution of these issues, in order to avoid parallelism in the implementation of a common LINE.

The leadership of the final solution of the Jewish question, regardless of geographical boundaries, in the center should be entrusted to the Reichsfuehrer SS and the chief of the German police (chief of the security police and security service).

The Chief of the Security Police and Security Services then gave a brief overview of the measures already taken against this enemy. The most significant of them are:

- a) expulsion of Jews from certain spheres of the life of the German people;
- b) expulsion of Jews from the living space of the German people.

In fulfillment of these aims, the accelerated resettlement of Jews from the territory of the Reich was begun as a preliminary measure to resolve the issue, and then intensified.

By order of the Reichsmarschall, in January 1939, an imperial center for the resettlement of Jews was created, the leadership of which was entrusted to the head of the police and security services. It has its task:

- a) carry out all measures to prepare for the intensified resettlement of Jews;
- b) direct the flow of resettled people;
- c) in some cases to speed up the resettlement.

The task was to legally clear the living space of Jews Germans.

All instances were aware of the losses that the forcing of the resettlement entailed. However, due to the lack of other options, I had to put up with it. Despite the difficulties, from the moment of coming to power until October 31, 1941, a total of 537,000 Jews were resettled. Of these: from January 30, 1933 from Old Germany - an average of 360 thousand, from March 15, 1938 from the eastern regions - 147 thousand, with

5\* "131

March 15, 1939 from the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia - 30 thousand.

This is how the program looked before the start of World War II. Now, it was said in Wannsee, "another possibility of resolving this issue was used: the evacuation of Jews to the East began." Let's not close our eyes to the true meaning of the outwardly harmless term "evacuation". It was about destruction. It was for this purpose that an assessment of the future evacuation (read - deportation) was compiled, which was to be carried out:

"Country Number Proper Germany 131,800 Eastern Regions 420,000 Ostmark\* 43,700 General Government\*\* 2,284,000 Biaÿystok 400,000 Protectorate of Bohemia 74,200 and Moravia Estonia-Latvia 3,500 Lithuania 34,000 Belgium 43,000 Denmark 5,600 France 165 000 ( occupied territory) France 700,000 (non-occupied territory) Greece 69,600 Netherlands 160,800 Norway 1,300 Bulgaria 48,000 England 330,000 \* Austria.

\*\* Poland (ed.).

Finland 2300

Ireland 4,000 Italy (including Sardinia) 58,000 Albania 200 Croatia 40,000 Portugal 3,000 Romania (including Bessarabia) 342,000 Sweden 8,000 Switzerland 18,000 Serbia 10,000 Slovakia 88,000 Spain 6,000 Turkey (European part) 55 50 0 Hungary 742 800 USSR 5 000 000 Ukraine 2994 684 Belarus 446 484

(excluding Bialystok area)

Total: Over 11,000,000"

After this "hit list", explanations were given:

"... With appropriate leadership in the course of the final solution of the Jewish question, the Jews should be properly used in the work. In large work columns, divided according to sex, able-bodied Jews will be taken to build roads in these areas, and there is no doubt that a significant part of them will be naturally weeded out.

The remnant that has been preserved just in case (here, undoubtedly, the most able to resist part) must be treated accordingly, since, representing a naturally selected part, after liberation it must be considered as the embryo of new Jews (see the experience of history).

In the process of final practical solution

"133

question Europe should be combed from West to East.

The evacuated Jews are gradually brought to the so-called transit camps in order to be sent from there to the East.

The start of individual larger evacuation operations will depend to a large extent on the development of military operations."

In other words, the direct dependence of the implementation of the "final solution" on the success of the Wehrmacht in its war of extermination against the USSR was established. If we succeed in conquering the Soviet Union, then 11 million Jews will be liquidated. It won't work, then...

The document, known in post-war historiography as the Wannsee Plan, was not a Platonic declaration. With the boots of the SS, the volleys of the "firing squads", the shovels of the guards who buried their victims alive, he was brought to life.

Already by 1942, the following became known:

— the first months after the invasion of the SS and the Wehrmacht into the Soviet Union were marked by mass executions of Jews in Kyiv, Iasi, Odessa, Kaunas and Riga;

— in October 1941, the mass deportation of Jews from Germany to concentration camps in Poland began;

- in March 1942, the deportation of Jews from Slovakia began;

— in the same month of 1942, Jews in occupied France and Slovakia were deported;

- July 1942 was the month of the beginning of the deportation from Holland;

- in August 1942, the turn of the Jewish population of France and Belgium came;

— in October 1942, deportation from Norway began;

— in March 1943 the hour struck for the Jews in Greece, Macedonia and Thrace;

— In October 1943, deportations from Denmark and Italy began.

How many people fell victim to the "Wannsee plan"? On November 26, 1945, the testimony of SS-Sturmbannführer Wilhelm Hoettl was presented to the Nuremberg Tribunal. He recalled a conversation he had had in Budapest at the end of August 1944 with Adolf Eichmann, a participant in the Wannsee meeting and the head of the department [YL RSHA] responsible for the deportation and extermination of the Jews. Hettl asked him:

"How much do you have on your conscience?"

Eichmann replied:

"This figure is a state secret. But on the basis of available data, I believe that approximately 4 million people were killed in the various extermination camps. In addition, another 2 million were killed by other methods, mainly by the actions of the "Einsatz teams" of the SS during the Russian campaign. Himmler was not pleased with my answer, because, according to his estimates, the number of Jews killed must be more than 6 million ... "

Since that time, the terrible figure of 6 million has become customary for describing the genocide of the Jewish population. Of course, after the war, historians tried to put this assessment on a factual basis. This turned out to be no easy task. During the war, no one (not even the commandants of the "death camps") kept complete statistics on murders. With great difficulty, scientists from various countries reconstructed the data, some from existing SS reports, others by comparing the original data on the size of the Jewish population before the German invasion. It turned out to be especially difficult to count the victims of the "Wannsee Plan" on the territory of the USSR: in its reports, the Extraordinary State Commission created in the USSR did not single out groups of individual nationalities and did not take into account those direct actions that the German occupiers

"135

undertook in fulfillment of the orders of Hitler and Himmler on the "final solution of the Jewish question." Nevertheless, the authors of the fundamental study "The Scale of the Genocide" published in Germany came to the conclusion that the minimum figure for extermination was 5.29 million, the maximum being a little over 6 million people. For individual countries calculations gave:

Germany itself 165,000 people

Austria 65 459

Luxembourg 5,000

France and Belgium 77,320

Belgium 28 800

Holland 100,000

Denmark 116

Norway 762

Italy 7 680

Albania 581

Greece 67,000

Bulgaria 11,393 (deported but rescued)

Yugoslavia 65,500

Czechoslovakia 146 150

Romania 211214

Hungary 550,000

Poland 2,700,000

USSR 2,900,000

So, after all, six million!

What did Martin Bormann have to do with this "special subject of the SS"? Is it only formal, since he was a member of the SS and at the end of his life he held the high rank of SS Obergruppenführer? But formality was Bormann's life. Nothing in Germany could be done without his participation and outside his field.

vision. Especially the "final solution" of the Jewish question! This is precisely what was said in the verdict of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which tried Bormann ip absepiah (in his absence):

"Bormann was especially active in the persecution of Jews, not only in Germany, but also in the occupied and occupied territories. He took part in the meetings that led to the deportation by the SS and Gestapo of 60,000 Jews from Vienna to Poland. He signed a decree of May 31, 1941, which extended the "Nuremberg Laws" to the conquered eastern regions. In a decree of October 9, 1942, he declared that the permanent exclusion of Jews from German life could no longer be achieved by emigration, but only "by the use of brute force" in special camps in the East. | On July 1943, he signed a directive according to which Jews were deprived of judicial protection and transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of Himmler's Gestapo.

This was only a fragment of Bormann's participation in the "final solution" of the Jewish question. When rumors spread in Germany about the fate of Jews in "death concentration camps", Bormann on October 9, 1942 sent a directive to all party authorities that such rumors should not interfere with solving problems "only with the help of ruthless cruelty." And the meeting in Wannsee itself was attended by Bormann's direct representative, Dr. Gerhard Klopfer, deputy head of the party chancellery with the rank of secretary of state. We see his name more than once on the pages of Bormann's diary, almost every day. The implementation of the "Wannsee plan" was part of Klopfer's direct official duties. The topic of the "final solution" was repeatedly discussed by Bormann and Klopfer (by the way, although he was captured by the Americans, he was never brought to trial. He died in 1987, outliving all the other participants in the Wannsee conference).

"1377

Bormann also made a direct contribution to the extermination of the Jews. In his office there was a special department T-4, which was engaged in the development of measures for the mass destruction of the victims of the regime. They first became prisoners of concentration camps who got there from "madhouses" (the practice of declaring opponents of the regime as insane was invented in the Third Reich!). But then things got more difficult. As Dr. Wetzel, an employee of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, already known to us from his discussions about the general plan "Ost", wrote on October 25, 1941:



"I report that Oberdinstleiter Brak of the Fuehrer's Office has declared his willingness to cooperate in providing the necessary accommodation and in the manufacture of gassing apparatuses. The necessary devices are not yet available in sufficient quantities, they must be manufactured... The marriage warns that the indicated procedure is unsafe and requires special protective measures. I note that Sturmbannführer Eichmann, who is in charge of Jewish affairs in the RSHA, agrees with this method.

So, the ominous "gas chamber" - it was called in the German official jargon "gazvagen" - was invented not at all in any experimental laboratories of concentration camps, but directly in Bormann's office. The world learned about the gas chambers after the trial carried out in 1944 in Krasnodar against the Nazi executioners from the Einsatz groups. The production of gas chambers was established in Berlin. In each "gas chamber" 70-80 people were destroyed in one "procedure", and according to the most conservative estimates, about 250 people died in them during the years of occupation.

thousands of people...

The implementation of the "Final Solution" had its stages. At first (before the war) there was an accounting and what in Wannsee was called the "crowding out" of the Jews. When Poland was occupied, it was already possible with

take more drastic measures. Ghettos were created in Polish cities.

The German punitive machine by this period already had an extensive network of concentration camps, the creation of which dates back to the pre-war period. Then they were intended for reprisals against political opponents of Nazism and, in terms of their "capacity", were not suitable for the destruction of the multi-million Jewish population. Therefore, in 1940, intensive construction of new camps began, mainly outside the borders of Germany, and more precisely, on the former Polish territory.

As a result, a system of punitive institutions was formed (on the territory of Poland - 5887 in total), the components of which were:

- concentration camps (136)
- transit (transit) camps (about 130)
- labor camps (more than 1,700 in the General Government, 2,197 on "included" lands)
- camps for prisoners of war (including 24 - for the Soviet)
- labor camps for the Jewish population (about 440)
- ghetto (about 400).

All were used to varying degrees to implement the "Final Solution". However, camps were built (or converted) with the express purpose of exterminating the Jews. These camps were (German names in brackets):

Rogoznice (Gross-Rosen) Oswiecim (Auschwitz) Brzezinka (Birkenau) Majdanek (Lublin) Belzec (Belzec) Chełmno (Kulmhof) Sobibor (Sobibor)

1397

Treblinka (Treblinka) Schuchetov (Stutthof)

In order to imagine the scale of the destruction carried out, we present some data. The first of the special extermination camps was Chełmno (German: Kulmhof) near Łódź, where from December 1941 the prisoners of the Łódź ghetto were exterminated. A year later, the Belzec camp appeared in the Lublin region, and in the spring of 1942, Sobibor (also not far from Lublin).

At the same time, the Treblinka camp near Warsaw was built, where prisoners of the Warsaw ghetto met their death (since July 1942). These three camps used the gas chambers proposed by Bormann and Braque, where exhaust gas from diesel engines was admitted. Following this, near the same Lublin, the Majdanek extermination camp, which had previously been used for Soviet prisoners of war, began to operate. Finally, a complex of camps came into operation, bearing the common name of Auschwitz (Auschwitz) near Krakow. The first camp (Auschwitz-I) was also first used to accommodate and exterminate the Poles, then for the Jews. During the expansion of the complex near the village of Brzezinka (Birkenau), the Auschwitz-II camp was created, equipped with gas chambers and crematoria. It began operating in the winter of 1941-1942. Then they created the Auschwitz-III camp, which served the factories in the town of Monowice. Since 1943, the need for unpaid workers forced the SS to keep alive an increasing proportion of the doomed who could still work. Auschwitz-I became practically the main extermination camp.

Geographically east of all - i.e. Sobibor, Treblinka, Majdanek and Belzec were more accessible to the Soviet troops. However, some of them were closed for a different reason, namely because of the uprisings that were raised by the prisoners in Sobibor and Treblinka. The victories of the Soviet troops and their approach to

the western borders of the USSR inspired the prisoners of the camps to take active steps. An uprising took place in Treblinka on August 2, 1943, and on October 14, 1943, under the leadership of the Soviet officer Alexander Pelechov, a successful uprising was carried out in Sobibor; part of the rebels went to the neighboring forests. Following this, both camps were closed. But other extermination camps continued to operate, trains regularly went to the ramps of the camp's railway stations.

The first "extermination camp" that the Red Army managed to liberate was Majdanek near Lublin. Even when future operations were being discussed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in April-May 1944, the offensive was planned far into the depths of the German defenses. As Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, although by June non-German troops were still in charge in Belarus, the Soviet offensive operation planned for the summer under the code name "Bagration" provided not only for breaking the defense line, but also for entering the operational depth of the defense of the "Center" group. In particular, on its southern flank, the 1st Belorussian Front was to attack Sedlec and Lublin through Pinsk and Brest.

The unexpectedness of the appearance of Soviet troops near Lublin was all the more so because Eastern Poland was separated from the divisions of Marshal Rokossovsky by the famous Polissya swamps, difficult for the troops to pass. But this barrier was skillfully bypassed: units of the front armies - 36 rifle divisions, 4 tank corps - approached Lublin not from the east, but from the south. Here they were not expected. On July 6, the key railway center Kovel was liberated, and two armies—the 8th Guards and the 69th (Generals Chuikov and Kolpakchi)—moved to Lublin, forcing the Western Bug River here. Along with them were the units of the 1st Polish Army of General Berling. July 24 was taken

Lublin. When the Soviet troops found themselves on the southeastern outskirts of Lublin, about two kilometers from the city limits, they discovered another city - the city of death.

This was the first meeting of the Red Army with what was called the extermination camp. "When you walk along the Helm highway," wrote Konstantin Simonov, "on the right, just some 300 meters from the highway, the outlines of a whole city grow: hundreds of low gray roofs built in regular rows, separated by wire. This is a big city where tens of thousands of people can live... You turn off the highway and enter through a barbed wire gate. Rows of clean barracks with neat front gardens, with armchairs and benches knocked down from birch sticks. These are the barracks of the SS guards and authorities.

Next are the cells where the dress taken from the prisoners was disinfected. Pipes were made in the ceiling, through which the disinfectant was thrown. Then they

were smeared, the doors were hermetically locked, and disinfection was carried out. And this is true: the walls of the barracks, knocked down from boards, and the doors, not bound with iron, all of this is built too fragile for anything else to be done here, except for the disinfection of clothes.

But now we open the next door and find ourselves in the second disinfection chamber, built on a completely different principle. This is a square room, a little over two meters high and about 6 x 6 meters in size. Walls, ceiling, floor - everything is solid gray concrete. There are no shelves for the dress that we saw in the previous room. Everything is bare and empty. A single large steel door hermetically closes the entrance to the premises. It snaps into place on the outside with imposing steel brackets. In the walls it

There are three holes in this concrete crypt: two of them are pipes going outside and leading inside, the third hole is a peephole. This is a small square window, blocked off by a thick and frequent steel grate embedded in concrete from the inside. Thick glass is built into the outer side of the wall so that it cannot be reached through the bars.

Where is the peephole? To answer this question, open the door and leave the cell outside. A second small concrete chamber was built next to it, into which a peephole opens. There is an electric light and a switch here. From here, the entire interior of the chamber is visible through the peephole. Here, on the floor, there are several round, hermetically sealed cans on which are written "Cyclone" and then in small letters - "for special use in the eastern regions." The contents of these jars were poured through pipes into that neighboring chamber, when it was filled with people.

People were naked, they were placed close to each other, and they did not take up much space. Over 250 people were squeezed into 40 square meters of cells."

...I remember well how Simonov was shocked by what he saw in Majdanek. The writer visited us, at the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front, and shared his impressions.

When, at the beginning of 1945, major offensive operations were undertaken on the Soviet German front, on January 27, the troops of the neighboring 1st Ukrainian Front liberated the Auschwitz death complex (Auschwitz-Birkenau) - the "heart" of the monstrous program Hitler - Himmler. Only the extermination camp Chelmno (Kulmhof) and Rogoznica remained. Soviet troops came to Chełmno at the beginning of February. True, by that time (namely, from July 1944) trains with Jews no longer came here. In total, about 310 thousand people were killed here, including Jews from Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg,

Holland, Hungary, Poland. The line for the Rogoznica (Gross-Rosen) camp came on February 15, 1945. The total number of people killed here reached 125,000 people. In recent months, prisoners were urgently evacuated from here to the Dora camp (also a branch of Sachsenhausen) and the Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Dachau, Bergen-Belsen camps located to the west. The last execution in Rogoznica took place in January 1945. Sachsenhausen itself (northeast of Berlin) was liberated by Soviet and Polish troops on April 20, 1945. The number of victims of Sachsenhausen is estimated at 200 thousand people; the women's camp Ravensbrück (near Fürstenberg) was liberated on April 30, 1945. The last of the camps, which partially performed the function of exterminating the Jews, was Theresienstadt (Teresin) in Czechoslovakia. He was released on May 7, 1945. The sinister empire of the SS, which Martin Bormann carefully watched for prosperity for so long, disappeared under the blows of Soviet troops in 1945. The numbers, like the facts, speak for themselves. But this language is too dry to give an idea of what a monstrous barbarity Hitler, Himmler and Bormann were trying to normalize in the middle of the 20th century. For examples, as they say, not far to go. Indeed, Himmler's mistress Hedwig Potthast was not far to walk from Martin Bormann's villa to her villa, where she invited another Martin, Martin Jr., whom the Bormann family called "Crown Prince". One day, "Aunt Potthast" decided to enlighten the boy by inviting him to

Cup of tea. Tea was drunk, after which she asked Martin to go upstairs with her to the attic. Here she showed him a specially equipped room at the direction of the owner of the house, Heinrich Himmler. At first, Martin didn't notice anything: a room as a room, tables and chairs. But it turned out that the tables and chairs are unusual: they are made of human remains - bones and dried human skin,

processed in concentration camps are made from the bodies of prisoners who died in the camps.

"And this is Mein Kampf," the "auntie" showed the boy the Nazi gospel and added: "Look at the binding. It's also made of human skin..."

It is difficult to understand the purpose for which this monstrous "demonstration lesson" was held on the topic - what is the SS. Martin Jr., who became a Catholic priest after the war, remembered him for a long time. But he didn't tell his father about it. For what? He already knew what the SS was.

DAYS: February 16 - March 1

Friday, February 16

M.B. conversation with party comrade Friedrichs, Klopfer.

Saturday, February 17

M.B. conversation with Ruder, Lammers, Aksman.

Sunday, February 18

M.B. Meeting with Dr. von Hummel. Dr. Schmidt-Roemer about communication.

In the evening M.B. in Zossen. Switchboard in Hagen.

Camp Maybach - Zeppelin

(with Hummel on the situation in the North).

Monday, February 19

With Fegelein in the sauna in Possen.

Tuesday, February 20

Muller and two RAD officials\* to the North\*\*.

M.B. in the morning at the party. office. Conference with Friedrichs, Walkenhorst, Zander, Klopfer, Schmidt-Römer.

Wednesday, February 21

Muller returned from the North.

Meeting with Müller in Zossen, later with Zander.

Heavy raids on Vienna, Erfurt, Nuremberg.

Rate Berlin.

Thursday, February 22

Happy M.B. at the Fuhrer.

After dinner Forster at the Fuhrer. Meeting of M.B. with Dr. Naumann, with Ruder and Friedrichs.

Friday, February 23

Meeting of M.B. with Admiral Voss, Klopfer, Dr. Stoll, Lammers, in the evening - Bakke and Ricke.

Sunder.

\* Mecklenburg. Imperial labor service. \*\* We are talking about the Bormann estate in

Saturday, February 24

Sunday,

Monday,

At 14 o'clock Reichsleiters, Gauleiters and organizational leaders in the Imperial Chancellery.

Greetings.

Presentation of the "German Order" to Konstantin Hirl, who turned 70 on February 24.

Dinner. Fuhrer's speech.

In the evening from 8 p.m. to night at Goebbels. Hirl's 70th Anniversary Invitation!

25 February

Heavy raids on Linz and Munich. In the evening Fegelein and Burgdorf Dinner at M.B.

February 26

Strong raid on Berlin.

The second time the party office was badly hurt (in the yard).

Meeting of M.B. with Obergruppenführer Steiner.

Minister Bakke and Secretary of State Rike at a report to the Fuhrer on the issue of cutting supplies.

Tuesday, February 27

Afternoon M.B. consults with Burgdorf about General von Alphen, with Jon about Norway, with Dr. Ley at 4.30 pm, in the evening with Fegelein and Bredov.

Strong raid on Augsburg, Halle, Sahl

iburg.

Wednesday, February 28

Every day, as usual, Zander is at an operational meeting.

Thursday, March 1

Afternoon meeting M.B. with Oberg-Ruppenführer Prützmann.

In the evening with Sepp Dietrich and Kaltenbrunner.

## ESSAY SIX:

### Martin BORMANN and the German people

Among the February and March entries, reflecting the hectic activity of the head of the party office and the secretary of the Fuhrer, I was attracted by the name of Prützmann. Not because SS-Obergruppenführer Hans Prützmann is of any interest in himself. It is interesting only as an addressee. For it was to him in September 1943 that Himmler entrusted the implementation of the plan to create a "scorched earth" in the territories of the Soviet Union, from which the Wehrmacht was retreating. On 7 September 1943, Himmler ordered the Obergruppenführer

ru SS Hans Prützmann "not to leave a single person, not a cow, not a centner of grain, not a single railway rail in Ukraine." Now Prützmann was given a similar task - to carry out the scorched earth plan, but on German territory.

Albert Speer recalls this in some detail. Back in August 1944, he heard from Hitler fatal words that "if the German people are defeated in this war, it means that they are weak. If he does not stand his historical test, then he is not worthy of anything other than death." Indeed, at the Nuremberg trials, the world learned what thoughts were overwhelmed by Hitler when he saw the collapse of his empire. At the trial, he was cited

words:

"If the war is lost, then the people themselves must perish. Such a fate is inevitable. The people have shown that they are weak... In addition, those who survived are people of little value. The good ones are dead..."

One officer of the German General Staff recalled the words spoken by Hitler in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery:

"If the German people are so cowardly and weak, then they deserve nothing but a shameful death..."

Hitler was not the only one talking about this. The following words of Goebbels have survived:

"The German people, the German people... But what can be done with such a people if they don't want to fight anymore? All the plans of National Socialism and other goals were too lofty, too noble for this people. He was too cowardly to carry them out. In the East he flees, in the West he does not let the soldiers fight and meets the enemy with white flags. The German people have deserved the fate that now awaits them..."

So, in March 1945, Prützmann was instructed to "carry out special tasks behind enemy lines" — blowing up buildings, destroying bridges, and so on.

Prützmann was the same, but under the "rear of the enemy" something else was meant: it was Germany itself. The fateful twelve o'clock had long struck, but the Germans were ordered to "fight at all costs." In this case, Bormann took an active part. So, on February 28, 1945, he informed his closest assistants - Klopfer and Friedrichs - that in a conversation between Himmler and Hitler, the latter allowed 6,000 youths born in 1929 (that is, sixteen-year-old teenagers) to be mobilized to provide rear lines. In addition, the Fuhrer blessed the formation of women's battalions. Himmler discussed these measures in his capacity as Commander of the Reserve Forces, which he had been since July 1944. However, these measures seemed insufficient to Bormann: he proposed other measures, namely: to return to the army almost 700,000 deserters who, under various pretexts, were hiding in the territory of the Reich. For this, it was proposed to carry out an all-encompassing police action with the most severe sanctions against those who evaded service in the Wehrmacht.

But that wasn't the climax yet. The last came in March 1945, when Hitler's order appeared, which received the name "Nero's". He said:

"I order:

1) All military installations, means of transport, communications and industrial enterprises, as well as all valuables in the territory of the Reich, which can now or subsequently be used by the enemy to continue the war, are subject to destruction.

2) Responsible for the implementation of this destruction are: for military installations - the appropriate military authorities (they are also responsible for the destruction of communications and transport). Gauleiters and Imperial Defense Commissioners are responsible for the destruction of all industrial plants, public utilities

“51

and other values. The troops are obliged to render the necessary assistance to the Gauleiters and Reich Commissars of Communications in the performance of their tasks.

3) This order is immediately brought to the attention of the commanders of all types of troops. All other orders on this issue are declared invalid.

Signed: Adolf Hitler.

This order was signed by Hitler on March 19, 1945 and sent out by the headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces under No. 002711/45. In the following days, there was no more zealous supporter of this order than Bormann. On March 23, 1945, he issued a special order on the method of carrying out this Führer order. In the list of objects to be destroyed, Borman named:

all industrial enterprises

all important power plants, gas works and water pipelines,

all warehouses of food and uniforms,

all bridges, all railway lines and communication lines, railway communication lines,

all channels

all cables,

all railway carriages and locomotives.

In other words, if Hitler's order and Bormann's additional order had been carried out, then nothing would have been left of Germany at all!

How can you explain why the order was not fully executed? The decisive factor is the actions of the troops of the anti-Hitler coalition. Recall that this order was issued in March 1945, that is, during the period of the last decisive actions of the Soviet Army and the Allied armies in Germany. If we take into account that the final victorious offensive of the Soviet troops began already in mid-April, then we can understand why the “Nero's order” was not

fully completed.

Second circumstance. Obviously, even in the soul of the exhausted, confused and frightened German population, Hitler's order caused such an internal disgust that there were not always people who could carry it out. Hitler hated his people; Bormann also hated him. But many of those who received the “Neronian order” still possessed elements of common sense.

Third circumstance. When the owners of those enterprises that were to be destroyed found out about Hitler's order, they became naturally indignant. How, they said, we saved our factories even from British and American bombs, will they really have to die from their own, German mines? In Nuremberg, Speer spoke quite picturesquely about this. On behalf of his industrial friends, he tried to protest before Hitler and presented him with a special memorandum in which he argued that, in view of the inevitability of defeat, at least some industrial base should be preserved for the German people. What did Hitler say to Speer on March 18? He declared:

"If the war is lost, the German people must perish. Fate is inexorable. It is absolutely not necessary to pay attention to what the people need for their most primitive existence. Quite the contrary: it is better to destroy all these things yourself. It's better to destroy yourself. He who survived is the least valuable, for the best fell in battle..."

That's what Hitler said about those who were still alive. Bormann spoke about the same thing - he not only spoke, but also acted. There is a note made by one of the officers who was in the Imperial Chancellery on the memorable days of April 1945. It tells of a conversation that took place between Martin Bormann and General Wilhelm Burgdorf, head of the personnel department of the OKW. Drunk

"153

Burgdorf, in a fit of impotent rage and despair, shouted:

"Hundreds of thousands died! But for what? For your beloved German homeland, for its great future? For honest, clean Germany? No, they died for you, for your prosperity, because of your lust for power. You deceived them, collected colossal wealth, stole estates, built castles, bathed in luxury, deceived the people ... "

Bormann answered him:

"Ah, my dear, don't take everything so personally. If anyone else has profited, then it's not my fault. I swear to you everything that I have a saint. Let's drink, my dear!

But Bormann had nothing sacred for a long time, and it cost him nothing to lie again. The meaning of the "Nero's order" must be searched deeper - not only in the specific conditions of the end of the criminal Hitlerite adventure. This order, in its essence, followed from the whole concept of National Socialism, which practically called into question the very existence of the German people. Outwardly, everything looked different: Nazism did not spread about anything as much as about the people, race and so on. But in reality he deeply despised his own people. Racism is a boomerang. It is said that a people that oppresses other peoples cannot be free. Naturally, a person who despises other peoples cannot treat his people well. Hitler and Bormann, who condemned other peoples to death and considered them as their slaves, also considered the Germans their slaves.

So, after one of the night conversations with the Fuhrer, which took place on the night of January 27-28, 1944, Bormann outlined a broad program of how the Nazi leadership was going to deal with their wards.

The idea behind the Bormann memorandum was to ensure "eugenic growth"  
German Nase

leniya at any cost - up to the introduction of the institution of bigamy and encouragement of the birth rate by all sorts of methods. Particular attention was paid to the institution of illegitimate children, which Bormann wanted to develop rapidly.

And it was not only the program. After the war, in the archives of Martin Bormann, other documents concerning the fate of his fellow tribesmen were also found. Bormann considered them as breeding stock.



It sounds almost unbelievable, but nevertheless, together with his wife, a fanatical adherent of Nazism Gerda Buch, Martin Bormann for a long time prepared projects for the introduction ... of official polygamy in Germany.

How did it happen? It is known that the leadership of the SS for a number of years worked on "breeding a pure Aryan race." For this purpose, a special organization (the so-called "Lebensborn") was created and special "educational" institutions were organized, in which persons of a "pure race" were selected. The breeding of the race was carried out by a special department of the SS, which was led by SS Obergruppenführer Greifelt.

... In early May 1945, the author of this book accidentally ended up on the island of Pfaueninsel on Lake Wannsee. Goebbels' villa was located here, and nearby, in the garden, a more modest building. On it, like on many other buildings at that time, a large white flag fluttered. Together with a group of German anti-fascists and several Soviet officers, I entered this house. An elderly lady came out to meet us, who, with surprisingly good military bearing, reported:

"Gentlemen, here is the imperial school of brides.

Brides school? We have never seen anything like this before. And the elderly lady helpfully explained that in this "educational" institution girls were brought up who were intended as brides for the SS men who were at the front. About their wives

"155

hah they didn't have the slightest idea, but all the same, the SS teachers taught them the basics of the Nazi worldview, needlework, cooking and other arts, which, according to the instructions of the SS headquarters, the guardians of the SS hearth should have possessed. It all looked absolutely incredible. But nevertheless, looking around, we could see several young girls who, in a state of complete apathy, were sitting on the veranda and

doing knitting...

However, the new plan of Martin Bormann and his wife Gerda surpassed the degree of mockery of common sense, which was the imperial school of brides. Bormann, together with his wife, decided to oblige every SS man, every member of the Nazi Party, and in general any Aryan ... to enter into three marriages at the same time! For the normal functioning of this system, Gerda Bormann suggested that the spouse visit each of the three families once every two weeks. Her detailed letter addressed to her husband, in which Gerda Bormann justified the new project, she ended with a touching phrase: "How do you like it?"

The essence of this post-war Bormann plan appears in a slightly different light when compared with some other projects that were being developed at that time.

In March 1945, Martin Bormann commissioned the drafting of a document entitled "On the question of ensuring the dominant role of the NSDAP", which outlined the idea of turning the party office into the central institution of the Third Reich. At the same time, in circles close to Goebbels, a plan was being considered for the transformation of higher bodies: in them, Bormann was assigned the post of Minister for Party Affairs, and Goebbels the post of Reichskaniler.

But the projects did not end there. After the capitulation, the archives of the "Doenitz government" were found

The documents drawn up at the beginning of April and outlining the methods of preserving the NSDAP in the event of the defeat of Germany are surrounded. One of the documents is dated April 3, 1945; it is without a signature, but there is a title. It says:

German Freedom Movement. Berlin. April 3, 1945.

The German freedom movement is based on a racial idea. This movement took shape during the war as an expression of the will of front-line soldiers who believed in the old traditions of the National Socialist movement. True to the Fuehrer's oath and devoted to his cause, this movement breaks:

- a) with a rotten party bureaucracy,
- 6) with a self-deceiving government caste,
- c) with a policy of adventures ... "

There were two appendices to the above proclamation: the first contained a list of possible 12 foreign policy demands of the "new movement". Here they are:

"1. The liberation of the German people from oppression and occupation.

The return of the exiled.

United Germanic Racial Society. Termination of the arbitrariness of the enemy.

European Union on a federal basis. The right to racial autonomy.

European unity for mutual benefit. European Arbitration Court.

A community of kindred enemies to eventually create the German Empire.

10. Commonwealth of Germany with Bohemia and Moravia.

11. Guaranteed protection of racial groups.

12. Economic unification of Europe".

Here, of course, it is difficult to separate pure nonsense from political nonsense. But it is possible to register a quite definite fact: in the last days of

"157

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In April 1945, in the close circle of Hitler, a plan was hatched for the restoration of the Nazi Party. They wanted to impose on the German people plans that only verbally "broke with the policy of adventures," as the document of April 3 proclaimed. In fact, the dying leaders of Nazism wanted the policy of bloody adventures to continue!

To these "12 points" was added a program of domestic political character ("German world order"), including:

1. Create a strong government.
2. Construction of the "German Parliament" ("Volksting").
3. Orientation to "moral principles".
4. Organization of the "German Order" as the second chamber.
5. The right to racial autonomy.
6. European unity for mutual benefit.

7. European Arbitration Court.
8. A community of kindred peoples, in order to eventually recreate the German Empire.
9. Commonwealth of Germany with Bohemia and Moravia.
10. Guaranteed protection of racial groups.
11. Economic unification of Europe.

Curiously, in the text of the appendix there was a reference to the existence of a certain "General Plan for 1945", i.e. there was a plan of general action for the period after the military defeat of the Reich. The penchant of Nazi politicians for "general plans" is well-known – for example, in 1941-1942 during the creation of the "General Plan Ost"...

Perhaps part of the "Master Plan 1945" was the creation of new paramilitary organizations. So, on October 18, 1944, the notorious "Volkssturm" was created - a miserable ersatz of the people's militia. The idea of creating this "suicide guard" of the Nazi Party belonged to two figures "brown

go" mode. The first - from the side of the NSDAP - was Martin Bormann. The second, from the military side, was Lieutenant General Adolf Heusinger, whom Bormann brought in as a military adviser. The headquarters of the "Volkssturm" was located along with the headquarters of Bormann, and he considered himself in the role of the supreme commander of this organization.

The military value of the "Volkssturm" was equal to zero, as Keitel frankly admitted in Nuremberg. Therefore, it is quite possible that in the "Volkssturm" Bormann saw some kind of skeleton of a future military-party organization that could be preserved for the post-war period. Approximately the same can be said about the notorious terrorist organization of the "freedom movement" - "Werwolf" ("Werewolf"), which was created a little later - in March 1945. True, and this plan turned out to be a bluff.

The full text of the "General Plan 1945" was not found in the archives. Maybe he didn't exist. But Martin Bormann's clerical zeal could not stop the Nazi regime's rapid run to complete collapse. A regime that was the enemy of its own people.

In the notebook there are - at its end - several entries that are not of a chronological nature. They contain the birthdays of the father, mother and children, the dates of the Gauleiter conferences during the war years. But there are lines that, apparently, were important for the owner of the book. Why? It is hard to say. For example, why did Bormann need such a table of the duration of pregnancy in animals:

"Horses - 340 (307-360)

Cows - 248 (240-311)

Sheep - 152 (116-157)

Goats - 150 (137-154)."

Another entry, no longer about horses and goats, but about people, is more understandable, since in Nazi times

The exchange of genealogical confirmation of the purity of the race was very important. She says:

"A person has 1024 ancestors in the 10th generation. In the 20th generation, he already has more than a million ancestors, in the 30th already more than a billion, in the 40th more than a billion.

Moreover, the 10th generation was 250-300 years ago, the 40s - 1000-1200 years ago.

Suppose that Germany in the year 800 after the birth of Christ had 5 million inhabitants, then every German of our time is descended from the Germans of that time:

| billion: 5 million - 200,000.

Therefore, every German has 200,000 ancestors."

What could this mean? Was it possible that Bormann, the guardian of the racial purity of the German people, was going to demand from every German a certificate of Aryan origin in the hundredth generation? Even Bormann could hardly reach such bureaucratic zeal. But who knows - maybe racial idiocy has no boundaries.

DAYS: March 2 – March 18

Friday, March 2

In the morning heavy raids on Magdeburg, Dresden, Chemnitz, Plauen, Cologne. In the morning M.B. confer with Friedrichs and

Dotiler.

Saturday, March 3

With the Fuhrer - visit to the headquarters of the divisions "Berlin" and "Leberitz".

Anglo-Americans in Neuss and Krefeld! The Russians are in Keslin and Shlava!

Sunday, March 4

Monday,

Meeting of M.B. with Dr. Ley, Werner Lorenz, adm. Foss and adm. Matisse, once again with Ley; report to the Fuhrer, meeting with Ruder.

in the evening with Fegelein and Burgdorf. Deep breakthroughs in Pomerania.

Tanks near Kolberg-Schlawa-Dramburg. To the west, Neiss has only a bridgehead.

5th of March

In the morning a new strong raid on Chemnitz. In the morning with Fegelein in the sauna, then lunch with Streve.

Tuesday, March 6

In the morning, a meeting of M.B. with Dr. von Hummel, report to the Fuhrer, meeting. with Lammers, with Schmidt Roemer.

Hummel in Dresden with Ms. Hammitish M.B. in the evening with the Foss spouses at Puma \*.

Wednesday, March 7

M.B. before lunch in the sauna.

4.30 pm meeting with Dr. Glasmeier (St. Florian), followed by a meeting with M.B. with Dr. Nauman. M.B. with Dr. Nauman at the lecture

\*At the Puttkammers.

6 Dec. No. 665 Bezymensky

Fuhrer about the phenomena of decomposition. In the evening, Eva B. arrives in Berlin in a special car on 20.14.

Thursday, March 8

In the morning, a meeting of M.B. with Klopfer - Friedrichs - Müller - Zander. Englishmen in Cologne! Bonn is a bridgehead. Russians in Altdamm.

Friday, March 9

In the morning M.B. with Hummel, who came from Stolpe.

Conversation of the Fuhrer with Kesselring, Manteuffel, Huebner.

M.B. Conversation with Dr. Frelin, Zander, etc.

Saturday, March 10

Sunday,

Conversation M.B. with Ruder, Eberlein, Hevel, Geiger.

Conversation M.B. with Deniz.

Daily M.B. at the Fuhrer's report.

11th of March

Conversation M.B. with Geiger - Dr. Lay 15.50 M.B. in a report to the Fuhrer.

4 p.m. with Lammers + Tirac - Dr. Heiner, Attorney General at the People's Court.

In the evening M.B. with General Winter + Boulet + Captain Pollek + Meyer - Frykrug, etc. at the casino of the Operations State

ba.

Monday, March 12

At noon, M.B. with Schmidt-Römer, Geiger, with part. Comrade Keitel \*, Sturmbannführer Zander, from the party. comrade Treish.

Tuesday, March 13

M.B. daily talks with Geiger.

With Burgdorf about National Socialist Education Officers. Evening with Prof. Buchner to the Fuhrer.

22. High-speed bomber raid on Berlin. For the first time, the Ministry of Propaganda was damaged.

Wednesday, March 14

Conversations M.B. with Ruder, Mrs. Forster, with Field Marshal Keitel, Dr. Pawlicki, with Müller.

Evening with Obergruppenführer Frank.

Thursday, March 15

In the morning - flight M.B. on the "Condor" to Saliburg (Kr. Beei). M.B. - meeting. with Dr. von Hummel.

Friday, March 16

Meeting of M.B. with Shenk, Bredov (on the Obersalzberg), with frl. Joseph. Uführer - Colonel General Scherner, Field Marshal Bush.

\* Brother of Field Marshal Bodevin Keitel.

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Saturday, March 17 At the Fuhrer's Kaufmann + Doenitz.

M.B. in the mines of Gutshof, Dürrek. In the afternoon visit of Frau Hanke.

Sunday, March 18

Visit to M.B. mines, etc.

## ESSAY SEVEN:

### The Fortress That Wasn't

...The beginning of 1945 came to Germany in different ways. In its eastern part, in the fire of battles waged by desperately and senselessly resisting units of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS troops, in the major cities of the country, in the smoke of massive bombings carried out with increasing force by Anglo-American aviation. At that time, the western part of the country looked much calmer, where the allied forces encountered resistance only in certain areas. It was quite calm in the south, in the foothills of the Alt and

serene alpine valleys. The snowy peaks shone under the sun, and nothing seemed to disturb the idyll. But here is another mystery: it was this area that attracted special attention of the high command of the Allied expeditionary forces.

...As Supreme Allied Commander in the European theater of operations, General Eisenhower occupied many rooms. But one of the most important was a special room hung with maps. They noted the advance of the allied troops, fixed the position of the enemy. Here one could also see a map of South Germany, on which it was written: "Unconfirmed data about the redoubt area."

What was this card? What "redoubt"? The answer is: in the course of preparing the final stage of the fighting, the intelligence agencies of Eisenhower's headquarters received information that the Hitlerite command intended to turn the region of southern Germany into the so-called "Alpine fortress", or, as Eisenhower's headquarters put it, a "national redoubt". All data were shown on a map hanging in a special room. It marked the warehouses of chemical weapons, bridges, areas of concentration of troops, the deployment of headquarters, radio stations and barracks.

On February 12, 1945, the intelligence report of the Allied headquarters stated: "Sufficient importance has not yet been attached to numerous reports about the possibilities of creating the last Nazi base in the Bavarian Alps. It is necessary to take into account the importance for the Nazis of various kinds of myths, in particular, the famous myth of the "twilight of the gods". All this is directly connected with the name of Hitler himself. It is very important that the main center of the new district will be located in Berchtesgaden, which, in turn, is the burial place of Barbarossa. The latter, according to Germanic mythology, must one day rise from the

YOUR".

The compilers of the report were not embarrassed by the apparent discrepancy between these reports and real facts, including the facts of history. The alleged tomb of the legendary King Frederick Barbarossa was not in Berchtesgaden, but hundreds of kilometers away, in the Harz mountains. Yet intelligence bombarded Washington with more and more reports. So, on February 16, the following information was received from agents of the Office of Strategic Services (English abbreviation - OSS): "The Nazis, no doubt, are preparing to fight to the bitter end, relying on a mountain redoubt. The strongholds are connected by underground railways. Many months of production of the best weapons factories is concentrated here, stocks of poisonous substances are brought here from all over Germany. Everyone involved in the construction of these secret bases will be killed the moment the real fighting begins."

True, there were skeptical voices, but Eisenhower and other commanders were constantly under pressure from Washington. The commander of the 21st Army Group, General Omar Bradley, recounts this in his memoirs:

"A few months before this offensive (in the spring of 1945. — L.B.), intelligence stunned us with a fantastic plan of the German command to withdraw troops to the Austrian Alps, where, as reported, weapons, supplies were concentrated, and even built aircraft factories and where the last bastion of German defense was created. There, the enemy, in all likelihood, would have tried to sit back and preserve the Nazi myth until the Allies got tired of the occupation of Germany or until they quarreled among themselves ... Only after the end of the war did we learn that this vaunted the redoubt existed only in the imagination of a few Nazi fanatics. The rumor about him has grown to such incredible proportions that now I am simply surprised at our then naivety. However, at that time the legendary

167

The redoubt seemed to us a very real and very serious threat, which we could not neglect. He weighed heavily on our tactical plans in the last weeks of the war."

Bradley was right: there was no "redoubt" in the Alps at all. The Americans were frightened by the fact that 100 divisions would be concentrated here, of which 30 were tank divisions (06 this fantastic estimate was later reported by the prominent British military historian, General Fuller). However, the American divisions that approached Berchtesgaden and Munich found here only scattered rear units, Volkssturm battalions and the remnants of reserve formations.

Who was to blame for such a serious miscalculation? Indeed, at that time, it was in Southern Bavaria and Switzerland bordering it that American strategic intelligence had enormous potentialities. Allen Dulles himself was in Switzerland, having direct connections with the Nazi elite. As it turned out after the war, the Swiss residency of the OSS became a victim ... of its own fantasy. The American researcher D. Minott established that at the end of 1944, American intelligence compiled a special report on the possible role of South Germany at the end of the war. This report became known (or maybe palmed off?) to the branch of the SS intelligence, located in the city of Bregenz (not far from the Swiss border). The head of this branch reported on American assumptions to Gauleiter Girol Hofer, Hitler's deputy here. Then Hofer realized - why not bring him the idea of creating an "alpine fortress" for consideration by Hitler? After all, if such a fortress is created, then Hofer himself will automatically become its commandant...

In November 1944, he was at the reception of the Fuhrer, but was not successful. He was supported only by Goebbels, who associated propaganda with the idea of a "redoubt".

success. From this side, it was certainly attractive, and Goebbels included the "Alpine fortress" among the rumors that were subject to "centralized dissemination." The General Staff and OKW were not interested in the idea of a "redoubt", since the military command did not have free troops that could take up defense in the Alps in advance.

However, Dulles held on to his data until the last moment. At the end of April 1945, when the "Alpine bluff" became clear, an envoy from the head of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of the SS Kaltenbrunner, SS Obersturmbannführer Wilhelm Hoettl, came to him. On behalf of his superior, Hoettl warned Dulles of the threat from the Alpine Fortress, which could become a "base for guerrilla warfare." Therefore, Kaltenbrunner would have been prepared to counteract the concentration of German forces in the Alps. In response, the Americans should rush to Austria and prevent the Soviet Union from taking part in its post-war occupation...

The documents testify that Hitler, anticipating the events, ordered to divide Germany into two "fortified regions": the northern one between the Oder, the Hohenzollern Canal and the Elbe, the southern one — the Alps and the northwestern part of Czechoslovakia. In each of the districts, it was supposed to create a so-called. "outside command post". These "fortresses" were to hold out until a conflict broke out between the USSR and the Western powers. In this light, it becomes clear why Field Marshal Kesselring visited Hitler on March 9, and Scherner and Bush on March 16; Kesselring commanded a group of troops in Italy, Bush in the North, and Scherner had the most powerful group of troops in Czechoslovakia.

In the 1970s, I tried to get an interview from Ferdinand Scherner - he was then living in a nursing home on Menzingerstrasse in Munich - that

he discussed in those days with the Führer. The ex-field marshal replied that he did not give interviews in principle. But there is other evidence about the content of the conversations in March 1945. The remnants of the defeated Nazi army were going to be drawn into southern Germany: troops retreating from Italy, Austria, from the Western Front and Scherner's troops. It was also supposed to gather here the leaders of the party and state apparatus, bring the archives of the Reich, looted gold and other valuables, inventions and patents, works of art exported from the occupied countries.

Indeed, Field Marshal Scherner's visits to Berlin played a special role in planning the last stage of the war. Great hopes were placed on him as the most energetic and ruthless commander. Bormann's diary records Scherner's arrival at headquarters on 16 March; Scherner then visited Hitler on the evening of 22 April. Before the last visit, the field marshal, as J. Torvald tells about it in his book on the last stage of the war, in a frank conversation with his head of the operations department outlined a plan: to ask Hitler to move from Berlin to the headquarters of Army Group B and from there "use the still available military and political opportunities". This plan failed - apparently, it came into Scherner's head

too late.

That is why, back in the winter and spring of 1945, Bormann began to prepare bases in southwestern Germany. It was for this purpose that hiding places were created here to store secret archives and looted wealth that had not yet been taken to safe places, for example, to Switzerland. Such is the meaning of the records about "mines"! ("Saturday, 17 March: visit to the Gutshof, Dürrgk mines. Sunday, 18 March: visit to the mines, etc.") Berlin's most important documents (in the Imperial Chancellery

they have already filled 40-50 huge boxes). Here, in the Berchtesgaden-Reichenhall region, members of the imperial government were to move.

Many people received the task of laying caches in that area, for example, SS Standartenführer Kurt Becher (Bormann wrote about his reception with the Führer on February 6), Walter Funk, Otto Skorzeny, SS Standartenführer Josef Spazil, and from among Bormann's close associates, Dr. Helmut von Hummel. Although the latter did not want to talk to me, and during interrogation at the Frankfurt prosecutor's office categorically denied his involvement in any cases of this kind, he inadvertently fell into the hands of the Austrian police when, after the war, he tried to extract from a secret vault in the Kremmünster monastery two boxes with numismatic collections. So



or otherwise, the lakes of the Salzkammergut mountain region could tell a lot about what happened here in the winter - spring of 1945.

DAYS: March 19 — March 29

Monday, March 19

Afternoon 17 o'clock departure of M.B. from Obersalzberg via Munich to Berlin - 1.50 at night.

With Forster at the Fuhrer until 3.30, then the air raid! According to Hagen-Zossen = 5.30 hours!

Tuesday, March 20

In the morning - with Fegelein in the sauna.

“717

In the afternoon - a meeting of M.B. with Friedrichs, Schmerbeck, Geiger.

Wednesday, March 21

Report by M.B. at the Fuhrer. Meeting with Klopfer.

Thursday, March 22

Meeting of M.B. with Waiblinger at 1 pm.

Zander 12.30 o'clock.

Conferences with Walkenhorst, Lammers, Schütt, Geiger, prof. Blash-ke.

During the night, the enemy crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim with amphibious tanks.

Friday, March 23

Meetings of M.B. with Walkenhorst, Geiger, Zander, with Hauptsturmführer Eckhardt.

Saturday, March 24

In the afternoon, the first raid from the south (from Italy) on Berlin, in clear weather.

In the morning at 3 o'clock a raid on the Wesel. In the afternoon at 15 o'clock M.B. with Gauleiter Koch at the Fuhrer's.

M.B. consulted with Pawlicki, Steinhacker, Dr. Schmidt-Römer.

“127

Sunday, March 25

With Fegelein in the sauna. With Sauckel at a report to the Fuhrer. Tanks at Aschaffenburg.

Monday, March 26

12.30 meeting with aviation. General Shu

macher. Afternoon debate with General von Hengl.

Happy M.B. conferring with the Reichsfuehrer SS.

17 hours meeting with Sauckel. G.K. Zander is sick, M.B. takes part in operational meeting.

Tuesday, March 27

Since the morning of the meeting M.B. with Hilgenfeldt, Walkenhorst, Hummel. Operational meeting.

In the evening, a meeting with Bule about transport problems.

Wednesday, March 28

In the morning at 9.45 a meeting with Gen. Hereke about transport.

During the day with Rosenberg. Operational meeting.

Walkenhorst with Dr. Ley about the "Adolf Hitler Volunteer Corps", with Dr. Kaltenbrunner, etc.

Hanks in Marburg and Giessen.

"137

Thursday, March 29

Panzer vanguards in front of Korbach! Shelling of Rechnitz (Styria). The situation is tighter than ever!

Meeting of M.B. with gen. Reinecke, with Ley and Admiral Mathis.

Operational meeting!

Evening with Axman.

Guderian is fired.

ESSAY EIGHT:

It happened in the bunker

Adolf Hitler did not like Heinz Guderian. Why? After all, the ability of General Guderian brought the Wehrmacht many brilliant victories, and his name became a symbol of the tank offensive. But who can understand the soul of a dictator? Perhaps, in the soul of the infantryman of the First World War, there was envy for the new branch of the army, which, having appeared already at the end of the war, suddenly acquired the halo of a victory talisman? Or did Hitler's dislike for the closed general caste play a role? Or the popularity of Guderian in the troops caused a roar-

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the Fuhrer? Be that as it may, good relations never existed between Hitler and Guderian.

True, everything started well for the general. Hitler was one of the first who drew attention to a capable, energetic officer - the first chief of staff of the inspection of motorized troops. During the exercises of 1934, which took place at the Kummersdorf training ground, Colonel of the Reichswehr Heinz Guderian demonstrated the capabilities of the Motovoysk.

Such a person will be useful to me! I want to get it! - said Hitler, who had recently become Chancellor of the Reich. Guderian, who soon became famous for his book "Attention, Tanks!",

was glad to use the new capabilities of the Wehrmacht, which emerged from the Reichswehr and dropped the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. Heinz Guderian was a typical Prussian officer by training and upbringing (by the way, this surname is pronounced with an accent on the second syllable, and thus deprives the legend of the "Armenian Guderian" that was widespread in our country during the war years) turned out to be receptive to the technical advances of the 20th century and understood the role that motorized and tank troops equipped with powerful radio equipment would play. In fact, Guderian was the creator of the Wehrmacht tank troops. Becoming a general in 1936, he took part in military operations against Poland and France, gaining authority in the troops and in the eyes of Hitler.

But since 1941, the first cracks appeared in the relationship between Guderian and Hitler. Already at the beginning of Barbarossa, the Colonel-General, who commanded the 2nd Panzer Group, allowed himself to doubt the correctness of the decision of his supreme commander-in-chief, when in August he did not continue the offensive against Moscow and turned Guderian's group on Kiev. Guderian took the liberty of personally expressing his doubts - but he could not convince Hitler. As a loyal subject

executor of orders, he also brilliantly completed a new task, closing the Tank pincers around the Kyiv group of the Soviet Southwestern Front. But the dispute was not forgotten.

Even in 1941, when during the attack on Moscow the commander of the 2nd Panzer Group reported on the successes of his divisions, Hitler could not overcome antipathy. But when Guderian shared the fate of other German commanders, who in December 1941 fell under the powerful blows of the Soviet counteroffensive, Hitler gave vent to his discontent. What was he dissatisfied with? The fact that Guderian, who, unlike his commander-in-chief, was well aware of the real situation at the front, did not want to carry out T.N. Hitler's "stop orders", requiring at any cost to defend the lines near Moscow, and offered to retreat to new, more profitable lines.

I was able to find genuine evidence of this conflict. This can be learned from the surviving records of Guderian's adjutant Oberleutnant Joachim von Lesten. The first of the entries was made on December 20, 1941, the second only on January 6, 1942. But this pause becomes quite clear from the content of the notes themselves:

"December 20, 1941 19.00. Fuhrer's headquarters. Today before noon flew out of Orel with Guderian to the Fuhrer. At 15.30 they landed at the Rastenburg airfield. Now the commander is with the Fuhrer... Thank God that the conversation took place. To all appearances, Guderian is the only person in the army who dares to say something that must be said and that is called upon to save the situation in the East. Already from my brief conversations at headquarters, one gets the impression that they have no idea about what is happening at the front. And if such unrealistic ideas reign, then the fate of the troops hangs by a thread. The question remains: will decisive action be taken?

Measures were not taken: to carry out organized

"177

ny withdrawal of troops with the least losses failed. Under the blows of the Red Army, the Germans, abandoning their equipment, rolled back to the West. I had to pay ... Guderian. Lesten:

"January 6, 42 Erfurt. The old year ended for me with my departure from Russia... However, between the time of my last entry and today, so many events have taken place that I want to record them. All expectations were associated with the visit of Colonel General Guderian to the Fuhrer. However, already at headquarters and during the return flight to Orel, Guderian made it clear that they did not believe him or did not want to believe ... He spent several hours with the Fuhrer ... The Fuhrer accused Guderian of (as he later told me) what For the past six months, he was too close to the events, too sorry for the soldiers and lost the correct perspective. Therefore, the "stop order" will not be canceled... 2 days after our return to Orel, Chern, an insignificant settlement on the Orel-Tula highway, fell. This point could not be kept, since the neighboring parts

retreated, and not far away there was an advantageous position on the Susha River. The new commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Kluge, seized on this as an excuse to demand the removal of Guderian. Kluge clearly played on the differences between Guderian and the Fuhrer, so his behavior was simply unprincipled. As a result, such an experienced and popular commander as Guderian was sent home.

Guderian was out of favor for a long time. Only in 1944, when the affairs of the Wehrmacht were very bad, Hitler again gave him an important post: chief of the general staff of the ground forces. I had to go for it, because after the assassination attempt on July 20, 1944, in which the top generals were involved, Hitler did not trust his field marshals and generals. Guderian, however, was not seen in the opposition.

Alas, even in this post Guderian could not keep

sya. Not to mention the fact that in general it was no longer the time for the victories of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. But Guderian continued to "arbitrarily." He again suggested to Hitler not to persist in hopeless resistance on the old lines, but to find new ones. So, he proposed to evacuate the remaining troops far in the East and without contact with the main grouping of troops in the Baltic and East Prussia. When, at the beginning of 1945, Hitler decided to use the only strike force - the 6th SS Panzer Army of Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich - not against the advancing Zhukov, but in Hungary, Guderian began to object. Unsuccessfully, he argued that it was better to strike from Pomerania and East Prussia against Zhukov's flank, open from the north, than to save the already lost Hungary. Hitler did not tolerate new objections, and Guderian was offered to retire ... for treatment. Since then, they have not met again. Guderian no longer appeared in the Imperial Chancellery bunker...

But we forgot one thing: we didn't talk about the bunker itself. For such a story, I can use my own impressions.

..I can't say for sure whether it was May 3rd, or maybe May 5th, 1945, when I drove up to the corner of Voss and Wilhelmstrasse with a small group of officers from Marshal Zhukov's headquarters. We quickly found the commandant of the building of the former Imperial Chancellery (it seems that he was in the rank of lieutenant colonel) and proceeded to the inspection. Stepping over heaps of "iron crosses" and other orders, which for some reason were scattered by the hundreds at the entrance stairs, we first examined the devastated offices, and then went downstairs. I will describe my impressions - fortunately, I have a recording made a few days later and which was very useful to me, when in 1946 the Soviet writer Pyotr Pavlenko started work on the script for the film "The Fall of Berlin" and asked me to tell about the bun

kere.

Here is my 1945 entry:

"If you drive up to the Imperial Chancellery from Voss Strasse, then in the corner of the protruding part of the facade there is an inconspicuous steel plate that does not rise above ground level. This slab is lifted with the help of hydraulic pumps, as a result of which a descent opens up - wide steps leading to the first underground floor of the imperial office.

There are over 120 rooms on the first floor, which are located on both sides of a large corridor. The corridor is built according to the ship principle and has a number of compartments isolated from each other by a pair of doors. Doors lead from each compartment to 6-8 rooms. The walls are lined with yellow tiles, the floor is also tiled. Not far from the entrance, on the left side on one of the doors you see the inscription "Führer's office". In two rooms there are rooms of Hitler's secretariat - a large number of telephones, tables on which lay maps. On the other side of the corridor in the same compartment there are 3 rooms of the imperial broadcasting. Thus, Goebbels could speak on the radio without going out

from the underground room.

Walking further along the corridor, you come across inscriptions: "pharmacy", "dressing room", "diesel station", "telephone switchboard", "command post", etc. . SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. The doors of all rooms are metal, with two levers that lock them tightly. Diesel units are located on each floor, providing lighting and ventilation of the room.

The entrance to the second underground floor leads through an inconspicuous door in one of the compartments on the first floor. You pass through vast storage areas and find yourself in an underground garage. There are still several gas-generating machines still standing there. There is no exit from the garage, the cars went down there on a special cargo

lift. From this room you can go to the right and find yourself in the kitchen and dining room. Next comes the descent into a series of rooms. However, it was not possible to go through them due to the fact that the fire is still going on there.

Through a series of intricate passages you descend to the third underground floor - the floor where the rooms of Hitler, Goebbels and Bormann were located. It should be noted that during a visit it is very difficult to get a picture of the true arrangement of the furnishings in the rooms, because some of the rooms were completely burned out, and in the rest of the rooms the furniture was rearranged and partially broken.

After one of the turns begins a wide corridor. To the right in this corridor are doors to the rooms of Goebbels and Bormann. Goebbels occupied two rooms. One of them, apparently, is working, the other is for the family. In the family room you can see beds for his children, and they are built on the principle of two-story soldiers' beds - three beds with two places in each.

In the closets are the remains of the wardrobe. At present, all kinds of suits, rags, underwear and table linen have been put into this room. After some digging, we managed to extract a slightly burnt white tunic with a red band on the right sleeve. On the left pocket there is an "iron cross" of the second class of the First imperialist war, and above it there is a swept hole for the party badge. This is Hitler's jacket. A half-burnt gray carpet coat is lying nearby, which could be seen in a number of photographs of Goebbels.

The rooms are not particularly spacious, the ceiling is of medium height, and therefore you have the feeling that you are underground. On the left side of this large corridor is a kitchen, but it was completely burned down. On the walls of the corridor are paintings in expensive frames, mostly by Dutch masters. At the end of the corridor there is a small room, after passing into which we

discovered that it contains an extremely valuable collection of literature on architecture. This is apparently a personal collection of Hitler, who considered himself an architect. Large mahogany cabinets contain a number of art publications and descriptions of architectural structures of all times and peoples. The books were partially damaged, their spines burned.

Steps lead from a large corridor to the location of Hitler's rooms. Go down, turn right, then turn left - and in front of you is a massive door, similar to the door of a fireproof cabinet. This is the entrance to Hitler's underground apartment. It is built on the same principle, the central corridor is of medium width. The walls are not tiled, but covered with wallpaper.

The first door on the left is the entrance to Hitler's room. Hitler had 4 rooms here - a reception room, a dining room, a bedroom, a bathroom. In addition, there is another small passage room, the nature of which is difficult to establish, because no furniture was left in it.

Through the passage room you first find yourself in the reception room. It is very small — there is a table with drawers at the right wall, a small fireproof cupboard and a table with telephones at the back. To the right is the door to the bedroom—the bedroom is even smaller. It only fits a bed, a bookcase, a fireproof cupboard and a small bookcase. There are several volumes of the encyclopedia on the bookcase. The second room is of a conventional arrangement: there is a row of electrotherapeutic devices - a mountain sun, small quartz lamps, and a few more devices of an unknown nature. All Hitler's rooms are striking in their small size, it is literally difficult to turn around in them. Next

the door behind Hitler's rooms is the room of his personal guard. On the right side of the corridor there is a diesel station, a telephone station, a doctor's office and a pharmacy. From the third underground floor there is a separate exit to the garden.

To give a more complete picture of the bunker,

182

I will give a description left by other eyewitnesses. Their names are Otto Günsche, Heinz Linge. The regular SS man, personal adjutant of the Fuhrer in 1943-1945, Sturmbannführer Otto Günsche, having been captured by the Soviets, spent quite a long period in it, during which he wrote a book, more precisely, dictated it to Soviet investigators. Günsche's story was immediately translated and recorded. To make the story more complete, another very knowledgeable person who was in captivity, SS-Sturmbannführer Heinz Linge, Hitler's valet from 1935 to 1945, was involved in the work. Linge's story is not devoid of comedy: he mingled with the general mass of prisoners and expected to go unnoticed. It was for this purpose that he, when he was led through the streets of Berlin, handed over to some woman standing on the street a watch with Hitler's personal inscription. But Linge miscalculated: the woman who received such an unexpected gift reported this to the Soviet military commandant's office. An order was given to immediately search for Heinz Linge, which was done.

So, here is the description of the bunker by Günsche-Linge:

"In mid-February 1945, Hitler moved into a bomb shelter. Together with him, Eva Braun and the doctor Morell settled there, without whose injections he could not do a single day. The entire personal headquarters of Hitler remained in the Reich Chancellery. This Hitler bomb shelter was built on his orders in 1943 in the park of the Reich Chancellery.

Hitler's old bomb shelter, which was located UNDER the "hall of diplomats" and which he used until recently during air raids on Berlin, began to seem to him insufficiently reliable. He wanted to get even deeper into the ground. The new bomb shelter was built three meters deeper than the old one. From the old bomb shelter to the new one, a passage was made with a spiral stone staircase, which at the bottom rested against a small chamber with an armored door. For two

the rue began a wide corridor of the "Fuhrerbunker", divided into two halves.

In the first half of the corridor, against the right wall, there were several cabinets with anti-aircraft equipment (anti-sweet suits, steel helmets, gas masks, fire extinguishers). There was a door in this wall that led to the engine room with ventilation units. The second armored door led to 6 adjacent rooms. Here were: the switchboard, where the telephone operator from Hitler's bodyguard sat, a telephone exchange, a telegraph office, Morell's room, a medical station where the bed of Hitler's doctor on duty, Dr. Stumpfegger, stood, a bedroom for Linge and orderlies and a common room.

At the left wall of the first half of the corridor stood a quadrangular table with chairs. A clock hung over the table. Nearby there was a telephone booth, from which the duty officer of the communications service at headquarters ordered telephone conversations for the participants in the meetings. A door in the left wall of the corridor led to the washroom. There was also a place for Hitler's dog Blondi. Blondie's mating with Frau Trost's dog did not produce "results." Therefore, at the end of January 1945, Blondie had another affair with the dog of Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg. By order of Hitler, the corner that Blondie occupied was heated with an electric reflector. In the first days of April, a long-awaited event took place: Blondie brought 8 puppies. Three of them survived. The strongest and strongest puppy Hitler himself gave his nickname - Wolf (wolf).

The first part of the corridor was separated from the second part - the so-called "reception" - by an armored door. The entrance to the waiting room was guarded by an officer from Hitler's bodyguard standing at the door. In the reception room, before the start of military conferences, the participants of these conferences gathered in

waiting for Hitler. The walls of the reception room were hung with large paintings, mostly landscapes. At the right wall stood 12—

16 chairs. On the opposite wall there is an upholstered bench, in front of it there is a large rectangular table with upholstered chairs. To the left and right of the upholstered bench were two armored doors. The left door led to the rooms of Hitler and Eva Braun, the second to the conference room.

There was a small pantry in front of Hitler's rooms. There, at the door, a screen was placed so that the participants in the meeting could not be seen from the room of Hitler and Eva Braun.

Behind the double doors of the pantry was Hitler's office, covered with a thick, soft carpet. In the office, to the right of the door, there was a desk, in front of it was an armchair. On the table is a large bronze lamp, a writing instrument, a telephone, a world atlas, and a magnifying glass. Hitler's glasses usually lay there. Above the table hung a half-length portrait of Friedrich P by Menzel in an oval frame. There was a sofa against the opposite wall. In front of her is a table and three armchairs upholstered in colorful silk. A still life hung over the sofa. To her right was a tea table, to her left a radio. On the right wall hung a painting by Lucas Cranach.

In the same wall was the door to Hitler's bedroom, the floor of which was also carpeted. There was a bed with a bedside table, a wardrobe, a tea table on rollers, a safe in which he kept secret documents, bookshelves and an oxygen tank. On the left wall of Hitler's office was a door leading to a shared bathroom between Hitler and Eva Braun. A door led from the bathroom to Eva Braun's dressing room and to her living room bedroom. Here, to the right of the door, stood a dark couch, a small round table, and an armchair. Against the couch, against the opposite wall, was Eva Braun's bed, wardrobe, and box for her dog. There was a dark patterned carpet on the floor. The walls were decorated with pictures depicting flowers. The second door from Eva Braun's room led to the pantry.

At the end of the reception room was the so-called "gateway" with an armored door. In the "gateway", on the right and

on the left, there were two emergency exits to the park of the Reich Chancellery. A spiral staircase made of stone slabs led up from the right exit. A square tower with thick concrete walls was built over this exit, in which a security guard guarded the entrance to Hitler's bomb shelter. In the park itself, another sentry from Hitler's bodyguard stood in front of the door. From the left emergency exit a steel staircase of a fire standard led. This exit was also protected by a domed tower, which had machine-gun nests and observation posts. In this tower were SS men from Hitler's personal guard. The tower had a telephone connection with the bomb shelter.

The foundation, ceiling and walls of the Fuehrerbunker were made of high-grade concrete three meters thick. The ceiling of the bomb shelter was also reinforced with thick iron beams. But even this seemed to Hitler not safe enough. He ordered to reinforce the bomb shelter with an additional one-meter-thick covering of chopped granite, interleaved with a thick iron mesh. In addition, he ordered the passages from the Reich Chancellery to be rebuilt into a bomb shelter, giving them a zigzag appearance.

So Adolf Hitler built a mausoleum for himself, because he did not come out of it alive.

DAYS: March 30 - April 16

Friday, March 30

Meeting of M.B. with Gross Adm. Doenitz. Operational meeting. The Fuehrer dismissed Dr. Dietrich.

Afternoon tanks at Beverungen/Weser. Tanks near Hersfeld at night.

Saturday, March 31

Sunday,

Monday,

Meeting of M.B. with Geiger, Müller. Operational meeting.

Telephone conversation with Frau Scholz-Klink.

In the evening, Krebs, Sherf and Bule paid a courtesy visit to M.B.

April 1

Meeting of M.B. with Friedrichs, Keitel, Rukshedel.

Operational meeting.

Shelling of Eisenach.

Russian tanks in front of the Wiener Neustadt.

April 2

In the morning, a meeting with Capt. Assman. In the evening - the enemy in Thuringia near Untermasfeld, Herschel, Eisenach, Weimar.

M.B. participates in the night operational meeting.

Tuesday, April 3

Meeting of M.B. with Stürtz and Kreisleiter Kerner. Operational meeting.

Wednesday, April 4

Meeting of M.B. with Axman. Operational meeting. Meeting with Zunderman.

Thursday, April 5

Bolsheviks at Vienna!

Anglo-Americans in the Thuringian region near Langensaltz, Meiningen, etc. Meeting with Zander.

Friday, April 6

Saturday, April 7

In the evening, Krebs, Winter, Burgdorf, Fegelein, Meisel, Wenck at M.B. Operational meeting.

Sunday, April 8

Meeting M.B. with engineer Flattery (262). Operator meeting.

Meeting of the Fuhrer with Kaufman and feldm. Bush.

Monday, April 9

Meeting M.B. with Friedrichs.

Afternoon meeting of the Fuhrer with Gauleiter Hofer, M.B., Jodl, Gen. Winter.



In the evening - with Obergruppenführer Frank, then with Hübner about Keitel.

188

Tuesday, April 10

Meeting of M.B. with Scholy-Klink. "" with gen. Wreath.

"" with Walkenhorst, Hess. "" with Hofer.

Wednesday, April 11

Engagement day!

Sovesh. M.B. with Lauterbacher, Eggeling.

Tanks near Magdeburg, Gr. Oschersleben, Camburg, Alain, Schönebeck on the Elbe.

Thursday, April 12

Meeting M.B. with Schmidt-R.

Report to the Fuhrer, daily. operational meeting.

In the evening - Kesselring, a long conversation.

In the afternoon, Roosevelt died.

Friday, April 13

Meeting M.B. with Gerland, Metiner, Hilgenfeld, Walkenhorst.

Hanks at Seehausen (Elbe) - Wittenberg - in front of Stendal and Tangermünde; tanks in Dortmund, Kettwig, Gummersbach, Arnsberg; tanks at Magdeburg-Nordhausen, Clausthal-Zenz-Saalfeld, Kronach.

Saturday, April 14

Birthday of our Cronia.

Sunday,

Monday,

The enemy captured the Paderborn Forest, Kalbe Marburg in the Harz, Guntersberg, Hohenstein, Ennstal, Kronach, Steinach - Bamberg - Wildbad - Rastatt. In the evening, a raid on Potsdam.

Death of Deputy Gauleiter Metiner.

April 15

Meeting M.B. with Reckman.

Afternoon, on behalf of the Führer with EB, Dr. Malz, Dr. Stumpfegger (because of Prof. Brandt).

Night opera. meeting (MB stayed in Berlin).

The enemy took Arnheim - Köthen, Andreasberg - Gary - Chemnitz, Meerane - Glauchau, Lünbach, Berneck - Bayreuth - Bulle/Baden.

April 16

The enemy captured Leverkusen - Iserlohn - Mittweid - Krimitchau - Weid - Schleitz - Erlangen - Offenburg - Baden. Major battles on the Oder front!

## ESSAY NINE:

Beginning of the End

... When I asked Colonel-General Vasily Mitrofanovich Shatilov about when his division launched an offensive against Berlin, he began to think and began to look for some folder in a drawer. When the folder was found, a map appeared from it - an old one, worn on the folds, battered. But it was not a map of Berlin or the Oder approaches to it. No, the map showed forests and lakes in the Kalinin region far from Berlin.

- As a matter of fact, the path of our division to Ber

The line began here," said my interlocutor, a gray-haired veteran of the Soviet Army, a man who for three years commanded the 150th Rifle Division, the division that hoisted the Victory Banner over the Reichstag in May 1945. - Of course, it can be considered an accident that it was our 150th division that had to fight for the Reichstag. Another division could have ended up here on the Spree. And there is no doubt that she would have fought with the same military prowess.

How long have you been in command of the division? I asked.

- I took command of the division in the May days of 1944. Prior to that, I commanded the 182nd Infantry Division. The 150th division was formed in September 1943 on the basis of three brigades - the 127th cadet, 144th and 151st ski brigades.

- From what line did the 150th division begin its march to the West, to Berlin?

- It was a district of the city of Pustoshki, not far from Nevel. Here the 3rd shock army occupied its lines, which included the 150th division, which endured heavy fighting in the so-called "Nevel bag". I remember very well my first meeting with the soldiers, when I arrived at the 674th regiment. I said then:

"I am your new division commander, Colonel Shatilov. Let's fight together now. You and I have a long military journey to the west, all the way to Berlin!"

Of course, at that time I could not foresee that our division would indeed be among those Soviet formations that would be the first to enter Berlin. But at that time, in the spring of 1944, every Soviet soldier, every Soviet officer and general was sure that the moment when the Red Army would crush the fascist enemy was not far off. After Stalingrad and Kursk, no one had any doubt that we would not only expel the invader from our land,

but we will also finish off the enemy on his territory. However, of course, in order for our dreams to come true, there was still a lot to be done...

The attack on Berlin was planned with great care. After the Vistula-Oder operation was completed in February 1945, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command experienced a considerable temptation to continue the offensive and take Berlin on the move. Even Marshal Zhukov succumbed to him. In one of his proposals sent to Headquarters, he wrote about the possibility of moving directly to Berlin. But soon he himself changed his mind and spoke in favor of stopping. This decision was not a whim, but the result of a serious analysis of the situation - and this decision turned out to be correct. Speaking about him at the Crimean Conference of the Leaders of the Three Great Powers on February 4, 1945, Chief of the General Staff General of the Army A.I. Antonov brought

data on the possible transfer by the Germans to the Eastern Front of 35-40 divisions. In his memoirs, General S.M. Shtemenko stated:

"If we take into account that many of these divisions were replenished by the enemy with personnel to the norm, and our divisions then averaged 4,000 people, if we take into account all the difficulties that we experienced with the delivery of ammunition, fuel and other material means, as well as the temporary air dominance of German aviation, it becomes quite obvious why it became impossible for us to continue the unstoppable attack on Berlin. This would be a crime, which, naturally, neither the Soviet Supreme High Command, nor the General Staff, nor the front commanders could commit.

As subsequent events confirmed, the forecast of the General Staff turned out to be basically correct. In February 1945, the German command indeed had large forces for the defense of Berlin and in

7 Dec. No. 665 Bezymensky

if necessary, could increase them even more. And besides, the failure near Berlin threatened to turn into bad political consequences.

The Headquarters, the General Staff, the military councils of the fronts again and again compared our capabilities with the capabilities of the enemy, and in the end they unanimously came to the conclusion: not having accumulated sufficient supplies of materiel on the Oder, not being able to use the full power of aviation and artillery, without securing the flanks, we cannot throw our armies into the offensive against the capital of Germany. The risk in this case was misplaced. Political and military Consequences in case of failure at the final stage of the war could be extremely difficult and irreparable for us.

Conscious of the full measure of responsibility, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command decided to stop the offensive. During March 1945, all necessary measures were taken for the strategic and material support of the storming of Berlin. It was during this time that the Pomeranian operation was carried out, which completely averted the threat to Zhukov's main forces from Pomerania (Zhukov understood Guderian's plans with his instinct), and after that the necessary troops were concentrated for the upcoming offensive.

How did the balance of forces develop at this final stage of the great confrontation between the Soviet troops and the Wehrmacht? Soviet forces were significant. Marshal Rokossovsky had 314 thousand men, Marshal Zhukov 768 thousand and Marshal Konev 511 thousand. But even on the German side, despite the exhaustion of the Wehrmacht, large forces opposed the Soviet troops. Under these conditions, the final decisions to conduct the Berlin operation were made. G.K. Zhukov recalls this:

"On March 29, at the call of the Headquarters, I again arrived in Moscow, having with me the plan of the 1st Belorussian Front for

Berlin operation. This plan was worked out during March by the headquarters and command of the front, all fundamental issues were basically agreed with the General Staff and Headquarters. This gave us the opportunity to submit a detailed plan for the decision of the Supreme High Command.

Late in the evening of the same day I.V. Stalin summoned me to his Kremlin office. He was alone. A meeting with members of the State Defense Committee has just ended.

Silently holding out his hand, he, as always, as if continuing a recently interrupted conversation, said:

— The German front in the west has completely collapsed, and, apparently, the Nazis do not want to take measures to stop the advance of the Allied troops. Meanwhile, on all the most important

directions against us, they strengthen their groupings. Here is a map, see the latest data on German troops.

Lighting his pipe, the Supreme Commander continued:

"I think it's going to be a big fight...

Then he asked how I regarded the enemy in the Berlin direction.

Taking out my front-line reconnaissance map, I placed it in front of the Supreme Commander. I.V. Stalin began to carefully consider the entire operational-strategic grouping of German troops in the Berlin strategic direction.

According to our information, the Germans had four armies here, which included at least 90 divisions, including 14 tank and motorized, 37 separate regiments and 98 separate battalions...

- When will our troops be able to launch an offensive? asked I.V. Stalin.

I reported:

- The 1st Belorussian Front can launch an offensive no later than in two weeks. The 1st Ukrainian Front, apparently, will also be ready by this date, the 2nd Belorussian Front, according to all information, will be delayed with

7\*

the final liquidation of the enemy in the area of Danzig and Gdynia until mid-April and will not be able to launch an offensive from the Oder simultaneously with the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian.

"Well then," said Stalin, "we will have to start the operation without waiting for Rokossovsky. If he is a few days late, no problem.

Then he went to the desk, leafed through some papers and took out a letter.

- Here, read it.

The letter was from one of the foreign well-wishers. It reported on behind-the-scenes negotiations between Nazi agents and official representatives of the Allies, from which it became clear that the Germans offered the Allies to stop fighting against them if they agreed to a separate peace.

This message also said that the allies rejected the harassment of the Nazis. But still, the possibility of the Nazis opening the way for the Allied forces to Berlin was not ruled out.

- Well, what do you say about it? asked I.V. Stalin. And, without waiting for an answer, he immediately remarked: - I think Roosevelt will not violate the Yalta agreement, but Churchill, this one can go for all".

What letter was it? The marshal did not name specifically, but today in the archives of Soviet intelligence one can read a number of messages of this kind. For example, the report of the People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V. Merkulov dated April 11.

"TOP SECRET TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

The NKGB of the USSR reports intelligence information received in different countries about the negotiations of the chairman

of the International Red Cross by Prof. BURK-HARDT and a former member of the Swiss Federal Council of the MUSIE in Berlin.

The British Foreign Office, in telegram No. 364 dated 22.2.45, informed the British envoy in Berne that, according to information emanating from the French representative in the International Red Cross, HIMMLER had invited the Chairman of the International Red Cross, Professor BURKHARD-DTA to meet with him to discuss some questions connected with the exchange of prisoners of war.

According to information received in Stockholm, the German Consul General in Stockholm, PFLEIDEERER, in a confidential conversation, speaking about the negotiations between BURKHARDT and HIMMLER, stated that the question of prisoners of war was only a pretext and that during the conversation with BURKHARDT, HIMMLER allegedly tried to find out the possibility of establishing contact with the British and Americans.

BURKHARLT allegedly asked HIMMLER to allow approximately 1,000 prominent Jews interned in Germany to travel to Switzerland. Himmler immediately granted this request. According to PFLEIDERERA, this is explained by the fact that HIMMLER is going, having eliminated HITLER, to enter into negotiations with the Allies, using 600,000 Jews in Germany as hostages.

According to information coming from Polish émigré circles in London, the German command allegedly agreed with the British and Americans through BURKHARDT that all tank and mechanized units would be withdrawn from the western front and transferred to the eastern front with the aim of holding the eastern front until the Allies occupy the rest of Germany. At the present time, this decision is allegedly being put into practice.

Similar rumors are circulating in Wa circles.

tickana. According to information coming from these circles, the German command, in agreement with the British and Americans, is transferring part of the army, weapons and food from the western to the eastern front. The British and Americans, for their part, allegedly promised the Germans not to persecute members of the Nazi Party, with the exception of the most prominent figures, and also not to allow the German population to be taken to work in the USSR from the areas occupied by the Red Army.

There were many such messages and they forced Stalin to rush his marshals. A.I. Antonov introduced G.K. Zhukov with a draft strategic plan for the Berlin operation, which fully included the offensive plan of the 1st Belorussian Front. After a careful study of the plan for the Berlin operation developed by the Headquarters, the marshal came to the conclusion that it was well prepared and fully corresponded to the operational strategic situation that developed at that time.

On March 31, Marshal I.S., commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, arrived at the General Staff. Konev, who immediately joined in the consideration of the general plan of the Berlin operation, and then reported on the draft plan for the offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Of course, in war there are no ideal solutions. Although the general plan of the Berlin operation of the three fronts - Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovsky - was indisputable, life made adjustments to its execution (Zhukov himself later wrote about them more than once). No matter how tempting it was for the great marshal to quickly make a breach on the shortest route to Berlin, he did not succeed. Immediately beyond the Oder lay the (later famous) Seelow Heights. Surrounding the small town of Zeelov, they gave the German troops excellent opportunities for defense - even when Zhukov brought General Bogdanov's tank army here against the Germans.

The offensive stalled, the tank units suffered heavy losses.

For us, officers of the 1st Belorussian Front, there was no doubt that Berlin should take Zhukov. Although at the end of 1944 we were not particularly enthusiastic about the fact that our longtime commander Konstantin Rokossovsky, with whom our headquarters had worked since the Stalingrad era, was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front. We also heard about Zhukov's tough character, about a number of his habits associated with his position as Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief. But we soon got used to them, trying to carry out the tasks related to the Berlin operation as best as possible.

The assignments were very different. As for intelligence, our department tried to quickly and accurately inform the commander about the situation on the Western Front - the battles of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. There was no representative of General Eisenhower at the front headquarters, all information went through Moscow. In part, it was supplemented by reports from the BBC and other Western radio stations, but they were not always reliable. But everything that came from Moscow, from the General Staff, was subject to immediate use. Early in the morning, even before Marshal Zhukov began work, we had to put data on the front line of Eisenhower's troops on a large map hanging in the marshal's office. Several times I had to do this work, which I did with some bated breath. But, of course, the great commander, when he entered the room, did not notice some young captain working at the map.

There were other assignments as well. Somehow (even before the start of the offensive), the head of the intelligence department, General Trusov, called your humble servant and ordered me to immediately take up the following work: the aviation and artillery of the front urgently need data: where are the water and gas centers in Berlin - and power supply,

sewer irrigation fields, the largest hospitals and everything that is necessary for the normal existence of the city. These points should not be subjected to bomb attacks and shelling. The task was not easy, because there was no such data in the "reserve" of the intelligence department. We got out of the situation like this: in the library of the city of Birnbaum and in some empty houses, guidebooks (preferably fresh ones) around Berlin were found with a description of the necessary objects. For two days and two nights I processed the sources, transferring everything to a map-scheme, which was prepared at the front-line aviation headquarters. I presented the work to the commander of artillery, the future Marshal of Artillery Kazakov and the commander of the 16th Air Army, Rudenko. In the following months, passing by the buildings of the operating Rummelsburg power plant or intact gas tanks in different parts of the city, I recalled the works of Birnbaum...

But then Berlin had not yet been taken. We anxiously read telegraph tapes with reports from the 8th Guards and 2nd Tank armies, which were operating in the direction of the main attack. On April 21, a breakthrough was achieved, the troops of the front entered the city limits. But they were not the first: the effect that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and Stalin foresaw when planning the operation worked here. As you know, three fronts went to Berlin: Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovsky. The latter had to play a supporting role, as he entered last. But Konev and Zhukov? What was the distribution of roles?

In principle, Berlin was to be bypassed: from the north and northwest by Zhukov and Rokossovsky, from the south and southwest by Konev, and Zhukov was entrusted with the direct capture of Berlin, Konev was to help him, the bulk was to rush to Dresden. But it soon became clear that Zhukov lingered on the Seelow Heights. Then Becoming

ka decided to use Konev's tank armies - and on the 22nd the tanks of the 1st Ukrainian Front ended up in the southern part of Berlin, since the prudent Stalin did not bring the dividing line between the two fronts to Berlin itself (this was done only on the 23rd). It is possible that with this "open line" the Supreme Commander-in-Chief wanted to encourage two old rivals, Zhukov and Konev, to some kind of competition in the last battle of the great war. Konev did his job - he could move on to Dresden, leaving Zhukov to complete the capture of Berlin.

True, Adolf Hitler flattered himself with the hope that the Soviet troops would not go directly to Berlin. He said in March to the same Guderian:

"The Russians will not be as stupid as we were when, blinded by the proximity of Moscow, we wanted to take it without fail. After all, it was you, Guderian, who wanted to be the first in Moscow with your army. You should have known better than others than the case of the conchilos "

Yes, Guderian knew how it ended. Go that began near Moscow ended near Berlin. The beginning of this end was forced to mark Martin Bormann in his diary for April 16, 1945 with the words: "Major battles on the Oder front."

DAYS: April 17 - April 20

Tuesday, April 17

Major battles on the Oder. Dinner with Gen. Krebs and Hilpert.

Wednesday, April 18

Evening: arrival of Bredov. Thursday, April 19

Big fights on the Oder! Friday, April 20

Fuhrer's birthday.

Alas, the situation is not at all appropriate for a "birthday".

The order to fly the advanced team to Salzburg.

ESSAY TEN:

Not at all festive

Those days that Martin Bormann, Otto Günsche and Heinz Linge describe more vividly - this is not a reproach to Bormann, but evidence of the situation that prevailed in the bunker of the imperial chancellery:

"At a meeting on the night of April 16-17, it was reported that in the area west of Kustrin, the Russians pushed back the German divisions even further. The counteroffensive launched on Hitler's order to eliminate the breakthrough of the front was not successful and had to

repeat on April 17 in the morning. That night Hitler again sat at tea until 6 o'clock in the morning with Eva Braun and his secretaries. He said that the Russians managed to penetrate the German defenses a little, but that this transient Russian success was only a temporary advantage for the attacker.

In the following days - April 17, 18 and 19 - the position of the German troops on the Oder became more and more critical. Waging fierce defensive battles, the German troops retreated under the intensifying blows of the Russian troops. The Russians launched an offensive also in the south, in Silesia. The breakthrough of the front in the area west of Kustrin was significantly expanded by the Russians and, having broken through all the barrier belts, they found themselves in threatening proximity to the eastern suburbs of Berlin.

The German front on the Oder still held out in the area of Stettin and Frankfurt. At night, the rumble of artillery was clearly audible on the streets of Berlin. Russian reconnaissance aircraft circled over Berlin.

Hitler placed all the blame for the critical situation on the Oder on the commander of the Army Group, Heinrici. He called him a slow, indecisive pedant who lacked the necessary enthusiasm. As the fighting approached Berlin, Hitler removed him from his post as commander of an army group that still bore the name Vistula, although the Vistula River

where she once fought, has long been in the rear of the Russian troops. Hitler did not appoint anyone to replace Heinrici. Hitler personally took over the leadership of the defensive battles for Berlin. Despite the fact that already in these days it became quite clear that the German front on the Oder would be overthrown and there was no way to restore it, Hitler clung to the sectors that still held out and ordered the liquidation of the breakthrough on the Oder with highly concentrated attacks from flanks.

At a military meeting in the afternoon

[April 9, Krebs reported that the Russian tank units had broken through even further and were right under Oranienburg, about 30 kilometers north of Berlin. This message acted like a bombshell and completely knocked Hitler out of balance.

Immediately after the meeting, Hitler called Linge. He complained of a severe headache and a rush of blood to the head, and requested that Morell be called in to bleed. This time, Hitler was not given leeches, as immediate bloodletting was required. Morell, with Linge's help, prepared the tools in Hitler's bedroom on a tea table placed in front of the bed. Hitler took off his tunic, rolled up the right sleeve of his shirt and sat on the edge of his bed. In a weak voice, he told Morell that he had not slept much in recent days and felt completely overwhelmed. Morell pulled off Hitler's right arm with a tourniquet and injected a syringe into a vein. But the blood did not go, because Hitler's blood was very thick, immediately coagulated and clogged the needle. Then Morell took a thicker needle and with great difficulty inserted it into Hitler's vein. Linge held a glass at an angle, into which blood flowed in thick drops. At the same time, Hitler asked Linge if he could stand the sight of blood. Linge replied:

"Of course, my Fuhrer. After all, the SS men are accustomed to this.

Blood accumulated about a glass, and she immediately curled up. Linge, wanting to show Hitler that the sight of blood did not touch him, said to him jokingly:

"My Fuhrer, now it is enough to add a little fat to your blood, and we can offer it as "Fuhrer's blood sausage."

The Fuhrer smiled, and in the evening, over tea, he told this to Eva Braun and his secretaries.

Soon, the optimistic mood that prevailed at the meetings at the beginning of the offensive of the Russian troops on the Oder was replaced by great nervousness.

205;

On April 20, Hitler turned 56 years old. Thoughts involuntarily return to what was 10 years old back.

In 1935 - solid brilliance and splendor. Already early in the morning the military bands greeted their supreme commander. Industrialists, party, state and military leaders crowded around their Führer and sought his favor by giving him precious gifts. Then - the imposing spectacle of a large military parade on a wide square in front of the Technische Hochschule in Berlin. A large "victory parade" was to take place on the same square after the end of the war with Soviet Russia. Hitler even drew a sketch of a gigantic triumphal arch through which the victorious German troops were to enter the capital of the empire.

And today... Russian troops are standing at the very gates of Berlin, and Adolf Hitler, morally and physically broken, is deep underground in his bomb shelter.

The day before Hitler's 56th birthday, Hitler's head of security, Rattenhuber, showed Ling a report from the SD that on Hitler's birthday, one of his orderlies was going to kill him. According to the SD, this orderly is dressed as if in civilian clothes and was wounded in the arm at the front. Linge



objected that none of Hitler's orderlies were in civilian clothes and had not been wounded in the arm. Rattenhuber nevertheless offered to be on the alert.

In past years, it was customary that around midnight between 19 and 20 April, Hitler's personal headquarters would come to him with congratulations. This time, Hitler had already warned in advance that he would not accept congratulations. Despite this, Burgdorf, Fegelein, Schaub, Albrecht, Günsche, Hevel and Lorenz gathered in the reception room around 12 o'clock in the morning to congratulate Hitler. Hitler conveyed to the assembled that he had no time. Then Fegelein went to Eva Braun and asked her to persuade Hitler to accept congratulations from them. Hitler, under her influence, reluctantly went into the waiting room. He

casually shook hands with those present, so that each of them barely had time to say "congratulations", and immediately went to his room. Hitler's chief pilot Hans Baur and co-pilot Betz, Rattenhuber, Hegl and Schedle came shortly before the start of the night meeting to the waiting room of the bomb shelter to congratulate Hitler as he passed from the office to the meeting room. Hitler casually shook hands with them.

After a meeting that lasted a very short time, Hitler alone with Eva Braun drank tea in his office.

On the morning of April 20, Linge woke Hitler up at 9 a.m. at the urgent request of Burgdorf, who had an important report from the front. Hitler got out of bed, went from the bedroom to the office and, without opening the door, asked Burgdorf what had happened. Burgdorf, who was standing on the other side of the closed door, reported that at dawn the Russians had broken through the front between Guben and Forst, that this breakthrough was small and that counterattacks were being carried out there. Burgdorf also reported that the commander of the military unit, in the area of which the Russians broke through, was shot on the spot for not holding out. In response, Hitler said:

Send me Linge.

Linge, who was standing at the door next to Burgdorf, answered:

- My Fuehrer?

"Linge, I haven't slept yet. Wake me up an hour later, at two in the afternoon.

When Hitler got up and had breakfast in his office, Linge poured cocaine drops into his right eye. After the pain in the eye had subsided under the influence of the drops, Hitler played with his beloved puppy Wolf until lunchtime. Hitler dined with Eva Braun and his secretaries.

At about three o'clock in the afternoon, the Reich Chancellery gathered in the park to congratulate Hitler, deputations from the Hitler Youth led by Axman and from the army group

"Center", headquarters commandant Shtreve with several officers, commander of the Fuhrer's "security company" SS Obersturmführer Drobe with several SS men of his company. In view of the fact that Hitler was very reluctant to leave his bomb shelter, the deputies lined up in one line at the very entrance to the bomb shelter. Hitler, dressed in a gray overcoat with a raised collar, accompanied by Putkammer and Linge, went into the park. When Hitler appeared, everyone stood "quietly" and raised their hands in a fascist salute.

Himmler, Bormann, Burgdorf, Fegelein, Hevel, Lorenz, Hitler's doctors Morell and Stumpfegger, Hitler's adjutants Schaub, Albert Bormann, Albrecht, Johannmeier, Belov and Günsche stood at the door of the music salon in the park. Himmler approached Hitler and congratulated him on his birthday. Hitler casually shook hands with him and began to greet the others. Then he approached the deputations. Hunched over like an old man and dragging his feet, Hitler walked slowly along the front. The leader of each deputation stepped forward from the ranks and congratulated Hitler. An officer from Army Group Center gave Hitler a leather-bound congratulatory address signed by Scherner. Axman congratulated Hitler on behalf of the Hitler Youth. When Hitler walked around the front, the audience formed a semicircle in front of him. Hitler warned that he could not

speak loudly, and limited himself to just a few words. He uttered his usual phrase that victory would surely come and that then they would be able to say that they also participated in its conquest. After that, Hitler languidly raised his right hand and again returned to his bomb shelter. On this day, Hitler saw the sky for the last time in his life. He never left the bomb shelter.

Himmler, Bormann, Burgdorf, Fegelein and the adjutants followed Hitler as the afternoon meeting was scheduled for 4 p.m. Minute for two

Goering, Ribbentrop, Doenitz, Keitel, and Jodl arrived at Hitler's bomb shelter before the start of the meeting with congratulations. Hitler received each of them separately in his office. Linge, who reported and let everyone into the office, heard Goering and Keitel assured Hitler of unbreakable loyalty and that they would stay with him to the end. Each of them did not stay long with Hitler, with the exception of Ribbentrop, who stayed with him for about 10 minutes. After congratulating Hitler, Goering, Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl joined the conference participants gathered in the reception room. Ribbentrop, after talking with Hitler, left the Reich Chancellery. A few minutes later, Hitler came out of the office into the reception room and greeted the rest of the audience, thanking everyone for their congratulations. Then Hitler turned to Krebs, asked about new reports from the Oder, and went with him to the conference room. Behind

others followed them.

The main issue at this meeting was the breakthrough of the front by Russian troops between Guben and Forst. Large Russian tank formations came even closer to Berlin and during the day reached the Spreewald south of the Berlin-Frankfurt motorway. This created a serious threat to the capital also from the south. Since on the eve of the Russian troops made their way into the area north of Berlin to Oranienburg itself, and from the east side - almost to Berlin itself, the breakthrough of Russian troops between Guben and Forst was especially dangerous, especially since the Russians could cut off Berlin from Southern Germany.

In view of this menacing turn of events at the front, Bormann took steps to move headquarters from Berlin to Obersalzberg as soon as possible. Even during the meeting, he hastily left the room and ordered that SS Obersturmbannführer Erich Kempka come to him in the bomb shelter. Kempka was Hitler's personal chauffeur and head of the Reichs garage.

office. Bormann, together with Kempka, picked up a convoy of vehicles that were supposed to transport Hitler and his personal headquarters to the Obersalzberg. About 15-20 large all-terrain vehicles, several buses and about 10 trucks were allocated for this purpose. An armored car was intended for Hitler. Kempka requested two armored personnel carriers from the armory in Spandau. Linge ordered all of Hitler's personal belongings to be packed, except for the clothes he wore every day.

How intensively Bormann planned the "exodus" from Berlin can be seen from the documents that were found by Soviet soldiers in the bunker of the Imperial Chancellery. These were cipher telegrams, which were transmitted by radio from Berlin to the Bavarian Obersalzberg. What did Bormann write about and what was reported to him?

April 21, 08.59

Bormann asks if the landing of the "advanced team" in Obersalzberg was successful?

09.30

Bormann asks to send him a "medicine".

19.30

Hummel reports to Bormann about the difficulties of accommodation due to the large number of arrivals in Obersalzberg.

19.50

Baur warns that a car should arrive at the Neubiberg airfield at 2] o'clock.

21.48

Friedrichs reports to Bormann about the influx of "noble refugees" into the Bavarian Alps.

23.07

He also conveys Gauleiter Hofer's request to close the border "for foreigners."

April 22, 00.43

\* I?

Bormann demands that the radio stations in Munich and Obersalzberg be kept in constant readiness.

08.49

Bormann demands to send "mineral water, vegetables, apple juice and mail" to Berlin.

09.35

He also transfers to Hummel the right to command on the Obersalzberg, "if I quit the game."

17.45

Bormann tells Hofer to act on his own, "because it is IMPOSSIBLE to control from here."

17.55

Gauleiter Rainer reports that everything is in order on the Adriatic coast and the "political forces" are on alert.

These were the encrypted telegrams that went from Berlin to the non-existent "Alpine fortress" and back, indicating that Bormann continued to take care of the future base and oriented others accordingly. He was preparing for his possible flight: two telegrams testify to this. One of them was sent at 15:01 on April 25:

"Order Koller to fly one of Baur's high-speed planes to Rechlin the next night anyway."

After 17 minutes - at 15:18 on April 25 - another encryption went out:

"Ensure, by means of police radio and other means, that Air Force General Kammhuber arrives as quickly as possible through Rechlin to the Führer. He will receive a further assignment. Borman.

But the assignments were never given.

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DAYS: April 21 - April 26

Saturday, April 21

In the morning, departure of Puttkammer and the main body.

Before lunch, the shelling of Berlin begins.

Sunday, April 22

The Fuhrer remains in Berlin! In the evening - Scherner in Berlin.

Monday, April 23

Tuesday, April 24

Gene. Weidling was appointed commandant of the defense of Berlin.

Wednesday, April 25

Göring is expelled from the party!

First major raid on Obersalzberg.

Berlin is surrounded!

Thursday, April 26

Himmler and Jodl are delaying the divisions marching to our rescue!

ESSAY ELEVENTH:

Wolf in the trap

The entries in this section of the diary seem to be contradictory: 2| On April 14, a command is given to send Hitler's adjutant and the bulk of the Fuhrer's inner circle from Berlin. And on the 22nd, Bormann writes: "The Fuhrer remains in Berlin." In his cipher to the Berghof, he confirms on the morning of the 22nd that the "Wolf" (such was Hitler's party nickname in the 1920s) remains here, since only he can seize the position, if at all possible. .

There were indeed hesitations: one of the bureaucrats

"213

The head of the Fuhrer's office recorded that on the evening of April 20, an order was given to all the ranks of the highest imperial institutions to fly south. Later it turned out that the flights were difficult, so you should go by train or by car. At the morning meeting on April 21, Hitler spoke differently. Günsche and Linge testify:

"The military meeting (April 21. — L.B.) was scheduled for 12 noon. It was the shortest meeting during the entire war. Many faces were distorted. They spoke in hushed voices, repeating the same question: "Why does the Führer still hesitate to leave Berlin?"

Hitler left his rooms. He hunched over even more. Having succinctly greeted the participants of the meeting, he sank into his chair. Krebs began to report. He reported that the position of the German troops defending Berlin had deteriorated further. In the south, Russian tanks broke through the Zossen and advanced to the outskirts of Berlin. Heavy fighting is going on in the eastern and northern suburbs of Berlin. The position of the German troops stationed on the Oder south of Stettin is catastrophic. Russian tank attacks broke through the German front and deep

wedged into the German positions.

Hitler got up and leaned over the table. He began to trace the map with trembling hands. He suddenly straightened up and threw his colored pencils on the table. He was breathing heavily, his face was filled with blood,

the eyes were wide open. Stepping back one step from the table, he shouted  
voice:

- It doesn't look like anything! Under these conditions, I am no longer able to command! The war is lost! But if you, gentlemen, think that I will leave Berlin, then you are deeply mistaken! I'd rather put a bullet in my head!"

One could understand that even for the Fuhrer, who had lost contact with the real world, it was difficult  
hope

on the possibility of changing the course of events if he moved from Berlin to Bavaria. Hitler could hardly count on any troops: he knew better than anyone that no "Alpine fortress" existed, and Scherner's army group operating in Czechoslovakia had no real opportunity to break through to the west, into the Bavarian Alps. Indeed, later records were found of such statements by Hitler in conversations with Bormann: "It is absolutely pointless to sit in the south, because there I will have neither influence nor armies. I would sit there only with my staff. The South German and Austrian highlands I could hold if Italy could be held. But there the command is infected with defeatism..." And one more thing:

"I would sit in Berchtesgaden like a pitiful fugitive and issue useless orders." Or in a conversation with chief pilot Baur: "I have two options: either to go to the mountains or to Doenitz in Flensburg. However, in 14 days I will be in the same position and facing the same alternative. The war ends in Berlin. I live and die with Berlin."

Frankly enough? That is why Bormann telegraphed the Obersalzberg on 21 April that the Wolf was staying here. The wolf is trapped.

In a trap — and alone!.. It was during these days that it became clear that Hitler's closest associates turned their backs on him. On April 20, he saw them for the last time - Hermann Goering and Heinrich Himmler.

If you follow the official hierarchy of the Reich, then you must first deal with Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering - the "second person" in the empire. In the spring of 1945, I had the opportunity to see him - in the American military prison Bad Mondorf, where a group of officers from the headquarters of Marshal G.K. Zhukov to interrogate the main war criminals. The "second person" by this moment was pretty emaciated, the light blue tunic with buttonholes of the Reichs Marshal hung on Goering very freely. When on-

"2157

interrogation began, Goering's hands trembled, and when he convulsively swallowed water, his teeth chattered on a glass ...\*

Goering was one of the first to leave Berlin before his encirclement, and settled in his villa in Bavaria near Berchtesgaden, waiting for him to assume the position of Hitler's successor. With this he associated quite definite calculations.

The fact is that during one of the conversations in the Imperial Chancellery, in response to a proposal to enter into negotiations with the Western allies, Hitler dropped the remark that, perhaps, Goering was most suitable for this role. In the quiet of the Bavarian Alps, Goering drew up plans according to which he saw himself as the new master of Germany. As the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Koller, later recalled, Goering instructed him to write an appeal to Eisenhower. And Goering himself presented his plan to his closest collaborators.

in these words:

"Germany has only one chance left. We conclude a truce with the Western powers, turn the entire Western front and kick out the Russians. For this we are still strong enough.

In the end, a conflict will break out between East and West, and we can alleviate it for the Western powers ... "

But in order to act, Goering needed authority. It was for this purpose that on 23 April he sent a ciphered telegram to his beloved Fuehrer asking for authority to exercise his role as successor. At the end of the telegram, he inadvertently added that if he did not receive an answer before 12 midnight, he would consider that the Fuehrer was not free in his decisions.

When this telegram arrived at the bunker of the Imperial Chancellery, Bormann, who could not stand Goering, provided

\* Goering was a drug addict by the end of the war. The Americans, taking him prisoner, deprived Goering drugs (by the way, then he was cured of drug addiction) (ed. note).

baked a corresponding reaction from Hitler. Hitler, at the suggestion of Bormann, saw in Goering's telegram a desire to seize power and immediately gave the order to deprive Goering of all posts. A telegram flew to Berchtesgaden ordering the local SS men to immediately arrest Goering.

True, the SS treated him very kindly, and on May 6 he managed to free himself. Having learned that during this time the place of the "Fuehrer's successor" was taken by Grand Admiral Doenitz, Goering sent him a telegram offering his services. In particular, he declared that he could start negotiations with Eisenhower as "marshal with marshal." But the Reichsmarschall was late: at that time, General Jodl had already left to see Eisenhower as Doenitz's representative. Then Goering thought it best to surrender to the passing soldiers and officers of the 1st American Airborne Division. It should be noted that he was received with all honors and even managed to give a press conference to representatives of the American press. He behaved at this press conference rather cheekily and, in any case, not like a war criminal. His behavior was so defiant that the American command had to reprimand the division commander for allowing Goering to hold a press conference.

Goering's end is known: he was sentenced to hang at Nuremberg, but poisoned himself before his execution. It is still not clear how he got the poison capsule. According to one version, he kept it all the time, according to another, he received it from SS Obergruppenführer von den Bach-Zelewski during cross-examination, the third version is from an American guard.

Goering in the spring of 1945 was a man without power. The same could not be said of Himmler. He still had a powerful SS apparatus in his hands.

What angered Himmler Bormann, and then Git

Lera? "217

The history of Bormann's relationship with Himmler is as old as the history of the entire Nazi dictatorship. It began back in the 1930s, when none other than Bormann drew the attention of Hitler and Hess to the then little-known neophyte Himmler. Himmler's first years as head of the SS were the years of his alliance with Bormann, for through Bormann lay the path to Hitler. And on a personal level, both were friendly — up to the financial services of Bormann to the Reichsfuehrer SS for the maintenance of Himmler's mistress Hedwig Potthast. Himmler had something to pay: he knew that the exemplary family man Bormann (wife, favorite of the Fuehrer Gerd, and 10 children) had a constant mistress, the Dresden artist Maya Bersich, and the silence of the Reichsfuehrer was useful to Bormann. Then two kingdoms - the SS and party affairs - existed side by side, without interfering with each other. Not to mention the fact that the "principled" goals of both kingdoms were the same, Himmler and Bormann used each other in court intrigues - in particular, against Goering (he was hated by both of his manners and pretensions) and Goebbels (with a rhetorical skill which they could not compete). But as the Reich "shrank" like Balzac's shagreen leather, Bormann's and Himmler's interests began to clash. Especially after the question arose about a possible successor to the Fuehrer. The claims of the Reichsfuehrer SS grew with

every month of the new, 45th year. The reader must have noticed that Himmler's name is rarely mentioned in Bormann's little book. Indeed, Himmler began to rarely visit the bunker. He preferred his own headquarters in the Hohenlirchen sanatorium, taking care of his SS kingdom and receiving the highest ranks of the SS there, so that they could see on whom they depended.

The second circumstance that separated Himmler and Bormann concerned the most important question - the question of the prospects for war. The fatal prospect of defeat

nia could not suit both - and Hitler. Military defeat became obvious. I remember how Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel discussed this before the Soviet officers.

"It became clear to us that by military methods," he said, "the war cannot be won. There were political methods left..."

But how? Hitler kept pushing away from himself such a need, which meant an attempt to come to an agreement with one of the enemy sides, either with the West or with the USSR. He persuaded his associates to wait until military happiness smiled at Germany (as he directly told Karl Wolff, who proposed the "Western option"). Bormann, apparently, in this matter went "behind" Hitler. But Himmler...

Now the historians of the Third Reich agree that back in 1942-1943, the top of the Reich (and the SS) began to think seriously about the possibility of a separate agreement with the West. Fortunately, this conspiracy had a rich background (they still remembered the flight of Hess). As for the "order" of the SS itself, the most active supporter of the "Western version" was the head of foreign policy intelligence (the so-called UI Directorate of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of the SS), SS Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg. His first initiative dates back to a very early date - August 1942. Even before Stalingrad, but after an unequivocal collapse near Moscow, well informed about the situation not only on the fronts, but also in the rear, the young and prosperous Brigadeführer decided on a bold (at that time) action. Seizing the opportunity, he asked Himmler an unpleasant question:

— Allow me, Reichsfuehrer, to ask you a risky question: in which of the drawers of your desk are alternative proposals for ending the war?

At first, Himmler was angry:

How can you ask such a thing?

Schellenberg was ready for such a reaction. He waited until his boss calmed down, and began to explain to him that we were talking about purely secret negotiations with the West. Himmler then asked:

"Won't this turn into a boomerang against us?" After all, it is quite possible that the Western powers themselves will then try to find an agreement with the East?

Schellenberg promised that he would act only through his own channels. Himmler had already taken up Schellenberg's ideas.

— But we shouldn't let Bormann know about it. He is able to compromise us and accuse us of trying to come to terms with Stalin!

So, little by little, Schellenberg turned Himmler into his ally. He even sketched out a scheme for a compromise with the West: the withdrawal of the Wehrmacht from Northern France, the restoration of Belgium and Holland; the preservation of the Baltic States as a German foothold, the creation of friendly states in the Balkans. And in the East?

"A compromise peace," concluded Schellenberg, "should be such that in the future we will be able to defend ourselves in the East!"

And he clarified:

- The construction of a new Europe should ensure the possibility of a big war against Russia.

Himmler agreed and gave Schellenberg "carte blanche" for action, remarking only in passing:

"But if you make mistakes in the conduct of business, then I will immediately refuse you!"

From the time of this conversation (it took place in Vinnitsa!)\* until the spring of 1945, a lot of water flowed under the bridge, but the Schellenberg department made extraordinary efforts to realize the plans of driving a political wedge between the allies. Here, for example, is 1944, when on July 20 an unsuccessful general's

+ Schellenberg himself tells about this conversation in his post-war memoirs. - Ed.

conspiracy against Hitler. The "civilian" and political head of the conspiracy, Carl Goerdeler, had high hopes for an agreement with the West and took steps to secure contacts with the US and Britain. But the plot failed, Goerdeler ended up in the SS dungeon.

But it turned out that Goerdeler was still useful ... Himmler. Here is what Wilhelm Brandenburg, one of the SS jailers who guarded Goerdeler, said about this:

"Once the highest authorities, it was Himmler, made an offer to Goerdeler. You can even call it a mission. The point was to use his close political connections with the Swedish financier Wallenberg in Stockholm and with the Jewish leader Dr. Weizmann to establish contact with the British Prime Minister Churchill and in this way achieve a speedy and acceptable peace. Goerdeler accepted this commission."

Brandenburg did not know exactly how this assignment ended. But in any case, it is known that on October 8, 1944, Goerdeler wrote a letter to Wallenberg asking him to act as an intermediary between Nazi Germany and the Western powers, so that "Europe would be saved from Bolshevism." "England must conclude a truce with Germany today," Goerdeler urged on behalf of Himmler. "England must tolerate National Socialism..." Goerdeler immediately warned: "First, everything must be prepared behind the scenes, secretly from Russia." An extremely clear presentation of the concept!

At the same time, in October-November 1944, Himmler instructed Walter Schellenberg to invite Wallenberg himself to Berlin for confidential talks. Wallenberg did not dare. Then Himmler sent a special message through other Swedish channels to the governments of the United States and England, in which he proposed to send an emissary for negotiations. This message, as the Secretary of State testifies

"2217

tar Cordall Hull, has reached the addressee. But it did not find support from Roosevelt.

Himmler himself soon entered into negotiations. So, at the end of 1944, Himmler held secret meetings with the former president of Switzerland, Musi, the official pretext for which were negotiations on the release of a group of Jews imprisoned in concentration camps, for which Musi, on behalf of Jewish organizations, offered Himmler 5 million Swiss francs. The negotiations were held under the flag of the Red Cross. If we recall that emissaries from the governments of the United States and England actively used this stamp, then we can assume that this time Himmler also discussed with Musi not only the question of the fate of the prisoners. By the way, this became known in Moscow (we read Merkulov's report!).

We already know that 1945 brought new attempts to find a common language between the SS emissaries and the military-political figures of the USA and England. I will make a reservation right away: both the American and British participants in the negotiations did not act as a united front and did not



always had a cover "above". After all, the year of Victory was coming, and the leaders of the Western powers did not want to risk the won unity of the anti-Hitler coalition, they were not at all attracted by the prospect drawn by the German side immediately after such a close Victory to enter into a new "hot war" - this time with the Soviet Union. This, of course, would not find support among the peoples of democratic countries, and Joseph Goebbels was right in his letter to Hitler, which I quoted above, when - with regret for himself - he stated the dependence of Western governments on the opinion of the electorate.

So it happened with the action of SS Ogruppenführer Karl Wolff in Northern Italy. There, agreement between Wolf, Dulles, and the commander of the allied forces in Italy, Field Marshal Alexander, went far enough that, on the night of April 17, Wolf

"227

could promise Hitler a lot. But this agreement turned out to be shaky, and Dulles had to refuse it when Moscow learned about it and Stalin directly raised the question of the fate of the grand coalition. Stalin was unusually harsh in his messages to Roosevelt and Churchill. For example, Roosevelt, justifying himself for starting negotiations with SS emissaries (and this directly violated allied agreements), wrote Stalin on March 25, 1945: "... As a military man, you will understand that it is necessary to act quickly so as not to miss the opportunity. The same would have been the case if your general at Koenigsberg or Danzig had been approached by the enemy with a white flag.

March 29 I.V. Stalin replied:

"Not only am I not against, but, on the contrary, I am entirely in favor of taking advantage of cases of collapse in the German armies and hastening their surrender on one or another sector of the front, encouraging them to open the front to the Allied forces.

But I agree to negotiations with the enemy on such a matter only if these negotiations do not lead to easing the position of the enemy, if the possibility for the Germans to maneuver and use these negotiations to transfer their troops to other sectors of the front is excluded, and primarily to the Soviet front.

Regarding the analogy with Koenigsberg and Danzig, I.V. Stalin remarked:

"Unfortunately, the analogy does not fit here. German troops near Danzig or Koenigsberg are surrounded. If they surrender, they will do so in order to save themselves from extermination, but they cannot open the front to the Soviet troops, since the front has gone far to the west from them, to the Oder. The position of the German troops in Italy is completely different. They are not surrounded and are not threatened with extermination. If the Germans in northern Italy, despite this, still seek negotiations in order to surrender and open the front

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Allied troops, this means that they have some other, more serious goals regarding the fate of Germany.

Of course, Stalin deliberately exaggerated the danger of a split in the allies. But he can be understood - he, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who made monstrous, almost unbelievable efforts and suffered such losses, was offered a comparison of the march from Stalingrad to East Prussia with what looked like a "walk" campaign of the Anglo-American troops in Italy (the latter in general capitulated)! Stalin had the right to exaggerate, because he knew that the West would not agree to split the coalition. In the spring of 1945, the Western Allies could not agree to this once they came to the continent. But in essence, the last months of the war year were overshadowed by the shadow of a future "cold war" between the West and the Soviet Union, which in subsequent years flared up no worse than a "hot" war.

One way or another, the US President and the British Prime Minister were forced to disavow their participants in the Swiss talks: they were instructed to cut off all contacts. But this did not mean that the German participants laid down their diplomatic weapons. Schellenberg shifted his efforts from the Italian bridgehead to another, namely, to Sweden, where already since 1943 stable contacts of the SS with British and American intelligence officers had been established, carried out with Swedish mediation. In the spring of 1945, negotiations went through a special intermediary - the head of the Swedish branch of the International Red Cross, Count Folke Bernadotte. The last act of these negotiations took place on 24 April.

...On the 23rd, Himmler learned from Fegelein that Hitler had decided to stay in Berlin. Himmler felt like the new master of the Reich. Schellenberg was in a hurry: he advised Himmler to ask Bernadotte (he was "accidentally" in Germany) to personally send

to approach General Eisenhower and, on behalf of Himmler, offer him the surrender of Germany to the Western Allies. Clever Bernadotte immediately said that this was unrealistic. Then Himmler chose a different path: he himself decided to meet with the count. It took place in Lübeck on 24 April. The conversation turned out to be long, Himmler persisted:

"I am ready to unconditionally capitulate to the Western Allies in order to save the largest possible part of Germany from the Soviet invasion, and to fight on the Eastern front until a meeting with Western troops takes place there ..."

Bernadotte did not express much enthusiasm, but declared that he was ready to convey Himmler's proposal to the Swedish government if the Germans surrendered in Norway and Denmark. Himmler agreed to this and wrote a short letter to the Swedish Foreign Minister Günther. On the 24th Günther informed the US and British ambassadors in Stockholm about this.

What was the answer in London and Washington?

Churchill recalled that he learned of Himmler's proposal on the morning of the 25th and immediately convened the War Cabinet. The Prime Minister told his colleagues that it was necessary to coordinate the answer with the Americans, and then with Moscow. At the same time, he cunningly explained: they say, it is necessary to talk about capitulation with the three of us, together with Moscow. But at the same time, General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Alexander (in Italy) must not be deprived of the right to accept partial, local capitulations. This does not require tripartite agreement. He also reported this to Washington.

Then a strange telephone conversation took place with Truman:

Truman: I think that he (i.e. Himmler) should be forced to capitulate to all governments - Russian, yours and the United States. I think we can discuss partial surrenders.

Churchill: No, no, no. From a man like

8 Law. No. 665 Bezymensky "2257

Himmler, no partial surrender. Himmler can speak on behalf of the German state, if such a thing is possible today. And so we think that negotiations should be conducted with all three Governments.

Truman: Quite right. This is my opinion as well.

Churchill: Of course, we are talking about a partial surrender at the front, on the Himmler Allied front. And there, Eisenhower is left with the right to accept capitulations, then he (ie Himmler), perhaps, will want to capitulate.

Truman: Yes, of course.

Churchill: Do you understand that?

Truman: Completely. If he speaks in the name of the all-German government, then the surrender must cover everything and it must be carried out before all three governments.

Strange conversation! Truman does not seem to hear, or pretends not to hear his interlocutor's reasoning about partial surrender, about Eisenhower's powers. And if the prime minister asks rather impolitely: "Do you understand that?", the president answers unequivocally. After all, he remembers the recent correspondence with Stalin about Northern Italy. Therefore, Churchill's cunning maneuver had to be rejected. Both Western leaders informed Stalin about Himmler's proposal and their negative attitude towards it. Stalin, of course, supported his colleagues. Truman instructed the ambassador in Sweden to hand over the joint refusal, and on April 27 Schellenberg found out about this from Bernadotte, and Himmler himself learned about the refusal from Schellenberg. This was announced on the radio. The intrigue is over.

But no! Having been refused by Churchill and Truman, Himmler turned to General de Gaulle and offered him... an alliance between Germany and France. They say that the Anglo-Americans will treat France as a satellite, and

Stalin "sovietizes" her. France's only path to greatness and independence lies through an immediate alliance with Germany, and General de Gaulle will win for himself the name of the great man of all time. Of course, there was no answer.

But Borman

settled with Himmler - but only

in your diary.

DAYS: April 27 - April 29

Friday, April 27

We stand for the Fuhrer and we will die with him. Loyal to him until death. Others think they must act from a "higher motive." They sacrifice the Fuhrer, and their infidelity, damn them! - similar to their "honor"!

Saturday, April 28

Sunday,

8+

Our imperial office has turned into a heap of rubble. The world is on the brink of destruction!

High treason - unconditional surrender - but this is reported by the foreign press.

Fegelein was demoted — he cowardly tried to escape from Berlin in civilian clothes. The day begins for the second time with a hurricane fire.

April 29

On the night of April 26-29, foreign

"2277

The press announces Himmler's offer to surrender the Reich.

Betrothal of Adolf Hitler to Eva Braun.

The Fuhrer dictates his political and then his personal testament.

The traitors Jodl, Himmler and the generals are leaving us in the hands of the Bolsheviks. Hurricane fire again!

According to the enemy, the Americans have penetrated into Munich!

All these phrases—literally scribbled by Bormann at random, not observing the order of the lines of a lined notebook—clearly do not correspond to the clerical nature and general style of the document. Indeed, the collapse of the Reich had to happen in order for a person standing behind his master's back to show human traits: anger, despair, indignation!

We will analyze these days later, but now about something else: about how deep the gap was between the ghostly life in the bunker and real life on the same days of April 27-29, 1945 in the same Berlin. After all, it was no longer the capital of the Great German Empire, but a city run by the Soviet occupation commandant's office. This Berlin began a new, complex and unusual life for him. Even to us, the officers of Marshal Zhukov's headquarters, she was not accustomed - and we learned about her from the stories of Soviet journalists, fortunately we maintained friendly relations with them.

## ESSAY TWELVE:

When MOSCOW came to BERLIN

On April 29, military correspondents of the Pravda newspaper, Boris Gorbатов and Martyn Merzhanov, my old acquaintances, had an appointment with the first Soviet commandant of Berlin, Colonel General Nikolai Berzarin. Merzhanov recalls this as follows:

"Even yesterday, the first Soviet commandant of Berlin, Colonel-General Berzarin, appointed Gorbатов and me a meeting for two in the afternoon, and after huddling around the rooms of the corps headquarters for another twenty minutes, we moved to the rear of the 5th shock army. We drove on the asphalt

on a flat road, and to our right we could hear the noises of distant battles. Finally, we turned to the right and drove to the city center, to 18 Altfriedrichsfelde Street, where the Soviet commandant's office of Berlin was located in an old sooty and pierced by bullets and shells house.

The sentry checked our documents and we entered a building with a long corridor. At the end of it we found a door on which was written in chalk: "Commandant of the city of Berlin." The officer escorted us into the adjacent large room, which was already full of people. Nikolai Erastovich Berzarin and an interpreter were sitting at a large writing table, and Germans in civilian clothes were sitting at a long green cloth covered table. They were all thin and pale. Most of them looked down despondently.

During the conversation, we found out that these were specialist engineers who worked at power plants, water supply, bakeries, trade enterprises, tram depots and the metro. They still had no idea what they should talk about with this slender, swarthy, handsome general, whose troops stormed Alexanderplatz and the town hall building that day. And at this seemingly inopportune moment, he invited the public utilities workers to his place and announced in a calm voice:

"Today, in eleven liberated regions, our army is distributing bread and potatoes to the population, more than thirty bakeries have been opened, and six mills have been launched.

The Germans listened attentively, and some wrote down something on pieces of paper.

Berzarin continued:

"Red Army Assistance Groups" have been set up in all districts. What are these groups? They, under the guidance of district commandants, must restore order in the streets and houses, pick up and hand over weapons, and follow all the orders of the commandants.

Further, from the report, the Germans learned that the other day an assault detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel F. Galkin, advancing on Treptow Park, broke into the largest Berlin power plant, Rumelsburg, which was operating at full capacity.

"The station is still operating now," said Berzarin. - Full contact has been established with the workers. They carefully carry out their duties. After looking at the map, the general added: "There are power plants in Klingenberg and Ramensdorf. A gas plant will soon be put into operation in the Karlhorst area. Hospitals are open and we supply them with medicines, private trade is allowed, watch workshops are operating.

The Germans listened without uttering a word, without expressing their attitude to the report.

Then Berzarin turned to them with a question:

— Will you help us restore your Berlin?

The words "your Berlin" made a certain impression on the listeners: how is "your" if the battle is lost, if the Reichstag and the Imperial Chancellery are about to fall?

Everyone was still silent, but there was a certain revival among the Germans. They looked at each other as if trying to guess each other's intentions.

Then Berzarin turned to one of them:

"Here you are, sir..." at that moment the engineer stood up, but Berzarin asked him to sit down. — I know that you are a good specialist, but you held a modest position as a shift engineer, while the director-fascist was poorly educated, but he was in charge of the entire station. Am I saying right?

The engineer was silent.

"So I suggest," continued the general, "you, sir, become the director of the station.

The engineer stood up again. His reddened face, his outstretched neck over the wide collar of his stale shirt became visible to everyone. He looked at Berzarin and, apparently,

"2317

elk, wanted to, but could not utter a word. His jacket was too small for him, and his bony arms protruded from the short sleeves. Finally he said:

- This is impossible...

- Why?

- How can I, an ordinary engineer, be higher than Mr. Director?

- Why not?

- This violates all the norms, habits, concepts that have developed with us.

"But the director is gone, he ran away, abandoned both the station and you, and will never return again.

The engineer looked at everyone, looking for support. But his colleagues either lowered their eyes or looked away. Tears streamed down the engineer's cheeks. Berzarin smiled and said:

- That's what they decided, and you will choose the employees yourself ... We will help you in everything.

The engineer sat down, his head resting on his arms crossed on the table, and his shoulders were trembling... Then he got up and said:

- I agree to everything for the good of German Berlin.

- That's good!

This is how the appointment to the posts of directors of stations, bakeries, railway stations, shops took place. And only one person answered the general's proposal with a sharp refusal. He spoke quickly, for a long time. The meaning of the refusal was that he could only submit to the German authorities.

"But no one is raping you, I am only offering you," said Berzarin.

"Won't they shoot me?"

- No!

"Then I categorically refuse to be the head of the Berlin water supply," HE said decisively.

The meeting is over. The Germans, whispering, went out in a crowd, and Berzarin, grabbing his cap, hurried

"2327

livo left the commandant's office. When we jumped out after him to ask him a few questions, we saw the blue smoke of the departed car: he was in a hurry to the troops of his 5th shock, who fought for the city center.

So Martyn Merzhanov wrote in his notebook, and so it was: Nazism was dying, and Berlin was coming back to life. Probably, many parallels could be drawn in those days - for example, a parallel between the fate of the Soviet capital Moscow, if the plans of the Nazis were realized and if it were taken by German troops, and the fate of Berlin, which was taken by Soviet troops. To me, who was in Berlin in those days, these parallels did not occur to me. But today you can think about it.

... I could imagine what Major General Baron von Gersdorff looked like during the war years, although it was not so easy to do, seeing in the summer of 1971 an elderly man in an orthopedic wheelchair (an avid cavalryman, he did not leave this occupation until old age, until he fell off his horse). But in the manners of this representative of the Silesian nobility, in whose family one general succeeded another, one could feel the "school", given not only for years. When Baron von Gersdorff arrived in Poznań, where Field Marshal von Bock's headquarters was located in the spring of 1941, he did not yet know his boss, but he was soon able to do it sufficiently.

"In the "triple constellation" of German field marshals - Runstedt, Manstein, Bock - Fedor von Bock was perhaps the most brilliant figure, - this is how General von Gersdorff characterized the man who was supposed to take Moscow. — A big strategist, an expert in his field, a Prussian field marshal, as one can imagine him: precise, correct, polished. However, Bock combined these professional qualities with ambition, careerism and ruthlessness.

"2337

As they say, Bok was a man who walked over corpses ... "

Baron von Gersdorff told me about von Bock's operational plan in the autumn of 1941, which provided for the capture of Moscow.

"To evaluate this plan," he noted, "one must bear in mind that, according to Hitler's order, our troops were not to enter Moscow. They were only supposed to surround the city.

- Shouldn't have entered Moscow?

"Yes, it directly followed from the orders of the Fuhrer ..."

It turns out that before the start of the attack on Moscow, a certain senior rank of the Nazi leadership (Gersdorf forgot his name) arrived at Bock's headquarters and introduced himself as "Chief of the Advanced Staff of Moscow." He declared that he had instructions from the Fuhrer that the troops should not enter the city. Bock will only have to dedicate units to carry out "security" tasks. Gersdorff asked for a clarification of the wording, to which the guest from Berlin called these tasks "tasks of political security."

But do we know everything that the Nazis were planning to do with Moscow? Many of Hitler's arguments about the need to wipe the Soviet capital from the face of the earth are known, as well as the corresponding directives. Specific plans are also known, in particular, the plan of flooding the city.

Thus, on October 9, 1941, Dr. Koeppen, mentioned above, wrote in his diary:

"The Führer ordered that not a single German soldier enter Moscow. The city will be flooded and wiped off the face of the earth.

The October 17 entry read:

"The Germans should not enter Russian cities, including large ones, if the cities survive the war. This will not happen with St. Petersburg and Moscow."

What did the Soviet troops do with Berlin, when

did he end up in their hands? Until now, the documentation on this subject has been very modest. Evidence that reflected the care of the new authorities about the city and its population prevailed. These documents are, and I will bring them. But now another side of events has opened up, which further emphasizes the truly historical nature of the decisions taken after the capture of Berlin.

It turns out that from the moment the Red Army entered the territory of Germany and its satellites, Moscow considered the question of what to do with the population of these territories? The answer suggested itself that it should have made at least a minimal contribution to the restoration of the monstrous destruction in the republics of the USSR. On February 3, 1945, a directive of the USSR State Defense Committee (GOKO) was issued under the number 7467. The directive is harsh, but understandable: to produce ...

.."mobilization for work of able-bodied German citizens, regardless of citizenship, according to the following groups:

Men from 17 years old to 45 years old,

women from 18 to 30 years old.

Women with infants (up to one year old) are exempted from mobilization.

The mobilized citizens will be used for work according to the decision of the Military Command.

The mobilized are required to have personal belongings with them: winter clothes, shoes, underwear, bedding, personal utensils, hygiene items and food for 15 days. The total weight of items must not exceed 200 kilograms."

The directive has been implemented. At the end of 1944, 112,480 Germans had already been taken (practically deported) from the Balkan countries, where the Soviet Army came to the USSR. This task was carried out by the internal troops of the NKVD. Now in Germany itself they were going to take the same measures. Should have been

"2357

send columns of tens (if not hundreds!) of Germans to the East ...

But on April 20, the day before Zhukov's troops entered the city limits of Berlin, Stalin realized that such draconian deportation measures were impossible in a country that the USSR and its allies were going to occupy for a long time. Not to mention the low efficiency of such a labor force, the Soviet authorities could not afford to assume a pose similar to the Nazi occupiers. On April 20, 1945, the GOKO directive was canceled, and then other documents appeared, which we will cite:

"ORDER

Head of the garrison of the city of Berlin dated May 2, 1945 No. 01 on ensuring the normal operation of medical research and medical institutions and sanitary and epidemic well-being in the city

In order to ensure the proper sanitary and epidemiological condition of the garrison and in order to preserve and restore the working capacity of the scientific and medical medical institutions located in the garrison, I order:

1. To the commandants of the districts of the city of Berlin:

a) take immediately all necessary measures to preserve the scientific, medical and medical institutions located in their areas, for which purpose ensure their protection and the inviolability of all types of medical and sanitary property, as well as medical personnel and attendants, working in these institutions. Seizure of property and its redistribution is permissible only at the direction of the head of the garrison sanitary service;

b) using all local sanitary facilities

ensure the restoration of civil health care in the garrison, including ensuring the mandatory hospitalization of all infectious patients in special hospitals, while simultaneously carrying out the necessary anti-epidemic measures in the centers of infection;

c) provide for the economic needs of the medical institutions of the garrison, including providing them with food, water and fuel;

d) medical workers of the garrison used in working medical institutions, as well as elderly medical workers and those who are unable to work due to disability, to be provided with apartments and necessary living conditions, paying special attention to meeting the everyday needs of scientific workers;

e) immediately start clearing the territory of the garrison from animal corpses and sewage.

On the execution of this order, report to me on May 5, 1945;

f) ensure the protection of all food industry enterprises, as well as food warehouses, by establishing strict control over their activities, over the distribution of food and in accordance with existing orders and with the obligatory participation of representatives of the sanitary service in this work.



I place on the commandants of the districts of the city of Berlin personal responsibility for the restoration of health care in the garrison, for the preservation of all medical and scientific medical institutions, as well as for ensuring the proper sanitary and epidemiological condition of their districts.

2. To my deputy major general Serdenko:

a) to take under its direct control the maintenance of the economic needs of the medical and scientific-medical institutions located in the garrison;

b) especially for maternity hospitals, obstetric departments of hospitals and clinics, as well as for children's

"237

medical institutions to allocate dairy cows from the herds of livestock to provide sick children and newborns with fresh milk;

c) to provide medical institutions from the trophy funds with the transport they need for their work.

3. To the head of the sanitary service of the garrison:

a) take a direct part in the restoration of the civil health care of the garrison, for which purpose organize the medical community of the city to recreate the medical network, determine the specific needs of the institutions being restored, establish control over their subsequent work and check the activities of the commandants of the district of the city of Berlin in this direction ;

b) for each district of the city, allocate a doctor - a sanitary commissioner, who will be entrusted with the organization of all work in the district to restore health care and ensure sanitary and epidemiological well-being;

c) give instructions to the commandants of the districts on the fulfillment of the above requirements and monitor their work on a daily basis, systematically report to me about shortcomings.

The original was signed by the chief of the garrison and the chief of staff of the Berlin garrison.

## RESOLUTION

Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front No. 063

dated May 11, 1945 on the supply of food to the population of the city of Berlin

In pursuance of the resolution of the GOKO of May 8, 1945, the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front and becomes:

1. Based on the norms established by the GOKO for the food supply of the city of Berlin, on average per person per day: bread - 400 - 500 g, cereals - 50 g, meat - 60 g, fat - 15 g, sugar - 20 g,

natural coffee - 50 g, tea - 20 g \*, potatoes, vegetables, dairy products, salt and other food products - according to the norms established on the spot, depending on the availability of resources - to be introduced from May 15, 1945. the following norms for supplying the population of the city of Berlin...

Distribution of bread to the population of the city of Berlin is to be carried out daily, giving the right to consumers to receive bread for two days at once for the current day and for the next day. Meat, fats, sugar, cereals and potatoes in May this year. to issue twice according to the established norms: the first time for the period from May 15 to May 21 inclusive - for 7 days and the second time for the period from May 22 to May 31 for 10 days. Give out salt from May 20 to May 31 in the amount of the established monthly norm.

Natural coffee and natural tea will be issued from May 25 to May 31, and surrogate coffee - from May 21 to May 31 in the amount of the established monthly norm.

Workers of science, technology, medicine, culture and art, as well as the leadership of city and district self-government bodies, the management of large industrial and transport enterprises, according to the lists approved by the relevant burgomasters, to sell all food products according to the norms established for working heavy - labor logo.

The rest of the engineering and technical workers of enterprises and institutions, doctors, teachers and clergy should be given all food products according to the norms established for workers.

To feed patients who are being treated in hospitals, to distribute food, based on the norms established for workers, and those in need of special treatment in accordance with the norms established by the health department of the city government ...

\* The specified norm of coffee and tea was provided for a month.

8. Based on the amount of food to be transferred from the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts to supply the population of the city of Berlin for a 5-month period, established by the GOKO resolution: grain for the production of cereals and flour 105,000 tons, meat products - 18,000 tons, fats - 4,500 tons, sugar - 6,000 tons, to the quartermaster of the front, Colonel Comrade. Tkachev to allocate from the resources of the front at the expense of the indicated quantities in the period from May 15 to July 15 of this year:

Flour 41,000 t Cereals 5,000 t Meat 6,500 t Fats 500 t Salt 4,000 t Coffee substitute 300 t Natural coffee 50 t Potatoes 50,000 t

Food to provide the population of the city of Berlin for 7 days to be delivered to districts up to 15

May this year...

## REPORT

Head of Logistics of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General and / sl. Antipenko to a member of the State Defense Committee comrade Mikoyan dated May 18, 1945 on providing food for the population and restoring normal life in the city of Berlin

I report on the implementation of the Decree of the Military Council of the First Belorussian Front No. 063 on providing for the population of the city of Berlin as of 18.00 on May 18, 1945.

According to item 2. Identified in the Berlin area with a radius of 35-40 km (Neuruppin, Wildeberg, Neustadt, Fri

Zach, Nauen, Spandau) farms with a total milk supply of up to 70,000 liters per bag. Measures are being developed for the delivery of milk to the trading network from May 25, 1945.

In addition, in Berlin and within a radius of 10-15 km from Berlin, it is possible to accommodate 5,000-7,000 dairy cows for 20 days. According to points 4 and 5. The cards were made and distributed on time, the products began to be released on May 15, 1945.

On point 7. All 235 officers have been selected and are working to create an apparatus for a trade network in the city's districts.

According to item 8. Brought into the trade network of the city of Berlin

Flour 9585 t Cereals 929 t Meat 3600 t Fat 300 t Salt 130 t Natural coffee 15 t On the way:

Salt 2130 t Coffee substitute 216 t

According to points 9, 10, Shi 12. 5,000 mobilized Germans and one regiment of 600 motor vehicles were sent to the potato loading areas.

At 18.00 on May 18, 52,000 tons of potatoes were brought to the loading stations. 17,500 tons loaded. 6,000 tons received and delivered to the trading network.

1500 tons of potatoes arrive daily, in the coming days the receipt will increase to 3000 tons.

One auto regiment, consisting of 825 vehicles and 50 trailers, works in the city of Berlin to deliver food to the distribution network.

According to item 13. Transferred to the city government: 100 passenger cars, incl. on the move 50, cargo

80 trucks. The remaining 120 trucks will be handed over by May 20.

Under item 14. 1,000 tons of motor gasoline were supplied to vehicles serving the city of Berlin.

The city self-government was supplied with 300 tons of gasoline on account of 60 tons on May 19, and 234 tons are at the oil depot and will be issued as needed.

In addition, the following has been done:

1. Removed and buried 2028 horse corpses. In the city of Frankfurt an der Oder, 9,300 wounded were taken out of cellars. There are up to 6,000 people left in hospitals and hospitals. 99 vehicles are working to take out the wounded and sick.

2. German doctors have been appointed in all 22 districts, 30 doctors from military units work in the district commandant's offices. Pharmacies are provided with trophy medicines and operate in all 22 districts of the city.

3. On May 16, the Central City Bank and 21 regional branches were organized.

The financial department of the city of Berlin was organized.

## RESOLUTION

Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front dated May 31, 1945 No. 080 on the supply of milk to children in the city of Berlin

In accordance with the resolution of the GOKO No. 8450 of May 8, 1945 "On supplying the population of the city of Berlin", the Military Council of the front decides:

1. Organize the supply of milk to children under 8 years of age through:

a) the use of dairy resources in the suburbs of Berlin in the amount of 70,000 liters daily  
molo

6) transfer of 5,000 heads of dairy cows from trophy cattle for placement at dairy stations in the districts of the city of Berlin.

2. Oblige the deputy. Commander for Civil Administration comrade. Serov:

a) secure the following suburban areas for the supply of fresh milk to the city of Berlin:

Spandau 3000 l daily Nauen 7000 "-" Neuruppin 30 000 "-" Rathenow 15 000 "-" Westhewalland  
15 000 "-"

Total: 70,000 l daily

6) To oblige the military commandants of the indicated areas to immediately organize the maximum collection of milk from the population through local authorities, restore the network of dairies and discharge points, take into account all specialists who previously worked at dairies, provide them with documents and direct - to go to the village to organize the collection of milk and to transport it to the dairies. At the expense of transport of the local population, organize the transportation of milk from settlements and discharge points to dairy plants, from which the milk will be transported to the city of Berlin.

3. Oblige Major General Zhizhin:

a) provide the Berlin Central Dairy Plant with 25 ZIS-5 vehicles to transport milk from the districts to Berlin;

0) through the burgomaster of Berlin, set up a network selling dairy products within five days.

4. To oblige the quartermaster of the front Tkachev until June 15 of this year. deliver and hand over 5,000 heads to the city government of the city of Berlin.

5. Oblige the chiefs of the rear of the armies to organize

driving cows to the area of the city of Berlin, allocating for this the necessary number of guards, riders, to provide feed on the route. The transfer must be completed by June 15, 1945.

6. To oblige the head of the veterinary service of the front, Major General Speyer, until the moment the cattle are delivered to the authorities of the city of Berlin, to check them for well-being in terms of epizootics.

7. Control over the implementation of this resolution is entrusted to the head of the rear of the front, Lieutenant General Antipenko.

Report on the progress of the implementation of the resolution to the Military Council of the front every 5 days.

The original was signed by the commander of the troops and a member of the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front.

## REPORT

Chief of Logistics of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, Lieutenant General Antipenko, to Comrade A.I. Mikoyan, a member of the State Defense Committee. dated June 21, 1945 on supplying the population of the city of Berlin with food and organizing the normal operation of public utilities and urban transport, medical and cultural institutions

I report on the implementation of the decisions of the GFCS on Berlin:

As of June, two million eight hundred thousand cards have been issued. The network of stores is sufficient, there are no queues. Milk is given regularly to children. Milk is supplied by importing 60,000-65,000 liters of milk a day from suburban areas. Of the trophy cattle, 5,000 dairy cows are transferred to the city government.

Food supply as of June 20 in daily dachas: flour and grain 55, cereals 3, meat 41,

salt 49, sugar 34, tea 39, natural coffee 22, coffee substitute 12, potatoes 19, no fat. Flour and cereals are obtained exclusively through processing at urban enterprises. A camping mill was additionally switched over to processing cereals for the city. There are no fats on site, it is necessary to bring them in.

Sanitary and epidemiological reconnaissance was carried out, foci of infections were eliminated. More than 2,000 animal corpses have been buried in the city.

Waterworks were examined, clogged sources were prohibited for use. Medical control was organized at refrigerators and a canning and sausage factory.

Medical personnel and medical institutions are taken into account. Identified and operating: 92 hospitals, 4 children's hospitals, 10 maternity hospitals, 146 pharmacies, 9 outpatient clinics, 4 dispensaries, 13 first-aid posts, 3 children's consultations, 6 ambulance stations. The total number of beds in hospitals is 31,780. Doctors 654 people working in medical institutions, 801 private practitioners.

The capacity of existing power plants has been increased to 98,000 kW.

Connected to the power grid: 33,000 residential buildings, 51 water and sewer stations, 4 bathhouses, 7 laundries, 480 hairdressers, 1,094 bakeries. More than 3,000 street lighting lamps have been restored and turned on.

15 waterworks with a daily capacity of 510,000 cubic meters were put into operation, and the main water mains were restored. 85,000 buildings and all operating utilities are connected to the water network.

35 sewer stations were put into operation.

39.2 km of metropoli line put into operation

Tena, 52 stations are open, 16 trains with 62 cars are in operation.

8 tram lines with a total length of 65.4 km were put into operation...

7 omnibus communication lines with a length of 91 km have been put into operation, 46 omnibus service stations are in operation.

5 gas plants with a total daily capacity of 157,000 cubic meters have been put into operation, work is underway to restore the gas network.

4 baths are put into operation, 2 are prepared for launch, 5 baths are being repaired. 10 laundries were put into operation...

The opening of shops and restaurants has seen little development. About 100 small shops selling small haberdashery and up to 50 restaurants have been registered by the city self-government in the city.

The Berlin City Bank and its branches in the districts have been organized and are operating. The Berlin city government was granted a loan of 25 million Reichsmarks.

Theaters are open and working: the Western Theater, where the ballet troupe performs, the Renaissance Theater (comedy), the Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra, the Opera and Drama Theaters will work in the coming days. 45 variety shows and cabarets, 127 cinemas are open and operate, the attendance of which is from 80 to 100 thousand people a day.

The original was signed by the head of the rear of the Soviet occupation troops in Germany.

#### REFERENCE

of the military commandant's office of the city of Berlin on the transferred food from May 10 to August 1, 1945 to supply the population of the city

Flour 58,771.2 t

Groats 11,015.9 t Meat 8,199.6 t Fats 2,116.2 t Potatoes 97,589.6 t Salt 3,527.2 t Sugar 5,221.3 t Tea 161 bt Natural coffee 382.6 t Coffee substitute 804.7 t

The original was signed by the assistant to the military commandant of the city of Berlin for supply and the head of the food department.

Today, these documents may seem like dry bookkeeping, a staff formality. But in the spring of 1945, this was not a formality, but life for hundreds of thousands of Germans who did not bear the guilt for the crimes allegedly committed in their name. Moscow had the civic courage not to take primitive revenge. Not "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth", but a look forward. It wasn't that easy to do.

Now let's return to our ghostly matter, to the last days in the bunker - the only place where Martin Bormann was still the owner.

THE SAME DAYS AGAIN: April 25 - April 29

The reader, perhaps, has already forgotten - what did Bormann write down in the last days of April 1945? NIM Reminder:

Wednesday, April 25

Göring is expelled from the party!

First major raid on Obersalzberg. Berlin is surrounded!

Thursday, April 26

Himmler and Jodl are delaying the divisions marching to our rescue!

Friday, April 27

We stand for the Fuhrer and we will die with him. Loyal to him until death. Others think they must act from a "higher motive." They sacrifice the Fuhrer, and their infidelity - damn them - is like their "honor"!

Saturday, April 28

Our imperial office has turned into a heap of rubble. The world is on the brink of destruction!

High treason - unconditional surrender - this is reported by the foreign press.

Fegelein was demoted — he cowardly tried to escape from Berlin in civilian clothes. The day begins for the second time with a hurricane fire.

Sunday, April 29

On the night of April 26-29, the foreign press reports Himmler's proposal to surrender the Reich.

Betrothal of Adolf Hitler to Eva Braun.

The Fuhrer dictates his political and then his personal testament.

The traitors Jodl, Himmler and the generals are leaving us in the hands of the Bolsheviks. Hurricane fire again!

According to the enemy, the Americans have penetrated into Munich!

ESSAY THIRTEEN:

Political

testament of HITLER-BORMANN

So here we are again in the semi-mystical, semi-farcical setting of the bunker. More than Bormann, it is drawn by Hitler's personal adjutant from the SS troops, Sturmbannführer Otto Günsche, who is already familiar to us. This record has a number of advantages: the first of them is the freshness of memories. Günsche spent a long time in Soviet captivity (until 1955). But he made this entry on May 17, 1945. The second advantage is that he dictated it not to the sophisticated NKVD investigators in the Lubyanka, but to military intelligence officers in the Main Intelligence

Directorate of the Red Army (GRU). They needed not politics, but facts. The facts were reported by the head of the GRU F.F. Kuznetsov directly I.V. Stalin. There are notes on the document: Stalin read it. Now we can do it too.

"At 10.00 on April 22, 1945, while in Berlin in my apartment at Hermann Goeringstrasse, house 17a, I was awakened by a strong roar. At first I thought that a bomb exploded nearby, but then I became convinced that these were artillery shell explosions. Having dressed, I took the shortest route to the concrete shelter of the Führer Adolf Hitler. Many of the personnel of the SS escort team, the imperial security team, the staff serving the Führer's kitchen, etc. were already there.

They loudly discussed the fact that the first artillery shells had already exploded in the city of Berlin itself. I quickly went into the hall, located in front of the living room of the Führer; there I met General Burgdorf, Führer Gruppenführer Schaub's personal adjutant, Colonel von Below, Major Johannmeier, and Führer Gruppenführer's personal adjutant Albert Bormann.

These persons also talked about the shelling of the city of Berlin itself. At 12.30 the Führer left his premises and inquired about the caliber of the shells with which Berlin was being shelled. Then he listened to Major Johannmeyer's report on the situation on the Eastern Front. At 2:30 p.m., the Führer had lunch with his wife (née Eva Braun). At 4:30 p.m. several large reports were made on the situation. The following took part in the discussion of the reports: Grand Admiral DENITZ, General Field Marshal KEITEL, Colonel General IODL, General of Artillery KREBS, General BURGENDORF, and General of Aviation KOLBE. During the discussion, special attention was paid to the situation in the area of Berlin and the Vistula Army Group. The Führer had

"2517

in view of carrying out the offensive of the 9th Army in the northwestern direction and the offensive of the army group of General of the Forces "SS" STEINER in the southern direction; With these offensives, he hoped to throw back the Russian forces that had broken through, in his opinion, weak, to reach Berlin with our main forces and thereby create a new front. Then the front would have passed approximately along the following line: Stettin, up the Oder to Frankfurt on the Oder, further westward through Fürstenwalde, Zossen, Troenbritzen to the Elbe.

The prerequisites for this should have been the following:

- 1) Indispensable holding of the front on the lower reaches of the Oder.
- 2) The Americans remain on the western bank of the Elbe.
- 3) Holding the left flank of the 9th Army, standing on the Oder.

After the chief of the general staff of the land army, General of Artillery KREBS, reported on the breakthrough of large Russian forces on the front south of Stettin, it should have been clear to the Führer that it was no longer possible to create the above-named front, and he expressed the opinion that in connection with this, Mecklenburg will also be surrounded by Russian forces in a few days.

However, despite this, 9, 12 armies and Steiner's army group were ordered to go on the offensive in the direction of Berlin. During this period, a number of senior officials at the headquarters advised the Fuhrer to leave Berlin. In response to this, the Fuhrer declared that he did not think about leaving at all and would remain in the city under any conditions. At the same time, he said: "If Berlin is destined to fall, then before this happens, I will shoot myself."

After listening to reports on the situation, the Fuhrer ordered Dr. Goebbels to be called in, and when the latter appeared to him, he had a long conversation with him. Not-

"2527

much later, Goebbels' wife also appeared in the Fuhrer's room.

In the following days, enemy artillery fire intensified. Grossadmiral DENITZ with his staff, Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces, Field Marshal KEITEL, Head of Operations Management Colonel General IODL with his staff, and Chief of the General Staff of the High Command of the Air Force General of Aviation KOLLER with his staff left Berlin and were to go to some unoccupied part of Germany. The areas they went to

unknown to me.

The situation informants were:

General of Artillery KREBS - Chief of the General Staff of the Land Army,

General of the Infantry BURGDORF, Chief Adjutant of the Fuhrer from the Armed Forces,

Reichsminister Dr. GOEBBELS,

Reichsleiter BORMANN, Head of the Office of the Nazi Party,

former commandant of Berlin, I forgot his last name,

Colonel von Belov - adjutant from the air force,

major Johannmeyer - first adjutant from the land army,

Sturmbannführer Günsche - adjutant of the SS troops.

On April 26, 1945, the last telephone communication lines connecting the city with the outside world ceased to operate. Communication was maintained only by radio. However, as a result of continuous artillery shelling, the antennas were damaged, or rather completely out of order. Reports of the advance or progress of the above three armies were received in limited numbers; most often they were delivered to Berlin in a roundabout way. On April 28, 1945, Field Marshal General KEITEL reported on the radio the following

total: "2537

1) The offensive of the 9th and 12th armies, due to the strong counter-offensive of the Russian forces, bogged down, further offensive is no longer possible.

2) The army group of SS General Steiner has not yet arrived.

After that, it became clear to everyone at headquarters that the fate of Berlin was sealed by this. Liaison officer of the Reichsführer SS under the Führer, Lieutenant General of the SS Troops FEGELJAIN, on April 27, 1945, left the Fuhrer's headquarters without permission; from the Fuhrer's concrete shelter. He was caught dressed in civilian clothes in his apartment and arrested. It was proved that he wanted to leave Berlin by plane as a civilian. On the evening of April 28, 1945, by decision of the military field court, he was sentenced to death and shot.



On April 22, 1945, the Fuhrer gave me the task of creating a battle group from guard battalions and personnel of the disbanded services of the SS troops. Major General of the SS troops MONKE was to command this group in the government quarter.

The command post of the battle group was set up in the concrete shelter of the Imperial Chancellery.

The task of the battle group was to guard and defend the government quarter.

Major General of the SS troops MONKE took up his duties on the evening of 22.4.45 and from that day began to take part in meetings.

On the night of April 28, 1945, the Fuhrer dictated his will to his secretaries Christian and Junge. This will was printed in 3 or 4 copies. Its content, apart from those who wrote it, is known only to Reichsleiter BORMANN. With these wills, on the morning of 29 April 1945, Major JOHANNMEIER was sent to the Commander of the Central Army Group, General Field Marshal SCHERNER, to the Oberberichsleiter of the Nazi Party LORENTZ and ZANDER, to Grand Admiral DENITZ, Field Marshal General

to KESSELRING or to Gauleiter GIESELER in Munich. Reichsleiter BORMANN assigned the couriers the task of changing into civilian clothes and making their way through Russian positions. Colonel von BELOV was given the task to get through the Russian positions in the same way and report to the commander of the 12th Army, General of the Tank Forces VENK. I don't know what order he was supposed to carry out.

These notes by Günsche mention some documents that record the events of the week in question: Hitler's marriage, his political and personal wills. If we have taken the trouble to acquaint the reader with the "events in the original", then we will have to adhere to this principle. I will say - I have to, but without any pleasure. More than half a century later, reading the pompous, extra-demagogic phrases of Hitler or Goebbels, and even filled with gross falsifications, overexposures and distortions of real facts, is no small test. The only document without these overexposures is the marriage certificate of Hitler and Eva Braun:

"Oberburgomaster of the capital of the Empire

Before the staff, Walter Wagner, who is the official of the capital for acts of civil status, authorized by the chief mayor, with the aim of immediately concluding a marriage, appeared:

#### 1. Adolf Hitler

genus. April 20, 1889 (inaudible)

Residence: Berlin, Imperial Chancellery Father:

Mother: (inaudible)

Identity is verified: known by occupation

MY POSTS.

#### 2. Maiden Eva Braun

genus. February 6, 1912 in Munich, Wasserburger Strass

se...

resides:

Father: Friedrich Braun

Mother: Franziska Brown, née Kronbur

ger

Identity is verified: a special ID

loan issued on 4.4.39 by the head of the German

POLICE.

3. As a witness: Reich Minister Dr. Geb

bels Joseph

genus. October 29, 1887 in Reidt

Residence: Berlin Hermann Goeringstr. 20.

Identity is verified: known by occupation

MY POSTS.

4. As a witness: Reichsleiter Martin Bohr

man

genus. 17.6.00 in Halberstadt

Resides: Obersalzberg

Identity is being verified: known by his POSITION.

Appearances 1 and 2 declare that they are of purely Aryan origin and do not suffer from any hereditary diseases that prevent marriage. They ask, taking into account military events, in view of extraordinary circumstances, about the wedding in accordance with wartime, then they ask to accept the announcement orally and refuse all the stipulated terms.

The request is granted. This oral announcement was checked and found to be in accordance with the established procedure.

I turn to the solemn act of marriage. In the presence of the above-named witnesses 3 and 4, I ask you

My Fuhrer Adolf Hitler

do you want to marry

girl Eva Brown

In this case, please answer "yes".

Now I ask you girl Eva Braun

do you want to marry

Fuhrer Adolf Hitler

In that case, I also ask you to answer "yes".

After both betrothed have declared their consent to marry, I declare the marriage concluded by law.

Berlin, 29 April 1945

Read and signed:

- 1) Spouse: A. Hitler
- 2) Wife: Eva Hitler, nee. Brown
- 3) Witness from 1: Dr. Joseph Goebbels
- 4) Witness from 2: M. Borman
- 5) W. Wagner

as a civil registry officer."

Of course, you can comment on this act, but you don't want to. Here, even more so, there is no basis for a sensational story about Hitler's "sex life", since it was quite normal, decent and philistine. In principle, the Fuhrer deserves only praise for the fact that after so many years of living together he decided to put a matrimonial point in her history. But let's face it, it's too late.

Now, on to more historically significant documents. There are four of them:

Hitler's political testament

- addition to it

Hitler's personal testament

- addition of Joseph Goebbels.

By the way, this is not a new archival find. The document, entitled "My political testament" and signed by Adolf Hitler on April 29, 1945, was found by Western intelligence agents at the end of 1945 and made public. But we didn't know one thing. It turns out that representatives of American and English

10 Law. No. 665 Bezymensky "2577

of the occupation authorities - Colonel T.J. Koenig and Captain Volis sent special letters to the Soviet authorities in Berlin, to which they attached texts signed by Hitler (personal and political wills, his marriage certificate). These letters, dated December 31, 1945 and January 8, 1946, were sent to the chief of staff of the Berlin commandant's office, General A. Sidnev. But the path of the document did not end there: on January 31, 1946, signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR S. Kruglov, it was sent to three addresses: I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and G.M. Malenkov - originals and translations into Russian under No. 329/k (the letter "k" testified that Kruglov himself sent it personally).

One necessary note: if the third document is excluded, Hitler cannot be considered the author of all the "farewell documents". As can be seen from Günsche's notes, in order to compose them, Hitler went into seclusion with Goebbels and Bormann. When Hermann Goering got acquainted with the will, he immediately told the American investigators:

"This is not the style of the Fuhrer. This is Bormann's document..."

## MY POLITICAL TESTAMENT

More than 30 years have passed since I used my modest strength as a volunteer in the first empire-imposed world war in 1914.

During this 30th anniversary, all my thoughts, actions and life were guided only by love and loyalty to my people. They gave me the strength to make the most difficult decisions that no mortal has ever faced before. I have spent my time, my energy, my health over this 30th anniversary. It is not true that I or anyone else in Germany wanted war in 1939. She was wanted and set on fire by those international

statesmen who were either of Jewish origin or worked in the interests of the Jews. I have made too many proposals for the limitation of armaments - this future generation will never be able to deny - for the responsibility for starting this war to weigh on me. Further, I never wished that after the first unfortunate world war there should be a second war against England, or even against America. Centuries will pass, but from the ruins of our cities and monuments of art, hatred will again revive for the people who ultimately bear responsibility, for the people to whom we owe all this - to international Jewry and its accomplices!

Even 3 days before the German-Polish war, I proposed to the British envoy in Berlin a solution to the German-Polish problem, similar to the solution of the question of the Saarland under international control. This suggestion cannot be denied either. It was rejected because the leading circles of English politics wanted war, partly in the hope of profitable business, partly under the influence of propaganda carried out by international Jewry.

I left no doubt that if the peoples of Europe were once again regarded as blocks of shares in these international financial conspirators, then the people responsible for this murderous struggle, the Jews, would also be held accountable! Further, I left no doubt that this time not only millions of European children of the Aryan peoples would die of hunger, not only millions of adults would die, not only hundreds of thousands of women and children would be burned in cities and perished under bombs, but also the culprit himself, albeit by more humane means, will have to atone for his guilt.

After six years of struggle, which, despite all the vicissitudes of fate, will someday go down in history as the most glorious and courageous manifestation of

10\*

the vital will of the people, I cannot part with the city, the capital of this empire. Since there are too few forces to continue to hold back the onslaught of the enemy here, and the behavior of subjects as blind as they are spineless devalues personal resistance, I want to stay in this city and share the fate that millions of others have chosen for themselves. Besides, I do not want to fall into the hands of the enemies, who, in order to amuse their hunted masses, need spectacles organized by the Jews.

Therefore, I decided to stay in Berlin and here, of my own free will, choose death at a time when, in my opinion, the residence of the Fuhrer and Chancellor could no longer be held. I die with a joyful heart in the face of the immeasurable feats known to me And the achievements of our soldiers at the front, our women at home, the achievements of our peasants and workers, and the only achievements in history of our youth that bears my name.

That I express gratitude to all of them from the depths of my heart is as self-evident as my desire that they should not stop fighting under any circumstances, but it is completely indifferent where they continue to wage it against the enemies of the fatherland, according to the great Clausewitz. The sacrifices made by our soldiers, and my close connection with them to the grave, will resonate in German history and lead to a radiant rebirth of the National Socialist movement, and thereby to the realization of the true unity of the German people.

Many of the bravest men and women have decided to commit their lives to mine to the end. I asked them and finally ordered them not to do this, but to take part in the further struggle of the people. I ask the commanders of the armies, navy and air fleet to strengthen in every possible way the will to resist our soldiers, educating them in the National Socialist spirit, especially pointing out that I myself, as the founder and

the creator of this movement also preferred death to cowardly removal from office or even capitulation.

Let in time the concept of the honor of a German officer, as is already the case in our navy, include the fact that it is impossible to surrender any locality or city, and that, above all, the commander must set a brilliant example of the faithful performance of duty until his death.

2nd part of the political testament

Before my death, I expel Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering from the party and deprive him of all rights that could follow from the Decree of June 29, 1941 and my statement at the meeting of the Reichstag | September 1939. Instead, I appoint Grand Admiral Doenitz as Reich President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Before my death, I expel the former Reichsführer SS and Minister of the Interior, Heinrich HIMMLER, from the party, and remove him from all government posts. I appoint Gauleiter Karl HANKE as Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police in his place, and Gauleiter Paul Giesler as Minister of the Interior.

GOERING and HIMMLER, by secret negotiations with the enemy, which they carried out without my knowledge and against my will, as well as by their illegal attempt to take state power into their own hands, inflicted boundless harm on the country and all the people, not to mention treachery. towards me.

In order to give the German people a government of honest men, which will fulfill the obligation to continue the war by all means, I, as the leader of the nation, appoint the following members of the new cabinet:

Reich President - DENITZ;

Reich Chancellor - Dr. GOEBBELS; Minister for Affairs - BORMANN;

parties

Foreign Minister - SEYSS-INQUART;

affairs

Minister of the Interior - Gauleiter GIZLER: Affairs

Minister of War - DENITZ; commander-in-chief - SHERNER; ground forces

commander-in-chief - DENITZ;

navy, commander-in-chief - GREIM; air force

fleet

Reichsführer SS - Gauleiter HANKE;

and chief of the German police

Minister of Economy - FUNK;

Minister of Agriculture - BAKKE;

farms

Minister of Justice - TIRAK;

Minister of Cults - Dr. SHEL; Minister of Propaganda - Dr. NAUMAN; Minister of Finance - SCHWERIN-KROZIG; Minister of Labor - Dr. HUPFAUER; Minister of Armaments - ZAUR; The leader is Dr. LEI.

German workers' front and cabinet member, Reichsminister

Although some of these people, like Martin BORMANN, Dr. GOEBBELS and others, together with their wives, joined me of their own free will and under no circumstances did not want to leave the capital of the empire, but were ready to die with me here,

I must still beg them to obey my demand and in this case put the interests of the nation above my own feelings. When I die, they will be close to me, thanks to their work and their loyalty, as companions; I hope that my spirit will be among them and will accompany them everywhere. May they be severe, but always just, and above all, may they never be guided by a sense of fear in their actions, and may they put the honor of the nation above everything else on earth. Let them finally realize that our task of developing the National Socialist state is the work of the coming centuries; it obliges everyone to always serve the common interest, relegating their own interests to the background. From all Germans, all National Socialists, men and women, and from all soldiers of the German army, I demand that they be loyal and obedient to the new government and its president until death.

Done at Berlin, April 29, 1945, at 4:00 a.m. Hitler.

Witnesses: Dr. Joseph GOEBBELS Martin BORMANN Wilhelm BURGDORF Hans KREBS

#### MY PERSONAL WILL

Since I thought during the years of struggle that I could not take upon myself the responsibility of entering into marriage, I decided, before the end of earthly existence, to marry a girl who, after a long faithful friendship, of her own free will, arrived in an almost besieged city in order to share your fate with mine. She by

dies with me as my wife at will. Death will replace for us what my work in the service of my people has deprived us both of.

What I own belongs, in so far as it is of value at all, to the Party. If it no longer exists - to the state, if the state is also destroyed, then further decision on my part is not necessary. The paintings I have acquired over the years have not been collected for personal purposes, but only to create a gallery in my hometown of Linz on the Danube.

I wish with all my heart that this will be carried out.

I appoint my most faithful party comrade Martin BORMAN as executor of my will. He is given the right to make final, legally binding decisions. He is allowed to give everything that is dear as a memory or necessary to maintain a petty, philistine life, to give to my sisters, and also, first of all, to the mother of my wife and my, well-known to him, faithful collaborators and collaborators and, first of all, my old secretaries and secretaries, Frau WINTER, etc., who supported me with their work for many years.

I myself and my wife, in order to avoid the shame of overthrow or capitulation, chose death. Our desire is to be burned immediately at the place where I did most of my daily work during the 12 years of service to my people.

Done at Berlin on 29 April 1945 at 4:00 Hitler.

Witnesses: Martin BORMAND Dr. GOEBBELS Nikolaus von BOELOVE

Reichsminister Dr. GOEBBELS

Addendum to the Fuhrer's Political Testament

The Fuehrer gave me an order, in case of failure of the defense of the imperial capital, to leave Berlin and take part in the government appointed by him as its leading member.

For the first time in my life, I must categorically refuse to follow the Führer's order. My wife and children join this. Otherwise, apart from the fact that out of a sense of humanity and personal loyalty we could never leave the Fuhrer alone in the most difficult hour of his life, I would consider myself for the rest of my life a dishonest renegade and a pitiful scoundrel, who would lose respect for himself and lose the respect of his people, which was to be the prerequisite for my further service in the future organization of the German nation and the German Empire.

In the fever of betrayal that surrounds the Fuhrer in these critical days of the war, there must be at least a few who unconditionally and until his death will remain with him, even if this contradicts the formally objectively justified order that he gives in his

political testament.

I believe that I will do the best service for the future of the German people, because for the coming hard times, examples are more important than people. There will always be people who will show the nation the way to freedom, but the reconstruction of our racial-national life will be impossible if it does not develop on the basis of clear and understandable examples. For this reason, I, with my wife and on behalf of my children, who are too young to express my opinion, but who, if they were older, would certainly join this decision, express my disagreement.

an unshakable decision not to leave the capital, even if it falls, and it is better to end life together with the Fuhrer, which for me personally has no more value if I cannot use it to serve the Fuhrer and be near him.

Done at Berlin on 29 April 1945 at 5.30. Doctor GOEBBELS.

So, what could I.V. Stalin and his closest associates, who read the statement of the last will of the German dictator on January 8, 1946? As you can see, not so much. In the first part of the political veil, Hitler made lengthy excuses that he did not start the world war at all. "It is not true that I or anyone else in Germany wanted war in 1939," Hitler wrote, claiming that he did not want "a second war against England or even against America," and his "peace proposals" were rejected because the leading circles of British politics wanted war. For Stalin, this statement was not news. Moreover, on the pages of Pravda on November 30, 1939, he himself announced that "it was not Germany that attacked France and England, but France and England attacked Germany." I do not think that the leader of the Soviet peoples was very pleased to remember the period when it seemed to him that he outwitted Hitler and became his ally. But on June 22, 1941, this illusion had to be abandoned. The Soviet people had to pay a terrible price for it.

But back to Hitler. It would be naive to believe that in a cramped bunker Hitler came to the "hour of truth". As you can see, even these days he did not want to admit defeat. Master of Social and

political demagoguery remained true to himself, calling for a "radiant revival of the national society" under the dictation of Bormann.

socialist movement, and thereby to the realization of the true unity of the German people.

What did war criminal number one see as the secret of this "radiant renaissance"? First of all, that his followers must continue the fight against the main enemy - "Jewry", which, it turns out, unleashed the Second World War. No, not Germany, not the Nazi Party and Hitler himself, but ... the Jews are guilty of the death of "millions of children of Europeans of the Aryan race." Therefore, expressing his last will, the Fuhrer obligated "the leadership of the nation and society to strictly observe racial laws and to offer ruthless resistance to the world poisoner of all peoples - international Jewry."

What did Hitler consider the main thing in the deeds of his dictatorship? After all, he does not bequeath to preserve the party organizations of the NSDAP. And he leaves the reconstruction of the National Socialist state to "future generations". He does not remember the "living space" (say, the German colonies in Africa), does not bequeath the fight against communism and the conquest of Eastern Europe to the Urals. But this is what he cares about first of all: about his racial doctrine and anti-Semitism as its main component.

Let us not forget that the stake on racial hatred and on inciting hatred towards the Jewish population has always been — from the very moment of the creation of the National Socialist movement in the 1920s! — was the most effective weapon in the hands of the leaders of this movement. In Germany and Europe, at first they did not pay attention to him and even tolerated him. Nazism quite logically searched for the "image of the enemy" against which it could mobilize the internal potential of the nation. And found! This "external" enemy was the Versailles political system, in which Germany was assigned the role of a European pariah. The Jews were chosen as the "internal" enemy. And in a skillful combination: to the antisemi

In everyday life (especially strong in Austria, where there was a large compact mass of the Jewish population in Galicia), social anti-Semitism was added, declaring the main cause of people's poverty "dominance" of Jewish department stores. This monstrous explosive mixture had its effect - Hitler did not have to seize power, it was voluntarily handed over to him by the German voters.

And after coming to power, Hitler did not forget about his powerful racist weapon. The physical persecution of Jews began, and not only in Germany. The extermination of 11 million Jews in Europe (we know the "Wannsee plan") became one of the main goals of Nazism, and not only Germans were involved in its achievement, they also attracted French nationalists, Ukrainian policemen, and Baltic nationalist SS men.

One can only wonder why Russian historians and political scientists, who in 1995 were instructed to develop a scientific and legal definition of fascism, allowing it to be nipped in the bud, why did they forget about anti-Semitism as its integral characteristic property? Didn't Adolf Hitler's testament tell pundits to pay attention to the role that Hitler assigned to this particular brand of racism and political extremism? Didn't give yourself the trouble or didn't want to consciously?

It is sad to see how the ominous seedlings sown by Hitler spread throughout Europe and Russia; It is sad to see how the hopes that Hitler placed on anti-Semitic slogans just before his death are justified. But if in 1945, at the cost of millions of victims, the world found the strength to overcome Hitler's racist nightmare, then half a century later, the world community can and should repeat this under

ONE DAY - April 30

April 30



- inscribed in Bormann's hand, without indicating the day of the week (it was Tuesday)

Adolf Hitler - A

Eva G. - A (runic signs denoting death)

#### ESSAY FOURTEEN:

death in the afternoon

Let's continue the story of Otto Günsche:

"Later we learned that on the night of April 28-29, 1945, the Fuhrer married Eva BROWN, whom he had known for a long time. On April 29, 1945, it was generally calm in the Fuhrer's concrete shelter. After the breakthrough of the Russian motorized units in the area of Anhalt Station and Königplatz, the Fuhrer began to worry about not missing the moment to commit suicide. I personally was of the opinion that the Fuhrer on that day decided to take his own life, because

only a few hours remained before the sudden appearance of Russian tanks in front of the Fuhrer's concrete shelter. In the evening, the military commandant of Berlin, General of Artillery WEIDLING, arrived at the shelter and informed the Führer about the hopeless situation in Berlin. The civilian population was mostly in a desperate state. He invited the Fuhrer to break through with him and the remaining troops of the garrison. The Fuhrer rejected this proposal in an extremely categorical manner. On the evening of April 29, 1945, the Fuhrer ordered his dog to be poisoned; in my opinion, he did this in order to test the effect of the poison - potassium cyanide. The poisoning of the dog was carried out by sergeant-major Thornov serving the Fuhrer's dog. According to him, the death of the dog occurred instantly. On the morning of 30.04.1945 at 0300, I went to my concrete shelter, located under the Imperial Chancellery, and went to bed. I ordered to wake me up at 10.00 on April 30, 1945. After waking up, I went for breakfast to the officers' club of the Fuhrer's concrete shelter, located next to the Fuhrer's front living room. There I met Reichsleiter BORMANN, General of Artillery KREBS and General of Infantry BURGDORF. They discussed the situation in Berlin; I stayed with them for a while, then left this room. When I again entered this room at about 12.30-13.00, the above-named persons were still together, were in a very excited state, and from their conversation I learned that the Fuhrer had said goodbye to them. Then they left the room and I was left alone in this room. After some time, the chief of the imperial security service Gruppenfuehrer and Police Lieutenant General RATTENHUBER and the Fuhrer's pilot Gruppenfuehrer and Police Lieutenant General BAUR entered the room. A little later, the Fuhrer entered this room and said: "After my death, my corpse must be burned, because I do not want my corpse to be later

"2717

put on display." After that, he looked at us intently and returned to his room. I went to Major General MONCK and shared with him that the Fuehrer now had the intention of taking his own life.

At 2:30 p.m. I again entered the hall, then went into the conference room and met Reichsleiter BORNMANN, Dr. GOEBBELS, General KREBS, General BURGDORF and Reichsjugendführer AKSMANN, who also arrived at the Führer's concrete shelter during my absence. They were talking about the farewell of the Fuhrer and were in a very excited state.

At 15.15 I left this room and met in another room the head of the SS escort team of the Führer Sturmbannführer SCHEDLE and the driver Obersturmbannführer KEMPKA. I informed them of what the Führer had said to me, Rattenhuber and Baur. After that, we stayed in one place for a while. Suddenly the front door was ajar and I

heard the voice of the Führer's chief servant, Sturmbannführer LINGE, who said: "The Führer is dead." Although I did not hear the shot, I immediately went through the hall to the conference room and literally told the leaders there: "The Führer is dead." They got up, went out with me into the hall, and then we saw how they carried out two human corpses, one of them was wrapped in a blanket, the other was also wrapped in a blanket, but not completely. The corpses were carried by Sturmbannführer LINGE, Hauptscharführer KNOGE, Obersturmführer LINDLOF, and another SS man whom I did not recognize. Then Obersturmbannführer KEMPKA and Sturmbannführer SCHEDLE began to help carry the corpses. The Führer's legs were sticking out of one blanket, I recognized them by the shoes and socks that he always wore, his legs were sticking out of another blanket and the head of the Führer's wife was visible. Both corpses were carried out through the emergency exit of the concreted

"272

Führer's dwelling in the park. There they were doused with gasoline prepared by Reichsleiter BORMANN and lit. This all happened at 4:00 pm. Both corpses were accompanied by Reichsleiter BORMANN. General BURGDORF, General KREBS, Reich Youth Leader AXMAN, Dr. GOEBBELS and myself. Then I helped drag the corpse of the Führer's wife from the door of the concrete shelter. I cannot confirm whether RATTENHUBER and BAUR were present at the same time, but it is quite possible that they were there, because it was very crowded and comparatively dark on the stairs.

After the corpses doused in gasoline were lit, the door of the shelter was immediately closed.  
due to heavy fire and smoke.

How were these remains found? This is a long, real detective story, worthy of an independent story.

The search consisted of four stages. The first was the discovery by a detachment of Soviet counterintelligence officers of the remains of the leaders of the Third Reich in the garden of the Imperial Chancellery. The second is a forensic medical investigation that began immediately after the discovery of the remains. The third is the identification of a find made in the garden. Finally, the fourth is a reconstruction of the circumstances of the events that took place on the afternoon of April 30, 1945 in the bunker of the imperial chancellery.

So, the first stage. Its main characters are officers and soldiers of the SMERSH department of the 79th rifle corps of the 3rd shock army - the army, parts of which took the Reichstag on April 30, 1945. But for Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Isaevich Klimenko, the head of the department, the work was just beginning. Polling | May of prisoners taken in the Reichstag and reported that Hitler and other leaders of the Reich were until recently in the bunker of the imperial chancellery, Klimenko went there with his detachment in the afternoon of May 2.

The building was badly damaged, so reconnaissance

"2737

The chicks immediately went to the garden, where a special passage led from the bunker. And immediately a find - the corpses of Goebbels and his wife, who were immediately taken to the headquarters of the corps, which was then in the Plötzensee prison. On the same day, the bodies of six Goebbels children, who had been killed by their mother, were found in the bunker itself. The main identifier was Vice Admiral Foss, Grand Admiral Doenitz's representative at Hitler's headquarters.

But Hitler, where is he? Klimenko, taking Foss with him, again went to the garden of the imperial office. Voss had already testified during interrogation that the Führer had committed suicide and that the corpse was somewhere in the garden of the Imperial Chancellery. But the day of May 3 did not produce results.

The next day began just as uneventfully. Difficulties arose - the building of the imperial office was already in the zone of another, the 5th shock army, and Klimenko was not even allowed to enter it at first. When he got into one of the halls, he saw that there was a corpse that looked like

Hitler. Waiting for recognition. Meanwhile, a disappointed Klimenko was asked by a soldier of his group:

"Show me where you found Goebbels!"

Klimenko and the others went out into the garden. At that moment, he heard the voice of a soldier Ivan Churakov, who accidentally climbed into a funnel not far from the exit from the bunker. Churakov found the funnel suspicious. And indeed, having dug it up, the soldiers found two heavily burned corpses - a male and a female. Then Klimenko did not show much interest in the walker - after all, he had just seen a "real corpse" in the building of the imperial chancellery. Therefore, he ordered both corpses to be buried.

So the riddle would have remained unsolved if Klimenko and his officers had not decided to find out - what did the identification give inside the building? The result, it turns out, was negative. Therefore, the next day, Klimenko again returned to the funnel found by Chu

cancerous. A protocol was drawn up, and the corpses were taken (secretly from counterintelligence officers of the 5th Army) to the headquarters of the 3rd Shock Army, located in the Berlin suburb of Buch.

Then the second stage began - the forensic one. On May 5, 1945, the corpses of a man and a woman were presented to the forensic medical commission, which was headed by the forensic expert of the 1st Belorussian Front, lieutenant colonel of the medical service F.I. Shkaravsky. He was assisted by pathologists A.Ya. Marants, Yu.I. Boguslavsky, Yu.V. Gulkevich and the chief pathologist of the Red Army N.A. Kraevsky. The commission was also presented with corpses found near the bunker, the belonging of which was not in doubt - these were Goebbels with his family and the former chief of staff, General Krebs. As for the two "disputed" corpses, on the basis of research, doctors could say: in these two cases, death "came as a result of poisoning with cyanide compounds." The conclusion, as we shall see, is very important.

The third stage of identification has begun. It was conducted by Vasily Ivanovich Gorbushin, Deputy Head of the SMERSH Department of the 3rd Shock Army, his assistant, Major Bystrov, and translator Elena Rzhevskaya. They had to deal with the most difficult problem of identification. The group then had one important reference - they knew that Hitler was used by the otolaryngologist von Eiken. In order to give an idea of the work of the group, I will give the story of E. Rzhevskaya herself:

"...Finally, we entered the territory of the Charité clinic. Now there was a hospital, mostly civilian. It was located in a dungeon, where light bulbs flickered faintly under vaulted low ceilings. Nurses in gray dresses, with exhausted faces, sternly, silently carried out their duties. The wounded who were in this gloomy, cramped dungeon were non-military people, and

"2757

For this reason, the cruelty of the war that ended yesterday was felt especially sharply here.

Here was Professor von Eiken, tall, old, thin. Working in terrible conditions, he did not leave his post on dangerous days, did not run away from Berlin, no matter how they persuaded him to do so. Following his example, the entire staff remained in place. The professor led us into an empty clinic building, painted with bizarre colored stripes for camouflage. Here, in his office, we had a conversation.

Yes, he was indeed invited to Hitler for a sore throat. But that was a long time ago, even before the Fuhrer came to power. Aiken named doctors who were under Hitler until the last days, including Professor Blaschke, his personal dentist. Aiken arranged for a student apprentice who had studied with Blaschke to be invited.

The student, in a black demi-season coat, without a hat, with wavy dark hair over a round face, was affable and sociable. He got into the car with us and showed us the way. It turns out that he is a Bulgarian, he studied in Berlin, the war found him here, and he was not allowed to return to his homeland.

Soviet motor vehicles, decorated with red flags in honor of the Victory, were walking along the central streets that had been somehow cleared — after all, it was May 9! We drove into the Kurfürstendamm, one of the fashionable streets in Berlin. We stopped near the surviving house. At the entrance we ran into a man of small stature. He was without a coat, and a red ribbon was threaded into the buttonhole of his dark jacket. It was unusual - in those days the white color of capitulation dominated in Berlin.

The man introduced himself as Dr. Brook. When he learned that we were looking for Professor Blaschke, he said that Blaschke was not there - he flew from Berlin to Berchtesgaden together with Hitler's adjutant.

Dr. Brook led us into a multi-windowed space

ny dental office and seated in easy chairs. We asked Brook if he knew any of Blaschke's co-workers?

- Still would! cried Dr. Brook. Do you mean Kathen Heusermann? She's in her apartment, a stone's throw from here...

The student volunteered to go after her.

Soon a tall, slender woman in a blue coat entered.

"Kathen," Brook told her, "here are the Russians..."

We asked: is there a history of Hitler's illness in the study?

- Certainly! And dental x-rays too!

She took out a box of cards and began to quickly sort through them. We watched her fingers with excitement. There were cards of Goebbels, his wife and all the children. Finally, Hitler's card was found, but there were no x-rays.

Heusermann considered. She said that perhaps they were in Professor Blaschke's office in the Imperial Chancellery. We said goodbye to the Bulgarian student and Dr. Brook, and rushed off together with Käthe Heusermann, back to the Imperial Chancellery. We went through the lobby and went downstairs. In the radio studio, from where Goebbels was broadcasting, a Red Army soldier was sleeping in a helmet pulled over his eyes.

Käthe Heusermann led us to a small nook where her boss, Professor Blaschke, had recently lodged until he flew away from Berlin with Hitler's adjutant. A pocket torch dimly snatched out of the darkness a dental chair, a sofa with a cushion reclining at the head, a tiny table. There was a photograph lying on the floor: the Fuhrer's sheepdog on a walk with his adjutant. It was damp and smelled of mold. With the help of Heusermann, we found X-rays of Hitler's teeth and gold crowns that he did not have time to put on.

... Dental technician Fritz Echtmann, who performed

"2777

all the prosthetic work for Hitler, we found at home. He was a short man in his thirties.

Like Heusermann, he first presented a description of Hitler's teeth from memory and then examined the teeth and identified them. He was not shocked. Being with his wife and daughter all the time in Berlin, he

experienced lately that he was deaf to any impressions whatsoever. The Fuhrer, especially the dead one, no longer interested him.

But, looking at the teeth of Eva Braun, he suddenly became excited. The crowns he made for her burned out, but the side bridge was intact:

"This is my latest, most perfect design – my achievement!"

How accurate were the memories of Elena Rzhevskaya, I could establish in an unusual way. In the summer of 1983, a stranger called me. He introduced himself in English as a tourist, New York State dentist, Dr. Antonio Reves-Guerra. Wants to talk about my publications about the end of the war. The next day we met, and the guest said:

A few years ago I had a strange acquaintance. One patient came to me on the occasion of a complex fracture of the jaw. We started talking. He turned out to be a colleague, a dentist who came to the US after the war from Berlin. His name is Dr. Brook. He told me that he had to witness how Soviet officers arrived in Professor Blaschke's office. Brook himself got there by chance, at the request of his friend Kete Heuserman. Bruck heard from Heuserman all the details of the search at that time, which led to the indisputable identification of the remains of Hitler and Eva Braun. As a memento, he took several extracts from the medical journal from Blaschke's office ...

Reves-Guerra sent me these extracts. Indeed, they included Hitler, Braun, and Himmler. Brook also kept photographs of his dental

prostheses that Blaschke made (in particular, one of them fully confirmed the identification of E. Braun).

So, the conclusion was clear: Hitler and Eva Braun.

In the post-war years, there was no shortage of attempts to challenge the fact that Hitler's remains had been found, especially on the part of German researchers. The more important were the works of the "outside" observer. They became the American scientist Reidar F. Sognaeus. He is well known in the American medical (and forensic) world as a major specialist. A native of Norway, naturalized long ago in the United States, he was for many years President of the Boston Biological Society and President of the Society of Dentists.

Sognaez never dealt with the fate of Hitler. His interests, however, were in some unique dental cases, such as the history of President George Washington's artificial jaw. That was the only reason he became interested in the controversy around Hitler's prosthesis, which served as the basis for identification for Soviet investigators.

Sognaez decided to tackle this issue with the pedantry of a researcher-specialist. To this end, he conducted research in the archives of the United States, where he found:

a description of Hitler's teeth and prostheses made in American captivity by Hitler's dentist Professor Blaschke;

the description of the same made in American captivity by Dr. Giesing;

five x-rays of Hitler's skull and jaws taken in 1944.

With all this data gathered, Sognaez decided not to act alone. In order to avoid mistakes, he "cooperated" with the famous Norwegian forensic dentist Professor Ström. The results of the work were presented for discussion at the 6th International Meeting of Forensic Physicians in Edin-

burg in September 1972. I was invited there and witnessed the interest (and approval) with which the report of Sognaes-Strom was received. It contains about 30 pages of text and no fewer appendices.

Sognaez and Ström came to this conclusion:

"During 1971-1972, the two authors, being separated by a distance of 5000 miles and not being able to constantly maintain contact, investigated the comparative data of odontological and other identification of Hitler's corpse. As a result of the collective work, it is now possible to give a comparative conclusion based on the following documents:

- 1) Full interrogations filmed by American intelligence in 1945.
- 2) X-rays attached to them, taken on two different occasions and containing very characteristic dental features, namely: "window crown", b) a special bridge on the right, c) a number of specific traces of treatment, d) traces of a number of diseases.
- 3) Interpretation of the above data and their comparison with the Russian act published in 1968 and other data.

The authors concluded that the data in their possession constituted definitive dental confirmation that Hitler did indeed die during the collapse of the Nazi dictatorship in 1945 and that the Russians had carried out a forensic examination of the real Hitler's corpse.

Now about the fourth stage. This stage of the investigation, as it turned out later, was very important, since it concerned the circumstances under which Hitler carried out his last plan. As the well-known German publicist Erich Kubi wrote, "People from the Fuhrer's entourage were interested in what

would the deity of the Third Reich leave life courageously, shooting himself with a pistol. And here is a medical conclusion: "poisoning by cyanide compounds"! Soviet investigators interviewed many witnesses to the events of April 30 in the bunker. There were quite a few of them: the same Voss, Linge, Günsche, Baur, the head of the guard, General Rattenhuber, and many others. They were even brought to Berlin for the reconstruction of the events of April 30, 1945. However, the investigators could not help but notice one feature: although all the witnesses in unison claimed that Hitler shot himself, none of them heard the shot itself at the moment when it was expected. Later, a number of indirect but important evidence became known, according to which Hitler, intending to poison himself, himself demanded that he be shot. In the book of the American author Nerin Gan about Eva Braun (it is written on the basis of the stories of Eva Braun's close relatives, as well as Hitler's secretary), one can find very interesting data. In particular, Hahn cites the following statement by Hitler, made after the discussion about the possibility of resistance to the Russians with "weapons in hand" was discussed.

"I can't hold a gun. In the very first hours I will fall down, and then who will be able to shoot me?"

On April 29, Krebs and Hitler discussed the topic of suicide. Krebs said:

"It's best to put a bullet in your mouth!"

To this Hitler replied:

"Of course it is. But who will shoot me if the shot is not fatal?"

The testimony of SS Brigadeführer Mohncke drew particular attention of the Soviet investigators. He testified during interrogation in captivity that on April 30 he learned about Hitler's self-poisoning. Among the persons

who knew about it, he named Goebbels, Bormann, Burgdorf, Krebs and the head of the guard, General Rattenhuber. Three of them were dead, one disappeared. And Rattenhuber? Rattenhuber

was taken prisoner. While in Moscow, he personally described the last days of the imperial office. An entry describing the day on April 30 reads:

"About one o'clock in the afternoon I woke up, checked the posts and at about 4 o'clock went down to the Fuhrer-bunker. Linge informed me that the Fuhrer committed suicide and after that he, Linge, had to carry out "the most difficult order of the Fuhrer."

I knew from Dr. Stumpfegger that he was to supply the Fuehrer and his wife with potassium cyanide. I was shocked by Linge's report, despite the fact that I had been present at Hitler's farewell the day before. I sank into a chair. Linge told me that the corpses, wrapped in a blanket, were burned at the back entrance to the garden. He went on to report that there was a blood stain on the carpet; when I looked at him in surprise, as I knew that Hitler had potassium cyanide, Linge said that Hitler ordered him to leave the room and after 10 minutes, if nothing was heard in the room, to enter and carry out his order. And when Linge put Hitler's pistol on the table, I realized what kind of "Hitler's heaviest order" was.

How much could Rattenhuber be trusted? The Lubyanka investigators really wanted to do this, and, to be honest, I also wanted to do it. However, I have now come to a different conclusion.

First, about what was the fate of the reports of counterintelligence officers from Berlin on the searches they conducted on May 2-11.

They reported to Stalin by telephone, although he immediately showed distrust of the reports, considering Hitler (and Bormann) capable of disinformation. Nevertheless, the Berlin counterintelligence officers — the SMERSH Directorate of Lieutenant General Alexander Vadis — submitted a formal report. On May 17 he was reported to Stalin. Here is his text:

"On May 5, 1945, on the basis of the testimony of a detained policeman of the Imperial Kan

celaria Oberscharführer - MENISHAUSEN \* in the mountains. In Berlin, in the area of the Imperial Chancellery, at the emergency exit from Hitler's bunker, two burnt corpses of a man and a woman were found and seized. The corpses were in a crater and were covered with a layer of earth, badly burned, and without any additional data it was not possible to identify them.

MENISHAUSEN declared that in the corpses of a man and a woman he identified the Reich Chancellor of Germany Hitler and his wife Braun Eva. At the same time, he testified that he personally saw when the corpses of Hitler and his wife Braun were burned on April 30 under the following circumstances: on April 30, MENISHAUSEN guarded the imperial chancellery from 10 a.m., patrolling along the corridor where the kitchen and dining room of the imperial office. At the same time, he supervised the garden, because. At a distance of 80 meters from the building there was a bomb shelter for Hitler.

While on patrol, he met Hitler's orderly, BAUER, who told him about the suicide of Hitler and his wife Braun.

An hour after the meeting with BAUER, at the exit to the terrace, which was located 60 meters from Hitler's air-raid shelter, MENISHAUSEN saw how the personal adjutant Sturmbannführer GUNSCHE and Hitler's servant Sturmbannführer LINGE carried Hitler's corpse out of the emergency exit of the air-raid shelter and laid him a meter and a half from the exit, and then returned again and a few minutes later they carried out the corpse of his wife Brown Eva and laid her next to the corpse of Hitler. Away from the corpses stood two cans of gasoline, from which GUNSHÖ and LINGE began to douse the corpses with gasoline and set them on fire.

When the corpses were charred, they were approached from the shelter by two men from Hitler's bodyguards (surname

\* That's right - Mengershausen.

liy does not know them), they took the charred corpses, put them in a funnel and covered them with a layer of earth.

Being interrogated on the question of how he identified the corpses of Hitler and his wife Braun taken out of the shelter, the detainee MENISHAUSEN testified: "I recognized Hitler by his face, height and uniform. He was dressed in black trousers for graduation and a gray-green jacket. Under the jacket, a white shirt-front and a tie were visible. None of the leaders of the fascist party wore such a uniform, I saw him in this uniform several times, and it was exceptionally imprinted on me. In addition, I could clearly see the profile of his face - nose, hair and mustache. And so I say that it was precisely Hitler.

Hitler's wife Brown, when she was carried out of the bomb shelter, was dressed in a black dress with several pink flowers on her chest. I have seen her in this dress several times. Also, I saw her in person. Her face was oval, thin, her nose was straight and thin, her hair was fair. Thus, previously knowing Brown well, I assert that it was her corpse that was taken out of the bomb shelter.

The fact that the discovered corpses are indeed the corpses of Hitler and his wife Brown is confirmed by the testimony of the technical assistant to Professor BLASHKE, who served Hitler, his wife Brown, Goebbels and his family, as well as other imperial leaders, - GOIZERMAN \* who, when interrogated, testified that she had repeatedly assisted Professor BLASHKE in the treatment of the teeth of Hitler and Braun. At the same time, she gave a detailed description of the state of the teeth of Hitler's upper and lower jaws and stated that a characteristic feature of Hitler's upper jaw should be a distinct trace left from sawing the golden bridge with a drill behind the location of the fourth tooth, which

\* That's right - Heuserman.

exhausted in the autumn of 1944 by Professor BLASHKE with her participation, to remove Hitler's 6th tooth.

After that, GOIZERMAN was presented for identification with the lower jaw with gold bridges and teeth, as well as the gold bridge with teeth of the upper jaw, seized from Hitler's corpse. GOIZERMAN, having identified Hitler's bridges and teeth, stated: "I assert that the golden bridges and teeth presented to me belong to Hitler on the basis of the following data — in the upper jaw shown to me, I see a distinct trace left from sawing the golden bridge with a drill behind the 4th tooth. I clearly remember this trace, because. it was produced in the autumn of 1944 by Professor BLASCKE with my participation to remove Hitler's sixth tooth. In addition, there are all those features of Hitler's bridges and teeth, which I showed during interrogation.

GOIZERMAN gave a detailed description of the state of the teeth of Hitler's wife Braun, and then identified a golden bridge with teeth for the right half of the lower jaw, made by the dentist EHTMANN for the latter. .

GOIZERMAN's testimony that the presented golden bridge with teeth belonged to Braun was confirmed by the testimony of the detained dentist EHTMANN, who stated that in 1944 he received an order from Professor BLASHKE to make a dental bridge for Braun Eva, which he made of gold and potopont, and gave a detailed description of the latter. Moreover, he stated that a distinctive feature of the bridge he made is the original way of attaching both artificial teeth to the bridge using gold rings made inside the tooth in such a way that they are imperceptible from the outside, and this design of the dental bridge is his personal invention.

Echtmann was presented with four bridges, of which he identified the dental bridge taken from his wife's corpse.



Hitler - Brown. All the features of the dental bridge made for Brown, named by him during interrogation, were fully confirmed upon examination of the dental bridge.

Therefore, analyzing the testimonies of GOIZERMANN, EKHTMANN, MENISHAUZEN and the head of the auto-repair shop of the Imperial Chancellery that on 29 June 2009, according to the order received from Hitler's secretariat, he delivered petrol to the latter's bunker; testimonies of the detained dentist of the imperial office of the KUNC that 1.U - this year. at a meeting with Goebbels, the latter told him that Hitler had died, and a number of other facts confirmed that Hitler and his wife Braun committed suicide - the corpses of a man and a woman discovered on May 5, buried near Hitler's bunker, are the corpses of Hitler and his wife Brown.

Forensic medical examination: based on the examination of the charred corpse of Hitler and the corpse of his wife Braun, due to significant changes from the fire of the body and head, no visible signs of severe fatal injuries could be found. In the oral cavity of Hitler and Brown, the remains of crushed ampoules of cyanide compounds were found. In a laboratory study of the latter, a complete identity with cyanide compounds found in the corpses of Goebbels and his family was established.

Thus, the materials available, such as the testimonies of witnesses, the protocols for identifying the discovered corpses, the acts of forensic medical examinations and material evidence, sufficiently confirm that on April 30 of this year. Reich Chancellor of Germany Adolf Hitler committed suicide while in his bunker. His wife, Brown Eva, whom he married 3-4 days before his death, committed suicide at the same time by taking cyanide compounds.

\* That's right - May 4th.

Their corpses were taken out of the bunker by Hitler's personal adjutant GUNSHE and a servant of LINGE, doused with gasoline and burned, and the remains were buried near the bunker in a crater from an exploding shell.

All this Stalin did not take into account. Having received Vadis's document, and then Beria's report, he sent them to his archive without giving any orders. He did not need these documents, since he had his own, Stalinist version: not to succumb to Hitler's provocations and tell everyone, including Churchill and Truman, that Hitler had disappeared.

Today, for us, this version is no longer the law. All researchers agree that on April 30, Adolf Hitler committed suicide, moreover, by a combined method: he shot himself in the right temple with a 7.65 caliber Walter and at the same time crushed a capsule with cyanide put into his mouth with his teeth. connections. Eva Braun limited herself to only a capsule.

As for the "method" by which Hitler committed suicide, disputes began, since there were no eyewitnesses to the suicide, and those who were nearby (and were captured by the Soviets) gave inconsistent testimonies. But after analyzing all the versions, most researchers agreed that the method was combined: a shot to the temple and an ampoule crushed in the mouth.

One of the first to come to this conclusion was Dr. Schenk, not an outsider, but one of the participants in the events. At the end of the war, he was in the bunker, as a general practitioner of an underground hospital, hastily equipped in the Reich Chancellery. Ernst-Günther Schenck was "lucky" - he managed to survive: he left the bunker as part of a breaking group, was captured by the Soviets, after which he returned home and was a professor in Aachen for a long time. I corresponded with him, during which he expressed the conviction:

"Hitler shot himself and took poison at the same time" (letter dated 10/18/1968). He substantiated this belief in the following way:

"Envoy Hewel, representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Hitler, committed suicide in my presence in the bomb shelter of the Schultheis-Patzenhoff brewery in the Gesundbrunnen district of Berlin on the evening of May 1, 1945, at the moment when Soviet officers entered the premises. Shortly before this, lying on the bed, he put a small ampoule with a solution of potassium cyanide into his mouth and put a revolver to his forehead. With a simultaneous "act of will" he bit through the ampoule and pulled the trigger. I stood facing those who had entered a couple of steps away from him. Immediately I ran to him - he was already dead.

I ask you to move into this situation. Such a decision to pull the trigger causes, as a consequence, a strong contraction of the muscles of the chin and neck, which automatically leads to crushing of the thin walls of the ampoule.

For many years, Hewel belonged to Hitler's inner circle and constantly accompanied him. I only met him on my way from the Reich Chancellery to Gesundbrunnen and talked to him for several hours. As a doctor, I tried to dissuade Hewel from committing suicide and, being naive, I assured him that his diplomatic status would protect him. He objected, saying that he had promised the Führer to commit suicide so as not to be in danger of being forced to give evidence that distorted the Führer's role before history. He promised the Führer to die in the same way as Hitler. The latter himself gave Hewel an ampoule of poison, which he showed me. Hitler was tormented by the nightmare that, like Mussolini, he would be trampled on and hanged. It is clear that Hitler therefore looked for the surest method of suicide. As I know, in the early morning of April 30, Hitler talked about this with Professor Haase, sitting with him at a table in the front room of his private room.

288

All this makes me believe that, like Hewel, Hitler simultaneously shot himself and poisoned himself in a single act of will.

This conviction of Shenk is confirmed by many specialists. Here is just one - the most recent - opinion, which was expressed by Professor Dr. Klaus Püschel, Director of the Institute for Legal Medicine at the University of Hamburg:

"I consider the most probable version to be a combined suicide by crushing a capsule with poison in the mouth and immediately after this shot in the temple. It should be assumed that after crushing the capsule, the capacity remains for a short time - in the order of one to two minutes. Given this circumstance, Adolf Hitler could well have shot DOWN into the right temple.

My colleague Ulrich Völklein, who was talking to Puschel, asked:

- But according to a number of testimonies, Hitler's hands were shaking badly?

Puschel replied:

- Even if the motor skills of both hands were impaired, then, according to the same evidence, the violation was not so strong that he could not pull the trigger. After all, until his last day, Hitler could eat on his own, he could sign. Moreover, such a combined method corresponded to Hitler's repeated desire to act "for sure".

Puschel added that he knew from his practice that shots of suicides in the temple often did not lead to death, but only to blindness or other undesirable consequences. But an ampoule of potassium cyanide, the remains of which were found in the mouth ...

I promised to tell about the death of a man who competed with Hitler and even tried to take his place - about Himmler. On this occasion, I have a doc

ment, which is composed - oddly enough! - a Soviet officer, although Himmler was never in the hands of the Soviet authorities. I met Major General Vasily Ivanovich Gorbushin at the end of the 1960s, when I was studying the complex and intricate question of finding the corpses of Hitler and Eva Braun. Gorbushin was deputy head of the SMERSH (counterintelligence) department of the 3rd shock army of the 1st Belorussian Front. It was he who was able to find convincing facts with the help of which the found corpses were identified. It was in Berlin, at the beginning and middle of May 1945. At the end of May, Gorbushin had to leave for the west of Germany - as part of a group of officers who took part in the arrest of the "Doenitz government" (the group of Major General Trusov). But Trusov assigned a special mission to Gorbushin. Gorbushin told me this about her:

"The British informed General Trusov that the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, had committed suicide in the city of Lüneburg. The British asked us to send our officers so that they could verify the authenticity of Himmler's death.

Early in the morning of May 24, I and Lieutenant Colonel Ivlev, accompanied by a major of the British army, left Flensburg. At the barrier on the outskirts of Lüneburg, an officer of the British army was waiting for us in a car, indicating the way to the building where Himmler's corpse was located. Upon entering this building, we saw a corpse lying on the floor. His face was clean-shaven. There was a red spot on his forehead, a characteristic trace of exposure to potassium cyanide.

From conversations with British officers, the following picture of Himmler's suicide came to light.

A few days earlier, an English patrol\* had detained three unknown, like

\* As it turned out later, Himmler was detained not by the British themselves, but by two former Soviet prisoners of war

curfew violators and sent them to a camp for civilians located on the outskirts of the city.

No one considered it necessary to interrogate the detainees. On May 24, one of them himself came to the head of the camp and confidentially declared that he was Heinrich Himmler and would like to meet with high officials of the British administration. The head of the camp did not believe him and called him crazy. However, a major of the British security service found out about this, who invited Himmler for interrogation. The major had a search card for Himmler as a war criminal. After interrogating Himmler, he established his biographical data - they coincided with the data of the search card. The numbers of the party and SS tickets exactly matched. Then the officer compared the signs. And they matched the search results. The officer no longer doubted that Heinrich Himmler was in front of him. He immediately reported this to his superior, a colonel in the British army.

Upon the colonel's arrival, the interrogation initiative passed to him.

Are you Heinrich Himmler? the colonel asked.

Himmler answered in the affirmative.

- Get undressed! - For what? Himmler asked. "We'll change your linen," said the Colonel, on

trying to thoroughly search the detainee.

- There is no need for this.

"Then we will undress you by force.

After lengthy persuasion, Himmler agreed to take off his outer clothing, stay in his underwear, wrap himself in a blanket, and so reach the Colonel's car, and then follow him to another room.

which were liberated from the camp and were used to help the patrols of the British troops.

And

Having delivered Himmler to the headquarters of the British troops in Lüneburg, the colonel ordered that Himmler be searched. They undressed him and examined his hands and feet, offered to open his mouth. Seeing a glass ampoule in his mouth, the doctor who conducted the search tried to remove it, but at that time Himmler crushed the ampoule with his teeth and died.

Such was the story of the British officers.

I asked the colonel to take photographs of Himmler's corpse for our control commission and state in writing the circumstances of his death.

Bormann's diary had only one day left - | May.

ONE DAY: May 1

1st of May

(handwritten, no day of the week)

Breakthrough attempt.

This is the most concise - it is also the last - entry in the book of Martin Bormann. Perhaps it is interesting not because of what it contains, but because it is silent about what happened between April 30 and May 1. This will be the subject of the next essay.

ESSAY FIFTEEN:

Final in the final

Political blindness is more dangerous than ordinary blindness. A blind person, as a rule, has more acute other senses: touch, hearing, smell. Political blindness turns into an absolute atrophy of feelings; nothing will replace it. "We will never capitulate. We will fight even after twelve," Hitler once proclaimed. Indeed, it has already struck twelve. But the National Socialist werewolves did not want to go home to the other world

ghosts.

Reich Chancellor without the Reich Goebbels and Minister for Party Affairs without the Party Bormann at dawn | May 1945 could estimate what was left under their rule. The size of the possessions was clearly too small for the "Great German Empire". From north to south, the extent of the empire was 1650 meters - from the Weidendammerbrücke bridge to the Prinz-Albrechtstrasse; from west to east - 1150 meters - from the Brandenburg Gate to Schlossplatz.

What were Bormann's intentions?

Apparently, Bormann had no intention of staying in Berlin. A characteristic detail: the telegram to Doenitz about his appointment to the post of Reich President, which came to the grand admiral at 18:30 on April 30, was signed not by Goebbels, but by Bormann. Obviously, Bormann not only claimed the first place in the ghostly duumvirate, but also emphasized his role as Hitler's executor. On May 1, at 7:40 am, Doenitz received a telegram: "The will has entered into force. I will come to you as soon as possible. Before that, in my opinion, nothing should

publish. Borman. And at [4 hours 46 minutes] a notice arrived: "Reichsleiter Bormann will come to you today to explain the situation."

But before Bormann decided to flee from Berlin, he carried out one more operation, which organically followed from the "master plan of 1945". Its meaning was as follows: to delay the term of surrender as much as possible, to achieve a respite, during which Bormann could reach Flensburg, where all the surviving leaders of the collapsed Reich were concentrated in Doenitz's headquarters. The second goal: along with the attempts of Himmler, Goering and Doenitz to split the united anti-Hitler front of the great powers and negotiate with Eisenhower, try to drive a wedge from the other side - to start negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The authors of this idea were Bormann and Goebbels,

executor - the last chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Guderian's successor in this post, General of the Infantry Hans Krebs. He seemed to Bormann an ideal figure: Krebs did not belong to the SS, was not a member of the NSDAP, and in addition, before the war, he was an assistant to the German military attache in the Soviet Union. Moreover, Krebs was personally acquainted with Stalin. Indeed, when on April 14, 1941 I.V. Stalin unexpectedly appeared at the Belorussky train station to see off the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Matsuoka, and no less unexpectedly spoke to Krebs.

"Are you German?" he asked Krebs.

He confirmed, Then Stalin told him, so that everyone could hear it:

"We'll always be friends..."

In the archives of Goebbels, after the war, they found his letter to the Fuhrer, in which he developed the idea of separate negotiations - but not with the West, but with the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1944. The letter, found by Allied intelligence, was also forwarded to Stalin in January 1946. Goebbels' arguments were as follows:

"The development of the war in recent months, when the enemy in the east and west not only approached the borders of the empire, but even crossed them, prompts me to present to you my thoughts regarding our military policy. At the same time, I leave without consideration the further course of military operations, no matter how it develops under the influence of favorable or unfavorable circumstances, since it is not within the scope of my activity to judge this. Moreover, I do not have the necessary data that would allow me to come to correct conclusions. I therefore wish to confine myself in this matter to merely stating the fact that the events of this summer have greatly shaken our hopes. In the east, our front could not hold on to the line where we

considered it possible; in the west we were unable to repel the invasion. On the contrary, the western territories previously occupied by us, which were a prerequisite for our operations in the east, have been lost by us with a few exceptions. I know quite accurately the reasons that led to these heavy military defeats. They depend more on individuals than on material conditions. But, in my opinion, in assessing the chances of a final victory, they are of less importance than the facts themselves, and we cannot help but listen to the latter.

Our most significant advantage in the further course of the war lies, in my opinion, in the fact that we face an extremely heterogeneous coalition of opponents. The western and eastern enemy camps are separated by mountains of opposing interests, which today do not manifest themselves only because both groups are driven by the desire to first destroy us, and then move on to resolving their own conflicts. Thus, we have exactly the same situation as in November 1932, when the party was weakened and morally oppressed as a result of heavy defeats, and the coalition of its opponents from right and left had every opportunity to destroy it, but did not try to do so. , since in the eyes of the most influential part of our enemies, a victory over the party would entail a much greater evil than a victory

parties. At that time, the brilliant achievement of your diplomacy, my Fuhrer, was expressed in the fact that you, by clever maneuvering, so skillfully exploited the contradictions within the hostile coalition opposing us, that on January 30, 1933, we came to, it is true, to a limited victory, but this victory was a prerequisite for the complete conquest of power ...

Then we took advantage of the contradictions between our enemies and tried to take advantage of it. But we did not wait for them to attack us, but they themselves advanced

on them. Today, it seems to me, we have allowed them to advance on us for too long.

Thanks to military successes, the Western powers began to feel more confident in relation to Stalin, but Stalin, for his part, is looking for opportunities to create "fait accompli" facts in the southeast, since he knows for sure that in his advance he is just in. At this sensitive point, he will run into Anglo-American and especially British interests, which under certain circumstances may lead him into a serious and irreparable conflict with the Western states. This development of events is very encouraging for us, and it must be our diplomacy and foreign policy task to try to seize this opportunity by using all our cunning. We are waging - which we wanted to avoid at the outset under all circumstances - a war on two fronts in its most acute form. In our history we have never won a war on two fronts; also today, given the numerical balance of forces, we will not be able to win it militarily. If our enemies had been united in 1932, they could have crushed us, just as our present adversaries could do so now under the same preconditions. But these prerequisites do not exist even now. Fate has decreed that there remains for us a convenient way out of the dilemma of this war. But I think fate also expects us to embark on this path. I do not want to be suspected of wanting to speak the language of an adventurist military policy. It is not a gamble if we are probing the ground from one side or the other with the aim here or there to delay, perhaps conflict, in order to defeat elsewhere. An attempt to act simultaneously in two directions is unpromising. We cannot simultaneously make peace with both sides, and at the same time we cannot wage a successful war on two fronts for a long time.

The question arises whether one of the parties is generally inclined to enter into negotiations with us, and if so, which one. I place little hope at the present time on the Western side, although that would naturally be the most logical solution to the conflict. It would correspond, my Fuhrer, to the foreign policy orientation you have been presenting for a long time and would give us the broadest prospects for success in the East. But history is illogical, and even if, for example, Churchill secretly desired such a decision, which I doubt, he could not practically carry it out, since he is bound hand and foot politically and would have to but fear that Stalin, at the slightest attempt in this direction, will overtake him. The Quebec conference showed this. England is in a truly tragic situation. Even if she were aware of what was necessary and right, she would not be able to do it. And victory would mean defeat. Another thing is the Soviet Union. Domestically, Stalin is in no way connected. He can make far-reaching decisions without having to prepare the public opinion of his country beforehand. He enjoys the reputation of a cold-blooded realist, which Churchill is completely denied. The facts show that the Soviets are systematically pursuing their great-power political goals and are able to use the favorable moment. But Stalin would not have been a man of cold-blooded calculation if he had not known that sooner or later he would have to collide with the Western states and that he should not be allowed to bleed to death on the Eastern front, and even more so that the British and Americans captured the overwhelming part of German military potential. In other words: the moment has come when the bare power-political interests begin to play their role again in the enemy camp, and our political and military chances, thanks to this sign

increased significantly.

We have a strong ally, Japan. Japan is entirely interested in our reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union in some way. This is, so to speak, a matter of life or death in Japan's ongoing war. I think that Japan will not want to continue this futile war. She has an imperial house with an influential court, and Tenno, despite her divinity, still remains the emperor. Japan would obviously be ready to make sacrifices on its part for the German-Soviet agreement. Our hopes for allies in Europe are now fruitless, since they themselves have surrendered. We still have one chance in our hands, which we will throw into the scales without seriously damaging the cause of our great historical victory in the East. Such a turn in the course of the war would have been welcomed by the German people with the deepest satisfaction. We would have freedom of action in the West, and the British and Americans would not be able, under the weight of such events, to continue the war indefinitely. What we would achieve with this would not be the victory we dreamed of in 1941, but it would still be the greatest victory in German history. The sacrifices made by the German people in this war would have been fully justified. The danger in the east, although not completely eliminated, we would be prepared for it in the future. It is another question when our people show more abilities: in danger or out of it.

You, my Führer, perhaps dismiss all this as a utopia. But in any case, this should be tried with all delicacy and caution, of course, so that in case of failure we could retreat at any time without harm to our military morale or our international prestige. There are innumerable channels through which one could first probe the soil. The world press so often claims

that we allegedly made attempts to make peace, that in the worst case such an assertion would no longer take place. Our people are firmly convinced that such attempts have been made for a long time. The last visit of the Japanese ambassador to you, my Führer, gave new food to these rumors among the German public, moreover, this visit was noted in almost all the newspapers. In all these rumors, one can easily sense how our people would react to such a development of events. Such a diplomatic blow against the Western powers he would consider the highest achievement of German political and military art. There is no need to say what effect this strike will have on neutral and enemy states. The picture of the war would immediately change dramatically, and the public opinion of England and the United States of America would inevitably suffer a heavy defeat. We would again be at the height of the situation, we would gain freedom of action, we could breathe a sigh of relief and then again, if necessary, strike such blows that would decide the outcome of the war ... "

These arguments of Goebbels had no effect on Hitler in 1944. But the Reich Minister of Propaganda was stubborn. In the atmosphere of the "death of the gods" he again preached his own - rather absurd! idea and was a success. This is evidenced by our next document: a telegram that Bormann and Krebs sent on the night of April 28 to 29 to General Wenck, the commander of the 12th Army, which was supposed to break through to Berlin. It was sent immediately after Hitler learned from radio messages in the bunker about Himmler's attempts to enter into negotiations with the Western Allies. Hitler tore and threw, although he knew about such intentions from both Himmler and Wolf. He was beside himself, not least because Himmler was taking away from Hitler his new trump card, which Goebbels had "revealed" to him. Krebs and Bormann telegra

filed:

"Dear General Wenck!

As can be seen from the attached reports, Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler made an offer to the Anglo-Americans, which unconditionally passes our people over to the plutocrats.

The turn can be made personally by the Fuhrer and only by him!

The precondition for this is that Wenck's army should immediately establish contact with us, in order thus to give the Fuehrer the freedom to conduct domestic and foreign policy.

negotiations.

Heil Hitler!

Your Krebs, early. General Staff.

Yours M. Borman.

The telegram left on the night of the 29th - that is, during the life of the Fuhrer. He certainly knew about her. With all the more energy, Bormann and Goebbels began to implement their plan. Krebs set off.

We already know about the mission of General Krebs, in particular, from the reports that Marshal Zhukov sent to Moscow, according to the testimony of General Weidling. But we have a unique opportunity to "launch the film" once again, capturing the night march of Hans Krebs across the front line and get acquainted with the minutes of his conversation with Colonel General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov.

First - the story of the direct participants in the events - the officers of the 8th Guards Army.

The first of them was Colonel Vladimir Alexandrovich Lebed. Here is his story:

"It was late at night. It was May 1, 1945. The 8th Guards Army of Colonel General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov was preparing for the last assault, and it included our 4th Guards Rifle Corps, of which I was chief of staff. Since 1943, the corps has gone through a long combat path, and

here we were fighting in Berlin, reaching the southern edge of the Tiergarten park.

At about 11 p.m., the telephone buzzer buzzed at the command post of the corps. I picked up the phone. The commander of the 35th Guards Division of the Guard, Colonel Smolin, spoke. He reported that a German officer had crossed the front in his division's sector and said that the chief of the German General Staff, General Krebs, wished to enter into negotiations with the Soviet command and convey to him a message of particular importance.

I immediately reported this to the army headquarters, from where I received an order from General Chuikov: immediately leave for the division and deliver Krebs to the army headquarters. Immediately I jumped into the "jeep" and set off. The path was not easy, it was difficult to drive: the city was on fire, now and then explosions of mines and shells were heard - in a word, the war was still going on.

Here is the command post - it is located in the basement of some house, not far from the front line. I ask Smolin:

- Where is the parliamentarian?

It turns out that he went after Krebs, promising that in about an hour and a half Krebs would cross the front line.

The waiting began. A special chain was installed to inform about the movement of a truce. Approximately 2 hours later (I don't remember exactly) General Staff Colonel von Dufwing arrived, and some time later Krebs himself arrived. Picking up the phone, I reported this to General Chuikov.

Some time later Lieutenant-General Dukhanov, deputy commander of the army, arrived at the command post of the 35th division; he was in an armored vehicle. Dukhanov informed Krebs that he would be delivered to Chuikov.



During the time that Krebs spent at the command post of the division, I had the opportunity to observe him a little. You

juicy, fit, with a shaved head, he resembled a stretched spring. He carefully concealed his excitement. But we already knew that the general was carrying out an unusual task; his authority to cross the front line was signed by Martin Bormann.

Krebs got into an armored personnel carrier with Dukhanov, von Duf-WING IN MY Jeep. About half an hour later we arrived at the advanced command post of the 8th Guards Army. He was then on the ground floor of an ordinary residential building, on the outskirts of the Tempelhof airfield.

Krebs and Dufwing were led into a room where Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, his deputy Dukhanov, several generals from the army headquarters, and the translator of the army headquarters, Kelber, were at the table. Chuikov's guests that day were the writers Vsevolod Vishnevsky and Evgeny Dolmatovsky. They unwittingly became the "secretaries" of Krebs' conversation with Chuikov. The conversation began.

What happened next? Krebs handed three documents to V.I. The documents were printed on the famous typewriter designed for Hitler: it had huge letters (three times larger than normal ones). The Fuhrer was short-sighted, he did not want to wear glasses, considering it obscene for a commander.

We have two entries. They were led by both famous writers and later published. Let's start with Dolmatovsky's notation.

"May 2, 1945

BERLIN. Tempelhof. Colonel General CHUIKOV, Lieutenant General POZHARSKII, Lieutenant General DUKHANOV, Major General PRONIN, and others are present at the observation post of Army Commander 8.

| May at 4 am.

DUKHANOV: General Krebs arrived with a Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff and an interpreter for negotiations.

KREBS\*: I would like to ask you to start negotiations with you in private. I ask you to decide this question at your discretion.

CHUIKOV: The Military Council is with me, I can talk in front of it.

KREBS: I, General Krebs, Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, am authorized to convey a statement of decisive importance to the Soviet Command.

CHUIKOV: I, Colonel General Chuikov, have been authorized by Marshal Zhukov to listen to you.

KREBS: I repeat that my message will be extremely important and top secret.

CHUIKOV: Please.

KREBS: I report this to the first non-German. Today, April 30, Hitler committed suicide.

—

CHUIKOV: Excuse me, I already know that.

KREBS: According to the Führer's will, all powers of power were transferred to Grand Admiral Doenitz, as well as to Reich Chancellor Goebbels and Secretary of the Party Chancellery Bormann. I am authorized by Goebbels and Secretary Bormann to negotiate with the leader of the Soviet Union. These

the negotiations are aimed at clarifying the relationship between the German people and the Soviet Union, at finding a foundation for peace negotiations, for the well-being of both peoples, who have suffered the greatest losses in this war. (Shows a document.) This was signed by Goebbels and Bormann. If you wish, this document may remain with you.

CHUIKOV: Are you talking about Berlin or all of Germany?

KREBS: I am authorized in two ways - the entire German

\* Throughout the document, he is erroneously referred to as "Krebs".

army and troops stationed in Berlin. Dr. Goebbels is also here in Berlin.

CHUIKOV: Peace talks are held when the guns are not firing. However, you hear the firing of the German troops.

KREBS: I am authorized - if the negotiations drag on - to cease fire near Berlin. I declare that the Germans do not yet know about the death of the Fuhrer.

(The telephone rings. Chuikov reports to Marshal Zhukov the essence of the matter.)

KREBS: I'm reporting to you: no one knows yet that Hitler is no more. Goebbels in Berlin. Hostilities can be stopped if there is an agreement. Both sides will disperse without firing.

CHUIKOV relays Zhukov's questions: When did Hitler commit suicide?

KREBS: April 30 at 15.50 Berlin time.

CHUIKOV conveys Zhukov's question: Are you addressing us with a proposal on the basis of complete surrender or not?

KREBS: I am authorized to ask: is there another possibility? I am empowered to find out whether peace can be established without total surrender?

CHUIKOV: Do you address the allies with the same question?

KREBS: I have no way of contacting the Allies, but I believe that perhaps another German government elsewhere is already negotiating.

CHUIKOV: Will this delegation negotiate only with the Soviet Government or with the Allies as well?

KREBS: Powers can be expanded, but we are imprisoned in Berlin and cannot approach other authorities.

CHUIKOV reports to Zhukov the contents of the conversation with Krebs: I will speak on that issue on my own behalf - not on behalf of the government and not on your behalf. (Kreb

su.) The marshal asks: are you negotiating on the basis of general surrender or not? We can only speak if this proposal applies to us and to the allies. This is the first. Second, complete surrender or not?

KREBS: In order to be able to continue negotiations, I ask you to temporarily stop hostilities.

CHUIKOV: Two questions. 1) About allies. 2) Complete surrender or not?

KREBS: I have another suggestion, because the new government can exist as the legal government of Germany.

CHUIKOV: Complete capitulation or not?

KREBS: Until I am familiar with the general situation, I cannot talk about it. As soon as I get acquainted with the general situation, I can talk about complete surrender. For now, I'm asking for a truce to negotiate.

CHUIKOV: Is the Berlin grouping ready to capitulate now?

KREBS: We ask for a truce in order to agree with all the Germans on the current situation.

CHUIKOV: With regard to the Berlin group for complete surrender or not?

KREBS in Russian: We ask for an armistice in order to clarify or legalize our new government for the whole of Germany.

CHUIKOV after a telephone conversation with Zhukov: The issue of a truce can be resolved only on the basis of complete capitulation.

KREBS: With complete surrender, is the legal government liquidated?

CHUIKOV: Mr. General, we did not come here to destroy the German government and the German people. Wasn't there such a capitulation in the history of the country, when the government remained?

KREBS: But members of our government will end up in

your hands.

CHUIKOV: Representatives of the German people are working on the territory occupied by us and the Allies. They are empowered to restore order.

KREBS: I repeat that with the complete capitulation of Berlin, the government will capitulate for the whole of Germany. We ask you to leave the new German government in order to contact the entire German people.

CHUIKOV: Now Marshal Zhukov is talking to the government. But keep in mind that Germany and I can only talk on the basis of complete surrender.

KREBS: That's clear to me. But a legal government must exist, because otherwise you won't be able to create it. It is convenient for both governments that this government should remain, otherwise you will not know with whom to negotiate.

CHUIKOV: I am a military man and follow the orders of the government.

KREBS: I fear that before the announcement of Hitler's will, some other representatives were negotiating with the Allies.

CHUIKOV: Our Information Bureau has already reported this. GERMAN TRANSLATOR: We heard about it on the radio during Hitler's lifetime.

CHUIKOV: In my conversation with you, I am basing myself on the decision of the Conference of the Leaders of the Three Powers—Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill.

KREBS: I've come to get the full furnishing.

CHUIKOV looks at his watch: In a few minutes I must begin active hostilities.

KREBS: The Berlin government cannot speak of the whole of Germany.

CHUIKOV: I understand.

KREBS: Is it up to you to hold a temporary truce pending an agreement with the allies?

CHUIKOV: I am incapable of disobeying the order given to me.

KREBS: Without such an opportunity, we cannot negotiate. During hostilities, negotiations cannot be conducted.

CHUIKOV: I'm waiting for a call.

KREBS: How long can this go on?

CHUIKOV: I think it will be fast. You still have a small piece of Berlin, which is being shot through by machine-gun fire.

KREBS: You probably know how strong we are. We know how strong you are.

CHUIKOV: I don't want to belittle your strength or exaggerate my strength. But I don't envy the Berlin garrison. I was on the defensive in Stalingrad, my position was somewhat better than yours.

KREBS: We are ready to fight to the last.

CHUIKOV: Honor and glory to those who fight to the last.

KREBS: In the event of the destruction of the only legal persons who know Hitler's will, negotiations will not be able to go on. What about the issue with the government?

CHUIKOV: By God, I can't say anything about this. I am in a position to resolve the issue of unconditional surrender. All life is saved. As for the rest, I am not authorized.

KREBS: If we capitulate, we will not be able to exist as a legal government. This piece of Berlin is decisive for the whole of Germany.

—

CHUIKOV on the field phone: What are you doing? Are you moving? Did the delegation\* leave or not? Is there resistance or not? Okay, wait. Understandable, right, good. (To the general...) For now, your garrison is capitulating.

\* We are talking about the delegation of the Berlin garrison, authorized

noah to capitulate.

KREBS: This is being done without proper authorization. In what area?

CHUIKOV: On the front. The guns do not fire.

KREBS: According to my orders.

CHUIKOV: I also ordered not to shoot.

KREBS: Could the colonel general acquaint me with the situation, with the data that is available in connection with the offer of surrender to the Allies?

CHUIKOV takes an army newspaper and reads out a TASS report about the negotiations being conducted by Himmler.

KREBS: This is against the will of the Fuhrer.

CHUIKOV: I find it difficult to say anything about this.

KREBS: That's what we were afraid of. I only found out about this now.

CHUIKOV: Did you authorize anyone to talk about this at other polling stations?

KREBS: No one knows about the death of the Fuhrer.

CHUIKOV: Do you know the Rheostat radio station?

KREBS: I'm surprised. This is a local event, against orders.

CHUIKOV: Here is the leaflet. (Reads a leaflet about Hitler's death.)

KREBS: What time was it announced?

CHUIKOV: Yesterday at 11.30.

KREBS: That's a lie. At the time, this was not true.

CHUIKOV: There is no smoke without fire - that's what they say in Russian. I don't know what the answer will be on the phone now, but it seems to me that we need to completely capitulate. The piece of land left in Berlin is not the center of German land.

KREBS: Once again I ask for a truce in order to contact the Allies and other parts of Germany. In the event of complete surrender, our group will no longer be able to represent the German people. Then the whole of Germany capitulates and Berlin capitulates. But while he

cannot do this. We have no relations with other parts of Germany. I am afraid that another government will do something against the will of the Fuhrer. Or maybe it already does.

CHUIKOV: The Allies won't take any steps without us, and neither will we.

KREBS: I am sure that all the winners have a great interest in seeing this government as a partner in Germany.

CHUIKOV: I don't know.

KREBS: Germany is defeated. But better about that later. (Smiling.)

CHUIKOV: What is your garrison counting on?

KREBS: Of course, we have a catastrophe, the main thing is to stop the war.

CHUIKOV: The best government in Germany is the one that will end the war.

KREBS: This makes the work of our government more difficult, especially in dealing with the victorious Powers.

CHUIKOV: Our government and allies can only talk about complete surrender. I so I understand.

KREBS: I know that.

CHUIKOV: When the Russian army came to Berlin, the German population was happy - they escaped the bombing. They hung out white flags, white armbands. Incidentally, I knew that the Chief of the General Staff was Guderian.

KREBS: He's been ill since March 15th. I'm replacing him.

CHUIKOV: I met Guderian in Brest.

KREBS: I was in Moscow in 1939.

CHUIKOV: There was a report in our newspaper that Guderian was not only ill, but dead. (Reads about Dietmar's testimony.)

KREBS: No, that's not true.

CHUIKOV: Where did you fight, where were you during the Hundred  
lingrad?

KREBS: I was the head of the combat training department. Was in Moscow deputy. military attache. Then -  
deputy. early army headquarters. Was near Smolensk. Stalingrad is the beginning of our misfortune. Were you a corps  
commander in Stalingrad?

CHUIKOV: No, I defended Stalingrad, commanding the 62nd Army.

KREBS: I read a book about Stalingrad. Zhukov and Chuikov are spelled the same way.

CHUIKOV: How can you explain Hitler's suicide?

KREBS: Firstly, military defeat, secondly, hope - thus opening up a new path for the future. This is a great sacrifice  
for the people.

CHUIKOV: It's a little late... Maybe send our telephone operators to put the phone on your side?

KREBS: I can wait, I can go and come back, I don't care. I hope that there will be a break in hostilities for this time.

CHUIKOV speaks on the phone with Zhukov: General, Marshal Zhukov is interested - have you arrived here with the  
relevant documents? (The translator reads a document signed by Goebbels and Bormann.) "I inform the first non-German,  
the leader of the Soviet people, that the Fuhrer of the German people, Adolf Hitler, voluntarily passed away from life,"  
etc.

CHUIKOV: Himmler was his deputy?

KREBS: No, he was the chief of the German police and became a traitor. He worked independently against Hitler  
and wanted to conclude a separate peace in the hope of splitting the Allies. Hitler learned this, and this was also the  
reason for his suicide, since he believed in his people. Our former leader wanted to find contact with the Soviet Union,  
to get out of this situation. Himmler is expelled from the party.

CHUIKOV: Where is Himmler?

KREBS: Outside Berlin. I heard from Reuters that Himmler wanted to help Berlin. No he  
Not

"31

wanted. He is a traitor. This was against the will of the Fuhrer and the interests of Germany.

CHUIKOV: How can one calculate where the headquarters of the German army is in Berlin or outside it?

KREBS: I was at headquarters, the whole course of the war was here. The command of the armed forces was in  
Mecklenburg. The orders came from Berlin. I'm in charge of operations on the Eastern Front.

CHUIKOV: After the death of Hitler, who is the commander-in-chief?

KREBS: According to the will, Grand Admiral Doenitz. Ground Forces - Scherner. He has not received this assignment yet. Aviation - von Greim.

CHUIKOV: Where is Goering?

KREBS: Sick.

CHUIKOV: Goering is ill, Guderian is ill, and others. Where is Ribbentrop? Isn't he sick yet?

KREBS: He's in Mecklenburg. Instead, the Fuhrer appointed Seisenberger\*.

CHUIKOV: Who will negotiate with the USSR and the allies?

KREBS: Maybe I am; if I can notify everyone appointed by the Fuhrer, then they will. Borman is the practical executor of the will. Of the new government in Berlin, only he and Goebbels, and they know about the death of the Fuhrer and about his will.

CHUIKOV: And what will the other members of Hitler's government do?

KREBS: They will carry out the order of the Führer and retire.

CHUIKOV: Do you think this government will be recognized by the troops?

KREBS: If it is possible to do it quickly, the troops will carry out the will of the Fuhrer.

CHUIKOV: Doesn't the general think that other governments can be organized?

\* The author of the protocol misheard. Must read: Seyss-Inquart.

“3127

KREBS: Himmler has already begun. He does not know about the death of the Fuhrer, does not know that he is not in the government.

CHUIKOV: Do you have connections with other regions?

KREBS: As soon as there is a temporary truce, Bormann and I will go and talk to the people.

CHUIKOV: So the government has been created and you want to give it the opportunity to work on German territory so that you can continue the war later?

KREBS: To negotiate later.

CHUIKOV: Where is Hitler's body now?

KREBS: According to the will, he was burnt in Berlin, 3 hours after his death. Burnt in a shell crater.

CHUIKOV: Your task is to carry out the will of the Fuhrer, and you want us to help you in this? I do not understand this. The guns are firing, and you are talking about a new government?

KREBS: I want to get this done as soon as possible so we can set up some kind of new government.

CHUIKOV: Our people will now storm and put your government on a bayonet - this can happen,

KREBS: That's why I'm asking for a cessation of hostilities.

CHUIKOV sends the marshal with \* documents: Your visit is for the purpose of talking only with us or allies? The conversation can only proceed on the basis of complete surrender.

KREBS: I am deeply convinced that if the Berlin garrison capitulates now, this government will never be formed. This will be a step towards non-fulfillment of the will of the Fuhrer. Complete surrender will not be a step of authority, as there will be no decision of my government.

DUKHANOV: So the government will be guarded by Russian bayonets? Interesting!

+ Zhukov.

"13

KREBS: The question of total surrender can be decided in a few hours if the entire government is assembled in Berlin.

CHUIKOV: If you do not agree to surrender, then you want to fight to the last?

KREBS: I have no other options. After the elimination of the grouping, you will not have a legal partner.

CHUIKOV: The general probably knows the statement of the three allies about the complete surrender of Germany?

KREBS: Until now, you have no one to talk to. There is no legal partner. Doenitz is not in Berlin and still does not know anything, and without him we cannot come to a final decision.

DUKHANOV: The Reich Chancellor has the right to make decisions at decisive moments.

KREBS: No, only the president can take it upon himself. It is inconvenient for Doenitz to receive this news by radio. In addition, the radio station in Berlin is broken.

CHUIKOV: You have radio transmitters. We know where they are.

KREBS: Only if we quickly inform Doenitz will we be able to set up a new government. Otherwise, Himmler will take his own measures, he will do something at the same time. This attempt at negotiations is aimed at leaving a legal government in Germany.

CHUIKOV: Please don't worry, none of the allies will conduct separate negotiations.

KREBS: I'm afraid that the Anglo-Americans will have separate negotiations.

CHUIKOV: We mutually trust each other, we are allies. There will be no separate negotiations.

KREBS: We want the help of the Soviet Union in order to create a legal government and then to negotiate with everyone.

CHUIKOV: As a military man, I want to get rid of the Berlin garrison as soon as possible.

KREBS: If we resist, then, of course, we will perish.

CHUIKOV: Not today, tomorrow we will crush you!

KREBS: Then anarchy will be created in Germany.

CHUIKOV: What influence does this government and its piece of land have? I propose surrender. Resistance here is madness.



KREBS: I introduced you to my instructions, I had no other powers. (Zhukov calls, Chuikov reports. Zhukov offers to send one officer back to reassure that the delegation has not returned for a long time.)

KREBS: I suggested a pause in the fight.

CHUIKOV: German soldiers are shooting, we are answering. The best way out is surrender. Otherwise, we'll kill!

KREBS: Complete or partial?

CHUIKOV: Berlin garrison. Then you can talk to someone.

KREBS: I am not authorized, not entitled. The remaining members of the government will be destroyed.

CHUIKOV: A shell and a bullet will not make out where a member of the government is.

KREBS: I'm worried about peace, not just my own.

CHUIKOV: We have to refer again to the statement of the three leaders of the powers - peace after capitulation.

KREBS: A complete and effective surrender can only be carried out by a legal government.

DUKHANOV: But Germany is capitulating de facto.

KREBS: It won't be a capitulation, but a takeover.

CHUIKOV: Yes, occupation based on war.

KREBS: The question of war is settled, but a legal government is needed. (Army General Sokolovsky arrives.) .

SOKOLOVSKII: Where is the true testament of Gith

Lera? "315

KREBS: Three persons carried away outside Berlin to three points. I can name the points after I ask.

SOKOLOVSKY: Where is Guderian now?

KREBS: Near Munich.

SOKOLOVSKY: Why are you addressing only us and not the allies too?

KREBS: There are no other means.

Then, apparently tired, Dolmatovsky added: "Continuation from V. Vishnevsky."

Well, let's continue:

"Army General Sokolovsky has arrived. They report to him about Hitler's suicide, about the will, about Doenitz, Bormann, and so on.

Call...

CHUIKOV (picks up the phone): I'm reporting on Himmler again. Krebs believes it was a traitor's blow. They supposedly didn't know. He still has the same leitmotif: Himmler, having heard the news of Hitler's death, will create his own illegal government. Where is the original will? They say,

that in Berlin. The Germans want to create a new government, otherwise they will fight to the last. Where is Guderian? He is in a sanatorium in Southern Bavaria. Where is Goebbels? In Berlin. Where are the papers? Sent to Marshal.

SOKOLOVSKY (to Krebs): When will you announce Hitler and Himmler?

KREBS: When we come to an agreement with you on a new government.

SOKOLOVSKY: Marshal believes that Himmler must first be declared a traitor in order to interfere with his plans.

KREBS: I'm ready to do it, that's very smart advice. (He perked up.) This can be done at once with the permission of Dr. Goebbels. I ask again to send the colonel to inform him of same.

CHUIKOV: I would ask you to tell Goebbels that there can be no new ruler until surrender

KREBS: Let's pause. Let's create a government...

CHUIKOV: After complete surrender.

KREBS: No.

SOKOLOVSKY: You have Goebbels and others and you can announce surrender.

KREBS: Only with Doenitz's permission, and he's out of Berlin. We could send Bormann to Doenitz as soon as we announce a pause. I don't have a plane or a radio. (The atmosphere heats up.)

CHUIKOV: Lay down your weapons, then we will talk about the future.

KREBS: No, that's impossible. We ask for a truce in Berlin.

CHUIKOV: Do you have codes, ciphers, and so on?

KREBS: Himmler has them. If you allow a pause, we will come to an agreement.

CHUIKOV: Only on the basis of surrender, after which Doenitz will be able to come to us, as YOU did.

KREBS: Doenitz must be summoned here. Skip it.

SOKOLOVSKY: Capitulate and we will let him through immediately.

KREBS: I am not authorized to decide this.

CHUIKOV: Surrender immediately. Then we'll arrange for Doenitz to come here.

KREBS: First connection with Doenitz, then capitulation. I cannot capitulate without Doenitz. (Thinking.) But I could still ask Goebbels about this if you send a colonel to him.

SOKOLOVSKY: So, we have come to the following: a German colonel goes to Dr. Goebbels to find out if he agrees to immediate surrender?

KREBS (interrupting): Will there be a truce, or should Goebbels agree to surrender before the truce?

SOKOLOVSKY: We do not allow Goebbels to ask for a truce.

KREBS (again stubbornly): Without Doenitz, neither I nor Goebbels can allow capitulation.

CHUIKOV: Then you won't create a government.

KREBS: No, we need to create a government. Then decide the issue of surrender.

CHUIKOV (calling Marshal Zhukov): I am reporting on the situation. Krebs insists on his own. So. So, wait? Without Doenitz, he does not want to, and Doenitz allegedly knows nothing about the events. Krebs asks him to report everything. Then there will be a decision. Send a colonel or another person to Goebbels, and then, perhaps, send a person to Doenitz? By car to Mecklenburg and back 200 kilometers. Send our officer for him - can Doenitz be waiting for him on the front line?

(Artillery shots are heard... Pause. There are fourteen of us, three of them Germans.)

CHUIKOV (still at the camera): It's more convenient for the colonel to go. Eat!

(Krebs quickly writes something in a notebook.)

KREBS: May I speak to the Colonel?

CHUIKOV: Please.

(Krebs and Colonel von Lufwing left. They returned soon.)

CHUIKOV (picks up the phone): I order to connect our battalion on the front line with the German battalion and give Goebbels a connection with us.

KREBS: The German government must be authoritative.

CHUIKOV: Do you think that with the complete defeat of Germany, Hitler's authority was still preserved?

KREBS: You see our suffering. Perhaps the Fuhrer's authority is somewhat less, but it is still great. His activities can never change. New people, new governments will be based on the authority of Hitler.

(Some fanatic! He speaks seriously. On his uniform are the general's red buttonholes with gold, narrow in

rutting, ribbon of the winter of 1941, "ritterkreuz" \*, orders, iron cross. Bald head.)

KREBS (continues): Maybe the base will be wider, more democratic. I allow it. But we want to save ourselves. And if England and France dictate the formulas of the capitalist system to us, it will be bad for us. (Ek, where bent!)

CHUIKOV: We do not want to destroy the German people, but we will not allow fascism. We are not going to kill members of the National Socialist Party, but this organization must be dissolved. A new German government must be established on a new basis.

KREBS: I think, I am sure that there is only one leader who does not want the destruction of Germany. This is Stalin. He said that the Soviet Union could not be destroyed, and just as Germany could not be destroyed. This is clear to us, but we are afraid of the Anglo-American plans to destroy Germany. If they are free in relation to us, it is terrible.

CHUIKOV: And Himmler?

KREBS: May I speak frankly? Himmler thinks that German troops can still be a force against the East. He reported this to your allies. It is clear to us, absolutely clear.

CHUIKOV: Then, Mr. General, I completely do not understand your stubbornness. A fight in Berlin is a waste of blood.

KREBS: Clausewitz says that shameful surrender is the worst, and death in battle is the best. Hitler committed suicide in order to maintain the respect of the German people.

(Tragicomic logic!)

We question the general about the details of Hitler's suicide.

KREBS: There were several witnesses: Goebbels, Bormann and myself. The corpse, according to the will, was doused with gasoline and

\*  
"Knight's Cross".

burned. The Fuhrer said goodbye to us, warning us. We dissuaded him, but he insisted on his own. We advised him to break through to the west.

(Discussion about National Socialism, German militarism, etc. The German general is stubborn.)

10 hours 15 minutes.

Huge fatigue.

Call. The Soviet government gives the final answer: general capitulation or capitulation of Berlin. In case of refusal, at 10:15 a.m. we begin a new artillery treatment of the city.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DUKHANOV: I will give the command.

KREBS: I have no authority. We must fight on, and all this will end terribly. The capitulation of Berlin is also impossible. Goebbels cannot agree without Doenitz.

(The call... It is reported that the colonel sent by General Krebs has come under fire and cannot cross the front.)

KREBS: This is a great misfortune. Can I speak with an interpreter? I asked for a break.

CHUIKOV: We don't shoot, the Germans shoot.

SOKOLOVSKY: We will not agree to a truce and separate negotiations.

This is where Vsevolod Vishnevsky's entry ends. General Chuikov completed his military diplomatic mission, in which he showed himself not only as a commander, but also as a skilled diplomat. Now he again had to return to his main profession. The mission of General Krebs also ended. He had only a few hours to fight, because the Berlin garrison had already begun negotiations for surrender.

SUMMARY CONTINUED:

Four reports to STALIN

At the beginning of the book, I told how I had to be a modest participant in great events, translating the very documents that Krebs brought to Chuikov. More precisely, not Chuikov, but Zhukov. Even more precisely: not to Zhukov, but to Stalin. From Chuikov's telephone conversations with the marshal, it is clear that Zhukov immediately informed the Supreme Commander of the night visit of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces. It could not have been otherwise.

Chance wanted that half a century later, a fairly aged former captain of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st

12 Law. No. 665 Bezymensky "3217

Belorussian Front came across - already as a historian - authentic documents in the archive of I.V. Stalin, from which it is clear how the events of that night in Berlin became known in Moscow, in the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was an exciting encounter with the past for me.

The first of these documents is a recording of the conversation, which was received in Moscow by the duty officer of the Stavka at 05:05 on May 1, 1945, No. d/1253. On the record, in bold pencil, it was written in the hand of Stalin's secretary A. Poskrebyshev "From Comrade. Zhukov" — and it is underlined. 5 o'clock 05 in Moscow - it was 3 o'clock 05 in Berlin.

Very hastily TOP SECRET TO Comrade STALIN

At sector 8 of the Guards Army, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces of the German Army, Infantry General KREPS, appeared and stated the following:

On 1.30.4 at 15.50 Berlin time, Hitler committed suicide.

2. According to Hitler's will, a new government was formed consisting of: Chancellor Goebbels, President Grand Admiral Denis, Party Secretary Bormann.

3. The new government, which has not yet been legalized, appeals to the Soviet Government for peace.

4. No one in Germany or Europe, including the Allies, knows about the death of Hitler and that a new government has been formed.

5. According to the personal statement of General Kreps, the new government can expand peace negotiations not only with the Soviet government, but also with the allies.

ZHUKOV.

"3227

Apparently, this report was transmitted even before the documents of Goebbels and Bormann were brought to us, in Strausberg (the name of Krebs was indicated with an error - Krebs - as Chuikov wrote it down from hearing). Zhukov himself dictated over the HF, realizing the colossal importance of his message - after all, at the dawn of May Day, Stalin was so waiting for the fall of Berlin!

A few hours later a new message went to Moscow. In it, Zhukov reported in detail on the visit of Krebs. The Goebbels-Bormann text was set out in full (in my somewhat clumsy translation). Then the marshal reported to Stalin some of Krebs' answers to the questions he was asked, and his assessment of the mission from the imperial office.

Very hastily TOP SECRET TO Comrade STALIN

1. Today, May 1, at 4 o'clock, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces of the German Army, General of Infantry KREBS, appeared at the 8th Guards Army sector, who handed over to CHUIKOV, for transmission to the Supreme Soviet Command, a written statement signed by GOEBBELS AND BORMANN following content:

"BERLIN. April 30, 1945. Imperial Chancellery.

Message

We authorize the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Army, General of the Infantry Hans KREBS, to transmit the following message:

I inform the leader of the Soviet peoples, as the first of the non-Germans, that today, April 30, 1945, at 3:50 pm, the leader of the German people, Adolf Hitler, committed suicide.

According to the orders legally given by him (testament), he transferred his power and responsible

Grand Admiral DENITZ, as President of the Empire and Minister Dr. GOEBBELS, as Imperial Chancellor, and appointed his secretary Reichsleiter Martin BORMANN as executor of his will.

I am authorized by the new Imperial Chancellor and Secretary of Adolf HITLER, Martin BORMANN, to establish direct contact with the leader of the Soviet peoples.

This contact is aimed at ascertaining to what extent it is possible to establish the foundations for peace between the German people and the Soviet Union, which will serve for the good and future of both peoples, who suffered the greatest losses in the war.

Dr. GOEBBELS BORMANN.

"Note to post:

1. Causes of death of Adolf HITLER - military defeat in the war, the hope to open the way for the German people to a new future, for which he himself can no longer create sufficient prerequisites.

2. The composition of the only legal government in Germany, appointed by the Fuhrer:

Imperial President - Grand Admiral DENITZ;

Imperial Chancellor - Dr. GOEBBELS;

Minister of Foreign Affairs - Dr. SEYSS-IN-QUART;

Minister for Party Affairs - Martin BORMANN;

Commander-in-Chief of the Land Army - General Field Marshal SHERNER;

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force - Field Marshal von GREIM;

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - Gross Hell

miral DENITZ;

Minister of the Interior - Gauleiter GISLER; Commander of the SS troops and chief of the German police - Gauleiter HANKR.

2. To our questions:

a) Where did HITLER shoot himself and where is his corpse now? KREBS answered that HITLER shot himself in BERLIN, and the corpse was burned according to the will on April 30, 1945.

6) When will GOEBBELS and BORMANN announce to the people about HITLER's suicide and his will?

KREBS replied that we would not announce the suicide of HITLER and his will, since HIMLER\* would find out about this and use it to create his own government, besides, we have

BERLINE has no means of communication for the announcement. We are thinking of announcing the death of HITLER and the establishment of a new government after the armistice and the opening of peace negotiations.

c) Do GOEBBELS, BORMANN and others know that HIMLER approached the British and Americans with an offer of unconditional surrender?

KREBS replied that he only knew about this from the Soviet command, that GOEBBELS, BORMANN and others "supposedly" do not know about this.

As for HIMLER, KREBS added that HIMLER is a traitor, he was very dishonest towards HITLER, deceiving him, not fulfilling the order to withdraw troops from the Western Front to defend BERLIN, and for this he was expelled from the party.

d) Will it be announced to HIMLER, the army and the people that HIMLER turned out to be a traitor, that he is expelled from the party?

KREBS replied that we do not have communication to transmit, and this will be done when the terms of the armistice are in place and when the new government is legalized.

\* So in the document.

"3257

To the question, isn't it better to do it now, so that the army and the people know about HIMLER as a traitor?

KREBS replied that GOEBBELS should do this.

e) where are GOERING, HIMMLER, RIBENTROPP, GUDERIAN now located, and what role will they play in the projected government?

KREBS replied that these persons were not included in the government in HITLER's will. GOERING is located in Bavaria on territory already occupied by the Allies. RIBENTROPP and HIMMLER are in Meckleburg. GUDERIAN is ill, on March 15 he was dismissed from the post of Chief of the General Staff, and instead of him HITLER appointed me, KREBS, to this post.

f) Who is now the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who is the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters?

KREBS replied: Grand Admiral Doenitz will be the Supreme Commander, now he is in Meckleburg, the Headquarters is also located there

g) To our question, does GOEBBELS think of surrendering BERLIN in view of the hopeless situation of the garrison?

KREBS replied that GOEBBELS could not decide to surrender and surrender BERLIN without DENITZ, since DENITZ was in Meckleburg, KREBS asked permission to send his officer by car across the front line for instructions.

3. From conversations with KREBS, I concluded that the main goal of GOEBBELS is to test the possibility of recognition, on the part of the Soviet government, of the projected government of Germany (drawn up on the instructions of HITLER) and to test the possibility of starting negotiations on an armistice.

GOEBBELS and BORMANN do not consider it possible to surrender BERLIN on terms of unconditional surrender before receiving guarantees of a truce.

I did not allow the sending of a German officer to Mecklenburg to Doenitz across our front line.

NOTE: The original documents signed by GOEBBELS and BORMANN are stored at the front headquarters.

G. ZHUKOV.

We know that soon the answer came from Moscow: only complete and unconditional surrender, no negotiations. A few days later (but even before the surrender of Germany), the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate, General F.F. Kuznetsov reported to Stalin about the last days of the Reich:

“Secret to MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION Comrade STALIN I.V.

I am reporting the report of the Chief of the Regional Headquarters of the First Belorussian Front on the fate of Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler, Goering and other statesmen and politicians of Germany, compiled on the basis of the testimonies of prisoners of war generals of the German army.

APPENDIX: Mentioned on 5 sheets.

HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT

GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY

COLONEL GENERAL (F. KUZNETSOV)

1) ABOUT HITLER ,

Testimony of General of Artillery WEIDLING, former Commander of the Defense of Berlin.

“When I saw Hitler on April 24, 1945, I was amazed. Before me sat a ruin, a ruin of a man. His head dangled, his hands trembled, his voice was indistinct and trembling. Every day he looked worse and worse.

“3277

worse. 29.4. I was terribly shocked by his appearance. This was my last report to him. He seemed to me just a dreamer. So, for example, in my words:

“My Fuehrer, as a soldier, I must say that there is no longer any way to defend Berlin. Maybe there is still a way for you to get out of here.”

He replied:

"It's pointless to get out. My orders are still not carried out by anyone."

At the same time, Krebs, Hitler's adjutant General of the Infantry Borkdorf\*, Goebbels, Bormann were present.

On April 30, I was summoned to General Krebs between 19:00 and 20:00. I arrived at the Imperial Chancellery. I was taken into Hitler's room. Here I found General Krebs, Reich Minister Goebbels and Hitler Bormann's personal secretary. They told me that after 3 pm (30.4) Hitler and his wife committed suicide by taking poison, after which Hitler shot himself again. They also told me that, at the special request of Hitler, he and his wife were immediately burned in the garden of the imperial chancellery. After that, they told me something like the following: the Fuhrer appointed the government in his will — the president, according to the will, should be Grand Admiral Doenitz, the chancellor — Goebbels, the party minister Bormann, etc.

I personally believe that the version that Hitler committed suicide is true. As far as I know the situation, I believe that after the evening of 29.4 (the last meeting with Hitler) there was no way for him to get out of Berlin.



I can't imagine that Hitler was alive and just a vile staging was staged, because that would be the meanest and, perhaps, the most stupid act of National Socialism.

\* Need: Burgdorf.

Testimony and written statement of a prisoner of war, Vice Admiral Voss:

"The last time the Fuhrer spoke to me was on April 30, 1945 at 2.30 pm, and in a conversation that lasted about 10 minutes, he said goodbye to me. I knew that he gave the order to burn his corpse immediately after death. The Reich Chancellor, Dr. Goebbels, did the same, who wanted to stay in the Imperial Chancellery until the last minute, since he did not want to leave the burning ship and burden the breaking troops with his presence.

I saw Hitler's corpse in person."

Written statement by Lieutenant General Baur.

"I know that the Fuhrer is dead. It was reported on the radio. We all mourned over this fact. Whether death followed by suicide or whether he was killed in any way is unknown. The Fuhrer was not evacuated by plane."

From a telegram to Grand Admiral Doenitz from Admiral Foss dated 1.5.45

"Yesterday at 15.30 the Fuhrer died. The will of April 29 conferred upon you the post of Reich President, Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels the post of Reich Scanner, Reichsleiter Bormann the post of Party Minister, and Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart the post of Foreign Minister.

By order of the Fuhrer, the will was sent from Berlin to you, Field Marshal Scherner, and for a complete guarantee - to the public (?). Reichsleiter Bormann will try to get to you today to keep you informed of the situation. The form and time of publication for the public and troops is provided to you.

Signed by Dr. Goebbels, Bormann.

2) ABOUT GOEBBELS According to Vice-Admiral Voss, Goebbels also committed suicide.

The authoritative commission, created from the military representatives of the front, representatives of the German administration and citizens, reliably established, according to the discovered corpses of Goebbels, his wife and six children, the death of the latter.

The corpses are in one of the farms of the First Belorussian Front.

3) ABOUT HIMMLER

Testimony of General of Artillery Weidling. This testimony was confirmed in a conversation by General of the Infantry Krebs during his negotiations for a truce.

"According to the statement of Goebbels, Bormann and Krebs on April 30, 1945, Himmler offered the unconditional surrender of England and America. They rejected it, stating that it could only be accepted in case of capitulation to Russia as well. Himmler acted as a traitor, without authority, for which he was expelled from the ranks of the National Socialist Party and declared a traitor.

According to the newspaper "Aften Bladet" dated 30.4.45, Himmler is allegedly in Stockholm for negotiations with representatives of the allies on the surrender of Germany.

4) ABOUT GERINT

Testimony of General of Artillery Weidling.

"General Krebs told me that on 25.4 or 26.4 Goering sent a telegram to Hitler, in which he recalled that in a speech in the Reichstag in 1939, Hitler stated that at the moment when he was no longer able to lead the state, he would transfer power and leadership to Hess, and in the absence of Hess to Goering.

Goering pointed out that the moment had come when Hitler was cut off from the country and he had to hand over the leadership to him. Hitler, according to Krebs, categorically rejected Goering's demand and took against him

some measures."

5) ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY,

FUHRER APPOINTED

From the statement of General of the Infantry Krebs during his parliamentary negotiations with the command of the First Belorussian Front:

President of the Empire - Grand Admiral Doenitz

Imperial Chancellor - Dr. Goebbels

Minister of Foreign Affairs - Dr. Seyss-Inquart

Minister for Party Affairs Martin Bormann.

Commander-in-Chief of the Land Army - Field Marshal Scherner.

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force - Field Marshal von Greim.

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - Grand Admiral Doenitz.

Minister of the Interior - Gauleiter Giesler.

The commander of the SS troops and the head of the German police - Gauleiter Hanke.

According to English radio from London, Doenitz dismissed Ribbentrop from the post of Foreign Minister and appointed Ludwig Schwerin, ex. finance minister. Goebbels' First Deputy Minister Fritzsche, the head of the Press and Radio Broadcasting Department of the Propaganda Ministry, Dr. Krieg, and the Government Adviser of the Propaganda Ministry, Dr. Heinrichsdorf, are in our captivity. Bormann, according to the testimony of the prisoners, is among those who broke through to present the will of the Fuhrer to Grand Admiral Doenitz.

CHIEF OF RO STAFF 1 BELARUSIAN | FRONT GENERAL-MAJOR - (TRUSOV).

Apparently, Stalin was interested in this report: there are many notes and underlinings on it. That's why  
testimony

"331

Weidling were requested in full. They were handed over to Moscow with the same secretary inscription (by the hand of Stalin's personal secretary, Poskrebyshev): "From Comrade. Zhukov.

SECRET

TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION - Comrade STALIN

I am reporting the main excerpts from the testimony of the commander of the defense of the city of BERLIN, commander of the 56th tank corps, General of Artillery WEIDLING, who surrendered 2.5.45.

"13.4 I met with the commander of the 9th Army, General of the Infantry Busse. He pointed out that we must count on the offensive of the Soviet troops, which they will undertake with very large forces, in the direction of BERLIN.

Describing the situation, he declared that the 9th Army had orders to hold the front on the ODER under any circumstances and at the cost of any sacrifice, since the fate of BERLIN would be decided here.

"... The fact that the Russians did not attack after the actions of their reconnaissance detachments on 14.4 and 15.4 misled our command, and when my chief of staff, Colonel von Dufing, on my behalf, told the chief of staff of the 11th SS TC 15.4 On the eve of the Russian offensive, the chief of staff of the 11th TC replied: "If the Russians did not attack today, then they will launch an offensive only in a few days."

Such was the opinion of other senior officers of the 9th Army.

16.4, in the very first hours of the offensive, the Russians broke through on the right flank of 101 TC, in the sector of the BERLIN division, in the afternoon the Russians broke through

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We were fighting in sector 303 pd, while at the same time the Russians exerted strong pressure from the front on the sector of my corps.

On the night of 17.4, parts of my corps, suffering heavy losses, were forced to withdraw. On April 17, the Russian troops continued to exert strong pressure on the entire 56th TC front, trying to expand the breakthroughs between 1] TC 56 TC on the one hand and between 56 TC and 101 TC on the other.

11 mk SS 17.4 brought into battle in the area of the Russian breakthrough, i.e. at the junction between the 11th SS TC and the 56th TC, the KURMARK motorized division, which made it possible to partially restore communication between both corps. On 17.4, I introduced 18 md into battle, with the task of counterattacking Russian units and restoring contact with 101 mk. The Russians continued to bring more and more new forces into the battle, and the gap between these corps reached 16 km.

By the end of April 17, I was forced under strong pressure from the Russians to withdraw the troops of the corps. On 18.4 the Russians continued to widen the gap. 19.4 in the morning was introduced into battle MD SS "NORDLAND". The Russians brought very large tank forces into this breakthrough and hung deep over the northern flank of the 56th Tank Corps. 20.4 was the hardest day for my corps and, perhaps, for all the German units. The units that had suffered huge losses in previous battles could no longer withstand the huge onslaught of superior Russian troops. On April 22, the defeated units of the 56th Corps continued to withdraw and by April 23 they were fighting on the eastern outskirts of BERLIN. On April 23, I sent General Voigteberger, commander of the defeated BERLIN division, to the headquarters of the 9th Army; he returned and reported to me that someone had informed Hitler that I had moved with headquarters to DEBERITZ (west of BERLIN) and that a general had been sent there with Hitler's order to shoot me for this.

On the same day I went to see Hitler in BERLIN, since the accusation against me had no basis, because the headquarters of the 56th shopping mall was actually located

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a few hundred meters from the front line. The order for my execution was cancelled. At the same time, on April 24 or April 25, I was appointed commander of the defense of the city of BERLIN.

I believe that the main features of this Russian operation, as in other operations, are the following:

1. Skillful choice of the direction of the main attack.
2. Concentration and deployment of large forces, and primarily tank and artillery masses in the areas where the greatest success has been noted, quick and energetic actions to expand the gaps created in the German front.
3. The use of various tactics, achieving moments of surprise, even in cases where our command had information about the upcoming Russian offensive and expected this offensive.
4. Exceptionally manoeuvrable leadership of the troops, the operations of the Russian troops are characterized by clarity of intentions, purposefulness and perseverance in the implementation of these plans.

I should note that during the war the Russians took a big step forward in the tactical sense, while our command took a step back. Our generals are paralyzed in their actions; the corps commander, the army commander and partially the commander of the army group do not have any independence in their actions. The commander of the army does not have the right to transfer the battalion from one sector to another at his own discretion without the sanction of Hitler. The command and control system of troops has repeatedly led to the death of entire formations. There is no need to even talk about the commanders of divisions and corps, they were generally deprived of the opportunity to act in accordance with the situation, to show initiative; everything must be done according to plans from above, and these plans often did not correspond to the situation at the front.

Already on 24.4 I was convinced that it was impossible to defend BERLIN

It is possible and from a military point of view it is pointless, since the command did not have sufficient forces for this.

Having been appointed commander of the defense of BERLIN, I received Hitler's order to defend BERLIN to the last man. It was clear to me from the very first moment that there was no way to defend BERLIN with the hope of success. Every day the position of the defenders worsened; The Russians tightened the ring around us, getting closer and closer to the city center.

Every day, in the evening, I reported to Hitler the situation and the situation. By April 29, the situation with ammunition and food became very difficult, especially with ammunition. I realized that further resistance from a military point of view is insane and criminal. 29.4 in the evening, after my one and a half hour report to Hitler, in which I emphasized that there was no way to continue resistance, that all hopes for air supplies had collapsed, Hitler agreed with me and announced that he had given special orders for the transfer of ammunition by aircraft and if on 30.4 the situation with the delivery by air does not improve, he will give sanction for the abandonment of BERLIN and the attempt of the troops to break through.

On 30.4 in the afternoon, at a conference of section division commanders, I became convinced that those present shared my point of view on the need to try to break through and leave BERLIN. At 14.30 SS Obersturmbannführer came to headquarters and brought a letter signed by Hitler, in which I was given freedom of action. At 17-18 hours 30.4 this Obersturmbannführer again brought a package with an order signed by the adjutant of the commander of the SS brigade defending the imperial chancellery that I should suspend the planned measures to leave BERLIN, that BERLIN must defend itself to the last and that I you must immediately report to General KREBS.

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I immediately ordered the divisional commanders to stop preparing to leave the city. Between 19 and 20 hours, I arrived at the Imperial Chancellery, I was taken to Hitler's room, here I found General KREBS, the Imperial Minister Goebbels and Hitler's personal secretary - Bormann. They

I was told that at 3 pm (April 30) Hitler and his wife committed suicide by taking poison, after which Hitler shot himself again. They also told me that, at Hitler's special request, he and his wife were immediately burnt in the garden of the Imperial Chancellery and that the Führer appointed the government in his will. The president, according to the will, should be Grand Admiral Doenitz, the chancellor - Goebbels, the party minister - Bormann, etc. Himmler offered unconditional surrender to England and America, they rejected it, stating that it could only be accepted in case of surrender to Russia as well.

Himmler acted like a traitor, without authority. We want to address Marshal STALIN by radio so that he will be the first to know about the creation of a new government in Germany. After that, I was ordered to prevent a change in the martial law of BERLIN within the next 24 hours. Given the late hour, I was asked to stay overnight in the Imperial Chancellery.

On the night of 1.5, General Krebs, accompanied by the Chief of Staff of the 56th Corps, Colonel of the General Staff von Dufing, carried the terms of the temporary truce to the Russian command, on the day of 1.5 Krebs returned, and he told me that the Russian command insisted on the unconditional surrender of BERLIN. Goebbels, Bormann, Krebs and I gathered again. Goebbels and Bormann rejected the Russians' demand for surrender, stating that the Führer had forbidden them to surrender. I exclaimed in great excitement: "But the Fuhrer is no longer alive," to which Goebbels replied: "The Fuhrer all the time insisted on fighting to the end, and I don't want to

to twirl." I replied that I couldn't hold on any longer and left. Asking General Krebs, I invited him to my command post; but he replied: "I'm staying here until the last opportunity, then I'll put a bullet in my head." Krebs told me that Goebbels decided at the last minute to commit suicide.

I gave the order to the units who can and want to break through, the rest to lay down their arms. At 21.30 1.5 I gathered the employees of the headquarters of the 56th TC and the defense headquarters of BERLIN, in order to decide whether the headquarters would break through or surrender to the Russians. I said that further resistance was futile and that to break through, even if successful, was to go from cauldron to cauldron. All staff members supported me, and on the night of 1.5 I sent Colonel von Dufing as a truce to the Russians, with a message about the cessation of resistance by the German troops.

Although I was commander of the defense of BERLIN, the situation in BERLIN was such that, after my decision, I felt safe only with the Russians. I am a soldier and for the first time in recent days I have found myself in a maelstrom of political events. I was amazed by what I saw and heard. I got the impression that Hitler, with the exception of Goebbels, was abandoned at the last minute. I was told by General Krebs that on 25.4 or 26.4 Goering sent a telegram to Hitler, in which he recalled that in a speech in the Reichstag in 1939, Hitler announced that at the moment when he was no longer able to lead the state, he would transfer power and leadership - stvo Hess, and in the absence of Hess - Goering. Goering pointed out that the moment had come when Hitler was cut off from the country and he must hand over leadership to him. Hitler, according to Krebs, categorically rejected Goering's demand and took some measures against him. When I saw Hitler on 24.4 (before that, I had last seen him last year), I was amazed,

13 Law. No. 665 Bezymensky "3377

before me sat the ruin (ruin) of a man. His head was shaking, his hands were trembling, his voice would have been indistinct and trembling. Every day his appearance grew worse and worse; 29.4 I was completely shocked by his appearance, at the same time, this was my last report to him, he seemed to me just a dreamer, for example, in response to my words: "My Fuhrer, as a soldier, I must say that there is no longer any possibility to defend BERLIN and you, maybe there is still an opportunity for you to get out of here," he replied: "It's pointless to get out, my orders are still not being carried out by anyone." At the same time, Krebs, Hitler's adjutant General Burgdorf, Goebbels, Bormann were present. Hitler also began to build completely unrealistic plans for me, he told me

25 more .: "The situation should improve, the 9th Army will approach BERLIN and strike at the enemy, together with the 12th shock army of General WENK, which should approach from the southwest, this blow will follow the southern flank of the offensive- Russian troops marching on BERLIN; troops under Steiner's command would come up from the north and strike at the Russian northern wing. These strikes should turn the tide in our favour."

It was clear to me that these were unrealizable plans, the 9th Army fought hard battles in the environment. The army of General Wenck was fighting and by that time was bled dry, I also did not believe in the presence of troops at Steiner.

I personally believe that the version that Hitler committed suicide is true; as far as I know the situation, I believe that after the evening of 29.4 (the last meeting with Hitler) there was no way for him to get out of BERLIN. I can't imagine that Hitler was alive and just a vile staging was staged, because that would be the meanest and, perhaps, the most stupid act of National Socialism.

ZHUKOV. TELEGIN".

But on our "Bormann" calendar, it's still May 1st. Krebs is still with Chuikov. He explains for a long time—how many times! — why Goebbels and Bormann cannot accept the Soviet demand for surrender. But at 13:08 | In May, he nevertheless had to leave the house on the Schulenburg in Tempelhof and go back to the imperial chancellery, where he arrived at about 2 pm (it was after this that Bormann sent a telegram to Doenitz that he would "arrive today").

From that moment on, Bormann cared only about the guy line. The front line was crossed by another truce with another refusal from Bormann and Goebbels. The fighting resumed, and Bormann saw that it was not so easy to "arrive today". It was then that Bormann said to his secretary, Else Krueger:

"Well, goodbye. There is little sense in this, I will try, but I probably will not pass ... "

Evening | May came quickly: for Goebbels, it was the last evening of his life. Following this, Colonel Duvfing again went to Chuikov: this time he was sent by General Weidling with the surrender of Berlin, which took place on the morning of May 2 (we know the details from Weidling himself). And Bormann?

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ESSAY SIXTEEN:

smoke or fire

There is a proverb: "There is no smoke without fire." One would like to use it when it comes to the mysterious fate of Reichsleiter Bormann, either who died in Berlin on the night of May 1-2, 1945, or who got out of the city.

I repeat what I said at the beginning of the book: Bormann's diary does not contain any sensations on this issue - except for the fact that on one of the pages there is a clumsily drawn chart of orientation by stars. We have to use only indirect information and testimony.

Perhaps one of the first to speak was Erich Kempka, Hitler's chauffeur, who left Berlin with Bormann and published his memoirs in 1950. According to this version, Bormann was hit by a direct hit by a Soviet shell near Weidendammerbrücke while leaving. When on July 3, 1946, in Nuremberg, Kempka was interrogated about the circumstances of the battle at Weidendammerbrücke, Dr. Berggold, the zazitnik, in every possible way "squeezed" out of his witness a categorical statement about the death of Bormann.

The protocol says:

"Kempka. In the place where Bormann was, a flame rose, and I still saw ...

Judge Biddle. When the tank exploded, how far were you from it?

Kempka. Approximately 3-4 meters.

Biddle. And how far was Bormann?

Kempka. As far as I remember, he held his hand on the tank. The tank exploded just where Martin Bormann was standing. The explosion threw me aside...

Defender Berggold. Witness, did you see Bormann die in the explosion?

Kempka. Yes, I saw how he was still moving, he seemed to be falling or, more precisely, he flew off to the side.

Berggold. Was the explosion so strong that, according to your observations, Martin Bormann should be killed?

Kempka. Yes sir".

Hitler's chief pilot, Lieutenant General Hans Baur, portrayed things differently. According to him, when the decisive moment of the breakthrough through the Weidendamerbrücke began, events unfolded as follows. After the explosion of the tank, Bormann did not die, but continued on his way.

"... We reached the Weidendamerbrücke bridge. There were lines of Russians. I asked Bormann to wait at the corner of the Schiffbauerdamm and Friedrichstraße until I

breakthrough opportunities. At about 3 o'clock I told Bormann that there was little chance of a breakthrough because of the heavy shelling. I asked Bormann to stay on the porch of the ruined corner house on Friedrichstrasse. From this position, he could view the entire street. Here Bormann remained for a long time. I myself went to scout out a place where we could pass without resistance. I made my way to the Ziegelstrasse, but there were Russians everywhere. When I came back about 2 hours later — it was about one in the morning — Bormann asked me to stay with him, because I was the only one he could hold on to. After that, we moved to the corner of Ziegelstrasse and Friedrichstrasse. Further, according to Baur, Bormann apparently died on the Ziegelstraße.

In turn, Secretary of State Werner Naumann, who walked, according to Baur, in the same group, paints a different picture. Naumann testified in a West German court on December 18, 1963

of the year:

"I went back to the Weidendamerbrücke bridge. In one funnel near the bridge, I noticed the remnants of our group, there were eleven of them, among whom was Martin Bormann, as well as Reichsjugendführer Axman. Also, as far as I can remember, Dr. Stumpfegger was there. After that, we went along the railroad tracks to the Lehrter railway station, where we tried to break through. The battle with the Russians began again. Our group was divided into three parts. I stayed with two officers. The rest joined either Axman or Bormann. I don't know who went with Bormann. However, I know that by this time Bormann was still alive.

When I had the opportunity in 1973 to talk with Werner Naumann—manager of an industrial firm in Westphalia after the war—he repeated this testimony, adding that, in his opinion, it was impossible for Bormann to break out of Berlin.

And what does Arthur Axman say? On October 11, 1962, he gave the following testimony:

"Suddenly, the German tank "Gigr" exploded, which passed the anti-tank barrier. I was slightly wounded by shrapnel and climbed into the crater to find cover. Here I found Martin Bormann, who was unharmed... Together with Bormann, SS doctor Dr. Stumpfegger, Goebbels' adjutant Schwegerman, and my collaborator Welzin, we walked along the railroad tracks to the Lehrter Station. There we left the embankment and again came into combat contact with the Russians. At the same time, our group was divided into three parts. The last impression I retained of Bormann did not at all indicate that he was exhausted or fell into despair. He was also not injured. I don't know who Bormann went with. However, I know that Bormann was alive at that moment. It was about 3 or 4 in the morning."

What happened next? According to Aksman, his group near the Lehrter railway station came across Soviet posts. Martin Bormann went along with Dr. Stumpfegger in the direction of Invalidenstraße. "Since they were moving very quickly, the Russian patrol became suspicious. My colleagues and I calmly followed Bormann and Schumpfeffer, while we lost sight of them. We walked along Invalidenstrasse in the direction of Alt-Moabit Street. When Russian tanks moved towards us and we came under fire, Veltsin and I turned back to the Lehrter station. On the way back, I saw Martin Bormann lying on his back on the Invalidenbrücke bridge." According to Axman, he saw Bormann lying lifeless, but without a trace of wounds. Nearby lay Dr. Stumpfegger.

Thus, the study of the circumstances of the breakthrough of Bormann's group from Berlin did not provide either confirmation of Bormann's death or a refutation of it. Soviet patrols

did not detain him; after it became known that Bormann was part of the group that was breaking through, the search did not yield any results. Even the discovered notebook was not evidence of Bormann's death.

Such was the initial situation of those worldwide searches for Martin Bormann, which began literally from the day of his disappearance. Paradoxically, the first person to talk about the search was... Josef Stalin. On May 26, 1945, while receiving the personal representative of the US President Harry Hopkins, Stalin told him:

"Hitler probably hid with Bormann, his deputy in the party, General Krebs and others. They say that Bormann took the body of Hitler and disappeared somewhere, but these are Arab

fairy tales..."

The instructions were clear: to look for the disappeared, including Bormann. If we compile a kind of "inventory" of all reports about the fate of the "man behind Hitler's back", then it will look like this:

1945 The writer Heinrich Linau, a native of Flensburg, spoke about Bormann. Linau spent a long time in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Linau claimed that on 26 (or 27) July 1945 he saw Bormann on the Hamburg-Flensburg train. Linau rode in this train, which Bormann boarded at the Neumünster station. Bormann was in civilian clothes, in a hunter's suit. Linau rode with him to the Flensburg-Weihe station, where Bormann got off, intending to make his way to Da NIYu.

1946 There were reports in the newspapers of the American zone that Bormann had been seen there.

1947 Several reports about Bormann were published this year. Former Australian Seafarers Union Secretary Joseph Kliman said he had seen Bormann in Australia. According to other reports, Bormann was identified in Egypt, where he allegedly arrived on the English ship Bonifation. The third version said that Bormann appeared in Spain.

1949 The Bormann case was examined by the Denazification Chamber in Traunstein (Upper Bavaria). Borman was declared missing, but subject to inclusion in the category of "major

culprits."



1950 On April 24, the Copenhagen newspaper Christeligt Dagblad published a report by its correspondent Bjorn Hallström, who visited South West Africa. According to Hallström, Bormann is hiding in Africa. In addition, the British Reynolds News published a report that Bormann was in Argentina until 1947, and is now in southern Spain. German journalist Karl Heinz Kerner allegedly saw him in Spanish Morocco.

1951 was again rich in reports about Bormann. The Paris Le Figaro, as well as the West German and Austrian newspapers, printed a statement by the former member of the German Reichstag from the Center Party, Paul Hesslein. Hesslein stated that he saw Bormann near the town of Llifén, in Chile. He learned that Bormann was living in Chile under the pseudonym Juan Gomez. But now, Hesslein said, Bormann has returned to Europe and lives in Spain.

Bormann's brother Albert also appeared in the press, who, during his denazification, stated that his brother might be alive. There were reports that Bormann is in Italy or Spain and is associated with the organization "Spinne" ("Spider"). The following details were also reported: the Federal Republic of Germany received information that three months after the capitulation of the Reich, the submarine "O-29" arrived in Argentina, disembarking three sailors and one civilian. Subsequently, at the landing site, they found a travel bag with the initials "M.B.", belonging to a certain Max Bem, and a passport in the name of Gerhard Onke. Other newspapers also reported on Bormann's stay in Argentina.

1952 brought another sensation: the former Italian partisan Luigi Silvestri stated that on May 10, 1945 he saw Bormann near the Dominican

monastery in Bolzano. Another eyewitness, a former Speer ministry official, Stern, saw Bormann in the cassock of a monk in the monastery of St. Anthony in Rome. Stern personally knew Bormann before and identified him by a mole on his nose. Soon there were photographs of "brother Martin", who looked very much like Martin Bormann. However, after this, the general of the Franciscan order, Augustinus Sierpinski, declared that the photograph belonged to the monk Romualdo Antonuzzi, who had nothing to do with Bormann.

Nevertheless, reports about Bormann did not stop. The West German press reported that letters from Bormann allegedly arrived in Bavaria; Brazil was named as the place of departure.

1953 At the beginning of the year, the story of the SS Tiburtius appeared. In addition to giving details of the battles in Berlin, Tiburtius told the following: from one SS man he heard that he saw Bormann on May 17, 1945 in the Chomutovo region (Czechoslovakia).

1954 The Bormann case was again tried in a West German court. This time, the court in Berchtesgaden declared Bormann dead, and his death was registered in the West Berlin Civil Registry under number 29223.

1955 After returning from captivity, Hitler's valet Linge stated that Bormann had been killed. The same was stated by former Blue Division soldier Juan Pinar.

1956 Hitler's adjutant Günsche, returning from captivity, reported that he had seen Bormann killed. But at the same time, the Daily Mail published a report referring to Israeli intelligence data, which believes Bormann is alive and in Brazil.

1960 Adolf Eichmann was caught in Argentina. Eichmann's own judgment that Bormann was alive became known. This was followed by a number of publications on this topic. According to one of them, Bormann was seen in

Spain, in the monastery of Montserrat. Then the Israeli newspaper Haolam Hazeh reported that Bormann had lived in Argentina for a long time, where he was identified (on the trail of a removed wart) by a doctor. The same doctor allegedly killed Bormann. Bormann's death in Argentina was also reported by the Daily Express. On October 12, the newspaper Westdeutscher Tageblatt, referring to the American journalist Comer Clark, also wrote about Bormann's death in Argentina.

In the autumn of 1960, the following episode took place: in the city of Zapata (Argentina), a certain Walter Flegel, strikingly resembling Bormann, was arrested. During the verification, the identity was not confirmed. It was established that Flegel had emigrated from Germany in the 1930s.

1961 was a particularly bountiful year. It began with the fact that the Schleswig-Holstein prosecutor's office received a letter from former SS Standartenführer Walter Leuchtenberg. It reported that in June 1945, Bormann, together with the leader of the Belgian fascists, Leon Degrelle, secretly made his way from Bavaria to Schleswig-Holstein, after which they both fled to Spain.

A number of reports about the fate of Bormann appeared in connection with the Eichmann investigation. In particular, it was alleged that Bormann used the same route from Austria to Italy as Eichmann. The day of August 16, 1947 was named as the date of transition. This opinion was supported by the Attorney General of Hesse, Fritz Bauer. He stated that he had information about the activities of the special organization OPESSA, which helped the SS men escape. In 1961, the Frankfurt prosecutor's office opened an investigation into the case of the "flight of the war criminal Bormann."

The most detailed account of Bormann was by the former Israeli ambassador to Argentina, Dr. Gregory Topolevsky, on May 19, 1961. According to Topolevsky, Bormann arrived at

South America in a submarine in May 1945, landed in Argentina, after which he moved to Brazil. In Argentina, he lived at Villa Belgrano (province of Cordoba) with the Germans, former officers of the cruiser Graf Spee. Borman, according to Topolevskii, underwent plastic surgery. Approximately in the same direction, the report of the Chilean newspaper Erquilla went, which claimed that after the capture of Eichmann, Bormann moved from Brazil to Chile, where he hid near the city of Osorno.

The year 1962 began with a report in a Bavarian newspaper that the confessor of the Bormann children had heard that a "mysterious man" visited them after the war. The Austrian "Volksstimme", referring to the testimonies of local residents of Tyrol, wrote on July 15 that Bormann was seen immediately after the war in Wolkenstein, where his family lived at one time.

On July 19, the Andere Zeitung published a "consolidated" report on the fate of the former Reichsleiter. It indicated that Bormann had been seen in Patagonia in 1946, in Ecuador in 1958. Bormann has undergone plastic surgery and wants to "return to Germany in due time to carry out the Führer's will." The Kölnische Rundschau published evidence that Bormann landed in Argentina and lived in Patagonia, where he recently died.

In the same year, information was received from diplomatic circles. Former Spanish diplomat and press attaché in London Angel Alcazar de Velasco told the press that he had taken part in the crossing of Eichmann (in 1947) and Bormann (in 1946) from Spain to Latin America. In 1945, Bormann arrived in Spain, and in May 1946 he sailed for Argentina. Bormann underwent plastic surgery, which allowed him to visit Europe. Bormann allegedly told de Velasco:

"Europe will see me again at the head of a new and stronger Germany!"

In 1958, Velasco, according to him, saw Bormann in Ecuador.

In 1962, the "Flegel scam" was repeated; In West Berlin, a Chilean citizen Juan Keller was arrested, whom the Chilean magazine BEA suspected in 1961 of resemblance to Bormann. Keller was soon released, as the fingerprints did not match Bormann's.

The year 1963 began under the sign of reports from Paraguay that Bormann had lived in that country until 1959. According to Agence France-Presse, an "eyewitness" stated that Bormann had taken refuge in a large colony of German settlers in Asuncion. According to the man, Bormann died on February 17, 1959, and was buried in great secrecy 40 kilometers south of Asuncion. However, following this, the Argentine journalist Meyer Glaser

published an article in the Buenos Aires newspaper Mundo on January 18, in which he said that he personally saw Bormann in a hut located high in the mountains of Bariloche, 1500 kilometers from Buenos Aires.

In 1963, the prosecutor's office of Hesse (Germany) actively continued the investigation into the Bormann case, interviewed a number of witnesses and, according to the statement of the Prosecutor General, Dr. Bauer, collected a number of data indicating that Bormann was alive.

The year 1964 was exceptionally rich in data on Bormann. For example, in February, a state of emergency was declared on the border between Peru and Chile in connection with reports that Borman was there, who was going to move from Peru to Chile. Following this, in the London newspaper The Evening Standard on February 26, a report appeared about the story of the former driver of the British Control Commission in Germany, Leslie Blenden. Seeing a portrait of Bormann in the newspapers, he said:

"The first time I saw him was probably in May 1947. I often visited the estate of one women

We were in Lüdenscheid, her name was Baroness von Schickenberg, I went for eggs and other products. I could freely walk everywhere there, with the exception of only one house, which stood to the side. For some reason they didn't let me in. One morning, at a quarter past seven, a man of about forty or forty-five came out of the house, looking a bit like a boxer. In parting, he waved his hand to the baroness. He asked me to give him a lift to the village of Altona. In those days it was forbidden to take the Germans anywhere, but I agreed, and he put his duffel bag in the trunk.

On the way he spoke very little and spoke English poorly. Before reaching Altona, he got off and paid me \$20 in \$5 bills. It seemed a little strange to me that a German had dollars, but I didn't really think about it."

By chance, 10 years later, Blenden once again came face to face with his mysterious passenger. "I worked as a barmaid on the British Engineer. It entered the docks of the island of Tenerife (a group of the Canary Islands). At that time there were full, full of Germans. I went to the park, where the owner was a German. As soon as I entered the room, I saw my passenger. I approached and addressed him: "Hi, sir! And I know you!" He looked at me and said, "No, you don't know me. You are mistaken". He immediately turned his back on me and disappeared. I was surprised. I saw that he recognized me; I couldn't understand why he wasn't even puzzled and didn't ask me anything." That would be Blenden's story.

Following this, the Danish newspaper Actuel reported on March 14 that the gatekeeper of the Grosten Palace (near the Danish city of Sonderborg) identified Bormann from a photograph as a man who arrived at the palace in mid-May 1945 as part of a small group of SS officers. At that time, the German military infirmary was located in the palace, commanded by SS Stantartenführer Professor Werner Heide. He provided

Bormann's guard. Another report appeared: a certain Austrian Karl K., who served in May 1945 in Flensburg, witnessed how, immediately after the surrender, a submarine sailed from Flensburg with a Passenger arriving from Berlin.

An even greater sensation was caused by the report of the UPI agency that in Brazil a man who called himself Bormann's brother, Richard, had surrendered to the authorities and knew that Martin Bormann lives in the state of Mato Grosso under the surname Engel. True, later it turned out that the "brother" had nothing to do with Bormann\*. In May 1964, Goebbels' former aide-de-camp Prince Schaumburg-Lippe stated that he had seen Bormann in the town of Buchloe (Southern Germany) in 1950.

An eyewitness to Bormann's burial in Berlin, a Czech J. Dedich, appeared. However, when checking his testimony, it turned out that he had no evidence that the person buried in May 1945 was Bormann. Reports were persistently repeated about Bormann's stay in Paraguay, as a result

which in the summer of 1964 the Frankfurt prosecutor's office again published a statement that they believed Bormann was alive. In Paraguay, an investigation was carried out into reports of Bormann's death. Father Heinrich Franz, who was cited as an eyewitness to Bormann's burial near Asuncion in 1959, stated that these references were unfounded. He does not know who is buried in the grave, which he saw only in 1963. Former submariner Karl Wittmershaus gave | April and May 9, 1964 in Hannover, the testimony, according to which in early May 1945 M. Bormann arrived in Kiel. From here, he was transported on the submarine "17-806" to Denmark, to the port of Aarhus.

In the same year, the Hessian prosecutor's office questioned

\* Bormann did not have a brother named Richard. His brother Albert

lives in Germany.

a number of persons who lived in 1945 in South Tyrol. Josefina Thalheimer reported seeing Bormann in Bolzano in the autumn of 1945. Ellenhard Keilbert saw Bormann in December 1945. After that, various reports appeared - either about Bormann's stay in Peru, or about his death there. In autumn, the Hessian prosecutor's office appointed an official bonus of 100,000 marks for the capture of Bormann.

1965 The West German magazine Bunte Illustrierte published a series of articles by B. Ruhland in which it was categorically stated that Bormann fled Germany and now lives in Latin America. Ruhland made a trip to a number of Latin American countries, where he collected a lot of material about Bormann. According to Roeland, Bormann first arrived in Argentina, then hid in Brazil, and in recent years was in Paraguay, where the former Nazis enjoy the patronage of the authorities and personally the dictator Alfredo Stroessner. Ruhland's conclusion was: "Bormann survived the collapse of Berlin. After wandering around Germany, he got out to South America. There he lives in his shelter.

Throughout the year, there were reports reiterating these findings. In addition, there were rumors about Bormann's visits to Sweden and South Africa. In connection with the assassination in Uruguay of the Nazi executioner Cukurs, reports appeared in Uruguayan newspapers that Cukurs was seen in the company of Bormann. On May 28, 1965, Bormann's son, Father Adolphe Martin, who was taken out of the Congo by Belgian paratroopers, told a reporter from Agence France-Presse: "We cannot be one hundred percent sure of the father's death."

In September 1965, Izvestia's correspondent in Brazil, V. Kobyshev, who had made a trip to the countries of South America, said that he had talked with a journalist who was specially engaged in the search for Bormann. During a visit to Paraguay (where the journalist entered with the documents of the former

"3527

cyst) he was told that Bormann was hiding there.

1966 There were reports that Bormann was in Uruguay. A telegram was found in the room of German Bittner killed by the Takuara terrorist organization: "Bormann 24.8 arrives in Montevideo on a Pan American plane. I'm waiting for instructions." The Czech press published a letter from the doctor O. Riss, who claimed to have seen Bormann in 1959 in Asuncion.

1967 The American press reported information about Bormann's stay in Argentina (the Patagonian provinces of Rio Negro and Hubut), in particular, in the border town of Bariloche. The same information was published with reference to the former SS member Sonnenburg. The Brazilian newspaper Folha da Tarde claimed that Bormann lived in São Paulo, having undergone plastic surgery.

1968 During the year there were disputes over the message of the former SS man Erich Karl Widwald, who claimed that Bormann was hiding in the colony "Waldner 555", which is on the border

Brazil with Paraguay. Widwald left the colony in 1958; he last saw Bormann in 1965; Initially, Bormann was in Chile, where he was guarded by the former SS Gruppen Fuhrer Richard Glücks, then he moved to Brazil. The Waldner 555 colony is funded by secret funds set up by Bormann and the SS at the end of the war, Bormann's second-in-command is Schwend, a specialist in financial operations and counterfeiting banknotes.

Former CIA officer James McGovern published a book about Bormann, in which he said: according to American intelligence, Bormann's stay in Latin America or the Middle East is not ruled out.

1970 I received a letter from former British intelligence agent Ronald Gray; according to him, Bormann was killed near Flensburg in 1946. In my

“353/7

turn, the Danish doctor S.E. Kofod, who was on the island of Bornholm in early 1945, stated that he had seen Bormann on Bornholm in early May 1945.

The year 1971 again becomes the “year of Bormann” in the Western press: the head of the Federal Intelligence Service of the FRG, General Reinhard Gehlen, in his memoirs put forward a new version: Bormann is alive, but hiding ... in the Soviet Union, since he was a “Soviet agent volume”. The version was immediately picked up by the press of the Springer concern. However, the sensation quickly faded: Gehlen could not confirm his data with anything. Moreover, in McGovern's book mentioned above, the following fact was cited: when in 1953 the CIA sent an official request to the same Gehlen, the latter reported that he knew nothing about the imaginary presence of Bormann in the Soviet Union.

In connection with this scandal, a number of new reports appeared that Bormann had been seen in Berlin in June 1945, that Bormann had fled through South Tyrol and Rome to South America, and that Bormann was allegedly buried in 1945 in Berlin. The opening of the grave did not provide any evidence. At the end of the year, a statement was published by the investigating judge Horst von Glasenap that the investigation could not come to any conclusion: Bormann's death in 1945 and his flight are equally possible.

1972 At the beginning of the year, the Parisian Le Figaro printed a report stating that Francois H., a soldier of the SS Charlemagne division, who was in Berlin in April-May 1945, was present at the identification of the dead Bormann. Following this, 73-year-old German colonist Johann Hartmann was detained in Colombia, suspecting Bormann of him (as the Times calculated, this was the 16th “imaginary Bormann” detained after the war). In November, the Daily Express carried a report from Argentina, according to which the local police were on the trail of Bormann in the province of Salta. On October 5, 1977, Bormann allegedly crossed the bra

the Silesian-Argentine border and after that was in the estate belonging to the Krupp family. There were reports in the Argentine press that Bormann arrived in Argentina in 1948 from Italy, after which he was in several South American countries (Peru, Chile, Paraguay).

This is an incomplete list of messages about the fate of Bormann, which can lead to a dead end for any criminologist. At first glance, the reports are so contradictory that they mutually exclude each other. Take, for example, the messages of Topolevsky and Velasco, which are similar in meaning. But with the timing, both get a discrepancy: Velasco allegedly sent Bormann in May 1946. Topolevsky claims that Bormann left Europe already in 1945! With the terms of moving from Argentina to Brazil, given by Topolevsky, not everything is in order either. Thus, the Chilean newspaper Erquilla believes that Bormann ended up in Brazil much earlier, and in 1952 he had already moved to Chile. Finally, Paul Hesslein saw Bormann in Chile already in 1948.

Frankly, I was among the “searchers” of Bormann. In 1964 I published the book In the Footsteps of Martin Bormann, in which I tended to believe that the presence of contradictions in reports about

Bormann is no reason to stop looking. I was also strengthened in this judgment by the general political trend, which required the vigilance of the world community in the face of the neo-Nazi groups and parties that had already appeared at that time. When some of my colleagues nevertheless reminded me that the version of Bormann's death in Berlin on May 1-2, 1945 was not rejected, I declared, without hesitation, that they were unwitting accomplices of neo-Nazism.

Moreover: I tried to make my modest contribution to the search. In 1964, while dealing with the problem of the flight of former Nazis from Europe and collecting material on this then very topical topic, I began to

“3557

sew participants in the events of early May 1945 in Berlin. Purely by chance, I found among them a man who not only saw the famous diary, but also ... owned it. He explained that the “relevant” military authorities, having studied the diary and not seeing any “operational” value in it, returned the little book to the so-called. 7th Directorate of GlavPUR (Main Political Directorate). No one showed interest in it (after all, the translation had already been made), and one of the officers took the diary for himself, took it to the dacha and put it in a basket with other military papers. Set and forget.

It was necessary for the occasion that I got to this person! With some hesitation (would he get caught for keeping the Nazi leader's diary?), he let me make a copy. Then there were no copiers, it was necessary to look for a photo lab, and even explain what kind of strange document and why it is needed. A copy was made, and the owner of the original decided to give it to "the authorities". Of course, I tried to extract a "publicistic sense" from the diary - and published it. My book was transferred to the GDR, and my Berlin friends asked me to give them a copy. It turns out that the investigating authorities of the GDR decided to carry out excavations in those places where Bormann wandered [on May 2, 1945, and collected all kinds of materials for this. They did this in contact with the investigating authorities of the FRG. Therefore, when I got to Frankfurt am Main, I visited the Attorney General of Hesse, Dr. Fritz Bauer, and showed photocopies. They were even included in the investigation file. Bauer infected me with his certainty that Bormann was hiding somewhere, and we discussed for a long time all the reports about the missing Reichsleiter that had been available by that time.

The search for Bormann has become official. Indeed, in October 1946, Bormann was - in his absence - sentenced to death by the Nuremberg International Tribunal. The sentence was not carried out, although the world

search. When the German justice authorities began to act, the West Berlin prosecutor's office decided to continue the investigation, since evidence was registered that Bormann was alive. In 1959, the case was transferred to the state of Hesse, since there was already an investigation into the case of “euthanasia” (one of the Nuremberg charges against Bormann). The case against Bormann was given the number 3R(K)J5 248/60. The first thing they did in the Hessian

curator's office - by comparing all the testimonies about the possible death of Bormann in Berlin (Axman, Naumann, Krumnov, etc.)

West German lawyers did not know that the GDR authorities had decided to carry out the excavations themselves. The peculiarity of the situation consisted in the fact that the Berlin Wall and the forbidden strip adjoining it ran exactly along the possible excavation sites. It was possible to dig only with the highest permission. It was given, but it turned out to be ineffectual. They began to dig from the western side of the wall. On July 20 and 21, 1965, under the supervision of Richter, they began to look for traces in the area of the former exhibition site "Ulap" and did not find skeletons corresponding to the signs of Bormann and the SS doctor Ludwig Stumpfegger who was walking with him. In addition, the necessary initial data for identification in Frankfurt am Main was not available. The excavations turned out to be useless.

I remember that with some timidity I entered the monumental building of the Frankfurt Palace of Justice. Not to mention the fact that those built in the Kaiser era in big cities

In Germany, such palaces are distinguished by pomp and colossal size. They seem to be designed to inspire the visitor with some fear of the courts and prosecutors located here. But there was another reason for timidity: it was the 1960s, the height of the Cold War, and then any contact with the bodies of the West German (revanchist!) justice was not safe. Is it true,

“3577

I have secured the consent of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the GDR, Professor Toeplitz, and have already acquainted him with my research on the Bormann case. But who knows? What if someone doesn't like this visit?

Everything worked out. Dr. Bauer turned out to be a lively, active person with an anti-fascist past (which was atypical for the FRG), and we found a common language. Bauer especially liked my discovery in Bormann's papers - a cipher telegram in which the Reichsleiter expressed his agreement with the redeployment to "southern overseas". He promised to find out the meaning of this telegram, which seemed to confirm Bormann's preparations for leaving for South America. However, after a few months we had to be disappointed: Bauer found out that the "southern overseas region" in Bormann's diary was not called South America, but the reserve headquarters in South Bavaria.

It would be an exaggeration to say that Bormann's fate was a matter of big politics. But it belonged to the political complex of relations between West and East and the confrontation between the two German states. One of the main theses of the policy of the GDR was the desire to show that the FRG is an imperialist, revanchist state that does not want to part with the traditions of the Third Reich and does not want to pursue Nazi war criminals. Needless to say, there were some grounds for such accusations: what was the cost of appointing Hans Globke and Theodor Oberländer to the highest state posts in the Adenauer government! But in the heat of the debate, Soviet propaganda (and, of course, about the propaganda of the GDR) lost sight of the no less important political and psychological processes that were taking place in West Germany. Not least under the influence of reproaches from the East, but mainly in the course of its own democratic development, West German society was freeing itself from the heavy legacy of the past era. Slowly but with a German fund

mentality, lawsuits began against the SS executioners, the highest functionaries of the NSDAP. According to official figures, between 1945 and 1970, 6,181 people were sentenced to punishment by German courts (in addition, until 1951, the courts of the occupying powers operated; they convicted about 50,000 people). As for neo-Nazi groups and parties, they found themselves on the sidelines of West German political life. The voters did not support the "eternally yesterday" figures who tried to openly rehabilitate the past. Politicians who openly broke with the past had much more success. During these years, I had to meet more than once with such people as Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr, Erich Ollenhauer, Herbert Wehner, through whose efforts the painful process of healing society from past diseases was carried out. To be honest, a radical turn in Soviet-West German relations in the 1970s would have been impossible otherwise. But he is finished.

But enough politics, back to our topic. At the end of 1972 there was a sensational turn. When, in the course of routine building work in West Berlin, the city authorities set to work on long-vacant land near the Berlin Wall, one firm took over the same Ulap site that had been searched in vain in 1965. Vigilant Jochen von Lang was on the alert: having read a note about this in the newspaper, he informed Richter about it. He alerted the Berlin police, and they were immediately on the spot when, on December 7, 1972, workers discovered two skeletons in a hole that their excavator was digging. The next day, jaws with teeth were found in the same pit, and on March 12, 1973, a golden bridge was also found there. All these finds - skeleton No. 1 (presumably Stumpfegger) and skeleton No. 2 (presumably Bormann) - were subjected to a thorough medical examination.

vision, since Richter took control of the find. This time, the identification could be made accurately, since the archive of Dr. Blaschke, who treated Bormann's teeth, was discovered a few years ago. Blaschke's assistant, the prosthetist Echtman, and assistant Heuserman were also involved in the work. Identification was carried out separately, by jaws and skeletons.

Of course, we are interested in skeleton no. 2. But for the corollary, skeleton no. 1 was no less important and interesting - under special circumstances. The fact is that back in August 1945, Stumpfegger's widow received a letter from the Office for Notifying Close Relatives of the Fallen Wehrmacht Servicemen located in Berlin, No. SHIM 9474, with the following content:

"May 8 this year. Post office employees found a soldier who had fallen during the battles for Berlin on the railway bridge along Invalidenstrasse. According to the passport found on the dead man, it was Ludwig Stumpfegger. Since it must be assumed that this is about your spouse, we tell you this sad news and express our condolences. Your spouse was buried along with other soldiers on May 8 at the former exhibition site "Alpendorf" in Berlin district No. 40, Invalidenstraße 63. We are sending you the photographs found with the dead. The passport has been destroyed."

Stumpfegger's widow did not tell anyone about this letter then, which is understandable: the widow of Hitler's personal doctor and SS Obersturmbannführer did not want to attract attention to herself. But the find was absolutely indisputable, and since it was known that Stumpfegger left the office with Bormann, it was also important evidence for the identification of Bormann's corpse. In addition, all further examination of "skeleton number 1" in 1972 confirmed that it was Stumpfegger.

Now to "skeleton number 2". Conclusion:

"For skeleton No. 2, on the basis of the studies carried out, a height of 168-171 cm and a head volume of 55-57 cm were established. The skull is defined as "round". According to SS records, height is listed as 170 cm; Head size is not listed. The definition of "round head" corresponds to what is shown in the photographs of the accused.

..In "skeleton No. 2", macroscopically and on the basis of Dr. Scheldgen's X-ray, traces of healing after a fracture of the right clavicle in its middle third are established. This confirms the data of both sons of the accused (the sons testified that Bormann had a broken collarbone in 1938-1939. — LB).

... Skeleton jaws No. 2. They were also examined at the police clinic in Berlin. In addition, on 4.1.1973 Obermeditsinrat Dr. Macchke performed an examination of the jaw on the basis of her own scheme and the scheme made by Dr. Blaschke. The conclusion reads: "Summarizing, we can say that despite some possible deviations based on the errors of the attending physician, there is a great similarity and a number of other unambiguous coincidences that indicate the identity of the jaws of Bormann and skull No. 2.

On 12/16/1972, the dentist Echtman, who was presented with Skull No. 2, stated: "I can say that the work found on the jaws was made in the laboratory of Dr. These are technical works, namely two bridges and one crown ... "

Since a wart above the left eye can be seen on the accused's forehead in various photos, skull No. 2 was studied accordingly. No significant bone damage was found. The possibility of accidental hemorrhage in case of head injury cannot be ruled out. Photomontage of profile photographs of both skulls with the photo of the accused and Dr. Stumpfegger and their combination established complete

coincidence.

...Regarding skeleton No. 2, the expert comes to the conclusion that the skull and skeleton No. 2 can be identified with a high degree of probability as belonging to the accused...



The identity of skull No. 2 and skeleton No. 2 (small) with the personality of Martin Bormann can be considered proven with a probability bordering on unconditional.

Further, in the final act of the Frankfurt prosecutor's office, the fact of the discovery in the jaws of fragments of glass ampoules, which could contain cyanide compounds (traces of potassium cyanide were not found, which is not surprising for the period of stay of the bodies in the ground - from 1945 to 1972) is analyzed. . These, in Richter's opinion, "almost certainly" were the causes of death. In addition, the prosecutor's office ordered a special reconstruction of a person's appearance based on the preserved skull (like the famous reconstructions of Gerasimov). This reconstruction was carried out in Munich (without using the famous photographs of Bormann and Stumpfegger). The work was evaluated as another confirmation of identity. Therefore, Richter ended his act with such an almost philosophical phrase: "Although the possibilities of human knowledge are by nature limited (see the federal collection of regulations, vol. 30, pp. 379-393, publ. 1962, 1505), On December 7-8, 1972, at the Ulap site in Berlin, both skeletons belong to the accused Martin Bormann and Ludwig Stumpfegger. The accused and Dr. Ludwig Stumpfegger died in the early morning of May 2, 1945—between approximately 1.30 and 2.30 am—in Berlin."

On this basis, Richter finally closed the investigation file and other cases opened on the search for Bormann in 1965. The remains were handed over to relatives, but without the right to be cremated. As it turned out, this decision was far-sighted.

Npia ia soteia? No matter how! The inertia of the search continued to operate, and it was already "dawn

wives", not only individual journalists and their editorial offices, but also international organizations such as the "Simon Wiesenthal Foundation", which did a lot to search for fugitive Nazi criminals. This was done, for example, by the American "Civilian Censorship Detachment" in the American zone of occupation of Germany. He eavesdropped on telephone conversations of suspicious persons. One of the "suspicious" said: "Listen, how do you live?" Answer: "Did you hear that Bormann was seen in Lucerne?" "Why wasn't he detained?" Answer: "I don't know." But the counterintelligence officers could not do anything from this interception. In 1996, a sensational story appeared by the former British intelligence officer Christopher Creighton. He claimed that, on a personal assignment from Winston Churchill, in the last days of the war, he took Bormann to ... England in order to obtain from him the secret numbers of Nazi accounts in Swiss banks. To this end, Creighton found in England a man strikingly similar to Bormann (down to a mole and prostheses). The real Bormann allegedly died in England, and his double died in Berlin. In the same 1996, the Italian magazine Manifesto announced that Bormann had died in 1952, not in London, but in Rome. Finally, the American publicist Robert Katz offered another version - the hundredth, if not the thousandth - version: Bormann was hiding in Italy with the documents of the German soldier Kurt Gauch and died there in 1952. In 1972, the English press published a series by the well-known publicist Ladislav Farago about Bormann in Argentina.

It seems that the search began to turn into a farce, which was unexpectedly facilitated by a small booklet entitled "Martin Bormann - an agent of Soviet intelligence." It was published in Moscow in 1992 in the series "From the history of domestic intelligence - the KGB". Its author is the little-known Boris Tartakovsky. He offered readers the mind-blowing narrative that Bormann had been recruited by Soviet intelligence.

back in the 20s. It turns out that he was recommended in Moscow by none other than the leader of the German Communists, Ernst Thälmann. According to Tartakovsky, Thälmann was well acquainted with Bormann, since this "broad-shouldered blond with blue eyes" was a member of the "Spartak" union under the pseudonym "Karl". When Thälmann was asked in Moscow to recommend a person to Soviet intelligence officers to infiltrate the top of the NSDAP, Thälmann offered them "Karl"...

To be honest, Mr. Tartakovsky could have made his version more plausible. He does not give dates, he shamelessly misrepresents names, quoting the cheapest stories from Hitler's biography or fictionalizing well-known facts (which is worth, for example, the scene of Hitler's wedding night on April 29, 1945, during which both spouses do not have sex, but chase the rats). But in the end, the author depicts a heroic scene in which a man with a bag on his head is led out to a Soviet tank that has approached the entrance to the imperial office. This, of course, is Martin Bormann. Tartakovsky buried him in Moscow, at the Lefortovo German cemetery (by the way, it was closed a long time ago) in 1973...

I choked with laughter as I read the essay of a man whom the publishers included among the former "Soviet intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers." He, of course, surpassed the German General Gehlen, who was one of the first among the authors of the version about the "Soviet intelligence agent Bormann".

I remember that in 1971 (I was then working as a Soviet correspondent in Bonn), I received a telephone call in my office. From Frankfurt am Main, I received a call from the public prosecutor's office and asked me to express my opinion on Gehlen's report (in his book Service). What could I say? Only that I can relate to him "only satirically." By the way, when the prosecutors asked Gehlen - where did he get

information that Bormann was seen in Moscow, he gave an answer that sounded really satirical:

"I was informed that Soviet sports newsreel was on in the GDR. She was seen and in the image of the audience of a football match at the Dynamo stadium they recognized a person who looked like Bormann..."

This is how times change: in 1971, a German intelligence officer and a sworn anti-communist by profession, Gehlen, wanted to make Bormann a Soviet agent (oh, bad Soviet intelligence officers), and in 1991, a Soviet author wants to weave into the laurels of Soviet intelligence the same questionable sheet. After all, the place for the original Stirlitz has not yet been occupied!

This endless stream forced Bormann's relatives to turn to the Frankfurt prosecutor's office with an urgent request: to conduct a gene analysis of Bormann's remains and put an end to all speculation. Bauer and Richter were no longer alive, but their successor Hans-Christian Schaefer decided to defend the honor of the legal uniform. The task of testing for DNA was given to two specialists in Frankfurt and Bern. It turned out to be difficult to carry out, since the remains (which were kept according to the verdict) were very deformed and dilapidated. Scientists from Munich came to the rescue, developing a new, more modern method for extracting "DNA" from bone. Then it became possible to compare the analysis of the bones with the analysis of the blood of the 83-year-old granddaughter Amalia Folborn, the aunt of Martin Bormann. The Munich professor Wolfgang Eisenmenger was then able to compare the two DNA "tests" with ease. The result is 100% identical. This means: the last and bold point has been put in the dizzying story of the search for "the man behind Hitler's back". He is dead, he died in Berlin at dawn on May 2, 1945.

## CHRONOLOGICAL NAMED DIRECTORY TO THE DIARY OF MARTIN BORMANN

(in order of mention)

Goering, Hermann

KEITEL, Wilhelm

RUNDSTELT, Gerd von

SHERF, Walter

DENitz, Carl

IODL, Alfred

- Reichsmarschall, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force

— Field Marshal General, Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command (OKW)

- Field Marshal General

- lieutenant general, historical department OKW

- Grand Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy

— Colonel General, Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the OKW

RIBBENTROP, Joachim von

BURGDORF, Wilhelm

GUDERIAN, Heinz

SPEER, Albert

RUDEL, Hans-Ulrich GOEBBELS, Joseph

NAUMANN, Werner SAUR, Otto GANTZENMULLER,

Theodore

VEGELEINS: Hermann Gretl

KLOPFER, Helmut

- Foreign Secretary

— General, Head of the Personnel Department of the OKW

- Colonel General, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces of the OKH (until March 1945)

- Minister of Armaments and Military Products

pilot, colonel

- Propaganda Minister, Gauleiter of Berlin

- secretary of state in min. propaganda

- head. department in min. weapons

- secretary of state in min. transport

Herman - SS Gruppenfuehrer, Himmler's representative at Hitler's headquarters;

Gretl - his wife, sister of Eva Braun

- Secretary of State of the Party Chancellery

FRIEDRIHS, Helmut

HUMMEL, Helmut von

AXMAN, Arthur

SCHENK

WEINGART

PRICE

JOSEPH

SILBERHORN FUNK LAZECKI TRESEMER BAURIDEL STOHL, Willy

MULLERBUSCH POST

- party secretary

- economy. Bormann's adviser

— Reich Fuhrer of the Youth

- party secretary

- commandant of houses on the Obersalzberg

- party secretary

— employee of the party office

— «-» «-» — «-» «-» — «-» «-» — «-» «-» — «-» «-»

- party secretary

— «-» «-»

— «-» «-»

SHREK, Julius Greiderer

DREAMS

BUHLER

WOLFF, Johanna

MEYER

FRANC

VOLLMER TREISH

HOESCHEN

(Hilda Potthast) TERBOVEN, Josef QUISLING, Vidkun

LAM MERS, Hans

KINKEL

- Hitler's chauffeur

- party secretary
- an employee of the SD team on the Obersalzberg
- party secretary
- Hitler's stenographer
- party secretary
- Head of the SS team on the Obersalzberg
- gardener
- party secretary
- Himmler's roommate
- Imperial Commissioner of Norway
- Prime Minister of Norway
- Secretary of State of the Imperial Chancellery
- Hitler's chauffeur

14 Law. No. 665 Bezymensky

GRAZER, Arthur SEYSS-INQUART, Arthur

LEY, Robert STER, Willy REINEcke, Herman TIRACK, Otto FREISLER, Roland  
KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst

KOCH, Erich

WENK, Walter WOLFF, Carl

GIESLER, Paul BECHER, Kurt

- Gauleiter of the Wartheland
- Imperial Viceroy in Holland
- Head of the German Labor Front
- Gauleiter of the Saar-Palatinate
- General, Chief of Staff of the National Socialist. education in the OKW
- Minister of Justice
- chairman of the so-called. "People's Tribunal"
- SS Obergruppenführer, head of the RSHA
- Gauleiter of East Prussia
- Colonel General, Commander of the 12th Army
- SS Obergruppenführer, early. SS troops in Italy

- Gauleiter of Bavaria

- SS Standartenführer

14\*

DIETRICH, Joseph (Sepp)

BERGER, Gottlob STREVE, Gustav SCHMIDT-RÖMER RUDER, Willy WALKENHORST, Heinrich

ZANDER, Wilhelm

MULLER FORSTER, Albert

FOSS, Erich

STOIL, Willy Bakke, Herbert

RIKE, Hans Joachim

- SS Obergruppenführer

— SS Ogruppenführer — commandant of the headquarters of the ground forces in Zossen

- party secretary

- "-" "-" - "-" "-" - Bormann's personal referent - "-" "-"

- Gauleiter of Danzig - Zap. Prussia

— Admiral, Doenitz's representative at Hitler's headquarters

- party secretary

— Minister of Food and S.-Kh.

- secretary of state in min. FOOD AND S.-X.

“371

HIRL, Konstantin

STEINER, Felix

ALFEN, Hans von

Prützmann, Hans Dotzler

MATIS

HAMMITSH

PUMA (PUTTKAMMER), Esco background

GLAZMEIER, Heinrich

KESSELRING, Erich

MANTEIFEL, Hasso von

Hübner, Rudolf FRELING, Werner

EBERLEIN

- Chief Nem. labor service

— Commander of the 11th Army

- General, commandant of the Breslau fortress

- SS Obergruppenführer

- party secretary

- Admiral - Bormann's friend

- Adjutant of Hitler

- Director of Imperial Radio

- Field Marshal General

- colonel general

- SS Gruppenfuehrer

- party secretary

— "-" < "-"

“372

HEWEL, Walter GEIGER

HAFFNER WINTER, August

BULE, Walter

POLEK

MEYER-FREYKRUG

KEITEL, Bodevin

BUCHNER, Rudolf FRANK

SHERNER, Ferdinand

BUSCH, Ernst KAUFMANN, Carl

- Ribbentrop's representative under Hitler

- party secretary

- Attorney General

- General, Deputy Jodl

— General, chief of armaments in the OKW

— Colonel, Deputy Jodl

- party secretary

brother of Wilhelm early personnel department OKH

- Professor

— SS Obergruppenführer, viceroy in the protectorate of the Czech Republic and Bohemia

- Field Marshal, Commander of the Army Group

— «-» «-»

- Gauleiter of Hamburg

“373/7

HANKE, Kurt

SCHMERBECK

WAIBLINGER

SCHUTTE BLASHKE

ECHARDT

STEINAKER

HENGL, Georg von

SAUCKEL, Fritz

Hilgenfelts Gerecke, Rudolf ROSENBERG,

Alfred Dietrich, Otto

— Gauleiter of Lower Silesia

- party secretary

- party secretary

— «-» «-»

Hitler and Bormann's dentist

- SS Hauptsturmführer, collaborator. part. office

- Party employee office

General, officer of the OKW

- Reichsleiter of the NSDAP, full. by labor force recruitment

- party secretary

- general, chief transport service OKW



- Reichsleiter of the NSDAP

- imperial press chief

SCHOLZ-KLINK,

Gertrude KREBS, Hans

ASSMAN STURZ, Emil KERNER

ZUNDERMANN, Helmut

MEISEL, Erns FLATHER HOFER, Franz

LAUTERBACHER, Hartman

EGGELING, Joachim

GERLAND, Carl

METZNER, Erwin

RECMAN

BRANLT, Carl

— Head of the Imperial Women's Union

- Chief of the General Staff of the Army

— captain

Gauleiter of Kurmark - Kreisleiter

— Deputy Imperial Press Chief

- General Engineer - Gauleiter of Tyrol

- Gauleiter of South Hanover

— Gauleiter of Halle Merseburg

- and about. Gauleiter Kurgessen

- Deputy Gauleiter

- party secretary

- former Hitler's personal physician

“3757

MALTS - an employee of the party

office STUMIFEGGER - SS doctor under Hitler Ludwig HILPERT, Karl - general, command. groups  
Kurland WEIDLING, Helmut — commandant of the defense of Berlin

HIMMLER, Heinrich - Reichsfuehrer SS

APPS

The final report of the Frankfurt prosecutor's office on the "criminal case against Martin Bormann on charges of murder" dated 4.1/1973 (number \$ 11/61).

Preliminary remarks

The report includes:

a) Judgment and decision in other cases

6) 8 volumes of personal data and on specific charges against the accused

c) Special volume on excavations of July 20/21

1965 "3777

d) 34 volumes of search cases

e) 10 volumes of criminal cases

f) Farago Special Volume

g) Axman Special Volume

h) File folder of the police president of Berlin on the discovery of skeletons on December 7/8, 1972.

i) 2 special volumes on the discovery of skeletons

j) 1 Document Center data folder

k) File cabinet (by witnesses, informants, etc.)

m) Accounts

m) Reconstruction photo folder

o) A binder with conclusions and appendices.

Content:

1. Personal data on the situation of the accused in the "Third Reich"

P. Judgment by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg

Fri. Investigation, search and pre-trial detention

GU. Causes of unsuccessful excavations on July 20/21, 1965 at the Ulap site

D. Notebook of the accused

UT. Search inside and outside the country

UP. Further investigation at the Ulap site in Berlin

USh. Preparations for further excavations at the Ulap site

IX. Discovery of skeletons on December 7 and 8, 1972

X. Plastic reconstruction as an additional check

XI. results

HP. Further measures

I. Personal data on the position of the accused in the "Third Reich"

Martin Bormann was born in Halberstadt on 17/6/1900. At first he attended a folk school, then school until the eighth grade. From mid-June 1918 to mid-February 1919 he served as a private in the 55th Royal Prussian Artillery Regiment in Naumburg, on the Saale. There is no personal file, apparently burned down in 1944 in Berlin. Then he studied agriculture, from 1920 to 1926 he was a manager in a Mecklenburg estate. At that time (1922-1923) he was the commander of the section of the Rossbach organization.

On March 15, 1924, by the judgment of the Tribunal for the Defense of the Republic, he was sentenced to a year of imprisonment in the case of Rudolf Hess (the future commandant of Auschwitz) (case 13/1924) about the so-called. "theme court" in Parchim for complicity in inflicting severe bodily harm (with a month in pre-trial detention). Served full time. The verdict is in the case.

On February 17, 1927, he joined the NSDAP (membership card 6058), from April 1927 to August [1930] he was a member of the SA in the highest headquarters of the SA, a member of the National Socialist Automobile Corps until the spring of 1931.

After serving his sentence, he worked in the NSDAP, namely from 12/11/1927 to 11/14/1928 in Gau Thuringia as the head of the press department, from 4/1/1928 to 11/14/1928 he was simultaneously the party's manager in Thuringia. In 1930, the defendant, as a member of the headquarters of the leadership of the SA, founded the "auxiliary fund" of the party, which he led until July 1933. On 4/7/1933 he was appointed chief of staff of the Deputy Führer with the rank of Reichsleiter. The accused became an SS Gruppenführer on 30 January 1927, an Obergruppenführer on 20 April 1940 (SS number 555), and in 1938 a member of the Reichstag. After the flight of Rudolf Hess on May 10, 1941, Hitler, by his order of May 12, 1941, transformed the headquarters

Deputy Führer to the "Party Chancellery", directly subordinate to the Führer. On May 29, 1941, for closer interaction between the Party Chancellery and the highest state bodies, Hitler ordered:

"The head of the party chancellery, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, performs the functions of an imperial minister, is a member of the government and the Reich Defense Council. Where laws and decrees mention "Deputy Führer", the head of the Party Chancellery should be meant.

The orders necessary for the execution of this decree will be issued by the head of the imperial chancellery in agreement with the head of the party office."

On April 12, 1943, Hitler issued a decree that "Reichsleiter M. Bormann, as my personal assistant, receives the title of "Führer's Secretary".

On July 20, 1944, Hitler ordered:

"I authorize the head of the party office to carry out measures in the party and its subdivisions to carry out a total war. In particular, he has the right to dissolve or suspend the activities of departments in order to release forces in other areas of military production, more important for the war, and for the armed forces."

Hitler's order of September 1, 1944 reads:

"1. I instruct the head of the Party Chancellery, who is carrying out measures for the defensive installations, to issue the necessary directives to the Gauleiters on my behalf.

2. Gauleiters are obliged to take measures as soon as possible to carry out defensive work.

3. The head of the party office appoints his representatives for the uniform execution of orders. He has the right to transfer party functionaries to this.

4. By order of the head of the imperial office

head of org. department allocates him leading cadres.

According to Hitler's decree of September 25, 1944 on the formation of the German Volkssturm, "military measures are carried out by the commander of the reserve army, Reichsführer SS Himmler, political and organizational measures are carried out by Reichsleiter M. Bormann."

In Hitler's political will dated 04.04.1945 at 4 o'clock, which was signed by the accused as a witness, Hitler appointed him "Minister for Party Affairs" in the new government, and in his personal will dated the same day - the executor of this will, as "my most faithful party comrade."

The exact definition of the identity of the accused was given in his testimony by the witness Dr. Nauman on 19.1.1970:

"I knew the accused through numerous official contacts. Bormann can certainly be considered a "workhorse", he combined the gift of improvisation with exceptional tactical skill. Although he was not distinguished by education, he, as a rule, found indisputable solutions to questions that were asked to him unexpectedly. This success-oriented working style, in keeping with today's ideal manager, explains why Hitler trusted him for everything. Bormann knew this. Of course, this position of Bormann gave him the opportunity to keep the Gauleiters on his leash. This is what Bormann wanted to own this link in the hierarchy."

In his testimony dated 31.8.1970, Dr. Hupfauer, in 1944 the head of a department in the Ministry of Armaments, characterized Bormann's position in the then hierarchy as follows:

"By the end of 1944, there was a conviction that Bormann, as the head of the party office (including the military sphere), had become the most influential and powerful personality. I could see how various Reichsleiters and ministers were looking for a way to the Fuehrer through Bor

mana."

The accused had a "golden party badge" and the so-called. "order of blood", which he received retroactively for his time in prison. On September 2, 1929, he was married to Gerda Buch (born 1909), daughter of the supreme party judge Walter Buch. In this marriage he had ten children. The wife of the accused died on March 23, 1946 in a hospital for prisoners of war in the mountains. Meran.

The decision of the admin. court in Berchtesgaden dated 30.1.1954 (number P / 40/53), the accused was declared dead. The time of death was determined 2/5/1945, 24 hours.

On September 18, 1931, the accused was prosecuted in Munich for perjury, since that time his fingerprints have existed.

The accused wrote a letter dated August 1943 (Appendix No. 4) provided by his relatives. He was 1.70 m tall, which is recorded by his hand in the SS table; shoe size - 42.5. His description is given in his passport dated 1936: medium height, oval face, brown eyes, dark brown hair. There are no special marks.

According to reliable evidence, the defendant had two traces of previous operations on the skin of his body.

The data was compiled based on materials from the Berlin Document Center, on search cases and other registered sources.

## P. Judgment by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg

On October 1, 1946, Martin Bormann was sentenced to death for war crimes and crimes against humanity, according to the IMT judgment of October 1, 1946.

The verdict, the reading of which began on September 30, 1946, see Volume XXII, p. 467.

... On November 17, 1945, the tribunal decided to proceed against the accused Bormann in his absence, in accordance with Article 12 of the Charter.

In Bormann's absence, the tribunal appointed his lawyer. On 10/1/1946, his lawyer declared that Bormann was dead and could not be tried under Article 12, which allows the trial unabated. However, in view of the lack of sufficient evidence of Bormann's death, the tribunal decided, as mentioned above, to try Bormann *uni versa*. If he is still alive and later arrested, then, according to Article 29, the Control Council for Germany must decide whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to change or commute the sentence.

Conclusion: Bormann is not guilty on count 1 (conspiracy against peace) and guilty on counts 3 and 4 (war crimes and crimes against humanity).

Volume XXP, p. 674 (1.10)

...Chairman: The Tribunal sentences the accused Martin Bormann according to the charges to death by hanging.

## Sh. Investigation and search

In 1959, the Attorney General at the Regional Court in Berlin decided to open an investigation against the accused, since there was information that Martin Bormann was still alive. This case (3ŷ(ŷ), \$ 248/60) was transferred to our prosecutor's office on May 24, 1961 (Volume I, p. 96) and was accepted into proceedings on July 2, 1961 (Volume PC, pp. 130, 131), according to \$145 CC.

The transfer of the case did not raise any objections, since Bormann, according to the verdict of the MMT, was sentenced to death and his case falls under the treaty governing relations between the FRG and the USA, England and France (vol. 1, p. 129). ).

The defendant is charged with complicity in the murder according to the so-called. "euthanasia", crimes during the extermination of Jews and murders under the "scorched earth" complex

la". This follows from the warrant of arrest issued by the court of Frankfurt am Main dated 4.7.1961 (case 931, Cs 4388/61) (see Vol. II, p. 147). Evidence is available only in the form of documents.

Judicial compensation follows from the fact that murders by "euthanasia" were also committed in Hesse (Hadamers near Limburg), murders of Jews were also committed in Hesse (Frankfurt am Main), and Hitler's headquarters, where the accused was permanently, was located from 12/16/1944 to 1/16/1945 in Ziegenberg near Bad Nauheim. The case first focused on the search for the accused, since information was received about his flight from Berlin. According to them, the accused was seen in various places, including Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Guatemala, England, Italy, Canada, Cuba, Mexico, Austria, Paraguay, Peru, Switzerland, USSR, Spain, South Africa, Venezuela and the USA. This is just an incomplete list.

With the consent of the Minister of Justice of Hesse (11/13/1964), a reward of 100,000 marks was awarded for information that would lead to the arrest of the accused, and a press release was also published on 11/23/11. The March issue of Reader's Digest published an article by Blake Clark entitled "The World's Most Wanted Criminal" announcing the reward. The article ended with the words: "If you know or have seen this man, call the nearest West German embassy." Reader's Digest is published in all languages of the world.

All any serious reports in the FRG were collected in special commissions of the criminal investigation of the lands. If they concerned foreign countries, they were collected and checked by diplomatic missions abroad. However, all such reports turned out to be untrue. To avoid that a number of countries in Latin America from

seems to be issuing an arrest warrant wanted because of the statute of limitations, the court case was officially opened on 25.4.1968.

The investigating judge was mainly engaged in the search for the accused. However, all his actions were not successful. The preliminary investigation stage was closed on 10/14/1971, and it was terminated on 12/14/1971.

GU. Reasons for unsuccessful excavations in Berlin on July 20/21, 1965 at the Ulap site

Simultaneously with the constant search for new data, an investigation was carried out into the circumstances of the accused's breakthrough from the imperial office on the evening of May 1, 1945. It turned out that, contrary to the testimony of witness Kempk, Bormann did not die during the explosion of a German tank on the Weidendammer-Brücke bridge. It turned out that the accused survived this explosion and, together with the witnesses Nauman, Schwegerman, Aksman and Veltsin (the latter died in Russian captivity on 10/16/1945) and Dr. Ludwig Stumpfegger, moved along the railway. embankment from the bridge to Lehrter railway station. This was stated at the preliminary investigation by the witnesses Nauman, Schwegerman, Dietrich and Axman. The whereabouts of Dr. Stumpfegger remained at first unclear.

At the Lehrter railway station, this group split up. Witnesses Naumann, Dietrich and Schwegermann first hid in the bushes south of Invalidenstrasse and withdrew to the south, they were able to hide for several days in the industrial area west of the station and reached the area occupied by the Western Allies. The accused, together with Dr. Stumpfegger, went along Invalidenstrasse to the northeast to the Sandkrugbrücke bridge, the witness Aksman, together with Veltsin, went southwest to Alt Moabit. Witness Axman

also managed to get out of Berlin to Mecklenburg, and then to Lübeck. Witnesses Axman and Veltsin ran into Russian tanks near the courthouse in Moabit and were forced to return.

#### 1. Axman

During the interrogation on 17.4.1970 (case file, vol. TU, pp. 743 et seq.), witness Artur Aksman testified:

"When we passed the bridge leading over the rails on this way back, we saw two male bodies at the end of the bridge closer to the Stettinerbahnhof station. The fire intensified. We knelt down and identified Bormann and Stumpfegger. Both lay on their backs with their arms and legs spread out. Dr. Stumpfegger was lying 2-3 meters from Bormann. I called out to Bormann, shook him, but did not notice his breath. Both were still dressed in greatcoats, as before. The situation was not such that it could be established whether they were really dead. There were no injuries or wounds on them, and changes in the mouth were also not noticeable. True, I did not open my mouth to Bormann. I did not feel a strong smell, for example, the smell of almonds, characteristic of potassium cyanide. I checked only Bormann. I didn't take anything from either of them. It happened somewhere between 1.30 am and 2.00 am, maybe it was already 2.30 am on May 2nd. In any case, it was still dark, but the area was lit by fires. Therefore, I recognized Bormann without error. There were no other corpses nearby; As far as I remember, Bormann's eyes were closed, not damaged.

Witness Axman gave the same testimony during interrogation in Nuremberg to investigator Dr. Kempner on 10/10/1947:

"Question: Where did Goebbels get the poison from?

Answer: I suppose from the one who accompanied Hitler

doctor.

V: Who was it?

A: It was Dr. Stumpfegger.

Q: What happened to him then?

A: I saw Bormann and Stumpfegger when they were lying on the bridge. They don't show signs of life. filed.

Q: Do you think Bormann is dead?

A: I have already shown that in the morning at half past two I stood before these gentlemen. I had a companion.

V: Who was it?

A: It was Veltsin.

Q: Is he alive?

A: I heard that he died in Russian captivity.

This description coincides with other testimony of Axmann and with other data (see Axmann's wife Erna, Ilse Fouquet-Michels, Wilhelm Gause, Lisolotte Gause) (see interrogation on 10/11/1962).

## 2. NVI letter

In a letter dated 16.1.1963, the German Office for the Notification of the Relatives of Fallen Soldiers (NVI) informed the Central Office in Ludwigsburg that Dr. Stumpfegger had been found dead on May 8, 1945 on the railway bridge along Invalidenstrasse by employees of Post Office No. 40 and buried on the same day at the Alpendorf exhibition site at Berlin 40, Invalidenstrasse 63 (see Appendix No. 9, layout of the site - see Volume U, p. 770) .

## 3. Krumnov

During the search for those postal employees of post office 40 who carried out the burial, the postal official Albert Krumnov was discovered, who on 24.4.1963 gave the following testimony (see the special volume "Excavations in Berlin"):

"About May 8, 1945, I don't remember the exact date, the Russians demanded that we remove and bury the corpses that lay on the railway bridge. I myself only reached the bridge and saw two corpses. It was one former Wehrmacht soldier, the other was wearing only underpants and an undershirt. I remember that there was talk of some kind of soldier's book, from which it turned out that the body, dressed only in underwear, belongs to an SS doctor. There were no SS uniform items nearby. My colleagues Wageful, Loose, Stelze were ordered to bury the corpses. We did this at the site of the former company Ulap (Alpendorf), digging a grave and burying both bodies. My colleague Wageful took the soldier's book.

At his judicial interrogation, the witness Krumnov (he is now deceased) testified on November 5, 1970 (volume GU, p. 510):

"A few days after the cessation of fighting in Berlin, either on May 5, or on May 6, or on May 7, I went to my place of work, post office 40 near the Lehrter station.

I do not remember when (a day or two later) I saw two male corpses on the railway bridge, which led along the Invalidenstrasse through the access roads of the Lehrter railway station. They lay on the northern pavement, on the side that leads to the Sandkrugbrücke.

On that day, the Russian soldiers who were at the station instructed me and several of my colleagues to go along with them and remove the corpses that I described. One of them was taller. From the military papers that we found with the said corpse, it was clear that this was Dr. Stumpfegger from Hohenlirchen. There was no uniform on the body, only underwear. Documents lay nearby. The other corpse was shorter, dressed in the uniform of the ground forces. However, buttonholes on it

388

did not have. There were no boots. Who these people were remains unknown to us. Wounds, bleeding and damage were not noticeable. I did not notice any signs of decomposition of the bodies. On self-made stretchers, which we brought from the post office, we carried the bodies to the site where the Weigman expedition company is now located. Maybe it existed even then. One Russian soldier showed us exactly the place, and we dug a hole there. On the site stood, as I remember, four trees in a square. There was supposed to be a grave in the center of the square. We started digging. The square was roughly opposite the exit from the firm. Rather closer to the ground. I don't remember what those trees were. Most likely, these were deciduous trees. When digging, we did not stumble upon the roots. I remember that the pit was from half a meter to three-quarters of a meter deep.

Witness Krumnov, during an interrogation by the criminal police on May 17, 1965, on the territory of the Weigman company, pointed to two places, each near a tree. But he was not sure near which trees the grave was dug.

#### 4. Osterhuber/ Müller

During the interrogation of the sons of the accused on 30.3.1965 in Freising (Vol. 16, p. 2827) by the prosecutor Metzner and myself, Gerhard Bormann reported: around 1958, a police officer in Freising drew my attention to the fact that a certain Sebastian Oster - huber (once a criminal officer in Goering's headquarters) said that he knew something about the fate of Bormann. Osterhuber (who is now deceased) claimed to have seen the defendant, after being wounded in the neck, try to swallow a capsule of potassium cyanide. Osterhuber knocked the first capsule out of the defendant's hand, and the defendant swallowed the second capsule without hindrance. Osterhuber allegedly still saw how the accused immediately fell

dead. This police officer was found. His name is Karl Müller and he testified on 19/8/1965 (see Vol. 17, p. 2951):

"Due to the reorganization of the Bavarian State Police, on 29/04/1960 I was transferred to Freising. From that time on I dined regularly at the Hackerbroy in Freising. Sometimes Mr. Sebastian Osterhuber sat at my table. He introduced himself as an air defense commissioner, a former officer. During a conversation with Mr. Osterhuber, I mentioned that the youngest son of Martin Bormann, Gerhard, lives in the hostel in Birkenack. He is a driver. Of course, there was talk about the fate of Martin Bormann. Then Osterhuber said that he knew for sure that Martin Bormann was dead, and he saw his corpse in Berlin. Whether he explained how it happened, I don't remember. It was important to me that Gerhard Bormann would know about Osterhuber's story. He said - let Gerhard Bormann come to him, then he will tell him everything about the death of his father. I informed Gerhard Bormann about this."

On May 22, 1962, Osterhuber died in Freising. He was a police inspector and member of the Imperial Security Service. According to the report of the police adviser Dr. Kisel (Vol. 18, p. 3172 of 12.7.1965), Osterhuber was engaged in Berlin at the end of April 1945 in the government quarter in air defense. In the autumn of 1944 he served in Hungary with the Weesenmeier team (vol. 27, p. 4951). From his documents it is clear that since 1939 he served in the police under the OKW, was captured by Russians on May 2, 1945 and escaped from there in May of the same

of the year.

5. Excavations on July 20/21, 1965. In the spring of 1945, the investigation studied the question of whether



whether there were any excavations at the site "Alpendorf" ("Ulap"). The answer was negative

18, p. 3161). Based on this, and also on the fact that so far not a single report of a living accused has been confirmed, it was decided on July 20 and 21 to carry out excavations at the site indicated by Krumnov. If the excavations had led to the discovery of two skeletons, one larger, the other smaller—Stumpfegger's great stature was known—and to the discovery of fragments of ampullae in the jaws, then there would have been a strong possibility of establishing an identity. True, identification would have been very difficult, since then there were no dental charts of both personalities. But dentists had already been found - the dentist Echtmann and his assistants, who worked for the dentist Dr. Hugo Blaschke, who treated the top of the Reich.

The excavations turned out to be fruitless (Vol. 20, p. 3589 and further p. 3621).

#### D. Notebook of the accused

Immediately after the excavations, the Berlin police received the witness Stelse, who between May 2 and 8, 1945, was walking along Invalidenstrasse on his way to his work at the Solex firm in Heiderstrasse. He stated that he saw two corpses on the bridge wearing only underwear. This he told his colleagues. One of them, discovered by the Stern magazine Bruno Fechtmeier, said that at the place where the two corpses lay, he found a notebook wrapped in wax paper, something like the pocket calendar of the accused. According to the Soviet journalist Bezymensky, this book is in the Soviet Prosecutor General's Office (volume UT, p. 1276). To our request dated 10/13/1971 (volume UP, p. 1347) for a copy, the USSR Foreign Ministry replied in a note verbale that all the documents about Bormann's guilt were in the file of the trial that met in Nuremberg. Competent

Important Soviet authorities have no other materials about Bormann.

The text, which is clearly part of this notebook, was given to us in 1964 by the prosecutor's office of the GDR (Vol. II, pp. 1847-1849). This is a reverse translation (from Russian) into German (Appendix 10). According to witness Fechtmeier, this notebook was in the pocket of a leather coat, which was brought by a French worker from the Solex firm in early May 1945 to the basement of this firm after the actions of a group collecting food nearby. According to the searches of the Stern magazine, it was Maurice Lachoux, a court official now living in Paris. Since Lasha did not want to tell the journalist from Stern about the circumstances of the discovery of the notebook, we turned to the French authorities for legal assistance and asked them to interrogate Lasha - how and where he found the book and whether he undressed the corpse. During the interrogation (Vol. 28, p. 5179) he testified on 27.4.1966 that during his stay in the basement of the Solex he had not heard anything about the leather coat allegedly brought there.

Thus, it remains unclear whether the book was actually in a leather coat. It has only been established that it was found near Invalidenstraße.

#### UT. Further searches in the country and abroad

Since the excavations on July 20/21, 1965 were unsuccessful, and the witnesses Nauman, Schwegerman, Dietrich as part of the aforementioned group managed to escape from Berlin, the investigation continued the search for the accused in the country and abroad, especially since information about the accused continued to flow in the press. In at least 50 cases, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked to double-check the information received from abroad. In addition, there was correspondence with foreign informants, sometimes about

personal meetings were held with them, sometimes they visited the prosecutor's office (for example, Mr. Furloop from Suriname, Gray from England). German diplomatic missions transmitted new information, which was cross-checked on the spot - mostly with a negative outcome. All information was rechecked in special commissions and turned out to be false.

#### 1. Information of Simon Wiesenthal

The opinion that the accused is still alive and in Latin America was greatly helped by an interview with the head of the Documentary Center of the Union of Jewish Victims of Nazism, engineer Simon Wiesenthal in Vienna. One of these interviews was published in the Italian journal Epoca, No. 1029 dated 14.6.1970 (vol. UT, p. 811), according to which the accused was in the German colony of Dribura in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, on the border with Paraguay. The priest of this colony bore the name "Himmler". In a UPI report of 13.3.1968, published in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 15.3 (Vol. VI, p. 913), it was reported that Simon Wiesenthal, in an interview with the Dagens Nyheter, stated that the accused was still alive and his — Wiesenthal — employees tracked down Bormann in the German colony "Waldner" in the southern part of Brazil on the border with Paraguay. Mr. Wiesenthal's other information (especially recently) turned out to be anonymous and frivolous. The interview from the Epoca newspaper was reprinted in the Brazilian magazine O'Cruzeiro. The German embassy in Rio de Janeiro wrote about this on October 9, 1970 (Vol. 33, p. 6287):

Wiesenthal's interview with O'Cruzeiro contains some errors. The place where Bormann allegedly was is actually called Ibiruba. It is located on the border with Argentina and has 4,000 inhabitants. Priest

name is Hummler.

The consul in Ijuí Khonsha told the embassy the following:

- "1. Even before receiving your request, I was talking with my son about Wiesenthal's O'Cruzeiro interview. He considers his data meaningless and unbelievable - MI.
2. A family I know from Ibiruba agrees with this opinion.
3. When visiting Ibiruba, I learned that the priest Hummler sent a written protest to O'Cruzeiro.

To this it is worth adding that he was named Himmler in O'Cruzeiro.

Witness Widwald was interrogated with regard to the UPI report dated 13.8.1968 (volume TU, p. 557). Widwald, who was an informant for the journalist Anton Terry about the "Waldner colony", turned out to be a crook. He admitted that in 1964 he went to South America for the first time with a journalist from Stern. After a series of interviews, we asked Simon Wiesenthal to interrogate what happened on September 29, 1970. Under oath, he gave the following testimony (vol. UP, pp. 965 et seq.):

"It is true that lately I have provided various journalists with information about the imaginary stay of Martin Bormann. At the same time, I only made assumptions about where Bormann could be. In other words: never have I been able to say with certainty about Bormann's stay, although there was some substance in my reports.

The hypothesis about Bormann in the "Waldner camp" is meaningless. I know that these assertions are made by a certain Widwald. I got to know him. His allegations are groundless, so I refused to cooperate with him.

Regarding Gorney's article, I can say that after talking with him, I came to the conclusion that the accused could in 1968 be in the small town of Mareshel Rondon. According to my information, the village of Ibiruba is located nearby. Germans live in both places. In the latter there is a hospital run by Dr. Zeibot. I was told that Dr. Zeibot had performed plastic surgery on the accused. I personally know this informant and trust him. This information seemed so reliable to me that I verbally reported it to the now deceased Attorney General Bauer.

There is no record of this in the files of the late Dr. Bauer (vol. UP, p. 987).

"This summer, I spoke with the Italian journalist Lazzero Ricciotti. This conversation led to the publication in the journal "Epoka" 14/6/1970. Your text of the publication was unfamiliar to me, I just read it. Most of it is based on the conversation, the other part is based on other sources, probably on the dossier with publications about Bormann. Unlike France-Soir, this at least contains my reservations. For the sake of order, I will say that the name of the settlement was transferred incorrectly. This is not Dribura, but Ibiruba. The main difference is that my assumptions are depicted as facts."

## 2. Data of Lev Bezymensky

During the interrogation on September 29, 1970, the witness Wiesenthal handed over copies of the "documents" that served as his basis. Among them was the text of a telegram sent on 22 April 1945 to witness von Hummel, who was then the accused's personal secretary on the Obersalzberg. The text reads:

"Hummel. Obersalzberg.

I agree with the proposed redeployment to the southern Zamorye (Obersee Si).

This copy and other radiograms were handed over to the case by the Soviet journalist Lev A. Bezymensky (see Volume 30, p. 5581). In his book "In the Footsteps of Martin Bormann" (1965), published in the GDR and containing mainly propagandist non-business attacks on the FRG, he cites this radiogram (on p. 254) and adds: "This is a very important document. It reinforces our thesis about the flight to South America."

An investigation carried out as early as 1966 showed that the words "Southern Overseas (Behrsee Sia) actually designate the reserve headquarters of the party chancellery in Steinach Castle in the city of Straubing (PO Box 99). According to the Federal Archives (No. 6/241, Schumacher Foundation/368, see Volume 27, pp. 4975-4980), the word "relocation" must be understood as transportation to South Tyrol, which was testified by witness von Hummel during interrogation 3.5 .1966 (vol. 26, p. 4811).

Thus, Bezymensky's conclusion is erroneous.

## 3. Gehlen data

In the autumn of 1971, retired Lieutenant General Reinhard Gehlen, the last head of the Foreign Forces Department of the East in the General Staff of the Ground Forces, and later the first head of the Federal Intelligence Service, published his memoirs. He mentioned the name of the accused in them. Preliminary press publications stated that the defendant died two years ago in the Soviet Union. During the interrogation on September 21, 1971, the witness Gehlen testified that during the search for the source of the leak, he and Admiral Canaris discussed the name of the accused. Literally, the witness said (vol. MI], pp. 1313, 1314):

"It was only after the appearance of reports concerning Bormann and made before the American authorities that attention began to be paid to the Bormann case. Like me

I remember it was in 1946 or 1947. From a reliable source, I learned that Bormann was accurately identified in a group of Soviet spectators of a sports chronicle shown in East Berlin. These were Soviet functionaries. I should note that this informant could have seen Bormann in person until May 2, 1945. We passed this information on to the American authorities. I should add that no records of this have been made. Written materials in intelligence are regularly destroyed.

After the creation of the Federal Intelligence Service, I had the opportunity to report the Bormann affair to Chancellor Adenauer or Secretary of State Globke. I also learned from a reliable source that the Russians were considering a plan to start a rumor that Hitler was still alive, and use Bormann, who was in Russian hands, as supposedly authorized by Hitler to create a united, national communist Germany. As I remember, the Chancellor decided that there was nothing political in this matter.

you won't reach. Anyway, I remember something like that. Of course, intelligence received many reports about Bormann. I was very skeptical about them, because I doubted the reliability of the sources. Only in the two cases mentioned above I had no doubts.

When I am asked today about the death of the accused, I must say that I never claimed that he died three years ago. I personally can assume that he died after the aforementioned plan for the creation of a national communist Germany arose. I myself never claimed and today I can repeat that I never had reliable information.

Witness Gelen did not name his two sources. We did not consider it necessary to force him to do so. The repeatedly mentioned Soviet journalist Bezymensky, who was accredited in Bonn as a correspondent for the Novoe Vremya magazine, during a conversation in

On September 11, 1971, Bonnet and the investigator remarked about Gehlen's advertised materials that "they can only be commented on satirically" (USH case, p. 1276). On September 12/20, 1971, I noted in my notes that Bezymensky considered Gehlen's version of Bormann to be absolutely false and he could not report anything about the existence of Bormann.

#### 4. Data from Ladislav Farago

At the end of November 1972, Ladislav Farago's sensational series of articles appeared in the Daily Express, which gave the impression that he had collected all the information about Martin Bormann. In two replies, namely 12/4/1972 and 10/1/1973, he stated that he had obtained intelligence reports made for the Argentine President in 1963. He also claimed to have over 200 photographs and a 4-minute film about Bormann. In a conversation on January 10, 1973, which took place after the discovery of the skeletons, I asked questions about the authenticity of his materials. He replied that the Argentine authorities hardly wanted to deceive themselves. Regarding his new book on Nazi leaders, he said that it would contain little about Bormann and would not include material published in the Daily Express. He expressed his willingness to provide copies of documents - Bormann's letters and medical reports from clinics and sanatoriums. We made this request because the investigation file contained indications of two marks on Bormann's body. On January 17, 1973, Farago promised to send his materials immediately and attached a copy from the American Dental Association News magazine with a drawing of the jaw of the accused, made by prof. Reidar Sognaes. The latter was involved in the identification of Hitler's remains and had materials on Bormann's teeth (Appendix 11).

The materials promised by Ladislav Farago are still

not yet received. It is pointless to consider the frivolous information of the Daily Express, since the results of the excavations on December 7/8, 1972 are already available.

UP. Further investigation at the Ulap site in Berlin

##### 1. There were no reburials at the Ulap site.

As mentioned, even before the excavations on July 20/21, 1965, an investigation was underway to see if the bodies were reburied from the Ulap site to the cemeteries. There was no data on this. Nevertheless, all the documentation of the funeral home "Erich Schroedter" for 1945-1946 was collected and reviewed, since this company carried out reburials in the Invalidenstrasse area (houses 63-68); reburials were not established from the Ulap site, although they were made on the other side of the street (at the gate, house 56a), as well as on Alt-Moabit street; those around possible graves. It was suggested that the grave with two bodies dug by Krumnov remained in the same place; most likely because it was not discovered (see Volume 25, p. 4102). Since a certain Horst Schultz repeatedly stated, most recently immediately after the publication of Gehlen in the autumn of 1971, that the accused and Dr. Stumpfegger were buried in the cemetery at 21 Vilshackerstraße, I drew on the documents from this cemetery and asked the firm Schrödter look for materials about reburials. The company did not have such materials. In to-

The documents of the burgomaster of the Tiergarten district (62011-03) also contained no indications of reburials (see volume [X, pp. 1506-1525).

## 2. There were no other graves at the Ulap site

Before the discovery of the skeletons on December 7/8, 1972, information was received that in the last days of the war at the Ulap site, executions of persons arrested in connection with the case on July 20, 1944 and convicted by the "People's Tribunal" took place (vol. 23, pp. 4128 - 4138). This question had to be clarified, since it was necessary to exclude the possibility of finding other burials on the site. Investigative documents 3 R/L/JS 167/60 of the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Regional Court Berlin (volume 11, pp. 229-230 of the special volume "The Finding of the Skeletons") were involved. From the final document of this investigation dated January 13, 1969, which was handed over in accordance with § 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the prosecutor of the Berlin Court of Cassation (volume UP, pp. 129-141), it was established that the first group of those shot on the night of April 23, 1945 (Schleicher, Bonhoefer, Ion, Perels, Nieden, Zirks, Marx and Kinzer) was buried on May 5 or 6 in a funnel at the Dorotheevsky cemetery (Clauzewitzstrasse, 126). The second group shot on the same day (Professor Albrecht Haushofer, von Salviati, Moll, Manzinger, Spele, Yennewein, Zosimov) was buried after 13/5/1945 in a mass grave in the garden of the Small Tiergarten. Thus, the danger of confusing the remains with

turned on.

## UPI. Preparations for new excavations at the Ulap site in Berlin

### 1. Dental diagram of the accused.

By letter dated 15.7.1971 (Vol. VIII, pp. 1236 et seq.) I forwarded to the investigating judge a description of the teeth of the accused, made by the late dentist Hugo Johannes Blaschke for the American investigating authorities in Germany. This description was given

but to me by editor Jochen von Lang of Stern magazine. The original is in the US National Archives. The scheme coincided with the drawing sent to me by Prof. Soggnaes (received 17.1.1973).

### 2. Messages to the police-president of Berlin.

On September 8, 1972 (Vol. 34, p. 3468), editor Jochen von Lang of Stern, who had been interested in the investigation of the accused since 1965 and with whom I had established contact, sent me a copy of the Gagespiegel report from August 13, 1972, which dealt with the proposed construction of a complex of buildings at the Ulap site. Work was supposed to start as early as 1972. However, the tenants of the buildings intended for demolition have not yet left, and the construction requires digging up the entire site. I sent to the Police President of Berlin a photocopy of the floor plan of the site, which has been on our file since 1969 (Vol. IV, p. 504), and asked him to contact the appropriate building department to find out the exact date of commencement of work. These works could be used for new searches. The police president contacted the foreman and alerted him to possible finds, especially skeletons. A promise was received to pay special attention to the excavations.

## IX. Finding skeletons on December 7 and 8, 1972 at the Ulap site in Berlin

On December 8, 1972, at the Ulap site—12 or 15 meters from the 1965 excavation site—two workers preparing to lay the cable discovered two skeletons. Warned by our letter of September 11, 1972, the Berlin criminal police ensured that the foreman was at the site of the discovery of the skeletons from the very beginning. The police searched the excavation site and found skeletons of various sizes. Skeletons are comparatively well

15 Law. No. 665 Bezymensky

were kept. One skull - further No. 1 turned out to be a damaged bulldozer. The skeletons were moved to a nearby morgue. Skull No. 2 dated December 7, 1972 has well-preserved teeth

upper jaw, but the lower jaw was missing many front teeth. In the jaws of both skeletons, as expected (see TR, 5), small glass fragments were found. On December 19, 1972, two teeth from the lower jaw and one tooth from the upper jaw were found in the preserved remains of the earth and bones of skull No. 2. Both teeth fit perfectly to the jaws. On March 12, 1972, a golden bridge (for three teeth) was accidentally found near the place of discovery.

The defendant's son Martin (born 14 April 1930) reported that his father fell off his horse in 1938 or 1939 and broke his collarbone; True, he did not remember whether it was the right one or the left one. The defendant's son Gerhard (born 31 August 1934) also told me that at the beginning of the war in 1939, during a horse ride north of Berlin, he was thrown from his horse and broke his collarbone.

The personal papers of Dr. Stumpfegger (born 11/7/1910) were retrieved from the Berlin Documentation Centre. Among them was an SS medical report dated 11/10/1939 indicating height (190 cm), head volume (58 cm), and skull shape (long). There was also a dental chart, as well as a note by Dr. Stumpfegger about a healed fracture of the left hand in 1923

year.

#### 1. Skull Jaws #1

The jaws of skull no. 1 were examined at the Berlin police clinic. On 4 January 1973, the senior medical adviser, Dr. Machke, drew up a report (see appendix 15) and came - only on the basis of the dental diagram of the skull No. 1 and the dental chart of 1939, i.e. without taking into account other data - to the conclusion:

"Summarizing, we can say that, with the exception of the wisdom tooth, there is a great similarity between the found skull and the archival scheme, and thus the found skull can be considered as belonging to Dr. Sh. with a degree of probability bordering on certainty."

The witness Echtman, who was Dr. Blaschke's dental technician, could not say anything about the treated teeth of this skull. There is no reason to believe that Dr. Stumpfegger was treated by this doctor.

#### 2. Jaws of the skull number 2

And this skull was examined in the Berlin police clinic. On the same day, 4.1.73, Dr. Macchke made an examination of this jaw, using her own scheme, drawn up from skull No. 2, and Dr. Blaschke's scheme (see Appendix No. 16). The review says:

"Summarizing, we can say that despite some possible deviations based on the mistakes of the attending physician, there are great similarities between our description of the skull and the report, and Dr. Identity of Bormann's Jaws and Skull No. 2".

Dentist Echtman, who was presented with Skull No. 2, stated on 12/16/1973:

"About Skull No. 2, I can say that the works found on it were made in the practice of Dr. Blaschke. I mean technical work. We are talking about both bridges and crown.

The material partially used in the work, palapont, is an artificial material from the Kulzer company, which was then in the first stage of development.

I was also shown a chart supposedly made by Dr. Blaschke. I will say that Dr. Blaschke could be wrong

about the bridge with window crowns and that this bridge was located not on the upper, but on the lower jaw. Unequivocally, I can only repeat that the work was done by Dr. Blaschke and

produced by me.

Witness Katharina Heusermann stated on 19 March 1973:

"From April 1936 until May 1, 1945, I was the first assistant to prof. Dr Blaschke. I was his medical and technical assistant. I helped him with the treatment of celebrities, including Martin Bormann. There are no medical documents left about him and other close associates of Hitler.

As far as I can remember, the defendant did not have a removable prosthesis. I don't remember more. They showed me the lower jaw of an intact skull. The bridge from the 2nd to the 5th mandible is a work done by Dr. Blaschke. Both window crowns are typical works by Prof. Blaschke. The other bridge (bottom, 5 to 7) is atypical for Blaschke. I was then shown the upper jaw of the same skull. The gold crown on the wisdom tooth is also the work of Blaschke. She

very elegant.

I don't remember the bridge on the upper jaw. If it is also a window crown, then it may be from Blaschke.

I was shown a dental chart made by Dr. Blaschke from memory. Blaschke forgot to depict the elegant gold crown described above. Then he forgot the bridge on the lower jaw. There is also no bridge indicated by Dr. Macchke. These teeth, subject to periodontal disease, were already loose during their lifetime. The technical work on the jaw was done by Dr. Blaschke. I certainly assisted in these works. But I can't swear that Martin Bormann was meant.

It could be."

An additional bridge found on March 12, 1973 was shown to the dentist Echtman. He stated on 22.3.1973:

"The bridge shown to me is a work from the laboratory of Dr. Blaschke. I will say that I have been working on it. It was one of my first works with Blaschke.

This is 20 carat gold. The missing incisor was replaced with a Pontopine intermediate tooth. Teeth 1 and 2 are Dr. Blaschke's favorite window crowns. Judging by the teeth with crowns, these were teeth affected by periodontal disease.

One has only to put a bridge on the circuit - and they coincide exactly.

Senior Medical Advisor Dr. Riedel of the Berlin Polyclinic, who had worked with Dr. Macchke in the identification of skulls, stated on 13.3.1973:

"The found bridge should be regarded as a missing link for Bormann's skull. If the found part fits into the alveoli 2 and 1, then the circuit will close.

Dentist Dr. Mün from the hospital of the Bundeswehr in Munich, who was asked to comment on whether the bridge fits skull No. 2, gave the following conclusion on 31.3.1973:

"The presented bridge corresponds in size to the skull. The dimensions of the roots of the teeth correspond to the alveoli of the skull. It has been established that the shape and size of the alveoli 12 match the features of the roots of the tooth 12 from the presented bridge.

On the basis of the above coincidences, the presented bridge can be considered as belonging to the skull of M. Bormann."

### 3. Forensic examination of the identification of skeletons

On March 31, 1973, the head of the State Institute of Forensic and Social Medicine, Dr. Spengler, performed a forensic medical examination of the identification of the skeletons (Appendix 17):

a) according to anthropological calculation according to the average values of the bones of both skeletons, which have different sizes, for skeleton No. 1 190 - 194 cm of height is determined, 57 - 59 head volume. The skull is typically "long". These calculations are consistent with the medical certificate (Appendix 14) of Dr. Ludwig Stumpfegger.

For skeleton no. 2, on the basis of the same study, a height of 168-171 cm was obtained, the volume of the head was 55-57 cm. The skull was defined as "round". Height corresponds to the data of the questionnaire SS 170 cm. The volume of the head in this questionnaire is not indicated. It matches the available photographs of the accused (see Appendices 18 and 19);

b) according to X-ray examination by Dr. Scheldgen, there are noticeable changes in the bone of the left hand of skeleton No. 1 (Appendix 20 and 21), which is most likely associated with an old fracture. Thus, they coincide with the fracture described by Dr. Stumpfegger. In skeleton No. 2, macroscopically and on the basis of X-ray examination by Dr. Scheldgen (Appendix 20 and 22), traces of healing of a fracture of the right clavicle in its middle part were determined. This confirms the data of both sons of the accused;

c) since a wart is visible on the forehead of the accused above the left eyebrow in various photos, a corresponding examination of the skull No. 2 was carried out. No noticeable bone damage was found. This does not rule out a bleeding injury to the skin resulting from an accident;

d) when photographing both skulls from a photograph

In the profile of the accused and Dr. Ludwig Stumpfegger, there is a complete coincidence of the forms of the skull and face (Appendix 23 and 24).

#### 4. The result of a forensic medical examination

The expert, on the basis of studies on points a, b, c, but without taking into account the studies of the jaw and other things, came to the conclusion that skeleton No. 1 with a high degree of probability belongs to Dr. Ludwig Stumpfegger.

Regarding skeleton No. 2, the expert came to the conclusion that the skull and the skeleton itself belonged to the accused with a high degree of probability. In the event that the dimensions of skeleton No. 2 determined by the anthropometric method coincide with the height, volume of the head and its shape, and prosthetic technical work on this skull can be verified from the point of view of a dentist, then "the identity of skull No. 2 and skeleton No. 2 ("lesser") with the identity of Martin Bormann can be considered as established with a degree of probability bordering on certainty." These premises, with the exception of the volume of the head, are evident. In addition, there are data given in paragraph [U (1 - 4) and U.

#### 5. Glass shards

Found in both jaws - which was expected according to Oberhuber's testimony (see point IV, 4) - glass shards were examined in the KD=S department of the police president of Berlin. The study showed that the size and thickness of the fragments are the fragments of the ampoule. Potassium cyanide was not found, since it decomposes in air and is easily soluble. Comparative material could not be found. The only ampoule made of artificial material

la, which was found from a private person in Berlin, was a product of private production. However, further searches proved unnecessary. The following testimony was obtained from the chemist Dr. Albert Widmann, a former employee of the Criminal-Technical Institute:

"According to the instructions of our chief, Nebe, "self-destructors" were developed and manufactured. In 1943 - 44 years. they were requested in the amount of 950 pieces to the imperial office for distribution to the highest ranks of the Reich. The filling of the ampoules was supervised by the secretary of crime Zaks. They were sent to the Imperial Chancellery."



"Our boss, Nebe, gave us the task of developing an absolutely reliable means of self-destruction. Tablets with potassium cyanide were rejected from the medical side, since they do not work with a low acid stomach and in diabetics. Therefore, we had to choose other methods. Hydrocyanic acid was chosen as an active agent, 2% oxalic acid was chosen as a stabilizing agent. Therefore, the filler is still considered flawless today. The volume of the filler is one cube. The lethal dose by inhalation, as far as I remember, is 8 mg. Hydrocyanic acid is obtained from commercial sodium cyanide. This work was carried out by the prisoner Dr. Kramer, who was a professional chemist. The production of hydrocyanic acid and the filling of ampoules took place in a small barracks in the Sachsenhausen camp. The observation was conducted by Mr. Sachs and Hauptsturmführer Gerhard Mayer. There were no accidents. In total, 3000 - 4000 ampoules were made. The shape and size of the ampoules matched the size of the preserved shell. Diameter 9 mm, fused length 35 mm. The bottom of the ampoules were flat. Welded end for reinforcement

408

dipped in blue paint. Ampoules tested by vacuum for strength were additionally marked with a red dot.

Spent infantry shells were used to store the self-destructor, from which small shells were made. Their length was 41 mm; covers, 9 mm in size, were also made from sleeves. The total length of the self-destroyer was thus about 46 mm, diameter 11 mm.

We probably received several times 1,000 empty ampoules from military medical stocks. I don't know where the self-destructors sent to the Imperial Chancellery came from."

Witness Hanna Reitsch (see Gerhard Boltt, *The Last Days of the Reich Chancellery*, Hamburg, 1964, p. 122) confirmed Dr. Widmann's information during the interrogation on 20.2.1973. She stated:

"The cases described match the description given by Dr. Widman. I know this because I myself sewed the cartridge case with the ampoule into the lining of my uniform. Then I measured it with my little finger, and then looked how many mm it was. When Hitler gave me the ampoule, he said that I should decide for myself whether to use it. Mr. von Greim asked for a capsule for him and for me. Hitler also said that by doing so we get what all the inhabitants of the bunker have."

Dentist Dr. Kunz, who was in the bunker hospital from 23/4/1945 (see Lev Bezymensky, *The Death of Adolf Hitler*, Hamburg, 1968, pp. 79-84), stated on 21/2/1973:

"I only know the capsules that were in the bunker, but I don't know what the ampoules looked like. Therefore, I cannot say anything about the glass and the shape of the ampoules that were in the bunker. Dr. Widman's testimony was read to me. I can only say that the frau

Goebbels and Eva Braun capsules could well have been made from infantry shells. Length - about 46 mm. I didn't have a capsule.

I don't know if Dr. Stumpfegger had the capsule. Frau Goebbels had a lot of them in his pocket. I am convinced that Dr. Stumpfegger and Frau Goebbels gave poison to Goebbels' children."

The glass shards were examined by Dr. Widman. He could prove that they were all cylindrical and thus could be the remains of a glass ampoule. The bending of the fragments corresponds to the bending of the walls of an ampoule with a diameter of about 9 mm. No fragments with blue paint were found. Therefore, Dr. Widman came to this conclusion:

"To be strict, the found glass fragments are part of an ampoule, the size of which is the same as the self-destructive devices were made. But they were not made for ampoules of a different kind."

Thus, with a probability bordering on certainty, we can say that these fragments were part of the self-destructors. For according to the testimony of Hanna Reich and Dr. Kunz, all the inhabitants of the bunker had the opportunity to receive them. According to the acts of examination of the remains of the Goebbels family and Eva Braun published in Bezymensky's book, fragments of thin-walled ampoules were found in their remains."

## 6. Motives for suicide

About the motives for the suicide of the accused and Dr. Stumpfegger - and it took place, since neither Axman nor Krumnov observed injuries on the bodies, and fragments of glass were found in the jaws - only conjectures can be made. Accused - as established in the course of  
consequences and on the body

grams of the last days - was not going to die. He sought to break through to Doenitz, in northern Germany. Therefore, the situation must have been hopeless, given that both had no combat experience. It must be assumed that it became clear to the accused that he, as the "Secretary of the Fuhrer", would be brought before an allied court and the sentence would be determined.

If Dr. Ludwig Stumpfegger had combat experience, he could assume that he was waiting for him in captivity. He was an SS Obersturmbannführer and Hitler's physician. He could fear that, as a former adjutant of the imperial SS and police doctor, lieutenant general of the SS troops, prof. Karl Gebhardt can be brought to trial for participating in cruel and deadly experiments on concentration camp prisoners, prisoners of war, etc. In addition, he could assume that he would be charged with the death of the Goebbels children.

These are only assumptions about motives, which, however, does not seem superfluous to us.

## X. Plastic facial reconstruction as an additional check

Only as an additional check and in an effort to carry out everything necessary for the identification of the skeletons, the Attorney General of Hesse, Moritz Furtmayr, decided on February 5, 1973 to conduct an examination based on the method of facial plastic reconstruction he himself tested using the skeletons found. Prior to this, Furtmayr had informed the Bavarian Criminal Office on January 29, 1973 that he could develop an impeccable objective examination in this case - and there were already press reports about him and it was not about some unknown person.

In addition, the Bavarian Criminal Office 14.2.1973

reported:

"The method developed by Mr. Furtmayr, which he wants to apply to the examination of both skulls, has received the approval of higher authorities. Mr. Furtmair had the opportunity to test his method on a number of occasions.

Criminalhauptmeister Furtmayr as a specialist in personal identification from cranial reconstructions was also mentioned in the appendix to the letter of the Bavarian Criminal Office No. 40 dated 05.10.1972.

To maintain objectivity, Mr. Furtmayr carried out all the work until 6.3.1972 in his office, being under supervision, excluding the use of available photographs. In addition, he included both skulls in a total series of 5 skulls.

Hauptmeister Furtmayr was not acquainted with the forensic medical examination (except for the press reports about the interview with Dr. Spengler). He was also not given materials from the Documentary Center. The result of plastic reconstruction is contained in the folder with Furtmayr's report dated 28.3.1973, and his conclusion reads:

"Both skulls were included in the series of 5 skulls in order to achieve maximum objectivity of the work. Both plastic reconstructions were subjected to a model study. At the same time, there was no artistic approach, since only the face itself has maximum expressiveness."

This comparative test was carried out on photographic images (skull 2, Martin Bormann; skull 1, Ludwig Stumpfegger) and showed a far-reaching similarity with photographs, which confirms the results of the studies. Of course, this method is still being tested and cannot be compared with fingerprint verification. But the very purpose of the test was achieved.

## XI. Result

Although the possibilities of human knowledge are limited by nature (see the collection of laws, volume 30, pp. 379 - 393, ed. 1962, 1505), it is unconditionally proved that both skeletons found on December 7/8, 1972 at the Ulap site in Berlin belong to the accused Martin Bormann and Dr. Ludwig Stumpfegger.

The accused and Dr. Ludwig Stumpfegger died in the early morning of May 2, 1945—between approximately 1.30 and 2.30—in Berlin.

### HP. Further measures

1. The search for Martin Bormann is finally terminated.
2. An action for dismissal of the case due to the proven death of the accused should then be brought before the appropriate court. Such a judgment is necessary because it is not possible to present the death certificate of the accused.
3. In the appropriate court, the cancellation of the arrest warrant of 4/7/1961 must be requested in order to exclude the possibility of an error in its application to a person bearing the same name.
4. Remuneration is not paid.
5. Notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the result of the investigation in order to cancel the decree of 4.6.1965 (U4-88-537) and replace it with a decree addressed to diplomatic and consular missions that the prosecutor's office at the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt - on the Main no longer accepts messages about the supposedly alive Martin Bormann. These missions must notify their informants of this. After receiving the requested court orders, the skeletons should be handed over to the relatives. However, cremation should not take place,  
as the skeletons  
should remain as a subject of historical research.
6. Report the results to the press in the country and abroad.
7. All acts, investigative acts, special volumes and official documents, after the expiration of the usual storage periods, be transferred to the Hessian State Archives as historically valuable."

Signed: Richter.

## FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

On August 8, 1945, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Government of the United States of America and the Provisional Government of the French Republic entered into an agreement, according to which a Tribunal was established to try the military criminals whose crimes are not associated with a specific geographical location.

In accordance with Article 5, the Governments of the following United Nations states have declared their accession to the agreement: Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, Haiti, New Zealand, India, Venezuela, Uruguay and Paraguay.

The statutes annexed to the agreement determined the organization, jurisdiction and functions of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal has been vested with the power to try and punish persons who have committed crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in the Charter.

The statute also provides that, in the case of any individual member of any group or organization, the Tribunal may (in connection with any act for which that person is convicted)

know that the group or organization of which the defendant was a member was a criminal organization.

On October 18, 1945, in Berlin, in accordance with Article 14 of the Charter, the Indictment was presented to the Tribunal against the above defendants, who were named by the Committee of Chief Prosecutors of the signatory Powers as the main war criminals. A copy of the Indictment in German was given to each defendant who had been imprisoned at least 30 days before the start of the trial.

According to the Indictment, the defendants are charged with committing crimes against peace by planning, preparing, initiating and waging aggressive wars, which are also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and guarantees; war crimes and crimes against humanity. In addition, the defendants are charged with participation in the creation and implementation of a common plan or conspiracy to commit all these crimes.

The Prosecution further requested the Tribunal to declare all of the above groups or organizations criminal in the sense defined by the Charter.

The accused Robert Ley committed suicide in prison on October 25, 1945. On November 15, 1945, the Tribunal ruled that the accused Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was unable to appear before the Court on account of his physical and mental condition, but that the charges against him under the Indictment remained in force and the accused will have to be subsequently brought to trial if his physical and mental condition will allow it.

On November 17, 1945, the Tribunal decided to hear the case of the Defendant Martin Bormann in his absence, in accordance with Article 12 of the Charter.

After discussing the arguments and considering the detailed medical reports and the defendant's own statement | December 1945, the Tribunal decided that the mental state of the defendant Hess was not grounds for postponing the consideration of his case. A similar decision was made in respect of the defendant Streicher.

In accordance with articles 16 and 23 of the Statute, defendants in detention either chose their own defense counsel or, at their request, defense counsel was appointed by the Tribunal.

In connection with the absence of the defendant Bormann, the Tribunal appointed counsel for him, and also appointed defense counsel for the groups or organizations named above.

The process began on November 20, 1945 and was conducted in four languages - English, Russian, French and German. All defendants, except Bormann, pleaded not guilty.

The presentation of evidence and the speeches of the parties ended on 31 August 1946. There were 403 public hearings of the Tribunal. 33 prosecution witnesses gave oral evidence against individual defendants; In addition to 19 defendants, 61 defense witnesses were interrogated. A further 143 defense witnesses testified by submitting written responses to questionnaires. The Tribunal appointed commissioners to take evidence relating to the organizations. 101 defense witnesses testified before the Commissioners, and 1,809 affidavits from other witnesses were produced. Six reports were also submitted summarizing the contents of a large number of other affidavits. 38,000 affidavits, signed by 155,000 people, were presented in the case of political leaders; 136,213 in the SS case; 10 thousand - in the SA case; 7 thousand - in the SD case; 3,000 in the case of the General Staff and the OKW, and 2,000 in the case of the Gestapo.

The Tribunal itself heard 22 witnesses in the case of the organizations. The documents presented as evidence in the prosecution of individual defendants and organizations amount to several thousand. During the trial, a complete verbatim record was made of everything that was said at the Court, as well as an electric sound recording of all meetings of the Tribunal.

Copies of all documents presented as evidence for the prosecution were handed over to the defense in German. The petitions of the defendants to call witnesses and demand documents in some cases caused serious difficulties due to the disorder in the country. It was also necessary to limit the number of witnesses called to the Tribunal in order to ensure a speedy trial in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter. The Tribunal, after considering them, granted all those motions which, in its opinion, were relevant to the defense of any of the defendants or any of the named groups or organizations and were not cumulative. Through the General Secretariat, established by the Tribunal, the possibility of bringing in the witnesses and documents, the requests for the summons and retrieval of which were granted, was made possible.

Much of the evidence presented to the Tribunal by the Prosecution was documentary evidence captured by the Allied armies from German army headquarters, government buildings and other places. Some of the documents were found in salt mines buried in the ground, hidden behind false walls, and in other places that were considered inaccessible from the point of view of finding these documents.

...Bormann Bormann is charged under counts one, three, and four of the Indictment. He will rise

drank to the National Socialist Party in 1925. From 1928 to 1930 he was a member of the senior leadership staff of the SA and from 1933 to 1945 he headed the party aid fund and was a Reichsleiter. From 1933 to 1941 he was chief of staff in the office of the Deputy Fuhrer, and after Hess's flight to England on May 12, 1941 he became the head of the party chancellery, [on April 2, 1943 he became the Fuhrer's secretary. He was politically and organizationally in charge of the Volkssturm and was an SS general.

## CRIMES AGAINST THE WORLD

Bormann was not at first a prominent Nazi, gradually rose to power and, especially in the last days, achieved great influence with Hitler. He took an active part in the party's coming to power and especially in the strengthening of Hitler's power. He spent a lot of time persecuting the church and the Jews in Germany.

There is no evidence that Bormann knew about Hitler's plans to prepare, start or wage aggressive wars. He did not attend any of the most important meetings where Hitler consistently developed his plans for aggression. And it cannot be assumed that the position that he occupied gave him the opportunity to be aware of these plans. It was only when he became the head of the Party Chancellery in 1941 and later, in 1943, the Führer's secretary, that he began to attend many of the meetings held by Hitler, where he

received the necessary access for this due to the position he occupied. According to the view already stated, which the Tribunal has decided to take with regard to the conspiracy to wage aggressive war, the evidence presented is not sufficient to convict Bormann of the first count of the Indictment.

## WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

Bormann, according to the decree of May 29, 1941, accepted the position and powers of Hess; By a decree of January 24, 1942, these powers were expanded, and he received the right to control the implementation of all laws and directives issued by Hitler. Thus, he was responsible for the laws and orders issued from that moment on. | On December 1942, all Gaus were transformed into areas of imperial defense and the Gauleiters of the party, subordinate to Bormann, were appointed commissars of imperial defense. As a result, they actually led the war effort of the entire civilian population. This was the case not only in Germany, but also in those territories that were included in the empire from the occupied and defeated territories.

Through this mechanism, Bormann carried out ruthless exploitation of the subjugated population. By his order of August 12, 1942, he subordinated all party agencies to the implementation of Himmler's program of forced resettlement and Germanization of the population of the occupied countries. Three weeks after the invasion of the Soviet Union, he attended a meeting on 16 July 1941 at Hitler's field headquarters, where Goering, Rosenberg and Keitel were also present; according to Bormann's report, detailed plans for

enslavement and destruction of the population of these territories. On May 8, 1942, he conferred with Hitler and Rosenberg on the question of the forced resettlement of the Dutch in Latvia, as well as on the extermination program in the Soviet Union and the economic exploitation of the eastern territories. He was interested in confiscating art and other property in the East. In a letter dated January 11, 1944, he called for the creation of a huge organization for the export of goods from the occupied territories for the German population affected by the bombing.

Bormann developed an extremely active persecution of Jews not only in Germany, but also in conquered and defeated countries. He took part in the meetings that led to the deportation of 60,000 Jews from Vienna to Poland, in cooperation with the SS and the Gestapo. He signed a decree of 31 May 1941 extending the Nuremberg Laws to the annexed eastern territories. In an order dated October 9, 1942, he declared that the problem of the final elimination of Jews from the territory of great Germany could no longer be resolved by emigration, but only by the use of "brute force" in special camps in the East. On July 1, 1943, he signed a decree depriving the Jews of judicial protection and transferring them exclusively to the jurisdiction of Himmler's Gestapo.

Bormann played a prominent role in the slave labor program. Party leaders exercised oversight of slave labor in their Gaus, including the hiring of workers, their working conditions, their food and quartering. In his circular of May 5, 1943, to the leadership corps, sent up to and including the Ortsgruppenleiter, he gave instructions on the treatment of foreign workers, indicating that they were under the responsibility of the SS for security reasons, and ordered the termination of the previously existing

careful handling of them. A report dated September 4, 1942, concerning the deportation of 500,000 women from the East to Germany to work on private farms, shows that control was to be exercised by Sauckel, Himmler and Bormann. By decree of September 8, Sauckel instructed the Kreisleiters to supervise the distribution and assignment of these women to work.

Bormann also issued a series of orders to party leaders regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. On November 5, 1941, he forbade the burial of Russian prisoners of war in a dignified manner. On November 25, 1943, he instructed the Gauleiters to report cases of mild

treatment of prisoners of war. On September 13, 1944, he ordered the Kreisleiters to liaise with the camp commandants about the use of prisoners of war for forced labor. On January 29, 1943, he handed over to his subordinate leaders the instructions of the OKW, which allowed the use of firearms and corporal punishment on delinquent prisoners of war in violation of the rules of war on land. On September 30, 1944, he signed a decree under which prisoners of war were removed from the jurisdiction of the OKW and transferred to the jurisdiction of Himmler and the SS.

Bormann is responsible for lynching allied airmen. On May 30, 1944, he forbade the police to take any action or initiate criminal proceedings against persons who took part in the lynching of Allied airmen. This was accompanied by a propaganda campaign by Goebbels, inciting the German people to this kind of action. Bormann also attended a meeting on June 6, 1944, where provisions for the use of lynching were discussed.

His lawyer, who had to face a number of difficulties, was unable to refute this evidence. In the face of documents on which it has

Since Bormann's signature, it is difficult to imagine how he could have done this even if the defendant had been present at the Court. Counsel argued that Bormann was dead and that the Tribunal should not have recourse to Article 12 of the Statute, which gives the right to prosecute in the absence of the defendant. But the evidence of death is not conclusive, and the Tribunal, as noted earlier, decided to try him in absentia. If Bormann is alive and subsequently arrested, the Control Council of Germany, in accordance with Article 29 of the Charter, may consider any mitigating circumstances and change or reduce his sentence if he sees fit.

## CONCLUSION

The Tribunal does not find Bormann guilty on counts one, but finds him guilty on counts three and four of the Indictment.

In accordance with the sections of the Indictment under which the defendants were found guilty, and on the basis of Art. 27 of the Charter International Military Tribunal

## SENTENCED:

1. Hermann Wilhelm GOERING - to death by hanging,
2. Rudolf HESS - to life imprisonment,
3. Joachim von RIBBENTROP - to death by hanging,
4. Wilhelm KEITEL - to death through  
hanging,
5. Ernst KALTENBRUNNER - to death by hanging,
6. Alfred ROSENBERG - to death by hanging,
7. Hans FRANK - to death by hanging,
8. Wilhelm FRICK - to death by hanging,.
9. Julius STREICHER - to death by hanging,
10. Walter FUNK - to life imprisonment,

11. Karla DENITSA - to imprisonment for a term of ten years,
12. Erich REDER - to life imprisonment,
13. Baldur von SHIRACH - to twenty years' imprisonment,
14. Fritz SAUCKEL - to death by hanging,
15. Alfred IODL - to death by hanging, ,
16. Arthur SEYSS-INQUART - to death by hanging,
17. Albert SPEER - to twenty years' imprisonment, "
18. Konstantin von NEIRATH - to a prison term of fifteen years,
19. Martin BORMANN - to death by hanging.

Petitions for clemency may be lodged with the Control Council in Germany within four days of the pronouncement of the verdict through the Secretary General of the Tribunal.

The verdict was drawn up in four copies — in Russian, English and German. All texts are authentic and have the same authority.

Members of the International Tribunal: Their deputies:

From the United Kingdom, President Geoffrey LORENCE

Norman BIRKETT

From the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Iona NIKITCHENKO

Alexander VOLCHKOV

For the United States of America Francis BIDDLE John PARKER

For the French Republic Henri DONNEDIER de VABR Robert FALCO

Nuremberg, 1 October 1946

## AUTHOR'S NOTE

The documents published in the book are taken by the author both from the archives and from numerous studies of historians in Russia, Germany, the USA, England, and Israel. The Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Russian Center for the Storage and Research of Documents of Recent History were used. For the documentation of the German side, the archives of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, as well as documents of the Federal Archives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Institute of Contemporary History (Munich) were used.

The book uses numerous conversations of the author with Soviet and German participants in the events of the last period of the Great Patriotic War.

## CONTENT

FROM THE AUTHOR 5

INTRODUCTION How Bormann's notes ended up on Stalin's desk



FEATURE ONE: Owner - Martin Bormann

21

ESSAY TWO: Beginning of the year 1945

44

ESSAY THREE: Martin Bormann and the Russian people

59

ESSAY FOUR: Karl Wolff and Rudolf Hess

98

ESSAY FIVE: Martin Bormann and the "Final Solution"

127

ESSAY SIX: Martin Bormann and the German people

149

ESSAY SEVEN: The Fortress That Wasn't

165

FEATURE EIGHT: It Happened in the Bunker

175

ESSAY NINE: The Beginning of the End

191

ESSAY TEN: Not at all a festive mood

203

ESSAY ONLY ONE: Wolf in a trap

213

ESSAY TWELVE: When Moscow Came to Berlin

229

ESSAY THIRTEEN: Hitler-Bormann's political testament

250

ESSAY FOURTEEN: Death in the afternoon

270

ESSAY FIFTEEN: Final in the final

293

CONTINUED ESSAY: Four reports to Stalin

321

ESSAY SIXTEEN: Smoke or Fire

340

Chronological personal guide to the diary of Martin Bormann 366

Applications 377

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Bormann's diary

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Bormann's diary pages

Martin Bormann, party chief Adolf Hitler and Martin Bormann in front of the NSDAP chancellery and personal secretary of Bormann's house near the Obersalzberg Führer in 1944

Marriage of Martin Bormann and Gerda Buch in 1929. In the back seat next to the newlyweds is Major Walter Buch, the father of the bride. Witness Adolf Hitler next to the driver

Always Behind Hitler's Back (August 20, 1944)

Again next to the Fuhrer

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Hitler's residence "Berghof" near Berchtesgaden. Behind the mountain Obersalzberg

Hitler's first house on the Obersalzberg (1925)

R. Hess - pilot of the First World War

Rudolf Hess

The remains of the Hun I 0 aircraft, on which Rudolf Hess reborn flew to England in May 1941

Hermann Göring and Rudolf Hess in the dock at Nuremberg

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Benito Mussolini and General Wolf

Adolf Hitler April 20, 1945. To the right of the Führer - General Krebs, to the left - Axman

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Gate of death camp (Auschwitz)

Arematorium in Majdanek

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Nazi atrocities in Liepaja

Arrests of Jews in Lemberg

Nazi victims

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General Krebs and staff officer Chuikov

Hitler's adjutants Otto Günde and Heinz Linge

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Mr. SHOSKII

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No. The English Ministry of Foreign Maidens in Light Gray E 364 of 22.2.55 reported to the English envoy in Berne that, according to information from the French representative in the International Red Cross, GUMILER invited the Chairman of the International Red Cross Professor BURACHARDT to meet with him to discuss some issues related to the exchange of funds. According to the information obtained in Stockholm, Pen DERER, the Consul General of the city in Stockholm, in a confidential conversation, arguing about the paregonors of URCKHARDT with GIMILER, revealed that the question of outward drunkards was only a preago and that during the previous conversation with BURKHARDTOY GIVYAER Isl supposedly vyls- (5 the possibility of establishing contact with the English and Americans.

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Merkulov's letter to Molotov

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Hitler's bunker

Bunker layout

Adolf Hitler and Eva Braun

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Hitler's will. Witnesses: Goebbels, Bormann, Burgdorf, Krebs

Remains of Hitler (photo 8 May 1945)

G.K. Zhukov and N. Berzarin in Berlin. Left - General F. Bokov

Potsdam. 1945 On the veranda of the mansion during the conference. Marshal G.K. Zhukov and Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov

Interrogation of Guderian in Nuremberg

Martin Bormann in 1935 after being appointed head of the party chancellery

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